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SUMMARY 
Chapter one is a brief discussion of a few methodological 
premises. 
The second chapter is meant to show (by means of a theoretical 
analysis) the effective macroeconomic relevance of oligopsony in the 
market for credit. This is done by using two models. In the first 
(simplified) model - where the behaviour of the supply function of 
bank credit to industrial firms is captured by a "Cobb-Douglas" 
reduced form - an exogenous decrease in the market power of the 
industrial firms on the credit market increases the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. In the second model, where the banking sector 
behaves consistently with the portfolio allocation theory, the 
results are weakened: it is still true that, apart from extreme 
cases, reductions in the market power of industrial firms in the 
credit markets increase the macroeconomic level of investment and 
affect the monetary policy multiplier, but the sign of the latter 
effect becomes ambiguous and depends on the analytical forms of the 
behavioural functions. Both models, however, show that modifications 
of the market structure in the banking sector have, in general, 
macroeconomic effects. 
The third chapter suggests an interpretation of the phenomenon 
of "securitization" on the basis of Williamson's [1985] contractual 
framework. It is pointed out that in securitized financial systems 
substitutability between securities and intermediated credit is an 
empirically relevant phenomenon that makes the demand for bank 
credit to industry more unstable than the supply. For this purpose, 
a comparative econometric analysis has been performed with British 
and German data, because the two countries had (apart from the 
phenomenon of securitization) many similarities in their regulatory 
systems, as well as in the degree of concentration of their banking 
sectors and in the magnitude of the respective economies, at least 
until German Unification. 
The analytical form of the bank credit supply function is based 
on the "credit view". This specific aspect of the behaviour of banks 
is analyzed in Chapter 4, which contains an empirical analysis 
(performed with Italian data) of the free liquidity ratio for 
commercial banks, interpreted on the basis of the recent literature 
on investment decisions under conditions of investments' 
irreversibility and uncertainty. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the interactions between industrial 
firms and financial intermediaries in a "microeconomic" perspective. 
The focus is on the investment decision, and one of the main 
concerns is to perform a theoretical and empirical analysis on the 
connections between risk, cost of capital and investment decisions. 
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of the firms' 
investment decision based on a theoretical model where the decisions 
concerning investment and the firms' financial structure are taken 
simultaneously. The results are not conclusive, in part because of 
the complexity of the causal links among market structure, 
investment and financing decisions suggested by various 
contributions in finance as well as in industrial economics. 
The study of such causal links is precisely the concern of 
Chapter 6, which contains an analysis of the implications of a few 
alternative hypotheses (based on precise results of the industrial 
economics literature) on the link existing between the cost of 
capital, the market structure and the profit margins. 
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2 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The purpose of the analysis 
Mainstream macroeconomic models do not usually take into 
account the macroeconomic implications of changes in the industrial 
structure of the financial or banking sectors. In addition, 
traditional macroeconomics is not, in general, particularly 
concerned with the analysis of institutions. This study attempts to 
investigate these two issues by means of a few theoretical and 
empirical analyses which are concerned with the interaction between 
industrial firms and financial intermediaries. 
The analysis will have to deal, by definition, with aspects 
that would traditionally be included both in macroeconomics and in 
microeconomics. For this reason, and because particular attention 
will be dedicated to a controversial issue like the macroeconomic 
implications of different institutional environments, a brief 
discussion on the methodological premises of this study is needed, 
although a methodological analysis is well beyond the scope of this 
work. Such a brief discussion will be contained in the next-section, 
while section 3 will briefly describe a few contributions on which 
the present study is based, and section 4 describes how the work 
will be organized in the various chapters. 
2. A few methodological premises 
Dealing with the interactions between banks and industrial 
firms, or with the macroeconomic effects of modifications in the 
market structure, requires a precise choice on the well-known 
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problems of relations between micro and macro theory, of 
microfoundation and use (or not use) of the representative agent as 
an interpretative tool of individual rational behaviour. 
Until the mid-1980s, the neoclassical macroeconomic literature 
regarded Modigliani and Miller's neutrality theorem as an acceptable 
simplifying hypothesis for macroeconomic modeling. Only heterodox 
and post-Keynesian macroeconomic literature regarded the financial 
structure of the firms as non-neutral, and argued that business 
fluctuations could originate from financial market perturbations. On 
the other hand, in finance, even mainstream contributions had 
regarded the optimal financial structure of the firm as a central 
issue, long beforel such an assumption was incorporated in widely 
accepted micro-founded macroeconomic models (like, for instance, in 
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988], Bernanke and Blinder [1988], Bernanke 
and Gertler [1989]). The different aims of economic and financial 
analysis did not justify per se such a relevant difference in the 
valuation of the firms' financial structure. Obviously the 
discrepancy was to be found in a different prior valuation of the 
relevance of market imperfections, but the suspicion that an a 
priori factor might have played a role in this regard, seems to be 
legitimate, as Gertler [1988] argued: 
"The methodological revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s 
also helped shift away the attention from financial factors, in a 
less direct but probably more substantial way. The resulting 
emphasis on individual optimization posed an obstacle". 
(Gertler [1988], p. 565) 
Similar reservations to the mainstream methodology had been 
raised, even more explicitly, by Stiglitz [1991]: 
1 See for example Jensen and Meckling [1976], Leland and Pyle 
[1977], Ross [1977], Myers [1984], Myers and Majluf [1984]. 
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"Economics is, or is supposed to be, an empirical science: how 
could economists' views be so divergent? Were these so-called 
scientists studying the same economy? Were they - or should I say, 
are we - simply ideologues looking for justifications for our 
political biases, or, no less worse, technicians, taking the 
assumptions provided to us by our ideologue brethren, and exploring 
their consequences, trusting that the models we are analyzing bear 
some semblance to the world, because we have been told so by 
others! " 
(Stiglitz [1991], p. 5) 
"Economists have had two responses to such inexplicable phenomena. 
One is to suggest that because we cannot explain them, they do not 
exist. It is as if a biologist, finding it difficult to explain how 
blood can be pumped to the head of a giraffe, were to assume that it 
therefore must have a short neck". 
(Stiglitz, [1991] p. 21) 
Stiglitz' strong criticism of the mainstream methodological 
approach is motivated by an objection on the use of "first 
principles", illustrated, by the way, with an example taken from 
financial economics: 
"Not every piece of research has to begin at the beginning. We 
know that there are good reasons, based on problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, that equity markets may not function 
well. We also have ample empirical evidence that firms make limited 
use of equity markets, and event studies confirm that when they do 
raise additional capital through the issue of equities, stock prices 
are lowered significantly. It thus seems perfectly appropriate for 
macroeconomic studies to begin with the hypothesis that equity 
markets do not function efficiently. For some purposes, it may not 
matter what the precise source of this market failure is. " 
(Stiglitz [1991], p. 10) 
In connection with this point and in support of it, Stiglitz 
mentions the results of Debreu [1974], Mantel [1974] and 
Sonnenschein [1972], [1973], showing that any set of market excess 
demand functions satisfying Wairas' Law can be derived from utility 
maximizing individuals, which means, in other words, that the 
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rationality hypothesis does not put any relevant restriction on the 
observed behaviour2. 
Furthermore, Stiglitz argues that the use of representative 
agents' models seem to contain an intrinsic paradox, since, "when 
all individuals are identical there is no need for trade, and hence 
there are no consequences of the absence of markets" (Stiglitz 
[1991], p. 11). In addition, representative agents' models are not 
suitable for describing problems arising from information 
asymmetries and coordination failures, unless "a particular kind of 
schizophrenia on the part of the representative agent" (ibid) is 
assumed. However, in spite of the wide acceptance of 
micro foundations and representative agents as rigourous bases for 
macromodels, a series of assumptions commonly accepted in the 
microfounded models are pointed out to be "ad hoc". One of them is 
cash in advance, which is "obviously not binding for most 
transactions" (Stiglitz [1991], p. 19-20), while, for what concerns a 
well-known and common requirement for equilibrium to be reached, the 
objection is even more extreme: "What faith do we have that any 
propositions derived in the artificial economy in which individuals 
meet at most only once and there are no intervening financial 
institutions have any validity for our economy? " (ibid). 
2 We might briefly anticipate here that these points made by 
Stiglitz are relevant for the analysis of Chapter 6, on the basis of 
the empirical observations contained in Brioschi, Buzzacchi, Colombo 
[1990], Mayer [1989], [1992], [1993], showing that in the Italian 
financial markets hostile takeovers are extremely rare, not to say 
virtually absent, while the transactions concerning the control and 
the majority shares of a company are usually performed through 
private negotiations among the management of the parties interested 
in the transaction. For this reason it is assumed that the market 
for firms' control is not associated to the market for shares. The 
latter is regarded, in the models of Chapter 6, as a market where 
the firm raises external finance. 
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A more interesting point for its possible connections with 
other (although not explicitly mentioned) methodological approaches 
is made about "inexplicable phenomena", and mainly the "widespread 
phenomena of individuals holding dominated assets". There might not 
be, on the other hand, full agreement on Stiglitz' conclusion that 
"it is hard for any economic theory to explain why [... ] cash 
management accounts, [a financial asset that should "dominate" all 
of the other liquid assets] [... ] did not exist twenty years ago, 
and it is hard for any economic theory to explain why they are not 
even more widespread today" (ibid). In this regard, a very relevant 
interpretative contribution may be provided by Williamson's [1985] 
contractual framework, where the assumption of rationality is not 
eliminated, but substituted with the well-known assumption of 
"bounded rationality" or "intended rationality" , and the concept of 
asset specificity is regarded as the endogenous contractual outcome 
determined by all of the informationally relevant elements (such as 
timing, frequency of transaction, and many other details) affecting 
the decision process of the individuals3. 
of Confronted with the realities of bounded rationality, the 
costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring transactions need 
expressly to be considered. [... ] Transactions that are subject to 
ex post opportunism will benefit if appropriate safeguards can be 
devised ex ante". 
(Williamson [1985], pp. 46-48, also quoted in Chapter 3) 
Williamson's [1985] approach, based on the relevance of 
transaction costs, suggests an interpretation of the behaviour of 
economic agents in terms of contractual relations: the relevance of 
3 on this point, see also Chapter 3, which contains a more detailed 
description and analysis of all the points just mentioned. 
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transaction costs is also implied by those interpretations of the 
Arrow-Debreu model that define commodities not only by physical, 
spatial and time characteristics, but also by those elements of 
environmental uncertainty referred to as the "state of the world". 
In Williamson's view, economies on transaction costs can be 
implemented by assigning transactions to governance structures 
chosen among different institutional alternatives: the "classical 
market contracting" at one extreme, a centralized hierarchical 
organization at the other, and mixed models -of firms and market 
organization in between. In this context, bounded rationality 
contrasts with the traditional approach, which suppresses the role 
of institutions in favour of the interpretations of firms as 
"production functions", or "black boxes". 
In this sense, the "Cash management accounts" mentioned by 
Stiglitz might have appeared only recently and still not have a 
wider diffusion, to the extent that they correspond to a specific 
contractual outcome, responding to precise safeguard needs, 
determined by means of a "bounded rationality" decision process 
where information, planning and calculations are not costless and 
timeless. To the extent that a "time dimension", or even an 
"historical dimension" of the economic processes and phenomena 
becomes possible, such an interpretation might explain the common- 
sense observation of historically-determined or institutionally- 
determined behaviour of individuals and economic systems. 
These last points are relevant for the analysis of Chapter 3, 
which tries to interpret the phenomenon of securitization on the 
basis of Williamson's [1985] approach, and provides a comparative 
empirical analysis meant to show that some institutional factors 
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(namely securitization), have relevant macroeconomic implications 
that should be taken into account in the standard macroeconomic 
studies. 
3. Starting points and general assumptions 
After mentioning all the (well-known) criticisms of mainstream 
methodology, it could be objected that "destroying is easier than 
constructing", or, in other words, that the formulation of even the 
best motivated objection certainly requires less effort than the 
construction of a "positive", consistent and complex methodological 
approach. Hence the need for a brief discussion of the 
methodological criteria that will be illustrated and discussed. 
This work will follow, in general, the methodological approach 
described in Stiglitz [1991], and will interpret individual 
behaviour and the concept of individual rationality following - at 
least in spirit - Williamson [1985]. 
In general, this work will take Stiglitz' criticism on the use 
of first principles: "Hopefully our discipline is a cumulative 
science. Not every piece of research has to begin at the beginning" 
(Stiglitz [1991], p. 10). Following this approach means, for our 
purpose, that some of the models presented in this work will contain 
assumptions that derive from previous results of the related 
literature. The relevant literature and the specific contributions 
that prove such results will be referred to, and briefly described, 
but the results themselves will be regarded as starting points, or 
initial assumptions, and, in this sense, will not need further 
demonstration, provided that the model founded on them does not 
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explicitly violate the hypotheses of the models that proved such 
results. In other words, once a result has been acquired in the 
relevant literature, one should be allowed to investigate the 
implications of the introduction of such results in the hypotheses 
of related models. 
Furthermore, when two or more contrasting assumptions are 
possible on the basis of different pieces of literature, an attempt 
will be made to qualitatively compare how the different kind of 
assumptions (and, possibly, the different kinds of functional links 
associated to them) affect the behaviour of the model being built 
and its results4. Obviously the validity of the conclusions of each 
model is limited by the prior assumptions contained in each 
formalization. However, to the extent that some kinds of standard 
models are widely accepted in the literature (whether or not their 
prior assumptions or their first principles correspond to an 
accurate description of reality), some informational contribution to 
the debate might be obtained by analyzing the effects of introducing 
some non standard assumptions in one of such "popular models". The 
analysis of Chapter 2 is conducted in this spirit: the macroeconomic 
effects of oligopsony in the market for credit are analyzed by 
introducing a simplified (but commonly employed) formalization of 
market concentration on (the demand side of) the market for credit, 
in a very standard banking model, where the behaviour of the 
industrial firms is microfounded. This is done by keeping well in 
mind the above-mentioned criticism. In fact such a strategy of 
analysis, is needed for its counterfactual value: while the effects 
of market power constitute one of the main concerns of industrial 
4 In particular, such a procedure will be relevant for the analysis 
contained in Chapter 6. 
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economics and of some heterodox macroeconomic contributions, they 
tend to be considered irrelevant (or, in any case, are neglected) in 
mainstream macroeconomic analysis. The result of such a situation is 
the fact that macroeconomic irrelevance of modifications in, the 
market structure and in the market concentration are regarded as a 
common modeling rule, and not as implicit assumptions, while the 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of changes in the market 
structure is relegated to heterodox approaches. Therefore, a 
relevant informational contribution could be given by proving that 
even in a standard banking model, including the (microfounded) 
behaviour of industrial firms, changes in the market structure (in 
the case of Chapter 2, on the demand side of the market for credit) 
carry relevant macroeconomic implications. 
In connection with these last points, a particular relevance is 
assumed by Stiglitz' [1991] point on dynamics and adjustment speeds. 
"Any short-run macroeconomic model can be viewed as 'cutting 
into a dynamic process', of saying that some variables adjust more 
rapidly than others. More particularly, it is assumed that the 
present value of certain variables adjusts fully to their 
'equilibrium' values. [... ] Other variables are assumed to adjust, 
but too slowly to worry about for short-run analysis. [... ] It is, 
of course, not obvious that having two categories is an adequate 
simplification; one might want at least to consider three 
categories, in which case one would discuss 'short-short run 
equilibrium', 'short-run equilibrium' and 'long run equilibrium'. 
[... ] What is clear, however, is that much of the macroeconomic 
theory of the past fifty years has made a set of particularly 
unpersuasive implicit assumptions concerning dynamics. " 
(Stiglitz [1991], pp. 31-32) 
Choosing what variables have to be assumed to adjust rapidly or 
slowly entails some prior assumptions. If, on the one hand,, such 
prior assumptions can be well motivated, several examples can be 
made of cases where such prior choices do not depend on a precise 
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observation or hypothesis on the timing of the economic process 
under analysis, but rather on the kind of literature, or on the kind 
of discipline one is dealing with. To give an example pertinent to 
this study (and that will be taken into account in the following 
chapters), there is no particular reason to assume that the 
financial structure is given and exogenous for the investment 
decision of the firm (as is usually assumed by the mainstream 
literature on investment), or that the level of investment is given 
for the, choice of the firm's optimal financial structure. Indeed, 
only very few contributions (and only recently) have regarded the 
problems of firms' investment and financial structure as 
simultaneous. In the case of investment and financial structure, the 
choice of regarding some variables as fixed and other variables as 
adjusting, is not even a matter of speed, but a matter of prior 
assumptions. The same could be said by comparing the industrial 
economics literature on the "deep pocket argument" (Telser [1966], 
Poitervin [1989a]), and on the "limited liability effect" (Brander 
and Lewis [1986], Poitervin [1989b]) - which put into relation 
interactions between the financial structure decision with the 
market strategic interactions and suggests a precise causal link 
between financial decision and market structure - with the financial 
conomics literature concerned with the minimization of the cost of 
capital which ignores any form of interaction with the market 
strategic interactions. 
Relating some industrial economic results (which emphasize the 
relation between the financial decisions and the market power of the 
firms or its particular strategy) with the literature on firm's 
12 
investment and financial structure will be a specific concern of 
this work, in chapters 5 and 6. 
However, the matter becomes even more complicated if one takes 
Stiglitz' [1991] point on the fact that "the economy is always in 
the short run" and "never settles down to the mythical steady 
state", due to the possible presence of "sets of stochastic terms" 
that could constantly drive the economic system away from its 
(hypothetical) equilibrium. Also, if one accepts that the 
behavioural functions might be subject to discontinuous 
modifications in their characteristics, whether such modifications 
are better formalized by a set of stochastic terms or by assuming 
some "exogenous" or discontinuous changes in the analytical forms of 
the functions themselves, it might often be a matter of taste and 
personal preference. In this sense, the modifications of standard 
models by introducing some (non microfounded) specific assumptions 
based on the results of other studies should, in principle, be 
acceptable. 
Given all these open problems, we take Stiglitz' point in 
arguing that the conformity of a theory to the basic qualitative 
facts of the economy should be regarded as a suitable method to 
evaluate a theory. This means also that if a theory "fails to meet 
the test, there is little to be gained from the sophisticated 
testing of one or two of its implications, for in the end [... ] a 
theory must be judged by the consistency of all of its implications 
with the facts" (Stiglitz [1991], pp. 71-72). In Stiglitz' view, the 
expression "all of the implications" (of a theory) means micro- 
predictions as well as macro-predictions, and if even only some of 
the predictions are falsified (in Popper's sense), then the whole 
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theory should be "rejected or, at least, patched up" (ibid). Judging 
a theory on the basis of its ability to qualitatively explain some 
critical facts also means that econometric evidence based on the 
"goodness of fit" should not be regarded as a decisive test of a 
model. This point also takes into account the fact that a good 
empirical specification might be found to be consistent with two or 
more observationally equivalent theoretical explanations. Obviously 
this does not mean that empirical analyses are not important, but 
simply suggests that some healthy awareness of the intrinsic logical 
limitations of these kind of results (which, by the way, will 
constitute a relevant part of the present study) be maintained. 
An example of a theoretical approach that does not make use of 
"the representative agent" and, instead of starting from a priori 
"first principles" starts from empirical observations, is given by 
Bernanke and Blinder's version of the "credit view". Such an 
approach starts form Bernanke's [1983] empirical analysis showing 
that the financial distress in 1929 amplified the effects of the 
great depression, whose intensity and persistence could not have 
been explained only by money market forces. In Bernanke's [1983] 
paper it is shown that in the period 1930-33, almost half of the 
existing American banks failed, and the remaining suffered very 
relevant losses, while the stock market crisis of "Black Friday" 
(which was the initial event" of the crisis) determined an enormous 
increase in the debt burden of the firms. According to Bernanke, the 
banks' distress had an effect on real activity by suppressing the 
financial flows for some categories of firms that did not have 
direct access to spot financial markets and had to rely on financial 
intermediaries. In addition, the drastic increase in the debts of 
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-the industrial companies reduced their ability to obtain finance 
from the intermediaries, who would base their evaluations on the 
riskiness of the customers on indicators of the financial structure. 
According to Bernanke, and differently from what was argued by 
Friedman and Schwartz, the main role in the mechanism of propagation 
of the 1929 crisis would not have been played by perturbations in 
the banks' liabilities (i. e. in money), but rather in the banks' 
assets, and, in particular, by the elimination (or by the drastic 
reduction) of the channels by which finance was injected into the 
real economy. As evidence in support for his thesis, Bernanke shows 
that the liabilities of the failed banks and the spread between the 
interest rate on risky and riskless securities would significantly 
increase the explanatory power of the equations determining the 
level of output. Bernanke [1983] assumes obviously that the 
"perceived" riskiness of the firms borrowing from the banking system 
depends on the firms' financial structure. Such an assumption, which 
is often formalized by introducing a risk premium (defined as a 
function of the leverage ratio) in the interest rate on borrowing is 
contained in the models of investment decision of the firm in 
chapters 5 and 6 5. As mentioned earlier, Bernanke's [1983] is also 
one of the starting points of the well-known Bernanke and Blinder's 
[1988] modification of the IS-LM framework. This model differs from 
the traditional macroeconomic framework by, among other things, 
explicitly introducing the balance constraints of the banks. 
5 Such an assumption, as is well known, can actually be microfounded 
on the basis of an "incentive argument": loosely speaking, the 
higher the leverage ratio, the lower the cost of financial distress 
for the shareholders, and the smaller the incentive to avoid 
financial distress. 
15 
Bb +E+ LS = D(1-z) (1 
where Bb is the quantity of public bonds held by the banks, E the 
free reserves, Ls the credit supplied by the firms, D the deposits, 
t the reserve requirements. The deposits are determined by the 
liquid reserves and by the money multiplier according to the 
following relation: 
-++ 
D(i, y)=m(i)R (2 
Where "D" are the deposits, "y" the aggregate income, "ill the 
interest rate on public bonds, m(i) the money multiplier, "R" the 
liquid reserves. Bernanke and Blinder further assume that the 
portion of banks' assets invested as credit to the industrial firms 
depends positively on the interest rate on loans and negatively on 
the interest rate on public bonds, and is determined by the 
following relation 
LS = 6(r, i)D(1-z) (3 
Hence Bernanke and Blinder solve the equilibrium condition on 
the market for loans with respect to the interest rate on loans r, 
so that "r" is expressed as a function of the liquid reserves "R", 
of the income "y", and on the interest rate on public bonds "i". The 
resulting equation is 
r= 4(i, y, R) (4 
which, substituted into the IS curve, yields: 
y= Y(i, 4(1, y, R)) (5 
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Equation 5 is a modification of the IS curve that contains the 
disturbances and the macroeconomic fluctuations determined by the 
attitude of the banks in their lending decisions. For example, a 
variation in the degree of riskiness attributed by the banks to the 
firms' investments, determines a shift in the "modified IS", which 
is defined by Bernanke and Blinder as the CC curve, i. e. the locus 
of simultaneous equilibrium points on the goods and credit market. 
Such a macroeconomic model seems to be more consistent with the 
sort of "micro foundation" based on Williamson's [1985] contractual 
framework mentioned in the previous section because it allows for a 
larger degree of "asset specificity" by not aggregating all of the 
financial assets in a unique market (like the traditional IS-LM 
model does), which would cause a major loss by failing to capture 
the highly intrinsic contractual difference between the assets 
resulting from a monitoring activity (which contain safeguards 
against "opportunism", in Williamson's terminology) and the assets 
resulting from a spot market. 
Being consistent with most of the theoretical foundations of 
the present analysis, Bernanke and Blinder [1988] play an important 
role in it. First of all, a supply of credit function analogous to 
the one of equation 3 will be used in the comparative empirical 
analysis of Chapter 3, meant to show the macroeconomic relevance of 
some institutional features, namely securitization. Secondly, a test 
for the reliability of the theoretical model by Bernanke and Blinder 
is made in Chapter 4, by empirically studying the behaviour of the 
free liquid reserves of commercial banks. In fact, the free liquid 
reserves (or the free liquidity ratio, as has been done in Chapter 
4) can be interpreted as a "non investment" decision and, in this 
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sense, is expected to react according to the willingness of banks to 
invest: in other words, the free liquid reserves are expected to 
increase when there is an increase in the degree of risk of the 
whole economy perceived by the banks that would reduce the 
willingness of banks to invest. An empirical analysis showing that 
the free liquid reserves (or the free liquidity ratio, which is the 
ratio of the free liquid reserves to the total banks' deposits) are 
positively correlated with some measure of "perceived risk" of the 
whole economy, would be consistent with Bernanke and Blinder's 
[1988] model, and, more generally, with the "credit view". 
4. Structure of the work, 
The analysis of the second chapter is concerned with the 
macroeconomic effects of market concentration in the market for 
credit. The focus in this study is on oligopsony in the banking 
sector, an issue virtually ignored both by the microeconomic and the 
macroeconomic contributions on market power in the financial sector. 
The methodological approach of the second chapter constitutes an 
exception in this study, since it is based on a more standard 
banking model with optimizing industrial firms. The reasons for this 
exception in the methodological approach followed in this work have 
been given at the beginning of section 3, and will be recalled at 
the end of the present section. 
Most of the existing literature on market power and strategic 
interactions in the (supply side of the) market for credit, deals 
with problems of signalling in a game theoretical framework, as in 
the literature concerned with the "deep pocket argument" (Telser 
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[1966], Benoit [1984], Poitervin [1989a]) and the literature 
concerned with the "limited liability effect" (Brander and Lewis 
[1986], Poitervin [1989b]). In the former it is assumed that 
"strong" firms can afford a long-lasting price war because they can 
rely on large financial resources. In the latter, a high level of 
debt is regarded as a pre-commitment for an aggressive policy on the 
goods market. The signalling game of entry deterrence yields as a 
result the optimal financial structure for the incumbent and for the 
entrant. 
Even the rare contributions concerned with the macroeconomic 
effects of variations in the degree of concentration in the banking 
sector (like Vanhoose [1985]) look at the supply side of the credit 
market, i. e. at the effects of market power in the banking sector. 
In particular, Vanhoose [1985] looks at the central bank's ability 
to control monetary aggregates, under different monetary policy 
regimes and regulations (i. e. control of interest rate vs control of 
money supply and lagged reserves accounting vs contemporaneous 
reserves accounting). 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is then to show that variations in the 
degree of oligopsony in the market for credit may affect the 
equilibrium level of investment and the monetary policy multiplier 
in a partial equilibrium model with banks and industrial firms. In 
particular, it will be shown that an increase in the degree of 
oligopsonistic power of the industrial firms reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in a simplified model where the 
supply of credit to the industry is summarized-by a Cobb-Douglas 
function. When the banking sector is described by a more detailed 
and elaborated model with three assets, behaving in accordance with 
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the portfolio allocation theory, the results are weakened, and an 
exogenous increase in the oligopsonistic power of industrial firms 
will increase or reduce the monetary power multiplier depending on 
the analytical form of the various functions chosen, and on the 
different sensitivity of the agents to the interest rates of the 
different assets. The reason why an orthodox banking model with 
optimizing industrial firms has been chosen is very simple: it is 
meant to stress the fact that the implicit assumption of 
macroeconomic irrelevance of changes in the market structure on the 
(demand side of the) credit market - contained in the standard 
macroeconomic approach - might be questioned even by using a 
standard banking model with optimizing industrial firms. In other 
words, the purpose of the second chapter is to provide a framework 
that conceptually "isolates" the market power of industrial firms in 
the credit market and shows its macroeconomic relevance even by 
following the methodological approach of the macroeconomic models 
that normally ignore such issues. 
Chapter 3 looks at the macroeconomic effects of securitization 
and suggests, at the same time, an interpretation of such an 
institutional phenomenon in the light of Williamson [1985]. The 
analysis is again focused on the "demand side" of the market for 
credit and the key point is an institutional aspect connected with 
the size and reputation of big firms operating in securitized 
financial systems: their ability to substitute intermediated credit 
with recourse to the spot credit market. It is argued that 
substitutability between intermediated credit and securities makes 
the demand for bank credit to industry more unstable than the 
relative supply function. This makes it possible to identify and 
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estimate, in a monoequational framework, a supply function of bank 
credit to industry. Since instability of the demand for bank credit 
to industry is a consequence of securitization, the identification 
of a supply function is only possible in a securitized financial 
sector, where substitutability between intermediated credit and 
securities is an empirically relevant phenomenon. In this sense, the 
empirics contained in the third chapter suggest that securitization 
is macroeconomically relevant. Furthermore, the stability of a 
credit supply function might carry some economic policy 
implications, to the extent that stability of a macroeconomic 
function could be regarded as a "relevant" and "informative" 
property. The analytical form of the bank credit supply function is 
based on the theoretical part of the paper by Bernanke and Blinder 
[1988], which puts a strong emphasis on the macroeconomic effects of 
the attitude of banks and their willingness to lend money to the 
firms, affected by the degree of risk of the whole economy, such as 
perceived by the banking system. This specific aspect of the 
behaviour of banks is analyzed in Chapter 4, which contains an 
empirical analysis of the free liquidity ratio for commercial banks. 
The free liquid reserves of commercial banks are regarded as a 
liquid asset associated to the non-investing decision of the bank. 
Such a non-investing decision might be determined by an increase in 
the degree of risk of the whole economy perceived by the banks 
(which is the core of Bernanke and Blinder's [1988] model), and is 
interpreted on the basis of the recent literature on investment 
decisions under conditions of investments' irreversibility and 
uncertainty (for instance, Dixit [1992a], [1992b], Pindyck [1991]). 
This approach assumes the presence of sunk costs (in the specific 
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case of the banks they might be due to "lemon problems" and to the 
monitoring costs), "on-going" uncertainty concerning the 
profitability of future investments (which can only be inferred by 
the agents on the basis of probability calculus and expectations, 
and, in this sense introduce some elements associable to the 
assumption of "bounded rationality"), "relevance of decision timing" 
(in other words, the investment can be delayed, allowing the bank to 
collect all the information affecting investment profitability, 
before committing its resources). The "relevance of decision 
timing", by putting emphasis on the material determination of the 
"intendedly best" procedure, introduces again an element associable 
to the assumption of "bounded rationality", because it describes the 
intended optimization as the choice of a behavioural procedure 
limited by (and relative to) the effective time of choice. 
Furthermore, the "relevance of decision timing" is assimilable to 
the expression "calculus procedure is costly" which is the basis of 
the assumption of bounded rationality. However, the conditions just 
mentioned imply that the investor (i. e., in this case, the bank) has 
to take into account the presence of a positive "value of waiting 
for new information" before investing. In other words, the 
traditional "net present value" rule could be transformed into a 
rule suggesting that an investment should be undertaken if the net 
present value of its cash flow exceeds the purchase and installation 
cost by an amount at least equal to the value of keeping the option 
to invest the same resources elsewhere. In the empirical analysis of 
Chapter 4, the "value of waiting" will be "captured" in the 
estimates by a proxy for the degree of risk of the whole economy 
such as perceived by the banks, introduced in a standard model of 
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the free liquidity ratio for commercial banks. In this sense, the 
empirical analysis of Chapter 4 is meant to provide some evidence in 
favour of the connection between "risk perceived by the banks" and 
"banks' willingness to invest", which is highly relevant and, at the 
same time, exogenously assumed in Bernanke and Blinder [1988]. 
Having said that, the key feature of Bernanke and Blinder 
[1988] - as well as most of the contributions of the macroeconomic 
"credit view" - is the willingness of banks to lend (in general 
affected by the "perceived" degree of risk of the whole economy), 
what about the "microeconomic" level? How does risk affect the cost 
of capital and the investment decision? A fruitful way to approach 
such a problem is, in our opinion, the formalization of a model 
where the decisions concerning the financial structure and the 
investment of the firm are simultaneous. This is precisely the scope 
of Chapter 5, which contains an empirical analysis of the firms' 
investment decision founded on a theoretical model where the 
relevance of the financial structure - based on the assumption of 
asymmetric information - is summarized by the presence of a "risk 
premium" in the cost of borrowing, and other standard assumptions 
taken from models of finance with market imperfections. Although the 
formalization of the investment and financial structure choice as a 
simultaneous decision for the firm determines a significant 
informative contribution and puts the interactions between 
industrial firms and the financial sector in a more general light, 
it increases the degree of complexity of the models under 
consideration. As a consequence, some simplifying assumptions are 
often necessary, for the sake of tractability of the models, at the 
cost of some loss of information. Such losses of information are the 
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main concern of Chapter 6, which contains an analysis of the 
implications of a few alternative hypotheses on the link existing 
between the cost of capital, the market structure and the profit 
margins. All of the alternative hypotheses taken into consideration 
are motivated by precise results of the industrial economics 
literature concerned with the connection between firms' strategic 
interaction and financial factors like the choice of the firm's 
financial structure and the determination of the cost of capital. In 
many parts the analysis is deliberately qualitative, in order to put 
into evidence the qualitative changes in the results determined by 
the different hypotheses. 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains a few conclusive remarks and an 
attempt to assess the informative contributions given by the 
analyses contained in the different chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MONETARY POLICY WITH OLIGOPSONY IN THE MARKET FOR CREDIT. 
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MONETARY POLICY WITH OLIGOPSONY IN THE MARKET FOR CREDIT. 
1. Introduction. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of the 
market power of industrial firms in their relationship with banks. 
The role of banks is still a controversial theoretical issue: 
it has been explained as a response to the financial markets' 
imperfections and incompleteness (Diamond [1984]), which means that 
financial intermediaries would be unnecessary and irrelevant in a 
complete market system ä la Arrow-Debreu. 
Although information asymmetry is certainly a key feature in 
understanding the mechanisms of the market for credit, one cannot 
exclude that market power in itself also affects the cost and supply 
for bank credit. 
The effects of the banks' market structure on monetary policy 
have been analyzed in an important contribution by VanHoose [1985], 
with respect to the effects of market power on the central bank's 
ability to control monetary aggregates, under different monetary 
policy regimes and regulation (i. e. control of interest rate vs 
control of money supply, and lagged reserves accounting vs 
contemporaneous reserves accounting). 
This paper will analyze the effects of oligopsony on the credit 
market, and on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This 
will be done, first in a simplified framework, where the credit 
supply to the (oligopsonistic) industrial firms is described by a 
reduced form of the monetary sector. Secondly, a generalization of 
the analysis will be done by describing in greater detail the 
behaviour of the banking sector. For this purpose the effects of an 
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exogenous modification in the market structure will be introduced in 
a model similar to the one by Hörngren [1985], which is basically a 
model of portfolio allocation ä la Tobin and Brainard [1963]. 
Section 2 contains a simplified model of partial equilibrium 
where the industrial firms are oligopsonistic in the credit market. 
In this over-simplified model, the monetary sector is described by a 
constant elasticity credit supply function whose arguments are the 
(unique) interest rate, and a generic parameter describing monetary 
policy. Within this simplified framework an increase in the degree 
of concentration in the industrial sector (i. e. in our case an 
increase in the oligopsonistic power of industrial firms in the 
credit market) will reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Section 3 contains a model of the banking sector, consistent 
with the portfolio choice theory. In this model, an increase in the 
degree of competition (a reduction in the degree of concentration) 
of the industrial sector on credit market, has an expansive effect, 
increasing the optimal level of the investments of the industrial 
firms. The same model is also employed to attempt an analysis of the 
results of the simplified case of section 2. Those results are no 
longer general because, in a more general framework, variations in 
the market power of industrial firms have an indirect effect on the 
"sensitivity" to the interest rate of the "optimal", level of 
investments of the industrial firms that might have an opposite sign 
to the one of the direct effects. 
Since the attention is here focused on a very specific point 
(namely the oligopsonistic power of industrial firms on the market 
for bank credit), some simplifying assumptions will be made in order 
to "isolate" the interaction between banks and industrial firms from 
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other forms of interactions involving the goods market. In 
particular, while assuming oligopsony on the market for bank credit, 
the goods market will be assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
Such an assumption, apart from simplifying dramatically the 
structure of the model, might describe those institutional contexts 
(relatively frequent in continental Europe) where large industrial 
firms are exposed to international competition in the goods market 
while enjoying some market power in the internal market for credit. 
Such a situation might be determined by the regulatory limitations 
in the banking sectors, concerning investments in foreign assets. 
2. Monetary policy in a simplified model with oligopsonistic 
industrial firms in the credit market. 
In this model the labour market will not be considered. The 
analysis will be focused on the capital market. 
Let us assume that in the market there are N equal enterprises 
producing a unique homogeneous good and using a production process 
whose characteristics may be described by a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
y= g(k) = Bka; with 0<a<1 
where y is output and k the capital (at constant prices) employed by 
the single representative enterprise. Let us assume that the 
enterprises are owned by n firms, each of the same dimension, so 
that N/n is the number of enterprises per firm. We will assume that 
N, the number of enterprises, is fixed, while "n", the number of 
firms, can vary. In this way, letting "n" vary, the scale of the 
economy will not be affected. Only the degree of concentration, or 
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in other words the number of enterprises per firm N/n, will be 
affected. 
Let us also assume that the life of physical capital be one 
period only, so that "k" is both the capital stock of each 
enterprise and the investment of each enterprise, and that the firms 
finance their investment only with borrowed money. We have then 
K= Nk 
where the aggregate stock of capital also corresponds to the 
aggregate level of investments. 
Let us assume that the reduced form of the monetary sector of 
the economy may be described by the following constant elasticity 
credit supply function: 
S(r, 0) = Arß6 
where "A" is a constant, "r" the interest rate on loans granted to 
the enterprises, "ß" the interest rate elasticity of the supply 
function of loans, "8" a generic parameter describing the monetary 
policy such that the higher 8, the more expansive the monetary 
policy. 
In this simplified framework, the effect of the monetary policy 
on investments of industrial firms will be given by: 
dK/dO = d(Nk)/d9. 
In order to verify whether variations in the degree of 
concentration in the industrial sector exert any influence on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, we have to see how dK/d8 varies 
when "n" varies. We have therefore to calculate the derivative of 
dK/d8 with respect to "n". Since N, the number of enterprises, is 
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If this multiplier is positive (given that the multiplier dk/dO of 
the monetary policy is positive, as we will see below), then an 
increase in the degree of competition (decrease in the degree of 
concentration) in the industrial sector in the credit market will 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Let us now analyze the behaviour of the firms. Let us assume, 
on the basis of the scenario pictured in section 1, that the credit 
market can be described by an oligopsony ä la Cournot, while the 
industrial firms operate on perfectly competitive goods markets. The 
problem of the representative firm can be described as: 
N 
max n= . [g(k) - rk] 
n 
N 
s. t. k+ K' = S(r, 9) 
n 
where it is the profit, and K' the capital of all the other firms. 
The constraint of the optimization problem of the firm can be 
rewritten as: 
k= [S(r, 8) - K']n/N 
The following first order conditions can be obtained: 
Sn N 8S(. ) n 
_" 
[(69(k)/6k 
- r) - kl =0 Sr n Sr NJ 
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hence 
8g (k) kN/n 
=r+ 
Sk 6S(. )/6r 
since in equilibrium we have 
S(r, 8) = Nk, 




hence, solving for k: 
r1 




from S(r, 8) = Arß6 = Nk 
we get r= (Nk/AO)1/ß 
substituting for r in (1: 
11 1/(a-1) 
k=r(1+-) (Nk/AO)1/ß] 
L Ba nß 
which, solving for k, determines: 
ß1 
j' 11 ß(a-1)-1 
e 
1-ß(a-1) 
(2 k=I(1+) (N/A)1/ßý 
L Ba nß 
At this point we are able to calculate the monetary policy 
multiplier and its derivative with respect to "n", which gives us 
information on the variation in the effectiveness of monetary policy 
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determined by a variation in the degree of concentration in the 
industrial sector. 
0_ p (ac-1) 
11 ß(a-1)-1 1-ß(a-1) 




d(dk/d6) -ß 1 'j ß(a-1)-1 
2L 
[1+1/(nß)] (N/A)1/ßJ " 
do [ß(a-1)-1] Ba 
-O(a-1) 1-ß(a-1) 
" (1/Ba)(N/A)1/ß [-1/(n2ß)] 0 (4 
From expressions 3 and 4 it is easy to verify that 
dk/d6 >0 and d(dk/dO)/dn >0. 
The first inequality simply shows that an expansionary monetary 
policy (described by an increase in the value 0) increases the level 
of investments of the industrial firms. The second inequality shows 
that the multiplier of the monetary policy is an increasing function 
of "n". This means, in other words, that an increase in the degree 
of competition in the industrial sector will increase (in this 
simplified framework) the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
This is due to the fact that an exogenous increase in the 
degree of competition in the industrial sector (in other words a 
reduction in the oligopsonistic power of the firms in the credit 
market), by reducing the difference existing between marginal 
productivity of capital and interest rate, implies, ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the optimal level of investments of the industrial 
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firms. Such an expansionary effect also causes an increase in the 
absolute value of the monetary policy multiplier. 
We can see from equation 4 that the result does not depend on 
the assumption of decreasing returns to scale in the production 
function, but, it rather depends on the analytical form of the 
credit supply function, although the use of a Cobb-Douglas is common 
in literature, even to describe e credit supply function. 
However, the above result seems to be consistent with the 
empirical evidence supplied by a recent contribution by Gertler and 
Gilchrist [1991] where it is shown that monetary policy has much 
stronger and more significant effects on small firms than large 
firms. 
On the other hand, removing some of the simplifying assumptions 
of the model weakens the results, as we will see in section 3. 
3. A generalization: banking sector and households. 
In this section we extend the framework described in section 2 
by introducing a more elaborate banking sector. 
The model contains a more detailed description of the monetary 
policy, no longer summarized by a generic shift parameter 0 in the 
credit supply function. 
The results obtained in the simplified model of the previous 
section will be weakened because an exogenous variation in the 
degree of competition in the industrial sector modifies the 
sensitivity (with respect to the interest rate) of the industrial 
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firms' optimal level of investment. As in the previous section, we 
will assume that capital only lasts for one period, and corresponds 
to the level of investments. 
The theoretical background for the behaviour of the banking 
sector in our model is provided (apart from a few relevant 
modifications that we are going to introduce) by Hörngren [1985]. As 
earlier mentioned, Hörngren's model is basically a model of banking 
and portfolio allocation ä la Tobin and Brainard [1963]. 
The agents operating in the model are industrial firms, banks, 
monetary authorities and households (unlike in Hörngren [1985], the 
"non-bank" financial intermediaries are not consider here), and all 
variables are expressed in real terms. The industrial sector is 
constituted, as before, by symmetric enterprises, producing the same 
homogeneous good, with a strong-market power with respect to the 
banking system. All the investments of the industrial enterprises 
are financed by loans obtained from banks. We consider a short run 
static partial equilibrium model, i. e. we do not consider the 
feedback from the non-financial variables to the financial sector. 
Following Hörngren [1985] (and most of the literature on banks' 
behaviour), we will assume, for what concerns the financial assets 
demand and supply functions, that the partial derivatives with 
respect to their own interest rates are greater, in absolute values, 
than the cross derivatives. 
3.1 The Monetary Authority 
In this model, given the level of public debt (which is assumed 
to be fixed and exogenous), the monetary authority implements open 
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market operations by purchasing public bonds from households and 
banks. Apart from open market operations, the central bank could use 
another instrument of monetary policy, the level of reserve 
requirements, as in Hörngren. In what follows we will, for 
simplicity, consider only open market operations, since an analysis 
focused on the use of reserve requirements as an instrument of 
monetary policy would give similar results, and open market 
operations are more commonly employed as an instrument of monetary 
policy. 
Let us assume that the characteristics of the economy are such 
that the payments are entirely performed using deposits. The money 
base of the economy is then given by bank reserves. 
Considering that we are dealing with a partial equilibrium 
model, where we neglect the feedback between the real sector and 
wealth, if we neglect the foreign sector, the balance sheet of the 
central bank can be simplified'as follows: 
BC =R (5 
where BC is the amount of public bonds held by the central bank and 
R represents the reserves of the commercial banks. The reserves that 
the commercial banks hold at the central bank include reserve 
requirements and free reserves. The central bank, while varying the 
value of BC, performs open market operations, and controls the money 
base. Therefore the money base, BM, will be equal to BC. The balance 
sheet of the central bank can be regarded as a sort of budget 
constraint, which has to be satisfied ex post, given the behavioural 
relations of the model. 
The public debt BT (exogenous) will be given by 
BT = BP + Bb + BC (6) 
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or, equivalently 
BT = BP + Bb + BM (6' 
where Bb is the quantity of public bonds held by private banks. 
3.2 Households 
This model does not include labour6, but only capital as a 
production factor, owned by households, which receive all the income 
produced. The private sector has a wealth endowment which enters the 
demand functions for financial assets. For simplicity, in the 
absence of the foreign sector, the financial wealth will be equal to 
the public sector debt, which is exogenous and fixed. We will limit 
our analysis to the impact of a variation in the degree of 
concentration in the industrial sector on the optimal level of 
investments, and on the monetary policy multiplier. The financial 
wealth is assumed to be constant. 
Let us assume that households do not lend funds directly to 
industrial firms, but can only choose between investing in public 
bonds or bank deposits. This last assumption (which also appears in 
Hörngren [1985]) is theoretically justifiable by the fact that banks 
enjoy scale economies in collecting information, or by the fact that 
the size of negotiated loans may be large with respect to the 
financial wealth of the single individual). It may be considered as 
an extreme description of those institutional contexts (such as that 
of Japan and continental Europe), where financial funds are 
predominantly intermediated by the banking sector. 
6 We could make a "ceteris paribus" assumption, and imagine that 
the labour is included in the constant "B", which appears in the 
production function y=Bka . 
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We can further assume that the demand for bank deposits of the 
public is given by a "fixed" component, which can be thought of as 
money transactions, and taken as exogenous, and a "variable" 
component which can be thought of as an increasing function of the 
interest rate on deposits and a decreasing function of the interest 
rate on public bonds. If we assume that one period of time passes 
between the moment when the industrial firms obtain the loans and 
the moment when the income determined by the production process is 
available for the households, we can express the "transactions" 
component of money demand as a function of Yt_i 7. Therefore, the 
households' demand for bank deposits can be described as follows: 
DP = C(Yt-1) + DVP(rB, rD, rL, W) i7 
where C(Yt-1) is the "fixed" component of the deposits, which we can 
assume to be exogenous and non-remunerated; DVP(rB, rD, W) is the 
"variable" component, function of the interest rates, DP is the 
total amount of deposits, W the wealth, rB the interest rates on 
public bonds, rD the interest rate on bank deposits, and rL on bank 
loans. 
Consistently with the portfolio allocation theory (and with 
Tobin and Brainard [1963] model, in the version presented by 
Hörngren [1985]) we can now define the other demand functions for 
financial assets and liabilities by the public: 
7 This last assumption is not strictly necessary, since, for the 
purposes of the present paper, it would be equivalent to assuming 
that the "transactionary" component of money demand is exogenous. 
However, it might be more convenient to keep the money demand 
function in this form, (by assuming that the transactionary 
component of the money demand is pre-determined rather than 
exogenous), in order to be aware of the potential extensions of the 
model, once we have taken into account the feedback between the real 
sector and the financial sector by making explicit the link between 
the real income and the process of wealth accumulation. 
39 
+--+ 
BP = BP(rB, rD, rL, W) (demand for public bonds) (8 
-+-+ 
DP = DP(rB, rD, rL, W) (demand for bank deposits) (9 
+-++ 
Ld = Ld(rg, rL, rD, W) (demand for banks' loans by the public) (10 
The budget constraint of the public is: 
W= BP + DP - Ld (11 
as we have said, we will have W= BT 
3.3 The Banking Sector 
The banks finance themselves by issuing deposits. Let us assume 
that the total amount of deposits is given by the sum of (non 
remunerated) current account deposits and (remunerated) saving 
deposits. Let us also assume that the banks are willing to issue any 
quantity of non remunerated deposits demanded by the public. 
Therefore we will have: 
D= Cb + DV. (12 
where Cb is the non remunerated component of bank deposits, DV the 
remunerated one which depends on the interest rates. The remunerated 
component of deposits,. DV are the money market liabilities that 
banks issue in order to provide themselves with loanable funds, 
according to the assumption of "active liability management" 
previously mentioned. 
The funds collected can be invested (once the reserve 
requirement has been satisfied) in loans, (non remunerated) free 
reserves, or public bonds. 
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If, for the sake of simplicity, we neglect the shares, the 
balance constraint of banks is given by: 
LS +R+ Bb =D (13 
LS = supply of credit; 
R= commercial banks' liquid reserves at the central bank; 
D= bank deposits. 
The banks' demand for public bonds will depend positively on the 
interest rate on public bonds, negatively on the interest rate on 
loans (which represent an opportunity cost) and the interest rate on 
time deposits. We have, therefore: 
+-- 
Bb(rB, rD, rL) (14 
Public bonds, unlike loans, can be sold on a spot market. This 
implies that public bonds held by commercial banks can be regarded 
both as a form of portfolio investment and a partially liquid asset, 
to the extent that it is traded on a "spot" market instead of a 
"customer" market. We say "partially" because, although Bb is traded 
on a "spot" market, we cannot exclude, for the sake of generality, 
that it carries some transaction costs. 
On the other hand, we can assume that commercial banks hold 
free (non constrained) liquid reserves for transactionary purposes, 
and in order to be able to satisfy unexpected requests of deposit 
reimbursements by the public. Therefore, since Bb is, for the bank, 
also a liquid asset, we may think that the transaction costs 
associated with Bb could determine some kind of hierarchy in the 
allocation of liquid assets between R and Bb, and we can expect that 
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the opportunity cost of the free liquid reserves might be mainly 
represented by the interest rate on loans. 
The reserves R include the reserve requirements and the free 
liquid reserves. Therefore, if we define: 
qp = reserve requirements coefficient; 
q'= free liquidity ratio of the commercial banks; 
we can write: 
R= q0'D + q'"D = 
= (q0 + q')"D 
We will assume, for simplicity, that q' behaves as follows: 
q' = q'(q0, rL) 
since, assuming some form of "hierarchical" funds allocation between 
the two liquid assets R and Bb (determined by the fact that Bb, 
unlike R, brings some transaction costs), we can regard rL as the 
main opportunity cost for R, and we may regard as negligible the 
effect of the interest rate on public bonds. Furthermore, as it is 
argued in Hörngren [1985], the higher the reserve requirements, the 
more costly it is for the bank to hold free reserves. Considering 
equation 5, we can write: 
BM =R= q(qo, rL)D; (15 
with q= q0 +ql and 0<q<1; 
then: D= BM/q("); 
and defining 
q(. ) = 1/ý(") (16 
we have: 
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D(") = BM"c(") (17 
and, obviously, >18 
In accordance with Hörngren's [1985] "active liability 
management" assumption, the banks issue remunerated time deposits in 
order to provide themselves with loanable funds. The amount of time 
deposits that the banks are willing to issue is then decided 
simultaneously with the supply of credit to the industrial firms. 
This means, that for the purposes of our model, the remunerated 
component of deposits DV, is directly linked to the supply of loans 
by the bank. 
While Hörngren [1985] assumes that (due to the market structure 
of the banking sector) the relevant variable affecting the supply of 
banks' loans and the remunerated deposits is the (constant) spread 
"rL-rD", we will simply assume here that there is a generical 
functional link between the interest rate on bank loans rL and the 
interest rate on ("variable") remunerated deposits rD. In other 
words, we are saying that a functional link rD(rL) exists and is 
determined by the fact that the remunerated deposits are issued by 
the banks in order to provide themselves with loanable funds, given 
8 in a previous version of this paper we assumed 
q= q(rL, rD, rB, q0) 
where rL, is the interest rate on bank loans, rB the interest rate 
on public bonds, and rD the interest rate on deposits. This seems to 
be a less restrictive assumption. However, as will be clear later, 
some additional restrictions had to be taken, in order to obtain a 
bank credit supply function behaving consistently with the portfolio 
allocation theory. In particular, we would have to assume: 
I(Sý/SrB)BMj < l6Bb/8rBl. 
Having made this assumption, the results would be equivalent to 
those of the present model, but the calculations would be more 
complex. 
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the (perfectly competitive) market structure of the banking sector, 
and given the presence of administrative costs for the banks (which 
prevents, in equilibrium, rD and rL to be equal). 
Our assumption is not very different from the one made by 
Hörngren, who, having defined LS((rL-rD), g0) as the supply of banks' 
loans, assumes 
SLS(")/rL =- öLS(")/rD" 
In our case, having defined 
rD = rD(rL) (18 
we assume, for simplicity9 
örL/Srp =1 (18". 
A similar assumption, although slightly more restrictive, is 
found in Modigliani and Papademos [1980] and [1987], where it is 
simply assumed that in a perfectly competitive banking sector, 
neglecting the administrative costs, the equality rD=rL holds. 
For what concerns the nonbank agents, their behaviour functions 
will still include the interest rate rD on "variable" deposits as an 
explanatory variable, but we will have to keep in mind the 
functional link rp = rD(rL). In other words, we will have: 
+--+ 
BP = BP(rB, rD(rL), rL, W) 
-+-+ 
DP = DP(rB, rD(rL), rL, W) 
+-++ 
Ld = Ld(rB, rL, rD(rL), W) 
(demand for public bonds) (8' 
(demand for bank deposits) (9' 
(demand for banks' loans by the 
households) (10' 
For what concerns equations 9 and 10, the sign of the partial 
derivatives with respect to rL is unambiguously defined, if we 
9 The following assumption of equation 18" could actually be 
weakened, but it has been expressed in this form for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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consider that we have assumed that the partial derivative with 
respect to their own interest rate is greater, in absolute value 
than the cross derivatives, and we take into account equation 18". 
For what concerns the banks, we can rewrite equation 17 as 
follows 
D. = BM"-I)(rL) (17' 
Like in Hörngren [1985], we assume that the "variable" 
component of deposits issued by commercial banks depends on the 
profitability of bank loans: 
SD(") 6.1, (") 
_" BM >0 (19 
SrL örL 
In equation 19, the interest rate rD does not appear because the 
bank "recognizes" the link existing between rL and rD, and equation 
19 express the amount of deposits (consistent with the banks' 
maximization of profits and to the unit cost rD of the "variable" 
component of deposits, "linked" to rD) that the banking system is 
willing to issue, given the fact that banks issue remunerated 
deposits only to provide themselves with loanable funds, to be 
supplied on the loans market, remunerated at the rate rL. 
Introducing the functional relation rD(rL) into the banks' 
demand for public bonds does not create any particular problem: 
+-- 
Bb(rB, rD(rL), rL) 
The banks' budget const: 
Bb + LS = [4, (") - l]-BM 
Equality 13' implicitly 
-+++ 
Ls = LS(rB, rL, BM) =[ (rL) 
(14' 
raint can also be written as follows: 
(13'. 
defines the supply of banks loans: 
+- 
- 1]-BM - Bb(rB, rL) (20. 
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Considering equation 20 with equation 10, we can define the 
function S("), which represents the supply of bank credit available 
to the industrial firms: 
-++++-+- 
S(rB, rL, BM") =[ (rL) - l]-BM - Bb(rB, rL) - Ld(rB, rL) (21 
From equation 19, we have oLd/SrL <0. This can be easily 
verified if we look at equation 10', and we consider two assumptions 
that we have made earlier: the first is that the derivatives of the 
demand and supply functions with respect to their own interest rates 
are greater, in absolute value, than the cross derivatives; the 
second is 6rD/8rL=1 10, 
3.4 The Industrial Sector 
The industrial sector has the same characteristics as the one 
described in the simplified model of section 2. The differences lie 
in the behaviour of the banking sector, which is described here by a 
more complex model, instead of being captured by a reduced form, 
like in section 2. 
The optimization problem of the representative enterprise is 
the following: 
max n= (N/n)( f(k) - rLk) 
10 In a previous version of this paper we assumed that the banking 
system only lent to the industrial firms. In this case, equation 21 
would have been simplified as follows: 
-++++- 
S(rB, rL, BM") = ['(rL) - 1]"BM - Bb(rB, rL) 
the result would have been equivalent, but we have preferred to 
remove this restriction and assume that households can borrow from 
the banking sector, since this does not excessively complicate the 
model. 
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s. t. N 
n 
"k+ K' = S(") 
or, equivalently, 
k=( S(") - K') n/N 
where K' is the capital of the remaining n-i firms, S(") is the 
supply of credit (loans supplied by the banking system), it the 
profit, rL the interest rate on the loans to industrial firms. 
Assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied, the 




SS(. ) n 
= L( )- ki =0 n 6k örL N 
hence 
1 kN/n 
6g(k)/6k - rL -=0 
n SS(. )/SrL 
Since, for symmetry, we have S(. ) = Nk, then we can write: 
1 S(. ) 
aBka-1 - rL -= fl(k, rL, n) =0 (22 
n SS(. )/SrL 
or, solving with respect to k: 
11 S(") 1/(a-1) 
k= (rL + )] (23 
Ba n SS(")/örL 
Expressions (22) and (23) are then F. O. C. of the optimization 
problem of the representative firm. They describe the relation 
between the marginal productivity of capital and rL (or, 
equivalently, a relation between k and rL), in a context 
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characterized by oligopsonistic power of industrial firms on the 
market for credit. 
3.5 Equilibrium Conditions 
Since the money base is exogenous, there are three relevant 
financial assets in our model: bank loans, public bonds and bank 
deposits. 
Moreover, we must add condition (22) to the equilibrium 
conditions of the assets markets. Condition (22) defines a relation 
between the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate 
on the loan market, and (given the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital in the production function) a relation between the 
optimal level of investments and the interest rates. It contains the 
information concerning the oligopsonistic power of industrial firms 
in the credit market. Since the market for bank credit is described 
by an oligopsony "ä la Cournot", we cannot properly define a demand 
function for capital, from the industrial firms, but we have an 
optimizing decision taken by the firms simultaneously to the 
decision of the monetary authority concerning the value of the 
monetary policy instrument, given the behaviour functions of the 
agents operating on the assets markets. Therefore the value for k 
chosen by the individual enterprise (and as a consequence the 
aggregate value K= Nk, since in an oligopsony ä la Cournot the 
behaviour of the firms is symmetrical) is the level of investments 
resulting from the F. O. C. of the optimization problem of the firm. k 
can be intuitively thought of as the equilibrium value in the game 
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describing the behaviour of the "n" oligopsonists, given the banks' 
credit supply available to industrial firms. 
In our model we have three markets: loans, deposits and public 
bonds, and three interest rates: rg, rL and rD. Equation (22) 
determines the relation existing between k, rL, and the other 
interest rates which appear in the supply of bank credit. Since the 
(competitive) market structure in the banking sector and the 
assumption of "active liability management" determines rD through 
equation 18, and since W, BT, and yt_i are given, we have actually 
three unknowns: k, rB, rL. 
1 S(. ) 
aBka-1 - rL -=0= fl(k, rL, rB, n, BM) 
n SS(")/SrL 
(22 
Considering that the aggregate investments Nk are equal to the 
banks' credit supply available to the industrial firms S("), we 
obtain the equilibrium condition for the market for bank loans: 
+-+ 
Nk - S(rL, rB, BM) = f2(k, rL, rB, BM) =0 (24 
Considering equations 14', 8, and 6, we obtain the condition of 
equilibrium on the market for public bonds: 
+-+-+ 
Bb(rB, rL) + BP(rB, rL, W) + BM - BT = f3(rL, rB, BM) =0 (25 
Combining equations 9' and 17' we obtain the equilibrium conditions 
for bank deposits: 
-+-+++ 
DP(rB, rD(rL), rL, W) - D(rL, BM) = f4(rL, rB, BM) =0 (26 
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Condition (22) is "microeconomic", since it is obtained from 
the F. O. C. of the optimization problem for the industrial firm. 
Equations (24), (25) and (26) are, on the contrary, "macroeconomic" 
conditions. 
Given equation 11, defining the wealth constraint of the 
private sector, equation 5, defining the budget constraint of the 
central bank, and equation 6', one can see, after doing some 
substitutions, that equations 25 and 26 are not independent. We will 
therefore drop equation 26, and we will work on consider only the 
remaining three. 
3.6 Comparative Statics 
We must now first analyze the effects of a variation of the 
exogenous variables BM and "n" (money base and number of 
oligopsonistic firms in the market) on the endogenous variables of 
the system. Then, after calculating the value of the monetary policy 
multiplier dk/dBM, we can see how a variation in "n" affects this 
multiplier, taking into account the direct effects of a variation of 
"n" on the money multiplier dk/dBM, as well as the "indirect" 
effects, induced through a modification (induced by a variation in 
"n") in the equilibrium levels of the interest rates, and in the 
higher order derivatives of the functions relevant for the 
comparative statics. 
Assuming that the vector function F (composed of the four 
functions fl, f2, f3, f4) satisfies the conditions of the implicit 
function theorem, we may implement a comparative static analysis 
considering the effects of a variation in the monetary policy 
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instrument BM and in the number of firms "n", on the endogenous 
variables of the system. We consider equations 22,24,25, and 
differentiating them at the equilibrium we get the following system: 
6fl 6fl 6fl 6fl 6fl 
dk -- 
6k SrL SrB OBM ön 
dBM 
öf2 6f2 8f2 6f2 
drL = -0 
Sk örL 8r13 SBM 
do 
6f3 öf3 6f3 
0 drB -0 
SrL SrB ÖBM 
(27 
We assume that system 27 is stable; the appendix contains the 
algebraic details concerning system 27, and an explanation of the 
signs of all the relevant partial derivatives. Let us define A the 
matrix on the left hand side of system 27, , 
(-1 the determinant of the 
matrix A, and aij the element of matrix A placed in the i-th row and 
j-th column. We have then: 
+- 
1 '5f 3' +- 
drH/dn = 
[- ] 
a21 a32 >0 (28 
fý, Sn 
+- 
1r sfl ++ 
drL/dn = {- L- 
] 
a21 a33 }>0 (29 
ön 










Inequality 30 is true because we have assumed that the 
derivatives with respect to their own interest rates are greater, in 
absolute value, than the cross derivatives. As shown in the 
appendix, this implies that 
1a221 > ja231 and 1a331 > 1a321 
In the appendix it is also shown, given our assumptions, that J1. > 
0. 
Form 28,29 and 30, that an exogenous increase of the degree of 
competition (a reduction of the degree of concentration) in the 
industrial sector increases the interest rate on loans, public bonds 
and the optimal level of investments for the industrial firms. This 
happens because a reduction in the degree of concentration in the 
industrial sector, reducing the spread between marginal productivity 
of capital and interest rate on loans, leads to an expansionary 
effect. 
Let us now consider the effect of monetary policy. 
1-+++-+ 
drL/dBM = {[a11(ß(")-1)a33 l+ [a13 a21 (-1)] - [all 823 (-1)]+ 
+++ 
öfl 





drB/dBM = ([all a22 (-1)] + 
[- ] 
a21 a32 + 
SBM 






a22 a33 + [a12 a23 (-1)] + 
, 
L1, L SBMJ 
+-+--+ 
+ [a13 (ý(")-1) a32 ]- [a13 a22 (-1)] - [a12 ('(")-1) a33] + 
öfl 
C SBM a23 832 } (33 
The sign of 33 is uncertain. When 33 is negative, the monetary 
policy will have perverse effects, i. e. and increase in the money 
base will reduce the level of investments instead of increasing it. 
The monetary policy will not have perverse effects when the positive 
addenda of 33 are greater than the absolute value of the negative 
addenda, i. e. when: 









a22 a33 + a13 (ý(")-1) a32 + a13 a22 (34 
SBM 
At this point, the most obvious strategy would be to perform 
the analysis for two different cases: effective and perverse 
monetary policy. However, if the monetary policy has perverse 
effects (i. e. if condition 34 is not met), it seems to be quite 
pointless to investigate how and wether market structure affects it, 
because, in any case, a monetary policy with perverse effects is not 
advisable. Therefore, in what follows, the analysis will be 
implemented only for the case of monetary policy effectiveness, 
i. e., when condition 34 is true. 
This means that Sk/SBM > 0, i. e., the multiplier of monetary 
policy 33 is positive. 
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Now let us analyze the effects on the monetary policy 
multiplier of an exogenous increase in the degree of competition 
(decrease in the degree of concentration) in the industrial sector. 
Differentiating equation (33) with respect to "n" we get the 
following expression, which will be positive when an increase in the 
number of industrial firms (keeping constant the number of 
enterprises) increases the effectiveness of monetary policy. Having 




a22 a33 + [a12 a23 (-1)] + 
sBM 
+ [a13 (ý(")-l) a32 ]- [a13 a22 (-1)] - [a12 ('(")-1) a33] + 
r Sfl 




" Jl -" Al 
do do 
d(dk/dBM)/dn = (36 
J2 
We can see in the appendix that dJ /dn < 0. If, as we assumed 
earlier dk/dBM > 0, then we also have Al > 0. The expression 
-(dJ /dn) " Al, the second addendum at the numerator of expression 
36, is therefore positive. For what concerns the first addendum, we 
have (see appendix for algebraic details): 
/\/ 
-+ 










/ \ /\ 
+i 
84(") drL +-- 





- (6a12/8n)(ýt(")-1)a33 - (6a12/6n) a23 + (8a13/6n) a22 (37 
Therefore, defining: 
ED = (1/ a) 
S [- 6f lJ 
(a22 a33-a23 a32) >0 (38 
Sn 6BM 
ö öfl drB 
EB = (1/J. ) 
[- ] 
(a22 a33-a23 a32) <0 (39 
örB ÖBM do 
8-1)( ") drL 
EL = (1/J) (a13 a32-a12 a33) >0 (41 
SrL do 
ES=(1/11)[(6a13/6n)(, D(")-1)x32 - (6a12/6n)(4ý(")-1)a33-(6a12/6n) a23+ 
+ (6a13/6n) a22 
] 
(42 
gJ. _ (1/J_ý, 2) [(dl- /dn)"Al] >0 (43 
we will have: 
d(dk/dBM)/dn = ED + EB + EL + ES + EJ_ý, (44. 
The sign of ES (from definition 42) is uncertain, while the 
signs of ED, EB, EL, EZ, are unambiguously determined. Equation 44 
tells us that the effect of an exogenous increase in the number of 
industrial firms (decrease in the degree of concentration) on the 
monetary policy multiplier dk/dBM can be decomposed into five parts. 
EB and EL can be intuitively thought of as the effect on dk/dBM 
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induced through a variation in the equilibrium level of rL and rB, 
originated by an increase in n. ED can be thought of as a direct 
effect on the multiplier dk/dBM of a variation in n, comparable to 
the one considered in the simplified case of section 2. Eft is the 
effect of a variation of n on the determinant of matrix "A", on the 
left hand side of system 27. ES is, like ELF, a "structural" effect 
of a variation in n. I call them "structural" because they can be 
intuitively thought of as variations (due to a change in "n") in the 
system "sensitivity" to monetary policy and market perturbations. 
For example, ES contains the effects, induced by a variation of "n", 
on the marginal productivity of capital, due to the fact that a 
variation in "n", by changing the equlibrium level of "k", changes 
the point of the production function chosen by each enterprise. ES 
also contains the effects of a variation of "n" on the elasticity of 
the slope of the credit supply function, since, a different point on 
the function S(. ) is "picked up" by the firms, again due to a 
modification of "n". EJ contains analogous effects, taking the form 
of modifications in the determinant of matrix "A" on the left hand 
side of the equality of system (27. 
In other words, the direct effect on dk/dBM of an increase in 
n, also brings some market perturbations (i. e. effects on the 
equilibrium values of the interest rates and other variables, as 
well as variations in the "sensitivity" of the system to market 
signals). 
As we can see from equations and definitions 37,38,39,40, 
41,42, and 43, ED, EJL and EL are positive, ED is negative, and ES 
has an uncertain sign. Obviously, an increase in the degree of 
competition (reduction in the degree of concentration) in the 
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industrial sector, will increase the effectiveness of monetary 
policy on the level of investments if the positive effects prevail 
over the negative ones. 
However, we can conclude that, in general, a change in the 
oligopsonistic power of industrial firms on credit market should 
affect the effectiveness of the monetary policy, except in the very 
particular and extreme case where the negative elements of 
multiplier (44) exactly compensate the positive ones. 
4. Conclusions. 
The models presented in this paper described an economy 
characterized by industrial firms oligopsonistic in the market for 
credit. Some effects of an exogenous variation of the market power 
of the industrial firms have been analyzed using two models. In the 
first one, the behaviour of the monetary sector is captured by a 
supply function of bank credit to the industrial firms, which 
depends positively on the (unique) interest rate, and on a generic 
parameter 0, whose value is bigger the more expansionary the 
monetary policy. In this simplified case, an increase in the degree 
of competition in the industrial sector (decrease in the degree of 
concentration) increases the effectiveness of monetary policy. This 
happens because an increase in the degree of competition, reducing 
the existing spread between marginal productivity of capital and 
interest rate on the credit market, creates an expansionary effect. 
The model of section 3 attempts to generalize the analysis of 
section 2, and describes the behaviour of the banking sector in 
accordance with the portfolio allocation theory. Having introduced 
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into the model a banking system and- other agents allocating their 
wealth according to the portfolio allocation theory, weakens the 
results of section two. 
However, a first result is that, in general, an exogenous 
change in the market power of industrial firms on credit market 
indeed affects the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The 
direct effect (defined as "ED") of an exogenous increase in "n" 
(i. e. an increase in the degree of competition) is positive and 
analogous to the one considered in the simplified case. Some 
ambiguity appears in considering the sign of the indirect effects. 
The indirect effect induced through the equilibrium value of 
the interest rate on bank loans rL (defined as EL) is still 
positive. The indirect effect (again of an increase in the number of 
industrial firms) on the monetary policy multiplier 37 induced 
through the equilibrium level of rB is negative, and the effect on 
the system "sensitiveness" to market signals, (mainly determined by 
the reciprocal interactions of several agents allocating their 
wealth among several assets, and represented by ES + EJ.,, ) has an 
uncertain sign. However, in this model, a situation of irrelevance 
of the degree of concentration in the industrial sector on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy can only happen in the 
very extreme and particular case where the opposite effects 
affecting the monetary policy multiplier exactly compensate one 
another. 
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Appendix 
System 27 is obtained by differentiating at the equilibrium 
functions fl, f2, and f3. We consider then linear approximations of 
the functions fl, f2, and f3. This implies that the second 
derivatives of the behavioural functions are null. We also assume 
that the generical derivative Sfi/SrLSrB is null. 
öfl 6 S(-) r 
(1/n)" _ 
6BM 6BML SS(")/örL 
84, (") SBb SLd St( .) 
[ý(")-1]"L "BM -- 
]- 
[BM(41, (")-1)-Bb-Ld] 
1 SrL SrL SrL SrL 
">0 
n rSý(") SB SL 2 
"I "BM -- LSrL SrL SrL 
6f2 




Sfl 1 S(. ) 
<0 
Sn n2 SS(. )/SrL 
Sfl 
= a(a-1)Bka-2 = all <0 
Sk 
hfl 1 S(-) 
-1 -S /SrL ; 
SrL n 8S(. )/6rL 





where E= [öS(. )/örL][rL/S(. )] is the credit supply elasticity with 





is the elasticity of the slope of the same function; but since we 
are considering linear approximations of the functions at the 
equilibrium, we will have E=0, hence: 
öfl 1 
_ -1 -= a12 <0 
SrL n 
For what concerns the remaining signs, we will have: 
Sf1 6S(. )/rB 
=-= a13 >0 
örB öS(. )/SrL n 
6f2 
=N a21 >0 
6k 
6f2 
SS(. )/SrL = a22 <0 
SrL 
öf2 
SS(. )/SrB = a23 >0 
SrB 
Sf3 
= a31 = 0. 
6k 
6f3 
= SBb/SrL + 6Bp/8rL = a32 <0 
örL 
Sf3 
= SBb/örB + SBP/örB = a33 >0 
SrB 
Therefore, the sign pattern of matrix A on the left hand side of 




the determinant of the matrix A is: 
--+++--++-+- 
3= (all a22 a33) +(a13 a21 a32)-(a12 a21 a33)-(all a23 a32) 
Since we assumed that in each demand or supply function the 
derivatives with respect to their own interest rate are bigger, in 
absolute value, than the cross derivatives, we have: 
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Ja22J > ja231 ; 1a331 > Ja321 
and 1a121 > ja131; 
which implies fam. > 0. 
In addition we have: 
8a12/6n = n-2 > 0; 
SS(")/örg 
6a13/6n = n-2" < 0; 
SS(")/SrL 
d(cD(")-1)/dn = (S-t(")/örL)"(drL/dn) 
d_ oft 1_S [_ 8f1 16 6f1 ] drB ö_ 6f1 drL 
do SBM Sn öBM 
+ 














/8rL)BM+(_oBb/8rL)+(_ýLd/ýrL)]_2[(8/8rL)(8S( . )/ýrL)+ 6888SrL 
6BM 






. {(64/6rL)[(6Bb/8rB) + (6Ld/6rB)3) >0 
At this point we are enabled to calculate dAl/dn and d, L1. /dn, which 
appears at the numerator of equation 36. 
(-1)n-2[(4(")-1)(8S(")/6rL) + (8(P/6rL)"(S("))] 
dAl/dn = 





"(a22 a33-a23 a32) + 
[(S, D/SrL)"BM + (-8Bb/8rL)+(-6Ld/8rL)l2 
SP drL 8S(")/6rB 
" (-t-1) "(a22 a33-a23 832) + 
SrL do 
(a13 a32-812 a33)+(n-2) 
SS(")/örL 




Sall dk 6a13 8a12 
dL-\, /dn = (a22 a33-a23 a32)+ (a21 a32)- (a21 a33)" 
6k do on On 
Since we assumed that in each demand or supply function the 
derivatives with respect to their own interest rate are bigger, in 
absolute value, than the cross derivatives, we have: 
6a12_ Sa13 
> and ßa331 > ja321 
on ön 
which implies dL\, /dn < 0. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAPITAL MARKETS' SOPHISTICATION AND BANK LENDING: AN INTERPRETATION 
IN THE SPIRIT OF 0. WILLIAMSON (1985) AND AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
*I am very grateful to Keith Cowling, Norman Ireland, Giovanni 
Amisano and David Vanhoose for helpful comments. I am obviously the 
only one responsible for any mistakes that might be found and for 
the views expressed here. 
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CAPITAL MARKETS' SOPHISTICATION AND BANK LENDING: AN INTERPRETATION 
IN THE SPIRIT OF O. WILLIAMSON (1985) AND AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
1. Introduction. 
In this chapter it is argued that the distinction made in some 
"institutional" analyses between "securitized" and "non securitized" 
financial sectors is more than a purely theoretical classification 
and may indeed carry some macroeconomic implications, empirically 
detectable, for what concerns the behaviour of the credit supply to 
industry. For this purpose, some empirical analysis will be 
implemented to show how the different behaviour of bank credit to 
industry in two different institutional contexts could be 
interpreted in the light of Williamson's [1985] contractual 
relations framework. 
While in most countries the most relevant source of finance is 
provided by profits retentions, it is well known that stock and bond 
markets are relevant sources of financial funds for the industrial 
firms in the U. S. and in the U. K. only. In continental Europe, the 
source of external finance is predominantly provided by the banking 
system. 
A distinction is made between the countries whose financial 
sectors are "intermediaries oriented" and the ones whose financial 
sectors are "securitized" is made by, among others, Rybczynski 
[1984]. While Japan is often quoted as a typical example of non- 
securitized financial system, the distincion between securitized and 
non-securitized financial systems, might be informative for a few 
European countries. Gardener [1991], following Rybczynsky's 
classification, argues that the United Kingdom is, at the moment, in 
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the phase of -"securitization", France and Germany are approaching 
it, while Italy is only entering an intermediate stage of gradual 
development of financial markets. The reason for such an evolution 
could lie in the increasing efficiency of markets and in their 
increasing capacity for risk bearing. -Similar analyses have been 
made by Frankel and Montgomery [1991] and Mayer [1992]. The latter 
also points out that in the German "non-securitized" financial 
sector (unlike in the British "securitized" one) hostile takeovers 
are a very rare phenomenon. This fact, due to a higher dispersion of 
share ownership in the "securitized" financial sectors, suggests 
that in non securitized financial sectors the connection between 
market for shares and market for control could be less direct and 
less straightforward. 
Outside Europe, the most significant example of "securitized" 
financial sector is the United States, while Japan is an often- 
quoted example of a financial system strongly oriented towards 
intermediaries. The impressive economic growth of Japan and Germany 
in the last decades shows that no value judgement-may be associated 
to the concept of "securitization". In the "intermediary-oriented" 
financial systems, a direct control on bank credit by the government 
authorities is, theoretically speaking, feasible (although not 
necessarily advisable), and constitutes an historically relevant 
experience. 
In what follows, Williamson's [1985] contract relations 
framework will be adopted in order to interpret the existence and 
development of securitized and non-securitized financial systems. A 
description of Williamson's approach and its implications are 
explained in section 2. Sections 3 and 4 contain an empirical 
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analysis of the implications of the two different financial systems. 
In particular, it will be argued that the phenomenon of 
securitization can make the demand for bank credit by industrial 
firms more unstable than the supply. Empirical evidence in favour of 
this last point will be provided by an analysis based on British and 
German data. Section 5 contains the conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. 
2 An interpretation of securitization based on 0. Williamson's 
[1985] contractual relations framework. 
Williamson's [1985] approach, based on the relevance of 
transaction costs, suggests an interpretation of the behaviour of 
economic agents in terms of contractual relations: the relevance of 
transaction costs (that Williamson defines - by quoting Arrow - as 
the "costs of running the economic system") is also implied by those 
interpretations of the Arrow-Debreu model defining commodities not 
only by physical, spatial, and time characteristics, but also by 
those elements of environmental uncertainty referred to as the 
"state of the world". 
Economies on transaction costs can be implemented by assigning 
transactions to governance structures chosen among different 
institutional alternatives: the "classical market contracting" at 
one extreme, a centralized hierarchical organization at the opposite 
side, and mixed models of firm and market organization in between. 
In this context a relevant role is played by the assumption of 
"bounded rationality" and the analysis of agents' opportunistic 
behaviour. The relevance of bounded rationality contrasts with the 
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traditional approach which suppresses the role of institutions in 
favour of the interpretations of firms as "production functions", or 
"black boxes". In Williamson's words: 
"Confronted with the realities of bounded rationality, the 
costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring transactions need 
expressly to be considered. ... Transactions that are subject to ex 
post opportunism will benefit if appropriate safeguards can be 
devised ex ante. " 
(Williamson [1985], pp. 46-48). 
In such a context, "asset specificity" is a conceptual tool that 
contains many informationally relevant elements (such as the 
frequency of the transaction) for the decision process described by 
the bounded rationality approach. In a context of unbounded 
rationality, contracts would determine a world of planning. On the 
other hand, in a world with transaction costs, 
"the organizational imperative that emerges ... is this: 
organize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism. Such a statement supports a different and larger 
conception of the economic problem than does the imperative 
'Maximize profits'!. " 
(Williamson, cit. p. 32). 
In what follows the theoretical contracting schema presented in 
Williamson [1985] will be applied to bank credit. Instead of the 
"supply for a commodity", the "supply for financial funds" will be 
used, instead of the "general purpose technology", a "spot market 
for financial funds" will be used, and instead of Williamson's 
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"transaction specific asset", the credit supplied by the bank to the 
specific firm will be usedll . 








\/ P2 > P3 
s>0 \ 
P3 
C FIGURE 1. 
Referring to figure 1, if one defines "k" as a measure of 
transaction-specific sunk cost for collecting information about 
borrowers' riskiness (the correspondent of Williamson's transaction 
specific assets), financial funds may be supplied on a bonds market, 
or intermediated and supplied by the banks. Banks can be thought of 
as agencies specialized in performing economies of scale in 
11 Such a definition shows some similarity with Okun's [1981] 
distinction between "auction markets" and "customer markets". 
According to Okun, in the latter, the kind of contract ties together 
particular sellers to particular buyers (in our case, particular 
financial intermediaries to particular firms), creating a sort of 
long-run relationship where the quantities (in our case the 
financial flows) or the prices (in our case the interest rates) 
might be fixed in the short run. 
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collecting information. In Williamson's terminology, the first case 
corresponds to the general purpose technology, the second one to the 
special purpose technology. Since parties have an interest in 
creating safeguards to protect investments in transactions, "s" can 
be defined as the magnitude of those safeguards which could be 
assimilated to the collaterals in banks' loans. 
Following Williamson [1985] again, one can assume that 
suppliers are risk neutral, willing to supply under either kind of 
transaction, and accept any safeguard condition provided that 
expected breakeven results can be obtained. In the absence of 
transaction-specific sunk costs (k=0), node A is reached; this 
corresponds to a breakeven price (interest rate) pi. The node B is 
reached in the presence of transaction-specific sunk costs (k>O) 
without safeguard (in our case without collateral, i. e. s=0). In the 
contract corresponding to node C we have transaction-specific sunk 
costs in the presence of safeguard (k>O, s>O). 
k, s, and p are determined simultaneously by a contract, and 
obviously influence each other. Transactions performed under each of 
those regimes can take place at the same time. In particular, in the 
real world, we see banks supplying credit with or without collateral 
(obviously at different breakeven levels of interest rates) when 
they lend different amounts of money to different categories of 
borrowers, and, above all, we see the coexistence of bonds markets 
and intermediated credit. 
We can further imagine that, since in node A transactions take 
place without asset specificity,. such a situation may be reached 
when the state of nature is such that the number of relatively low- 
risk agents is high enough to trigger a supply of financial funds 
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under a general purpose contract. This may happen if the governance 
institution is able to prevent forms of moral hazard and 
opportunistic behaviour that would undermine the feasibility of 
general purpose contracts. In other word, the existence, efficiency, 
size and macroeconomic relevance of stock markets might depend on 
the effectiveness of governance structure (and, of course, on all 
the other features influencing the number of relatively low-risk 
borrowers and agents, which might have to do with the degree of 
economic development). Securitized financial systems could be 
thought of as institutional contexts where the magnitude of the 
financial flows negotiated under the kind of contracts associated to 
node A is macroeconomically relevant compared to those associated to 
nodes B and C. 
We can further think of nodes B and C as different 
"hierarchical" contractual forms of banks loans. Williamson's 
observation that "... transaction located at node B ... are apt to 
be unstable contractually ... (and) ... may revert to node A ... or 
be relocated to node C" (Williamson [1985], p. 34), could be 
interpreted as a description of phenomena relating to credit 
rationing (i. e. unwillingness to supply credit to those agents 
unable to provide collateral) or other situations where the supply 
of bank credit to industries is affected by the willingness of banks 
to lend, and their subjective valuation on the riskiness of lenders. 
Such subjective valuations might be affected by the business cycle, 
as in the Bernanke and Blinder [1988] model. 
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2.1 Securitization: empirical relevance for bank credit and some 
macroeconomic implications. 
If, as Fama [1985] suggests, bank credit is a non substitutable 
source of finance for the firms penalized on bonds and shares 
markets by phenomena of asymmetric information and agency costs, 
then in a "securitized" financial system banks would conceivably 
face two different kinds of customers: firms non penalized on 
capital markets, for which the different sources of funds are 
substitutable, and firms penalized on capital markets. The firms of 
the first type (usually big corporations with a "strong" 
reputation), due to the high substitutability among the different 
sources of funds, would probably express a more unstable demand for 
banking credit than the firms of the second type. 
Fama's [1985] analysis, is obviously not inconsistent with the 
financial economics literature which describes the dividend decision 
by the firm's controlling group as a problem of signaling (Leland 
and Pyle [1977]): in the presence of information asymmetry, if the 
dividend policy can be used as a "signal" (on the quality of the 
firm's investment) in order to reduce the transaction costs, smaller 
firms (with lower market power and lower profit flow) might not be 
able to send the"signal" that would enable them to reduce the 
transaction costs. For this reason, they may be more dependent on 
the supply of credit by agencies specialized in monitoring and in 
economies of scale in collecting information (i. e. banks). 
For the same reason, in securitized financial systems, where 
the spot market for financial funds is empirically relevant, 
substitution between bank credit and securities is likely to be an 
empirical phenomenon too. 
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To the extent that the bank credit to large corporations 
represents a big portion of the total bank credit to industry, the 
demand for bank credit expressed by "strong" firms would contribute 
to determine an empirically observable stock level of bank credit to 
industry consistent with the behaviour of a supply function rather 
than a demand function. In fact, if the demand function for bank 
credit is more unstable than the supply (due to the high 
substitutability between bonds, shares and bank credit for the 
industrial firms), then, looking at the equilibrium stock of bank 
credit (and estimate with a monoequational model) a supply function 
is observed, rather than the usual demand function. This contrasts 
with the approach followed by most empirical works, which estimate a 
demand function with the assumption of partial adjustment. On the 
other hand, in a non securitized financial sector there is no reason 
to expect a demand for bank credit to industry more unstable than 
the supply. Therefore, a demand function for bank credit to industry 
could be identified in this last case. All these points deserve an 
intuitive explanation. 
Let us consider a supply of bank credit (in our case to the 
industrial sector) analogous to the one employed in the theoretical 
part of Bernanke and Blinder [1988], i. e. : 
+- 
Ls = 1i(rL, rß)"D(1-t) (1 
where LS = banks' credit supply; 
D= banks' deposits; 
-c = banks' required reserves coefficient; 
rL = interest rate on banks' loans; 
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rg = interest rate on bonds; 
Let us assume that the following function 
++- 
D= D(Y, P, rD) (2 
describes the deposits supplied by the banks to the public. In this 
function (where Y is defined as the national income, P the price 
level, and rD as the interest rate on banks' deposits) the deposits 
supplied by the banks are assumed to depend positively on the 
aggregate income, on the price level, and negatively on their cost, 
i. e. the interest rate rD. Let us further assume that a stable 
functional link exists between the two liquid assets traded on the 
spot markets: bank deposits and'bonds. Let us define this functional 
link as follows 
rD=rD(rB); (3 
the behaviour of such functional link may be determined by the 
term structure of the interest rate. 
The above-mentioned case, where the demand for bank credit is 
more unstable than the supply for bank credit, may be intuitively 
described with the help of the following figure (assuming, only for 
the sake of this graphic, that the competition between the different 
banks determine a fixed spread between rL and rD, so that rL may be 
expressed as a function of rD, and, figure 1 may be drawn, for 
simplicity, with one interest rate only): 
Ls = supply of bank credit to the industrial firms; 






Figure 2 shows (although in a simplistic way) that if, in a 
monoequational context, the demand function is more unstable than 
the supply, the simple observation of the stock values of the bank 
credit to the industry would identify a supply rather than a demand 
function. In fact, when the credit demand shifts from Ldl to Ld2 and 
Ld3, the three observable equilibrium stocks of credit lie in the 
same supply function, which is then identified. It is argued here 
that in a "securitized" financial system, the bank credit to 
industry is highly substitutable by the recourse to the "spot" 
market. Therefore, the demand for bank credit by industrial firms 
might shift when conjunctural causes affect the transaction and 
monitoring costs by making the spot market comparatively less *or 
more convenient. Substitutability between bank credit and non- 
intermediated credit is possible both in a securitized and in a non- 
securitized financial sector. If, according to the institutional 
analysis, substitutability is expected to be empirically relevant in 
securitized financial systems and not in the non-securitized ones, a 
supply function for bank credit to industry can be estimated, in the 
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former and not in the latter, using macroeconomic data. It must be 
stressed that observable data correspond to the equilibrium levels 
of bank credit to industry. In other words, since they correspond to 
actual negotiations, they might be thought of as equilibrium values 
between demand and supply: they are, per se both demand and supply 
values, and it is the relatively larger instability of one of the 
two functions'that allows the identification of the other. 
A further element which may contribute to increase the 
instability of the demand for bank credit is the diffusion of "loan 
commitment" contracts. In such contracts the bank commits itself to 
provide the customer with an overdraft availability, at the interest 
rate prevailing on the market at the moment of the actual 
utilization of the loan. The "loan commitment" contract is more 
flexible for the firm, which may decide not to use the credit 
availability (reducing, in that case its financial costs). On the 
other hand, the loan commitment brings higher opportunity costs in 
case the interest rate prevailing at the moment of the actual use of 
the loan availability is higher than the interest rate on long term 
loans at an initial moment, when a normal spot contract could be 
stipulated. In such a framework, a loan commitment contract is 
convenient for the firm if the expectations of variability in 
aggregate demand (and then the possible risk of undertaking 
unnecessary financial costs) are higher than the expectations of 
increase in the interest rate on loans. Duca and Vanhoose [1990] 
show that an increasing diffusion of loan commitment contracts could 
alter the macroeconomic impact of, monetary policy. A large diffusion 
of loan commitment contracts would-also carry higher instability of 
the demand for bank credit to industry. Duca and Vanhoose also point 
76 
out that the empirical evidence for the United States shows that 
loan commitment contracts have a lower bankrupt ratio than other 
loan contracts. This seems to suggest that the banks tend to 
stipulate loan commitment contracts with less risky firms. Also, 
quoting the "Federal Reserve Bulletin" ("Terms of Lending at 
Commercial Banks: Survey of loans made", vol. 74, September 1988), 
they remark that the share of loan contracts stipulated under the 
form of "loan commitment" tend to increase with the size of the 
single loan contracts: "... This suggest that large firms, which 
probably pose less credit risk and are thus' less likely to be 
rationed, tend to borrow under commitments to a greater extent than 
smaller, and probably less secure, firms" (Duca and Vanhoose, 
[1990], p. 180). 
it must be said, however, that the actual diffusion of such a 
kind of contract is not easily detectable, because its main element 
is the continuity in the relationship between bank and industrial 
firm. This element can be determined also by extensions or 
renegotiations of the terms of the contracts, which may not be 
explicitly observable and may constitute one of the main features of 
the relationship between bank and customer in the non-securitized 
financial systems. 
3. An empirical analysis of some macroeconomic implications of 
securitization: the United Kingdom and Germany. 
To perform a comparative analysis of the behaviour of bank 
credit to industry in the two different kinds of financial systems, 
the United Kingdom and Germany, have been taken into consideration, 
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during the period between the 1974 oil shock and the German 
Unification. Such a choice is due to the fact that the magnitude of 
the two economies is comparable, and, as Frankel and Montgomery 
[1991] point out, many legal issues and structural features (such as 
the degree of concentration in the banking sector) are very similar 
in spite of the two countries having very different financial 
systems. Thus, by comparing the behaviour of bank credit in the two 
countries, it might be possible to "isolate" (at least to some 
extent) the effects of the two different financial systems. 
In Frankel and Montgomery [1991], a comparison of several 
different legal issues between Germany, U. K., U. S. and Japan shows 
that 
"regulation of British and German banks follows a universal 
bank model, under which banks are permitted to engage in a wide 
range of financial activities, including all insurance and 
securities activities. The main difference between the British and 
the German versions of the universal bank is that British banks 
usually conduct their securities business through subsidiaries, 
while German banks conduct their business directly" 
(Frankel and Montgomery, (1991), p. 273). 
The regulation issues analyzed by Frankel and Montgomery are: the 
principal regulators of commercial banks, geographic and regulatory 
banking restrictions, the scope of permissible activities (such as 
securities, insurance, industrial investments) capital requirements, 
deposit protection scheme, and reserve requirements. No relevant 
differences have been found, in this regard, between the British and 
the German banking systems, while some relevant differences are 
pointed out in a few institutional features which are, incidentally, 
at the core of the attention in most studies on securitization, 
namely the customer relationship and the bankruptcy procedures. For 
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what concerns the former point, in Germany (like Japan), banks are 
able to establish "very close ties" with industrial firms, whilst 
this happens only very rarely in the U. K. and in the U. S. For what 
concerns the bankruptcy procedures, while the British (and American) 
law heavily penalizes banks that have close relationships with 
customers and imposes greater losses on the banks than on other 
creditors, not only are banks less penalized in Germany than in 
Britain, in case of customers' distress, but 
"often take responsibility for organizing creditor coalitions 
for financially troubled firms. a bank's behaviour in such a workout 
may be disciplined by its interest in establishing and maintaining a 
reputation as a structurer and arranger of successful firms' 
finance" 
(Frankel and Montgomery (1991), p. 288). 
For this reason, informal bankruptcy arrangements are in Germany 
more frequent than the informal ones, and this may help to explain 
why the number of corporate bankruptcies has greatly increased in 
the U. K. (and in the U. S. ), while it does not show any clear upward 
trend for Germany (and Japan). Frankel and Montgomery [1991] also 
report some empirical data concerning the trend of real assets of 
the largest banks (dramatically increasing for Germany, more stable 
for Britain, between 1970 and 1989), and the comparison between 
funds raised through securities and bank loans. The data reported in 
Frankel and Montgomery [1991] clearly show that by comparing all the 
quinquennia between 1965 and 1989 in the U. K., any increase in 
aggregate bank loans is associated with a decrease in funds raised 
through securities, and viceversa. Such phenomenon (which, 
curiously, has not been pointed out by Frankel and Montgomery) only 
affects the U. K. and the U. S. (i. e. the two securitized financial 
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systems) and seems to be consistent with the fact that (as argued in 
this paper) the securitized financial systems are characterized by 
higher instability in the demand for bank credit to industry than 
non-securitized financial systems. This might also be consistent 
with Mayer's [1992] observation of the fact that bank credit is the 
most relevant "anti-cyclical" source of financial funds for the 
industrial firms. 
For what concerns the degree of concentration in the banking 
sector, the data reported by Frankel and Montgomery show that the 
concentration of bank assets in the five largest banks is very 
similar between the U. K. and Germany, while the German banking 
system seems to be slightly more concentrated if one looks at the 
ten largest banks. Data on the degree of concentration in the 
banking sector are also reported by Gardener [1991], on the basis of 
OECD data, and the review "The Banker" (for what concerns the 
concentration ratios). Gardener's [1991] data are reported in the 
following tables. 
Degree of market concentration and size of the banking systems for 
Germany and the United Kingdom in 1988. 
concentration 
share of the market. 
total assets deposits 
5 banks 3 banks 5 banks 3 banks 
Germany 31.2 21.2 30.5 19.1 
United Kingdom 32.6 26.5 30.3 21.6 
number of size 
banks of the banking sector 
Assets (billions of $) 
Germany 4465 1465.0 
United Kingdom 661 1337.8 
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According to the concentration ratios calculated with 3 or 5 
banks, the British banking system seems to be only slightly more 
concentrated than the German one. On the other hand, if one 
calculates the ratio between the size of the banking sector 
(measured by the assets in billions of dollars) and the number of 
banks operating in the market, it can be seen that the average size 
of the banks is larger in the United Kingdom than in Germany. 
The British and the German banking sectors seem, then, to 
differ in all the features (such as customer relations, bankruptcies 
procedures and substitutability between bank credit and securities) 
connected with the phenomenon of securitization, while they do not 
show any relevant difference for what concerns the regulatory issues 
and the market structure. In addition, both economies are in a stage 
of advanced industrialization, their magnitude is comparable (at 
least until the German Unification), and they are highly integrated 
(which could lead us to assume that they are subjected to the same 
sources of disturbances, at a macro level). For these reasons, a 
comparative analysis on the behaviour of bank credit to industry 
should be able to provide information on the institutional 
differences of the two financial systems by isolating (at least to 
some extent) their macroeconomic implications. 
For what concerns Germany, bank credit will be modelled 
following the standard approach (demand function containing an 
interest rate representative of the cost of borrowing, and another 
interest rate containing information on the money market conditions) 
because, being the German financial system non-securitized, 
substitutability between securities and bank credit is not 
empirically relevant. On the other hand, bank credit to industry in 
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the United Kingdom will be described by a supply function, analogous 
to the one contained in the theoretical part of the paper by 
Bernanke and Blinder [1988]. This because in the securitized British 
financial system substitutability between bank credit and securities 
is expected to be empirically relevant. The empirical specification 
derived from such a function contains an interest rate 
representative for bank assets and another for the banks 
liabilities. If these two interest rates have very similar 
coefficients, they may capture (if jointly considered) the 
information for the interest rate spread between banks' liabilities 
and banks' assets, which could be interpreted either as a mark-up 
pricing mechanism, or (if one does not assume imperfect competition 
in the banking sector) as a proxy for the margin of intermediation 
necessary in order to cover the administrative, costs of the bank. 
The analytical form of the supply for bank credit to industry is log 
linear like the following: 
Ct =ap + al"ln(Yt) + a2"ln(Pt) + a3"rL - a5"rD (4 
This equation may be obtained by substituting equations 2 and 3 
into equation 1, and approximating the resulting equation with a 
Cobb-Douglas, exponential in the interest rates. A more complex 
dynamic structure of equation 4 will be obtained by following the 
general-to-specific approach. In this case, equation 4 would be 
considered in the more general form 
Ct =bp + bl(L)ln(Yt) + b2(L)ln(Pt) + b3(L)rL - b5(L)rD (4' 
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where b2(L), b3(L), b4(L), b5(L) are lag polynomials, on which a 
series of zero restrictions have to be tested, as explained in the 
next section. 
3.1 A Brief description of the econometric methodology. 
The purpose of the following analysis is to show how the 
behaviour of the bank credit to the industrial firms is affected by 
such an institutional feature as the relevance of the stock market. 
To do so, the behaviour of some relevant credit aggregates for 
Germany and United Kingdom will be compared and contrasted. For the 
sake of completeness, the demand for money will also be taken into 
account. The specifications of the different equations have been 
obtained following the "general-to-specific" (Hendry [1985], Harvey 
[1989]) methodology, starting from a general unrestricted 
specification containing four lags. Simulation studies have shown 
that this seems to be an appropriate dynamic structure to start with 
in order to capture the dynamic properties of the models, while 
several studies in the 1980's (for example Hendry [1988] and 
Muscatelli [1988]) have shown that Feedback mechanisms (like the one 
at the basis of the general-to-specific approach) yield better 
econometric performances that the "forward-looking" ones (for 
instance Cuthbertson [1985]). 
The appendix contains the tables with the data, the estimations 
and the results. All the estimations have been implemented with 
"Microfit", version 3.0. In the tests, the level of confidence of 
. 95 
has been used unless otherwise specified. 
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3.2 General-to-specific and partial adjustment. 
The partial adjustment mechanism can be consistent with an 
optimizing behaviour of economic agents. It can be assumed that 
individuals face costs due to the fact that they are holding a 
quantity of money different from the one of long run equilibrium; 
and other adjustment costs. Considering a quadratic cost function, 
the decision of the agents can be described as follows: 
min C= a(Mt - M*)2 + b(Mt - Mt-1 )2 
where C is the total cost, Ma financial asset. The asterisk stands 
for "desired" level; "a" is the cost of holding a level of asset 
different from the equilibrium one, "b" represents the adjustment 
cost. Assuming that the second order conditions for optimization are 
satisfied, the first order conditions are the following: 
6c 
= 2a(Mt - M) + 2b(Mt - Mt-1 )=0 
SMt 
ab_ 
Mt =M+ Mt-1 = 6M + (1 - 6)Mt-1 
a+ba+b 
with 6= a/(a+b). In the case of the money demand, we have 
M=k+ aYt - ßRt + ut 
(where "Y" is the income, "R" an interest rate representative of 
the conditions of the money market, "k" a constant, "u" a stochastic 
disturbance). then the estimable equation describing the short run 
demand for money is: 
Mt = Ak + AaYt - AßRt + (1-6)Mt_l + but 
Mt = const + g1Yt + 92Rt + g3Mt-1 + Vt 
where const = 6k; gl=6a; g2=8R; 93 = (1-8); Vt=eut. 
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A similar procedure and analytical function would be obtained 
for the demand for credit. 
In the estimates unadjusted data have been employed, because, 
as Wallis [1974] points out, the use of seasonally adjusted data 
could induce distortions in the estimations, apart from the very 
particular case where the same lag operator applies for the 
dependent variable and the regressors. 
The estimates have been performed with the method of ordinary 
least squares, but a test of exogeneity on income has been 
implemented in the final specification of the functions of demand 
for money and credit, in order to detect simultaneity between income 
and the dependent variable considered. For this purpose the Hausman 
exogeneity test has been implemented. This test is composed of two 
phases: in the first phase the variable subject to exogeneity test 
must be regressed on an instrument. The residuals of this regression 
must be included, in a second phase, in the original regression, 
containing the variable subject to exogeneity test. If the 
coefficient referred to the residuals does not seem to be 
significant (according to the statistics), then the variable subject 
to test can be considered exogenous with respect to the independent 
variable. 
4. The Empirical Results 
In what follows I will comment briefly on the estimates for 
each country and the relative economic implications. 
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4.1 The United Kingdom. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, three credit aggregates have 
been considered: the bank credit to industry, the bank credit to 
sectors other than industry, and the total bank credit (given by the 
sum between the bank credit to industry and the bank credit to the 
other sectors). The qualitative behaviour of the bank credit to 
industry differs a great deal from the other two credit aggregates. 
However, the information referred to the bank credit to industry 
seems to be more interesting because it identifies a well-defined 
category of credit users. For the reason mentioned earlier, a supply 
function for bank credit to industry has been estimated for the 
U. K., instead of a demand function. This supply function contains 
the interest rate on seven days notice deposit account with London 
clearing banks, (here defined RLCB, which can be regarded as a 
leading interest rate on banks' deposits market) and the interest 
rate on banks' overdrafts (ROV). The former is an indicator for the 
interest rates on banks' liabilities, the latter is obviously an 
interest rate on banks' assets. The spread between these two 
interest rates could represent a proxy for the "gross margin of 
intermediation" existing in the banking system. If we accept such'an 
interpretation, in an hypothetical estimation of the supply function 
of bank credit to industry, the coefficient referred to RLCB should 
be negative, while the one referred to ROV should be positive, and, 
if one regards the difference "ROV-RLCB" as a proxy for the banks' 
margin of profit, or for the margin of intermediation, they should 
have very close absolute value. We could imagine, as a first 
approximation, a partial adjustment mechanism of the kind: 
St - St-1 = e(S*t - St-l) 
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with S*t = S(ROVt, RLCBt, Pt, Yt) 
where the asterisk indicates "desired value", St is the supply of 
bank credit to industrial firms at time t, Pt the level of prices, 
Yt the real output. The lagged dependent variable mechanism could be 
justified with the same kind of argumentations which justify a 
partial adjustment mechanism for a demand function for a financial 
asset. 
Preliminary analyses have shown that, even if the data employed 
are non seasonally adjusted, seasonal dummies were not significant 
in any credit aggregate "general" unrestricted specification (unlike 
the demand for money equation, as we will see later). Therefore 
seasonal dummies were not included in the general unrestricted 
models employed for the "general-to-specific" analysis. 
In the estimates referring to the total credit the interest 
rates employed were analogous to the ones used by Bernanke and 
Blinder [1988]: the interest rate on short run treasury bills 
(TREBIRA) and the interest rate on bank overdrafts (ROV). In some 
preliminary analyses, ROV turned out to be more significant than the 
prime rate. 
Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix show the general unrestricted 
model for the total bank credit to the economy. There seems to be a 
structural break at the end of 1988 (i. e. 1988 QIV), corresponding 
to the period where the Bank of England definitively dropped Ml as 
an intermediate target for monetary policy: in fact, the model 
estimated over the sample period 1975 QII to 1991 QIV largely fails 
the test for normality of the residuals (and marginally fails the 
test of serial correlation); the same model estimated over the 
sample period 1975 QII to 1988 QIV largely fails the predictive 
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failure test calculated on the data of 1989,1990 and 1991, while it 
largely passes all of the other diagnostic tests. The general 
unrestricted model for the bank credit to other sectors than 
industry (tables 3 and 4) yields very similar results'and also shows 
as well a structural break at the end of 1988: the model estimated 
over the sample period' 1975 QII to 1988 QIV fails the predictive 
failure, while the model estimated over the sample 1975 QII to 1991 
QIV largely fails the test for normality of the residuals. Both bank 
credit to other sectors than industry and the total bank credit 
supports a partial adjustment mechanism with a lagged dependent 
variable (tables 5 and 6 respectively). Such models, determined by 
imposing some parameters restrictions on the general models of 
tables 4 and 2, are estimated over the sample period 1975 QII to 
1988 QIV, in order to run the predictive failure test, for the years 
after the Bank of England had dismissed Ml as an intermediated 
target monetary policy. LBACROIN (table 5) fails the predictive 
failure and the Chow test, and does not fail all of the other 
diagnostic tests. The same equation estimated over the sample period 
1975 QII - 1991 QIV (table 7) largely fails the test for normality 
of the residuals. On the other hand, the "restricted" model for the 
total bank credit (LBACRTO, table 6, over the sample period 1975 QII 
_ 1988 QIV) passes all of the 
diagnostic tests, including (although 
marginally) the predictive failure and the Chow test. It largely 
fails the test for normality of the residuals when estimated over 
the sample period 1975 QII - 1991 QIV (table 8). These results 
suggest that the bank credit to other sectors than industry and the 
total bank credit seem to be quite sensitive to changes in the 
monetary policy ; 
Eargeting, and do not seem to be very stable. The 
88 
results are quite different for what concerns the bank credit to 
industry (LBACREIN) which seem to be much more stable than the other 
two credit aggregates. For the reason illustrated earlier, LBACREIN 
has been estimated as a supply function. Tables 9 and 10 show the 
general unrestricted model with four lags estimated over the sample 
period 1975 QII - 1991 QIV and 1975 QII - 1988 QIV respectively. The 
model of table 9 marginally fails the test on the normality of 
residuals at the level of confidence of 0.95 (while it does-not, fail 
it at the level of confidence of 0.99), and the model of table 10 
yields satisfactory results in all of the diagnostic tests, 
including the predictive failure one. However the low number of 
degrees of freedom of the estimates of table 9 weakens the 
reliability of the tests. In both sample periods LBACREIN supports 
the parameters restrictions necessary to obtain a "partial 
adjustment" model with a lagged dependent variable (tables 13 and 14 
respectively). Since it is somehow "unusual" to estimate a supply 
function for bank credit to industry in a monoequational framework, 
the procedure implemented in order to obtain the final dynamic 
specification have been shown. Tables 11 and 12 respectively show 
the variable deletion tests for the restrictions allowing to obtain 
the restricted model of table 13 from the general model of table 9, 
and the restricted model of table 14 from the unrestricted one of 
table 10. 
In both sample periods, the "restricted" models-yield very 
satisfactory results in all of the diagnostic tests, including the 
predictive failure ones and the Chow test. This seems to suggest 
that the "supply function" of bank credit to industry seem to be 
much more stable than the "demand function" for bank credit to other 
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sectors than industry and the "demand function" for total bank 
credit. One of the possible reasons for such a result is the fact 
that the bank credit to industry refers to a category of borrowers 
which is much more homogeneous than for the other two aggregates. In 
particular, the total bank credit is a highly heterogeneous 
aggregate, which might be affected by a much larger set of 
disturbances. 
Tables 15,16 and 17 refer to the Hausman test of exogeneity 
calculated for the variable LRUKYDS (log of the British real GDP) in 
the "restricted" specifications of LBACREIN, LBACROIN and LBACRTO 
respectively. In all of the three cases the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of the variable LRUKYDS is not rejected at the level of 
confidence of 0.95. 
4.2 Germany. 
If one had to give an example of structural break, one of the 
best would probably be that of Germany in 1989-1990. Since testing 
for structural stability on the post-unification data would yield 
too obvious results, the regressions have been run on the sample 
period 1975 QI - 1989 QIII (i. e. until the announcement of the 
opening of the East German frontiers, which could rationally be 
interpreted as the first step of unification), while the last 
quarter of 1989 and the first one of 1990 have been employed to run 
a meaningful predictive failure test, since the formal process of 
unification took place gradually after the elections of 1990. 
The bank credit to manufacturing sector has been estimated as a 
demand function with partial adjustment, since in this case the 
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assumptions by Fama 1985 and the empirical evidence for 
substitutability between security and bank credit do not apply, 
given that the German financial system is not "securitized". A set 
of interest rates analogous to those employed by Bernanke and 
Blinder [1988] has been used (namely the interest rate on banks' 
credit on current account and the interest rate on treasury bills). 
Observing the graphic with the path of the dependent variable 
(LBACREMA in Figure 3), it can clearly be seen that in 1980, term 3 
there is a structural break, probably determined jointly by the 
effects of the implementation of the European Monetary System and by 
the recession which took place that year. In order to apply the 
general-to specific methodology, a general unrestricted model with 
four lags has been estimated using the data from 1975 QII to 1989 
QIII. However, (as one can see from tables 18 and 19 for the 
estimates without seasonal dummies and with seasonal dummies 
respectively) the general unrestricted model largely fails the 
diagnostic test on the normality of residuals, due to the structural 
break of 1980. Therefore a model with partial adjustment has been 
estimated over the sample period from 1980-QIV to 1989-QIII, without 
testing the coefficients restrictions on a general unrestricted 
model with lagged variables, because there would not have been 
enough degrees of freedom to make the variable deletion tests 
reliable. Table 20 shows the estimates with OLS over the sample 
period 1975 QII - 1989 QIII, and table 21 shows the same model 
estimated over the reduced sample period 1975-QII to 1980-QIII, 
which largely fails both the predictive failure and the Chow test 
for structural stability, proving that there is indeed a structural 

















break in 1980 QIV. The coefficient of the implicit deflator of GNP 
(LIPGNP) has a wrong sign, but the variable is not significant. 
Tables 22,23 and 24 refer to the Hausman test of exogeneity for the 
variable LRGGNP (log of the real German GNP). In particular, table 
22 shows the regression of LRGGNP on the instruments employed for 
the test (a constant and the lagged values of LRGGNP, the implicit 
deflator of GNP LIPGNP, the German treasury bill rate GTRBR, the log 
of Ml LNM1, and the log of the bank credit to manufacturing sector 
LBACREMA). The residuals HREBCMA of such regression have been 
included in the regression for LBACREMA in order to implement the 
second step of the test, shown in table 23 and 24 (the regression 
without seasonal dummies and with seasonal dummies respectively). In 
both cases the model fails the Hausman test for exogeneity for the 
variable LRGGNP. Therefore new estimates have been implemented using 
the method of instrumental variables. In particular, tables 25 and 
26 show the instrumental variable estimation of the equation without 
seasonal dummies and with seasonal dummies respectively. Again, in 
both the regressions of table 25 and 26, the coefficient for the 
implicit deflator of the GNP has a wrong sign, but it is not 
significant. The estimates with the dummies have been shown only for 
the sake of completeness, since the dummies do not seem to be 
significant in this case. 
For what concerns Germany, the demand for bank credit by 
manufacturing industries does not seem to be very stable. It is very 
sensitive to changes in the business cycle, like the structural 
break in 1980 seems to show. Therefore the estimates for LBACREMA do 
not seem to perform well enough to provide reliable information on 
the use of the demand for bank credit to industry as a possible 
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intermediate target for monetary policy. However, this may be due to 
the fact that the observable values of LBACREMA are just equilibrium 
stocks, and could be thought of as linear combinations of demand and 
supply functions. In this case LBACREMA has been interpreted in the 
former way, because it has been argued that in a non securitized 
financial sector there is not high substitutability between bank 
credit and securities, or bonds. As a consequence, in a 
monoequational framework one can follow the predominant approach in 
the existing empirical literature, and estimate a demand function 
for bank credit. In order to run a "counterfactual" experiment, it 
is shown, in tables 27 and 28, that estimating a supply function for 
banks' credit analogous to the one estimated for the U. K. (i. e. 
containing a set of interest rates which could be interpreted as a 
proxy for the banks' gross margin of intermediation) does not yield 
any sensible result. The results of table 27 (estimation with 
instrumental variables) do not make much sense, while the equation 
shown in table 28 (estimate with OLS) looks more like a demand 
function where the interest rate RTDEP acts as a proxy for GTRBR. 
Therefore, the prediction that securitized financial sectors 
would make the demand for bank credit by industry more unstable than 
the supply seems to be confirmed by the data. 
4.3 A quick comparison with the demand for money 
The behaviour of the various credit aggregates have been 
compared to the one of the money demand, in order to obtain further 
information by comparing the stability and statistic performances of 
the two functions. The main purpose of the estimates commented in 
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this section is to detect the presence of structural breaks 
(possibly different from the ones affecting the credit stocks). Like 
in Bernanke and Blinder [1988], the money aggregate employed both 
for the U. K. and Germany is Ml. The estimates for the money demand 
in the U. K. have been implemented only over the sample period where 
Ml has been used as an intermediate target of monetary policy, i. e. 
1975 QII - 1988 QIV. This is also the period relevant for the 
comparative analysis on credit aggregates, since the comparison of 
the data after 1989 are obviously biased by the beginning of the 
process of unification in Germany. In addition, the data later than 
1988 for Ml (i. e. after Ml has been definitively abandoned as an 
intermediate target for monetary policy) have not been reported by 
any OECD statistical publication, and only a few quarters later 
disappeared even from the CSO financial statistics. 
Table 29 shows the general unrestricted model for the money 
demand, which gives satisfactory results for all of the diagnostic 
tests. The dummy variables have been included because they appeared 
to be more significant than in the previous pieces of analysis. 
Table 30 shows the variable deletion test which leads to the 
"parsimonious" specification with partial adjustment shown in table 
31. The signs and magnitudes of the parameters seem to be consistent 
with the standard theory. The coefficient referred to the implicit 
deflator of GDP is not significant, and the model marginally fails 
(at the level of confidence of 95%) the diagnostic test for serial 
correlation. Table 32 shows the Hausman test for exogeneity 
calculated for the variable LRUKYDS (log of the real GDP), which 
turns out to be exogenous at the level of confidence of 95% and 
(marginally) 90% . 
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In the context of Germany, the equation for the demand for 
money seems to perform much better than the demand for bank credit 
to manufacturing sector. Tables 33 to 36 show the general-to- 
specific analysis. Table 33 shows the general unrestricted model, 
which yields satisfactory results for all of the diagnostic tests, 
excepting, obviously, the predictive failure test calculated over 
the last quarter of 1989 and 1990, due to the drastic changes in the 
monetary policy regime, immediately after the announcement of the 
end of Berlin's wall and the beginning of the process of 
unification. The seasonal dummies have been omitted because they 
turned out to be largely non significant in a preliminary analysis. 
Obviously this does not mean that seasonality is disregarded: it is 
assumed, instead, that the seasonal effects are captured by the 
dynamic structure of the model. The variable deletion test in table 
34 shows that the general unrestricted model does not support a 
partial adjustment mechanism, and requires a more complex dynamic 
structure, which has been determined through the variable deletion 
test of table 35 by keeping the most statistically significant 
regressor in the general unrestricted model. The final specification 
is shown in table 36. The diagnostic tests yield satisfactory 
results (excepting again the predictive failure test calculated over 
the period after the announcement of the unification), and the 
coefficients of the various regressors seem to have signs and 
magnitudes correspondent to the predictions of economic theory, 
apart from the more complex dynamic structure. In particular, it can 
be seen that the real GNP affects Ml with a delay of three quarters, 
the level of Ml shows some hysteresis, and seems to react to some 
95 
weighted time-difference in the price level, rather than to the 
price level itself. 
5. Conclusions. 
The empirical analysis of the previous sections show that the 
mechanisms characterizing the credit market are heavily influenced 
by institutional features (such as whether a financial system is 
market-oriented or bank-oriented). Also, the theoretical framework 
commonly employed to interpret the behaviour of money stock does not 
necessarily describe appropriately in any institutional context the 
behaviour of another liquid asset such as bank credit to industry, 
which may be affected by the specificity of the assets, determined 
by the interactions between industrial firms and financial 
intermediaries. 
For the sake of the present analysis, the most relevant credit 
aggregate is credit to industrial firms. 
The simplifying assumption of the traditional IS-LM model, 
which only envisages a distinction between money and generical 
"bonds", and implicitly aggregates any form of credit (i. e. bank 
credit and securities) in a unique financial sector, might turn out 
to be unreliable, due to the role of asset specificity and 
endogenous contractual response that characterizes the behaviour of 
the financial sector. The role of endogenous contractual response 
becomes empirically relevant in the context of securitized financial 
systems, because of the substitutability between bank credit and 
securities. 
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The institutional factors taken into account in this analysis 
are the distinction between "securitized" financial systems (like 
the British one), "intermediaries-oriented" financial systems (like 
the German one). 
Such a distinction is significant, especially in connection 
with Fama's [1985] assumptions, according to which some classes of 
enterprises, facing agency costs in the financial markets due to 
informational asymmetry phenomena, are heavily dependent on bank 
credit. In such a context banks could face two kinds of customers 
(in the industrial sector): "strong" enterprises which can easily 
substitute bank credit by issuing assets on the capital markets, and 
firms penalized by access costs in the financial markets. The demand 
for bank credit expressed by the "strong" firms could be more 
unstable than the supply, due to the high substitutability between 
direct emission of financial market assets and recourse to the bank 
credit. Both the situations contribute to create the conditions 
which allow for the estimation (within a monoequational model) of a 
supply' function of bank credit, rather than a demand function, 
starting from the observation of credit stock. 
'Such a situation seems to apply in the "securitized" financial 
sectors, in our case in the United Kingdom, where the following 
supply function of bank credit to industry has been estimated. 
LBACREIN=. 79068+. 19881 LRUKYDS+. 64950 LNIP+. 032855 ROV-. 028242 RLCB+ 
(1.5756) (2.3964) (9.6660) (7.5303) (-6.8997) 
+. 49464 LBACREIN_1 
(10.2420) 
R2=. 99796; the numbers in brackets refer to the t-statistics. 
On the other hand, for the total bank credit (where it is not 
possible to picture a particular class of agents having homogeneous 
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characteristics) a demand function has been estimated, according to 
the approach most commonly followed in empirical works, and 
similarly to what has been done by Bernanke and Blinder [1988]. 
The fact that a supply function for bank credit to industry-was 
identified yields some evidence (perhaps not very strong) in favour 
of the theoretical interpretation suggested in section 2,2.1 and 3. 
The empirical literature often implicitly assumes that the 
stock of credit is "demand determined". This is an interpretation 
once more based on the implicit assumption of macroeconomic 
irrelevance of the decisions of the banking sector concerning the 
allocation of credit, like in the IS-LM model. In other words the 
relevant behavioural relation would be a demand function and the 
existing stock would differ from the one desired by agents only 
because of adjustment costs, lags in correcting expectations, or 
modifications in the equilibrium levels of the relevant variables. 
Such a specification derives often from the application to credit 
demand of the specifications commonly employed to describe money 
demand, and implicitly assumes that the supply of banks' credit 
adjusts to the shocks and modifications originating on the (credit) 
demand side of the market. 
Following a "Poole-like" analysis (in the spirit of Bernanke 
and Blinder [1988]), one could argue that in a securitized financial 
system, if the monetary policy has to rely on the most stable 
behaviourial relation, then, to the extent that a policy target may 
be represented by the volume of activity of the industrial sector, 
some proper intermediate target could be chosen among the variables 
appearing in the supply function of bank credit to the industrial 
sector. A monetary policy based on a strict control of money 
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aggregates may be less effective in a securitized sector, where 
substitutability between different, sources of financial funds and 
endogenous contractual response could determine other forms of 
"virtual liquidity". Finally, the present empirical analysis seems 
to testify to the relevance of institutional features in determining 
the behaviour of financial assets, as argued by many post-keynesian 
economists, like Davidson [1982]. 
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APPENDIX. 
List of the variables employed in the regressions. 
United Kingdom: 
BACREIN = bank credit to the industry; 
BACROIN = bank credit to other sectors than industry; 
BACRTO = BACREIN + BACROIN; 
IP = implicit price deflator of GDP; 
LBACREIN = log(BACREIN); 
LBACROIN = log(BACROIN); 
LBACRTO = log(BACRTO); 
LNIP = log(IP); 
LNMl = log(M1); 
LRUKYDS = log(UKGDP/IP); 
RLCB = interest rate on deposit account at seven days notice with 
London clearing banks; 
ROV = interest rate on banks' overdraft; 
TREBIRA'= interest rate on treasury bills; 
UKYDS = UK GDP at market prices; 
UHAUS = residuals for the Hausman test of exogeneity of LRUKYDS; 
Germany: 
BACREMA = bank credit to the manufacturing sector 
GTRBR = German treasury bill rate; 
HREBCMA = residuals for the Hausman test for exogeneity for LRGGNP 
in the equation for LABCREMA; 
GGNP = GNP at current prices; 
IPGNP = implicit price deflator of the GNP; 
LIPGNP = log(IPGNP); 
LNM1 = log of Ml 
LBACREMA = log(BACREMA); 
LRGGNP = log(GGNP/IPGNP); 
RCRCA = interest rate on bank credit on current account; 
CONST = intercept term; 
Si, S2, S3 = seasonal dummies for the first, second and third terms 
repsectively. 
Source of data: DATASTREAM SERVICES at the University of Warwick, on 
the basis of seasonally unadjusted OECD data. 
Diagnostic Tests 
The diagnostic test performed in the tables that follows are 
those provided by the package MICROFIT 3.0. In particular, the main 
references are the following. 
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The diagnostic test for serial correlation is the one suggested 
by Godfrey [1978a], [1978b]. 
The diagnostic test for the functional form is Ramsey's RESET 
test (Ramsey [1969], [1970]). 
The diagnostic test for the normality of the regression 
residuals is the Jarque-Berg test (Jarque and Bera [1980], Bera and 
Jarque [1981]). 
The following pages contain the tables with the estimates and 
the diagnostic tests. 
The diagnostic test for heteroscedasticity is based on the 
auxiliary regression 
e2t = const + ayt 
where et are the residuals of the regression and yt the fitted 
values of the dependent variable. the auxiliary regression gives the 
LM and F-test for the null hypothesis HO: a=0. 
The diagnostic test for predictive failure is the one suggested 
by Salkever [1976] and Dufour [1980]. 
S I03. a 
A note on Hausman Test 
The variable UHAUS corresponds to the residuals of the 
regression of LRUKYDS on a constant term, LNM1(-1), LNIP(-1), 
TREBIRA(-l) ROV(-1). It has been employed to run the Hausman test of 
exogeneity of LRUKYDS in the equations of the different credit 
aggregates considered for the United Kingdom and in the demand for 
money. 
The variable HREBCMA corresponds to the residuals of the 
regression of LRGGNP on a constant term, LNM1(-1), GTRBR(-1), 
LIPGNP(-1), LRGGNP(-1), LBACREMA(-1). It has been employed to run 
the Hausman test of exogeneity of LRGGNP in the demand for money and 





Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACRTO 
67 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9104 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Frob] 
CONST -2.0358 . 83005 -2.4526[. 018] 
LRUKYDS -. 11573 . 22205 -. 52117[. 605] 
TREBIRA . 0039656 . 0078004 . 50838[. 
614] 
ROV . 0029105 . 0078261 . 37189[. 712] 
LNIP . 11723 . 45402 . 25820[. 798] 
LBACRTO(-1) . 87233 . 14047" 6.2099[. 000] 
LRUKYDS(-1) -. 083276 . 17858 -. 46633[. 643] 
TREBIRA(-1) . 0055581 . 0087271 . 63687[. 528] 
ROV(-i) -. 012758 . 0085051 -1.5000[. 141] 
LNIF(-1) -1.0562 . 71822 -1.4706[. 149] 
LBACRTO(-2) . 070153 . 19410 . 36143[. 720] 
LRUKYDS(-2) . 19811 . 17952 1.1036[. 276] 
TREBIRA(-2) . 013295 . 0089514 1.4852[. 145] 
ROV(-2) -. 011686 . 0085800 -1.3620[. 180] 
LNIP(-2) 1.1411 . 74117 1.5396[. 131] 
LBACRTO(-3) -. 14279 . 19065 -. 74897[. 458] 
LRUKYDS(-3) . 039115 . 17631 . 22185[. 826] 
TREBIRA(-3) . 0022162 . 0092368 . 23993[. 812] ROV(-3) -. 0010068 . 0086834 -. 11594[. 908] 
LNIP(-3) -. 72609 . 74357 -. 97650[. 334] 
LBACRTO(-4) . 10437 . 12671 . 82371[. 415] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 39537 . 24929 1.5860[. 120] 
TREBIRA(-4) . 0097853 . 0082237 1.1899[. 241] 
ROV(-4) -. 0095220 . 0076518 -1.2444[. 220] 
LNIP(-4) . 59539 . 44998 1.3232[. 193] 
R-Squared . 99950 F-statistic F(24, 42) 3524.6[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99922 S. E. of Regression . 024995 
Residual Sum of Squares . 026240 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.5937 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 89506 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 167.7445 
DW-statistic 1.9561 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 10.4741[. 033]*F( 4, 38)= . 1.7603[. 157]8 
* B: Functional Form SCHI-SO( 1)= . 060794[. 805]*F( 1, 41)= . 037236[. 848]* 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 72.7916[. 000)* Not applicable 4 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.7691[. 183]*F( 1, 65)= 1.7629[. 189]3 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlatio n 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Erased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Eased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 2 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
***********#*******#*## ***#**####******#******#*******************************: 
Dependent variable is LBACRTO 
55 observations used f or estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -1.2184 . 76809 -1.5862[. 123] 
LRUKYDS -. 24495 . 23711 -1.0331C. 310] 
TREBIRA . 0068020 . 0074765 . 90978[. 370] 
ROV . 0011040 . 0075895 . 14547[. 885] 
LNIP . 53695 . 42697 1.2576C"2181 
LBACRTO(-1) . 82726 . 15212 5.4380[. 000] 
LRUKYDS(-1) -. 078376 . 18113 -. 43270[. 668] 
TREBIRA(-1) -. 0026383 . 0083816 -. 31477[. 755] 
ROV(-1) -. 0077774 . 0076742 -1.0134[. 319] 
LNIP(-1) -1.4062 . 68857 -2.0422[. 050] 
LBACRTO(-2) . 014378 . 21016 . 068414[. 946] 
LRUKYDS(-2) . 11944 . 17277 . 69134[. 495] 
TREBIRA(-2) . 024531 . 0089570 2.7388[. 010] 
ROV(-2) -. 019632 . 0080627 -2.4349[. 021] 
LNIP(-2) . 95055 . 72384 1.3132[. 199] 
LBACRTO(-3) -. 041719 . 19306 -. 21609[. 830] 
LRUKYDS(-3) -. 0065664 . 17341 -. 037867[. 970] 
TREBIRA(-3) -. 0048277 . 010074 -. 47920[. 635] 
ROV(-3) . 0042089 . 0093340 . 450920.6551 
LNIP(-3) -1.1133 . 71012 -1.5677[. 127] 
LBACRTO(-4) . 12326 . 13338 . 92415C. 363] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 49234 . 25226 1.9517[. 060] 
TREBIRA(-4) . 010556 . 0093633 1.1274C. 2693 
ROV(-4) -. 0086290 . 0090824 -. 95008[. 350] 
LNIP(-4) 1.1006 . 44528 2.4718[. 019] 
R-Squared . 99951 F-statistic F(24, 30) 2567.8[. 000] 
R-Eiar-Squared . 99912 S. E. of Regression . 021051 
Residual Sum of Squares . 013294 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.3063 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 71132 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 150.9714 
DW-statistic 1.7663 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SCI( 4)= 4.8242[. 306]*F( 4, 26)= . 62495[. 649]4 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.7476[. 186]*F( 1, 29)= . 95171[. 33774 
* C: Normality SCHI-SCE( 2)= 1.5298C. 465]* Not applicable A 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( 1)= 1.1547[. 283]*F( 1, 53)= 1.1366[. 291]* 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-S0( 12)= 29.2123[. 004]*F( 12, 30)= 2.4344[. 024]4 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlatio n 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Sased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on square d fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 3 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACROIN 
67 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9104 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 79924 . 68418 -. 90393[. 371] 
LRUKYDS -. 065499 . 22933 -. 28561[. 777] 
TREBIRA . 0056553 . 0080818 . 69975[. 488] 
ROV . 3913E-3 . 0080968 . 048332[. 962] 
LNIP . 044714 . 48334 . 092510[. 927] 
LBACROIN(-i) 1.1450 . 15281 7.4926[. 000] 
LRUKYDS(-1) -. 11110 . 18976 -. 58545[. 561] 
TREBIRA(ri) . 0046143 . 0090731 . 50858[. 614] 
ROV(-1) -. 013353 . 0087181 -1.5317[. 133] 
LNIP(-1) -. 43357 . 74889 -. 57895[. 566] 
LBACROIN(-2) -. 017760 _ . 
2367i -. 074399[. 941] 
LRUKYDS(-2) . 14276 . 19286 . 74019[. 463] 
TREBIRA(-2) . 012706 . 0093915 1.35290.1833 
ROV(-2) -. 010728 . 0088941 -1.2062[. 234] 
LNIP(-2) . 55450 . 74932 . 740000.4633 
LBACROIN(-3) -. 30347 . 24124 -1.2580[. 215] 
LRUKYDS(-3) -. 039560 . 18767 -. 21080[. 834] 
TREDIRA(-3) . 3915E-3 . 0094871 . 041269[. 967] 
ROV(-3) . 0026562 . 0089616 . 29640[. 768] 
LNIP(-3) -. 42116 . 73911 -. 56982[. 572] 
LDACROIN(-4) . 12930 . 15556 . 83121[. 411] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 23999 . 25652 . 93556[. 355] 
TREBIRA(-4) . 0049479 . 0084412 . 58616[. 561] 
ROV(-4) -. 0059477 . 0078452 -. 75613[. 453] 
LNIP(-4) . 31894 . 45071 . 70765[. 483] 
R-Squared . 99958 F-statistic F(24, 42) 4130.5[. 000] 
R-Dar-Squared . 99933 S. E. of Regression . 025871 
Residual Sum of Squares . 028112 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.2562 
S. D. of Dependent Variable 1.0029 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 165.4357 
DW-statistic 2.0887 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 6.5790[. 160]*F( 4, 38)= 1.0344[. 402]1 
* S: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= 2.0358[. 1547*F( 1, 41)= 1.2848[. 264]8 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 87.0336[. 000]* Not applicable A 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 3". 0557[. 080]*F( 1, 65)= 3.1061t. 083)* 
A: Lagrange multiplie r test of resid ual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET tes t using the squ are of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and k urtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regre ssion of square d residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACROIN 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 15181 . 80987 . 18745[. 853] 
LRUKYDS -. 22406 . 22820 -. 98188[. 334] 
TREBIRA . 0066164 . 0071439 . 92617[. 362] 
ROV . 0024822 . 0073719 . 33671[. 739] 
LNIP . 44920 . 42707 1.0518[. 301] 
LBACROIN(-1) 1.1725 . 16748 7.0007[. 000] 
LRUKYDS(-1) -. 18873 . 18510, -1.0196[. 316] 
TREBIRA(-1) -. 0040258 . 0081026 -. 49685[. 623] 
ROV(-1) -. 0094500 . 0073266 -1.2898["207] 
LNIP(-1) -1.1004 . 67732 -1.6246[. 115] 
LBACROIN(-2) . 057313 . 27470 . 20864[. 836] 
LRUKYDS(-2) . 11694 . 18464 . 63266[. 532] 
TREBIRA(-2) . 022463 . 0089046 2.5227[. 017] 
ROV(-2) -. 018938 . 0080074 -2.3651[. 025] 
LNIP(-2) . 48539 . 69523 . 69818[. 490] 
LBACROIN(-3) -. 38855 . 26118 -1.4677[. 147] 
LRUKYDS(-3) -. 12429 . 17922 -. 69354[. 493] 
TREBIRA(-3) -. 0074315 . 0096489 -. 77019[. 447] 
ROV(-3) . 012685 . 0091406 1.3878[. 175] 
LNIP(-3) -. 58278 . 65771 -. 88608[. 383] 
LBACROIN(-4) . 15244 . 17208 . 88588[. 383] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 41259 . 24899 1.6570[. 108] 
TREBIRA(-4) -. 0026362 . 0091496 -. 28813[. 775] 
ROV(-4) . 0022472 . 0091198 . 24641[. 807] 
LNIP(-4) . 75093 . 41699 1.8008[. 082] 
R-Squared . 99964 F-statistic F(24, 30) 3511.5[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99936 S. E. of Regression . 020388 
Residual Sum of Squares . 012470 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.9378 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 80556 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 152.7325 
DW-statistic 2.0335 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
********************************************************** **************##****a 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 9.0862[. 059]#F( 4, 26)= 1.2863[. 301]1 
* Eu Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= . 70307[. 402]*F( 1, 29)= . 37551[. 545]9 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 5.3441[. 069]* Not applicable I 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= 1.2486[. 264]*F( 1, 53)= 1.2312[. 272]X 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SO( 12)= 37.6325[. 000]*F( 12, 30)= 3.1360[. 005]4 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlatio n 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 5 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACROIN 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 24058 . 48144 -. 49971[. 620] 
LRUKYDS . 030167 . 090003 . 33518[. 739] 
TREBIRA . 0093062 . 0060473 1.5389[. 130] 
ROV -. 0080704 . 0059709 -1.3516[. 183] 
LNIP . 091203 . 032716 2.7877[. 008] 
LBACROIN(-1) . 97143 . 019598 49.5690[. 000] 
R-Squared . 99921 F-statistic F( 5,49) 12339.0[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99913 S. E. of Regression . 023823 
Residual Sum of Squares . 027809 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.9378 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 60556 Maximum of Log-likelihood 130.6756 
DW-statistic 1.5695 - Durbin's h-statistic 1.6137[. 107] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* # * ýI 
* A. -Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 2.7165[. 6c)6]*F( 4, 45)= . 58453[. 675]4 
* # * 8 
* E4: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= .6 458[. 431]*F( 1, 48)= . 54778[. 46. ]* 
* * * 4 
* C: Normality SCHI-SO( 2)= 3.1669[. 205]* Not applicable 8 
* * 4C A 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( 1)= . 155o8[. 694]*F( 1, 53)= . 14987[. 700]* 
* * * * 
K E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SO( 12)= 25.7471[. 012]*F( 12, 49)= 2.1456[. 031J* 
* * # I 
* F: Chow Test *CHI-SO( 6)= 12.9889[. 043]*F( 6, 55)= 2.1648[. 06O]* 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
F: Test of stability of the regression coefficients 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 6 
Dependent variable is LBACRTO 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to B804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -1.0193 . 50292 -2.0267[. 048] 
LRUKYDS . 19837 . 098910 2.0056[. 050] 
TREBIRA . 0045923 . 0066625 . 66927[. 494] 
ROV -. 0043673 . 0065566 -. 66610[. 508] 
LNIP . 13516 . 040266 3.3567[. 002] 
LBACRTO(-1) . 92411 . 026786 34.5003[. 000] 
R-Squared . 99877 F-statistic F( 5,49) 7925.6[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99864 S. E. of Regression . 026242 
Residual Sum of Squares . 033743 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.3063 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 71132 - Maximum of Log-likelihood 125.3567 
DW-statistic 1.6446 Durbin's h-statistic 1.3445[. 1793 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* * # : 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 1.0685C. 899]*F( 4, 45)= . 22289C. 92431 
* * # 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= ;. 1858[. 0743*F( 1, 48)= 2.9512C. O9231 
* * * 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 2.9399[. 230]* Not applicable % 
D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( i)= 1.0496[. 376]*F( 1, 53)= 1.03111.315]4 
* E: Predictive Failure SCHI-SO( 12)= 17.5673[. 129]*F( 12, 49)= 1.4639[. 171J 
* F: Chow Test *CHI-SO( 6)= 8.3930[. 211]*F( 6, 55)= 1.3988[. 2ä2]x 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
E4: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: E$ased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
F: Test of stability of the regression coefficients 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 7 
Dependent variable is LBACROIN 
67 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9104 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 71216 . 48714 -1.4619[. 149] 
LRUKYDS . 12476 . 089084 1.4004[. 166] 
TREBIRA 012572 . 0060654 2.0728[. 042] 
ROV -. 011654 . 0057443 -2.0289[. 047] 
LNIP . 10470 . 029404 3.5607[. 001] 
LBACROIN(-1) . 95169 . 015402 61.7914[. 000] 
R-Squared . 99936 F-statistic F( 5,61) 19077.9[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99931 S. E. of Regression . 026371 
Residual Sum of Squares . 042422 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.2562 
S. D. of Dependent Variable 1.0029 Maximum of Log-likelihood 151.6514 
DW-statistic 1.4756 Durbin's h-statistic 2.1635[. 031] 
Diagnostic. Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
***# 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 4.8465[. 303]*F( 4,57)= 1.1112C. 360]ß 
* BiFunctional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= 5.3024[. 01]*F( 1,60)= 5.1566[. 027] 
* CiNormality *CHI-SO( 2)= 29.5368C. 000]ß Not applicable 
ýK D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= 1.0968C. 295]*F( 1,65)= i. 4818[. 302]* 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Pased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
ti, 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE ß 
Dependent variable is LBACRTO 
67 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9104 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -1.2952 . 48056 -2.6952[. 009] 
LRUKYDS . 24893 . 091091 2.7327[. 008] 
TREBIRA . 0065996 . 0063085 1.0461[. 300] 
ROV -. 0056548 . 0059626 -. 94837[. 347] 
LNIP . 12935 . 032194 4.0179[. 000] 
LBACRTO(-1) . 92014 . 018629 49.3927C. 0003 
R-Squared .. 
99913 F-statistic F( 5,61) 14059.6[. 000] 
R-Dar-Squared . 99906 S. E. of Regression . 027413 
Residual Sum of Squares . 045841 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.5937 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 89506- Maximum of Log-likelihood, 149.0547 
DW-statistic 1.5834 Durbin's h-statistic 1.72510.0853 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version #F Version 
***a 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 1.6737[. 795]*F( 4,57)= . 36510[. 832J 
k B=Functional Form *CHI-SQ( i)= . 14853[. 700]*F( 1,60)= . 13331[. 716]' 
***> 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 10.7174[. 005] Not applicable 
***3 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( i)= . Q486916[. 926]*F( 1,65)= . 0084332[. 927]) 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Dased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 9 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
65 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9102 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 55726 . 96694 . 57631[. 568] 
LRUKYDS -. 14611 . 26052 -. 56083[. 578] 
LNIP 1.6399 . 47509 3.4519[. 001] 
ROV . 031990 . 0075072 4.2612[. 000] 
RLCB -. 023026 . 0069883 -3.2949[. 002] 
LBACREIN(-1) . 45516 . 11174 4.0734[1000] 
LRUKYDS(-i) -. 35439 . 18796, -1.8854[. 067] 
LNIP(-1) -2.1545 . 72199 -2.9841[. 005] 
ROV(-1) -. 0081279 . 011105 -. 73189C. 4693 
RLCB(-1) . 0041172 . 010118 . 40691[. 686] 
LBACREIN(-2) . 10056 . 13451 . 74756[. 459] 
LRUKYDS(-2) . 20605 . 20082 1.0360[. 306] 
LNIP(-2) 1.2111 . 79996 1.5139[. 138] 
ROV(-2) . 0064698 . 010822 . 59784[. 553] 
RLCB(-2) -. 0075966 . 010006 -. 75923[. 452] 
LBACREIN(-3) -. 064061 . 12674 -. 50561[. 616] 
LRUKYDS(-3) -. 069630 . 19389 -. 35912[. 721] 
LNIP(-3) -. 66353 . 82167 -. 80754[. 424] 
ROV(-3) -. 0033591 . 010568 -. 31785[. 75] 
RLCB(-3) . 0016658 . 010272 . 16218[. 872] 
LBACREIN(-4) . 0068142 . 083401 . 081704[. 935] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 62356 . 30350 2.0546[. 046] 
LNIP(-4) . 57672 . 53479 1.0821[. 286] 
ROV(-4) . 0027407 . 0079658 . 34406[. 733] 
RLCB(-4) -. 0027679 . 0076920 -. 35985[. 721] 
R-Squared . 99889 F-statistic F(24, 40) 1505.6[. 0003 
R-Bar-Squared . 99823 S. E. of Regression . 025036 
Residual Sum of Squares . 025076 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.2549 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 59526 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 163.2261 
DW-statistic 1.8430 
Diagno stic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Ve rsion * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 4.5860[. 3327*F( 4, 36)= . 68319[. 608]* 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= . 48629[. 486]*F( 1, 39)= . 29397[. 591]* 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 6.4983[. 039]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.8001[. 180]*F( 1, 63)= 1.7944[. 185]* 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of resid ual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the squ are of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and k urtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of square d residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 10 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
55 observations used f or estimation f rom 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 1.3321 1.0402 1.2806[. 210] 
LRUKYDS -. 34137 . 27006 -1.2640[. 216] 
LNIP 2.1198 . 50171 4.2251[. 000] 
ROV . 030662 . 0086020 3.5646[. 001] 
RLCB -. 021049 . 0079781 -2.6383["013] 
LBACREIN(-1) . 42233 . 11089 3.8085[. 001] 
LFUKYDS(-1) -. 53869 "22082" -2.4395[. 021] 
LNIP(-1) -2.3248 . 75597 -3. "0753[. 004] 
ROY(-1) -. 010058 . 013123 -. 76643[. 449] 
RLCB(-1) . 0048474 . 012119 . 40000[. 692] 
LBACREIN(-2) . 023757 . 13578 . 17496[. 862] 
LRUK: YDS(-2) . 33485 . 21668 1.5454[. 133] 
LNIP(-2) 1.2057 . 84065 1.4343[. 162] 
ROV(-2) . 026803 . 014883 1.8010[. 082] 
PLCB(-2) -. 024553 . 013842 -1.7738[. 086] 
LPACFEIN(-3) -. 018112 . 12954 -. 13983[. 890] 
LRUKYDS(-3) -. 28696 . 22011 -1.3037[. 202] 
LNIP(-3) -1.6247 . 82145 -1.9779[. 057] 
ROV(-3) -. 013385 . 014312 -. 93527[. 357] 
FLCB(-3) . 0099275 . 013445 . 73836[. 466] 
LBACFEIN(-4) . 073450 . 083853 . 87595[. 388] 
LRUKYDS(-4) . 93541 . 29026 3.2227[. 003] 
LNIP(-4) 1.2769 . 53668 2.3792[. 024] 
ROV(-4) . 012345 . 013990 . 88245[. 385] 
FLCD(-4) -. 011439 . 012860 -. 88946[. 381] 
R-Squared . 99881 F-statistic F(24, 30) 1045.8[. 000] 
P-Bar-Squared . 99785 S. E. of Regression . 022409 
Residual Sum of Squares . 015066 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.0879 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 48341 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 147.5321 
DW-statistic 2.1383 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 4.1881[. 381]*F( 4, 26)= . 53576C. 711]X 
* B: Functional Form SCHI-SO( 1)= . 54545[. 460]*F( 1, 29)= . 29048[. 594]) 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)a 2.4638[. 292] Not applicable X 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= . 13703[. 711]*F( 1, 53)= . 13239[. 717J 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SO( 10)= 19.9344[. 030]*F( 10, 30)= 1.9934[. 071]ä 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlatio n 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on square d fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 11 
Variable Deletion Test (OLS case) 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
List of the variables deleted from the regressions 
LRUKYDS(-1) LNIP(-1) ROV(-1) RLCP(-1) LBACREIN(-2) 
LRUKYDS(-2) LNIP(-2) ROV(-2) RLCB(-2) LBACREIN(-3) 
LRUKYDS(-3) LNIP(-3) ROV(-3) RLCB(-3) LBACREIN(-4) 
LRUKYDS(-4) LNIP(-4) ROV(-4) RLCB(-4) 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 80853 . 52561" 1.5383[. 130] 
LRUKYDS . 23453 . 092817 2.5268[. 015] 
LNIP . 69678 . 072310 9.6360[. 000] 
ROV . 028274 . 0063952 4.4212[. 000] 
RLCB -. 024785 _ . 0055098 -4.4983[. 000] 
LBACREIN(-1) . 45151 . 054591 8.2708[. 000] 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SQ(19)= 33.3536[. 022] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(19)= 51.2871[. 000] 
F Statistic F(19,30)= 2.4329[. 014] 
Y 
TABLE 12 
Variable Deletion Test (OLS case) 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
List of the variables deleted from the regression: 
LFUKYDS(-1) LNIP(-1) ROV(-1) RLCB(-1) LBACREIN(-2) 
LRUKYDS(-2) LNIP(-2) ROV(-2) RLCB(-2) LBACREIN(-3) 
LRUKYDS(-3) LNIP(-3) ROV(-3) PLCB(-3) LBACREIN(-4) 
LRUKYDS(-4) LNIP(-4) ROV(-4) RLCE(-4) 
65 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9102 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Fatio[Prob] 
CONST . 79068 . 50182 1.5756[. 120] 
LRUKYDS . 19881 . 082961 2.3964[. 020] 
LNIP . 64950 . 067195 9.6660[. 000] 
ROV . 032855 . 0043631 7.5303[. 000] 
RLCB -. 028242 . 0040932 -6.8997C. 000] 
LBACREIN(-1) . 49464 . 048295 10.2420[. 000] 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SO(19)= 29.6848[. 056] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(19)= 39.6548C. 004] 
F Statistic F(19,40)= 1.7696[. 064] 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TADLE 13 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
65 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 9102 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 79068 . 50162 1.5756[. 120] 
LRUKYDS . 19881 . 082961 2.3964[. 020] 
LNIP . 64950 . 067195 9.6660[. 000] 
ROV . 032855 . 0043631 7.5303[. 000] 
RLCB -. 028242 . 0040932 -6.8997[. 000] 
LE<ACREIN(-1) . 49464 . 048295 10.2420[. 000] 
R-Squared . 99796 F-statistic F( 5,59) 5786.0[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99779 S. E. of Regression . 027969 
Residual Sum of Squares . 046155 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.2549 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 59526_ Maximum of Log-likelihood 143.3988 
DW-statistic 1.7666 Durbin's h-statistic 1.0213[. 307] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics # LM Version *F Version 
* * *' 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 4.4276[. 3513*F( 4,55)= 1.0051[. 413]4 
* * 4 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= 2.3694[. 124]#F( 1,58)= 2.1942[. 144]* 
* * # 
* C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 34882[. 640]* Not applicable 
* * * k 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= . 047012[. 828]*F( 1,63)= . 045599[. E. 214 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 14 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Frob] 
CONST . 80853 . 52561 1.5383[. 130] 
LRUKYDS . 23453 . 092817 2.5268[. 015] 
LNIP . 69678 . 072310 9.6360[. 000] 
ROV . 028274 . 0063952 4.4212[. 000] 
RLCB -. 024765 . 0055098 -4.4983[. 000] 
LDACREIN(-1) . 45151 . 054591 8.2708[. 000] 
R-Squared . 99697 F-statistic F( 5,49) 3220.9[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99666 S. E. of Regression . 027950 
Residual Sum of Squares . 038279_ Mean of Dependent Variable 10.0879 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 48341 Maximum of Log-likelihood 121.8885 
DW-statistic 1.7188 Durbin's h-statistic 1.1405[. 254] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics # LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 4.2798[. 369]*F( 4,45)= . 94928[. 4457' 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.4592[. 227]*F( 1,48)= 1.7,082C. 2581' 
* C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 26491[. 676]* Not applicable 
K D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= . 018527[. 892]#F( 1,53)= . 017859[. 894]) 
* E: Predictive Failure SCHI-SQ( 10)= 10.0813[. 4333*F( 10,49)= 1.0081["450]) 
**#> 
* F: Chow Test SCHI-SO( 6)= 5.1444[. 525]*F( 6,53)= . 85740[. 532]> 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
E; Famsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
F: Test of stability of the regression coefficients 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 15 
Dependent variable is LBACREIN 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 28029 . 76062 . 37902[. 706] 
LDACREIN(-1) . 43894 . 056237 7.8052[. 000] 
ROV . 025950 . 0068564 3.7848[. 000] 
RLCB -. 022293 . 0061109 -3.6480[. 001] 
LNIP . 68937 . 072807 9.4685[. 000] 
LRUKYDS . 33670 . 14237 2.3650[. 022] 
UHAUS -. 19467 . 20553 -. 94716[. 348] 
R-Squared . 99702 F-statistic F( 6,48) 2678.6[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99665 S. E. of Regression . 027979 
Residual Sum of Squares . 037577 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.0879 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 48341 Maximum of Log-likelihood 122.3977 
DW-statistic 1.6476 Durbin's h-statistic 1.4376[. 151] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 4.3038[. 3663*F( 4,44)= . 93383[. 4533) 
**#a 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= . 56896[. 451]*F( 1,47)= . 49129[. 4871) 
***y 
C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 42192[. 810]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( i)= . 070770[. 790]*F( 1,53)= . 068285[. 795]r 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Dased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 16 
Dependent variable is LBACROIN 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 31460 . 99482 . 31643[. 753] 
LBACROIN(-1) . 98688 . 031195 31.6360[. 000] 
ROV -. 0074258 . 0060913 -1.2191[. 229] 
TREBIRA . 0088873 . 0061193 1.4523[. 153] 
LNIP . 084783 . 034414 2.4637[. 017] 
LRUKYDS -. 073717 . 18606 -. 39621[. 694] 
UHAUS . 15089 . 23607 . 
63915[. 526] 
R-Squared . 99921 F-statistic F( 6,48) 10158.5[. 000] 
R-Dar-Squared . 99911. S. E. of Regression . 023968 
Residual Sum of Squares . 027575 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.9378 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 80556 Maximum of Log-likelihood 130.9086 
DW-statistic 1.5652 Durbin's h-statistic 1.6571[. 097] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 2.8406[. 5857*F( 4,44)= . 59905[. 665]1 
* # 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( i)= . 22032C. 639]*F( 1,47)= . 18903[. 6663) 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 4.7468C. 093]ß Not 'applicable 
* * * > 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( i)= . 22464[. 636]*F( 1,53)= . 21736[. 643]) 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
E: Samsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 17 
Dependent variable is LBACRTO 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Fatio[Prob] 
CONST -2.4260 . 97715 -2.4828[. 017] 
LDACRTO(-1) . 87322 . 040281 21.6785[. 000] 
ROV -. 0058994 . 0065055 -. 90684[. 369] 
TREBIRA . 0056996 . 0065780 . 86646[. 391] 
LNIP . 16102 . 042480 3.7904[. 000] 
LRUKYDS . 47695 . 19317 2.4691[. 017] 
UHAUS -. 40993 . 24567 -1.6686[. 102] 
R-Squared . 99883 F-statistic F( 6,48) 6845.6[. 000] 
R-Dar-Squared . 99869_ S. E. of Regression . 025777 
Residual Sum of Squares . 031894 Mean of Dependent Variable 11.3063 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 71132 Maximum of Log-likelihood 126.9072 
DW-statistic 1.5823 Durbin's h-statistic 1.6232[. 105] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version ýK F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 1.2853[. 864]*F( 4,44)= . 2632[. 900]) 
**#> 
* P: Functional Form *CHI-S(3( 1)= . 69466[. 405]#F( 1,47)= . 60121[. 4427) 
* C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 020663[. 990]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= 1.0975[. 295]*F( 1,53)= 1.0791[. 304]) 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Erased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: E{ased on the regression of squared residuals on squared-fitted values 
TABLE 18 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
55 observations used for estimation from 7601 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 35933 . 74550 -. 48200[. 633] 
LIPGNP -. 16194 1.0891 -. 14869["883] 
RCRCA . 017869 . 016456 1.0858[. 286] 
GTRBR -. 0022717 . 017372 -. 13077[. 897] 
LRGGNP -. 035235 . 43417 -. 081156[. 936] 
LDACREMA(-1) . 57581 . 21446 2.6849[. 012] 
LIPGNP(-1) -. 063215 . 78316 -. 080717[. 936] 
RCRCA(-i) -. 022368 . 020045 -1.1159[. 273] 
GTRBR(-1) . 0053293 . 019135 . 27851[. 783] 
LR6GNP(-1) . 0065390 . 38454 . 017005[. 987] 
LBACREMA(-2) . 030388 . 24024 . 12649[. 900] 
LIPGNP(-2) . 16640 . 69188 . 24051[. 812] 
RCRCA(-2) . 024663 . 019380 1.2726[. 213] 
GTRBR(-2) -. 033598 . 020907 -1.6070[. 119] 
LRGGNP(-2) -. 0011550 . 37284 -. 0030979[. 998] 
LBACREMA(-3) -. 31913 . 25230 -1.2649[. 216] 
LIPGNP(-3) -. 65022 . 70296 -. 92498[. 362] 
RCRCA(-33) -. 010640 . 019360 -. 54960[. 587] 
GTRBR(-3) . 039694 . 020788 1.9095[. 066] 
LRGGNP(-3) . 46122 . 39312 1.1732[. 250] 
LBACREMA(-4) . 18037 . 24441 . 73797[. 466] 
LIPGNP(-4) 1.1508 . 78096 1.4736[. 151] 
RCRCA(-4) . 0050343 . 011643 . 50111[. 620] 
GTRBR(-4) -. 016251 . 016112 -1.0086[. 321] 
LRGGNP(-4) . 25019 . 46309 . 54027[. 593] 
R-Squared . 99248 F-statistic F(24, 30) 164.9864[. 000] 
R-Dar-Squared . 98647 S. E. of Regression . 026151 
Residual Sum of Squares . 020516 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.1154 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 22478 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 139.0401 
DW-statistic 2.0718 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 6.9427[. 1393*F( 4, 26)= . 93904[. 457]4 * P: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 11.00801.001]*F( 1, 29)= 7.2566[. 012]1 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 67.4654[. 000] Not applicable x 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= . 096699[. 756]*F( 1, 53)= . 093347[. 761]1 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SQ( 5)= 1.7945[. 877]*F( 5, 30)= . 35889[. 872]4 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlatio n 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on square d fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 19 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
55 observations used for estimation from 7601 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 23809 . 75921 -. 31361[. 756] 
LIPGNP -1.2089 1.2004 -1.0070[. 323] 
RCRCA . 023049 . 016634 1.3856[. 177] 
GTRBR -. 0051042 . 017002 -. 30022[. 766] 
LRGGNP -. 48238 . 47900 -1.0071[. 323] 
LBACREMA(-1) . 61491 . 22899 2.6854[. 012] 
LIPGNP(-i) 1.0086 1.2226' . 82490[. 417] 
RCRCA(-1) -. 035924 . 020629 -1.7414[. 093] 
GTRBR(-1) . 0075801 . 018805 . 40308[. 690] 
LRGGNP(-1) . 62724 . 55312 1.1340[. 267] 
LFACREMA(-2) . 12237 - . 25957 . 47145[. 641] 
LIPGNP(-2) . 52754 1.1527 . 45764[. 651] 
RCRCA(-2) . 029605 . 020181 1.4669[. 154] 
GTRBR(-2) -. 029204 . 020540 -1.4218[. 167] 
LRGGNP(-2) . 064044 . 51602 . 12411C. 902] 
LBACREMA(-3) -. 24648 . 28234 -. 87300[. 390] 
LIPGNP(-3) -. 24266 1.1130 -. 21620[. 829] 
RCRCA(-3) -. 0086810 . 020072 -. 43248[. 669] 
GTRBR(-3) . 034192 . 020487 1.6690[. 107] 
LRGGNP(-3) . 77873 . 56441 1.3797[. 179] 
LBACREMA(-4) -. 014206 . 25770 -. 055126[. 956] 
LIPGNP(-4) . 33456 . 92838 . 36038[. 721] 
RCRCA(-4) . 0088733 . 011758 . 75468[. 457] 
GTRBR(-4) -. 016762 . 015929 -1.0523[. 302] 
LRGGNP(-4) -. 28630 . 52506 -. 54527[. 590] 
S1 -. 20508 . 10690 -1.9183[. 066] 
S2 -. 11209 . 078295 -1.4317[. 164] 
S3 -. 12051 . 103,52 -1.1641[. 255] 
R-Squared . 99356 F-statistic F(27, 27) 154.2491[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 98712 S. E. of Regression . 025513 
Residual Sum of Squares . 017574 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.1154 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 22478 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 143.2961 
DW-statistic 2.1119 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics # LM Version # F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 14.7266[. 0053*F( 4, 23)= 2.1026[. 113]* 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 12.7089[. 000]*F( 1, 26)= 7.8133[. 010] 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 56.9649[. 000]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SLR( 1)= . 24830[. 616]*F( 1, 53)= . 24036[. 626] 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SLR( 5)= 4.1430[. 529]*F( 5, 27)= . 82860[. 541]A 
A: Lagrange multiplie r test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET tes t using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: based on the regre ssion of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 20 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8907, 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 1.7754 . 88080 2.0157[. 053] 
RCRCA -. 024272 . 0073592 -3.2981[. 003] 
GTRBR . 031603 . 0081176 3.0932C. 0013 
LIPGNP -. 17755 . 30159 -. 58871[. 560] 
LRGGNP . 61163 . 16511 3.7045[. 001] 
LBACREMA(-1) . 66422 . 091883 7.2289[. 000] 
R-Squared . 96048 F-statistic F( 5,30) 145.81200.000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 95389 S. E. of Regression . 019172 
Residual Sum of Squares . 011027 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 - Maximum of Log-likelihood 94.5550 
DW-statistic 1.6201 Durbin's h-statistic 1.3660[. 17] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version #F Version 
* * * ' 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 6.51-30[. 164]*F( 4, 26)= 1.4357[. 250J> 
* * * > 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 4.6352[. 031]*F( 1, 29)= 4.2857[. 0473) 
ýc C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 93140[. 628] Not applicable 
* * * ' 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( 1)= 1.0544[. 305]*F( 1, 34)= i. O258[. 318]ý 
* * * > 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SQ( 5)= 2.4704[. 781]*F( 5, 30)= . 49408[. 778] 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
.ý 
TABLE 21 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
22 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8003 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 52153 . 83003 . 62832[. 539] 
RCRCA . 014915 . 0089298 1.6703[. 114] 
GTRBR -. 0075008. . 012664 -. 59227[. 562] 
LIFGNP . 51499 . 32936 1.5636[. 137] 
LRGGNP . 47562 . 22586 2.1058[. 051] 
-LSACFEMA(-1) . 26919 . 15098 1.7829[. 094] 
R-Squared . 97435 F-statistic F( 5,16) 121.5760[. 000] 
R-Ear-Squared . 96634 S. E. of Regression . 015561 
Residual Sum of Squares . 0038742 - 
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.8197 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 084815 Maximum of Log-likelihood 63.8724 
DW-statistic 1.7404 Durbin's h-statistic . 86227[. 389] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 6.1201[. 190]*F( 4,12)= 1.1562C. 3787* 
* D: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.5005[. 221]*F( 1,15)= 1.0980[. 311]* 
**** 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.1755[. 556]* Not applicable 
**** 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= . 83048[. 36]*F( 1,20)= . 78459E. 396]* 
**** 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SQ( 41)= 133.3209[. 000]*F( 41,16)= :. 2517[. 007]4 
***A 
* FsChow Test *CHI-SO( 6)= 65.6391["000]*F( 6,51)= 10.9399[. 000]* 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on"a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
F: Test of stability of the regression coefficients 
TABLE 22 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LRGGNP 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 1.3197 1.3687 . 96417[. 343] 
LFGGNP(-1) . 027380 . 35973 . 076114[. 940] 
LIPGNP(-1) -. 62398 . 47679 -1.3087[. 201] 
GTFDR(-1) -. 0076095 . 010058 -. 75658[. 455] 
LNMi(-1) . 35045 . 17960 1.9513[. 060J 
LDACREMA(-1) . 20111 . 19184 1.0483[. 303J 
R-Squared . 69364 F-statistic F( 5,30) 13.5849[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 64258 S. E. of Regression . 036468 
Residual Sum of Squares . 039898 Mean of Dependent Variable 1.5234 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 060999 " Maximum of Log-likelihood 71.4075 
DW-statistic 2.5186 Durbin's h-statistic *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 32.3701[. 000]#F( 4,26)= 57.9650[. 000]3 
***M 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= 5.2221[. 022]*F( 1,29)= 4.92^05[. 035]4 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.8534[. 396] Not applicable 9 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( i)= 1.3857[. 239]*F( 1,34)= 1.3611[. 25174 
*** ýI 
* E: Fredictive Failure *CHI-SO( 5)= 3.3951[. 639]*F( 5,3O)= . 67902[. 643]1 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 23 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Frob] 
CONST . 31470 . 81014 . 38844E. 701] 
LRGGNF . 97201 . 16296 5.9647[. 000] 
RCRCA -. 011416 . 0068451 -1.6678[. 106] 
GTRBR . 029543 . 0066695 4.4296[. 000] 
LIFGNR . 49955 . 30035 1.6632[. 107] 
LBACREMA(-1) . 22162 . 13466 1.6458[. 111] 
HREBCMA -. 81282 . 20506 -3. '9639[. 000] 
R-Squared . 97437 F-statistic F( 6,29) 183.7181[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 96906 , 
S. E. of Regression . 015704 
Residual sum of squares . 0071520 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 Maximum 6f Log-likelihood 102.3481 
DW-statistic 1.7104 Durbin's h-statistic 1.4745[. 140] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 3.8715[. 424]*F( 4,25)= . 75312[. 565]4 
* * 8 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= . 15274[. 696]*F( 1,28)= . 11931[. 732]4 
* * * A 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.2672E. 531]* Not applicable 
* * * A 
Ný D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.5417[. 214]*F( 1,34)= 1.5211[. 226]I 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: E(ased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals' 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 24 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Fatio[Prob] 
CONST . 60632 . 86523 . 70076[. 490] 
LRGGNP 1.0240 . 15837 6.4658[. 000] 
RCRCA -. 013911 . 0092921 -1.4971[. 146] 
GTRBF . 031021 . 0086344 3.5927[. 001] 
LIPGNP . 36052 . 34543 1.0437[. 306] 
LBACFEMA(-1) . 27797 . 16886 1.6462[. 112] 
Si -. 013442 . 026918 -. 49937[. 622] 
S2 -. 0022458 . 020278 -. 11075[. 913] 
S3 -. 017970 . 018340 -. 97982[. 336] 
HFEBCMA -. 91843 _ . 
28692 -3.2010[. 004] 
R-Squared . 97893 F-statistic F( 9,26) 134.2007[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 97163 S. E. of Regression . 015030 
Residual Sum of Squares . 0058795 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 Maximum of Log-likelihood 105.8748 
DW-statistic 1.5912 Durbin's h-statistic *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version #F Version 
************#******##************#********************************************> 
***> 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 2 . 314[. 693]*F( 4,22)= . 36343[. 832]) 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= . 034942[. 852]*F( 1,25)= . 024289[. 8771) 
* C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= 1.6854[. 431] Not applicable 
**#> 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= . 040879[. 840]*F( 1,34)= . 038652[. 845]) 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
TABLE 25 
Dependent variable is LE'ACREMA 
List of instruments: 
CONST LRGGNP(-1) RCRCA(-1) GTRBR(-1) LIPGNP(-i) 
LBACREMA(-2) 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 6.4250 5.9995 1.0709[. 293] 
LRGGNP 1.3245 . 77588 1.7071[. 098] 
RCRCA -. 040922 . 030294 -1.3508[. 187] 
GTRBR . 025565 . 020619 1.2399[. 225] 
LIPGNP -2.0921 2.4379 -. 85817[. 398] 
LBACREMA(-1) 1.2853 . 64504 1.5210[. 139] 
R-Squared . 88905 F-statistic F( 5,30) 48.0766[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 87055 S. E. of Regression . 03212~ 
Residual Sum of Squares . 030957 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 069284 Value of IV Minimand . 0000 
DW-statistic 2.3399 Sargan's *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* * # r 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 1.3477C. 853]ß Not applicable 
* * * r 
* D: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= i. 1632[. 281]* Not applicable 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 4. ý598[. 113]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= 1. Q959[. 295]ß Not applicable 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
TABLE 26 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
List of instruments: 
CONST LRGGNP(-1) RCRCA(-1) GTRBR(-1) LIRGNF(-1) 
LBACREMA(-2) S1 S2 S3 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 8903 
****************#****#*************#* *********#**********************#*#******> 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 4.7372 4.6934 1.0093[. 322] 
LRGGNF 1.0147 . 30879 3.2862[. 003] 
RCRCA -. 038867 . 036253 -1.07210.2933 
GTRBR . 032137 . 016613 1.9345[. 064] 
LIPGNP -1.4645 2.1479 -. 68181[. 501] 
LBACREMA(-1) 1.1416 1.0558 1.0813C. 289] 
Si -. 022185 . 10087 -. 21993[. 828] 
S2 -. 018889 . 079875 -. 21648[. 8157 
S3 -. 037288 . 075763 -. 49216[. 627] 
R-Squared . 94522 F-statistic F( 8r 27) 58.2307[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 92898 S. E. of Regression . 023793 
Residual Sum of Squares . 015285 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 Value of IV Minimand . 0000 
DW-statistic 2.3421 Sargan's *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* * * 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 3.9102E. 418]* Not applicable 
* * * 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.5723[. 210]* Not applicable 
* * * 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 3.2706[. 195]* Not applicable 
* * * 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 2.4764[. 116] Not applicable 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
D: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C; Eased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
TABLE 27 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
List of instruments: 
CONST LRGGNP(-1) RCRCA(-1) - RTDEP(-1) LIPGNP(-1) 
LBACREMA(-2) S1 S2 S3 
36 observations used for estimation from 8004 to 6903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -4.5984 6.2938 -. 73062[. 471] 
LRGGNP 1.0409 . 93171 1.1172[. 274] 
RCRCA . 037556 . 030528 1.2302[. 229] 
RTDEP . 0045315 . 033732 . 13434[. 894] 
LIPGNP 2.9247 2.7143 1.0775[. 291] 
L8ACREMA(-1) -1.0837 1.0883 -. 99574[. 328] 
S1 . 18857 . 095787 1.9686[. 059] 
S2 . 14952 - . 075199 1.9883[. 057] 
S3 . 12135 . 074643 1.6257[. 116] 
R-Squared . 90377 F-statistic F( 8,27) 31.6970[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 87526 S. E. of Regression . 031534 
Residual Sum of Squares . 026849 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 Value of IV Minimand . 0000 
DW-statistic 1.3765 Sargan's *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* * * a 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 2.8407[. 585] Not applicable 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= , 2.6979[. 100]* Not applicable 
* * * 8 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 2.7898[. 248]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 5.4182[. 020]* Not applicable 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 28 
Dependent variable is LBACREMA 
36 observations used for estimation from 80Q4 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
-CONST -. 19398 1.0125 -. 19158[. 850] 
LRGGNP . 77563 . 23901 3.2452[. 003] 
RCRCA -. 6703E-3 . 010741 -. 062403[. 951] 
RTDEP . 013468 . 0099354 1.4556[. 186] 
LIPGNP . 79938 . 38656 2.0679[. 048] 
LBACREMA(-1) . 095496 . 16327. . 56490[. 5637 
S1 . 064207 . 020762 3.0925[. 005] 
62 . 055613 . 016281 3.4281[. 002] 
S3 . 034212 . 015014 2.2786[. 031] 
***************###*********##*#**#*#****#*****#*******************************> 
R-Squared . 96742 F-statistic F( 8,27) 100.2310[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 95777 S. E. of Regression . 018347 
Residual Sum of Squares . 0090887 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.2647 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 089284 Maximum of Log-likelihood 98.0347 
DW-statistic 1.2204 Durbin's h-statistic 11.6426[. 000] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics # LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation SCHI-SQ( 4)= 7.4930[. 1123*F( 4, 23)= 1.5114[. 232]a 
* * .* 
K B: Functional Form SCHI-SO( i)= 3. O715[. OBO]*F( 1, 26)= 2.4252[. 1.3113) 
* * *  
* C: Normality *CHI-SQ( 2)= . 23515[. 889] Not applicable I 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= 2.1698[. 141]*F( i, 34)= 2.1BO7[. 149]1 
* E: Fredictive Failure *CHI-SO( 5)= . 1881311.00]*F( 5, 27)= . 037626[1. GG]x 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Dased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D; Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 29 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Fatio[Prob] 
CONST 2.3506 2.1862 1.0752[. 90] 
LRUKYDS . 30430 . 37295 . 81594[. 421] 
TREBIRA -. 0027194 . 0030928 -. 87927[. 386] 
LNIP . 13397 . 52997 . 25278[. 802] 
S1 . 017464 . 034059 . 51275[. 612] 
82 . 061714 . 038245 1.6136[. 116] 
33 . 027178 . 028624 . 94949[. 349] 
LNMI(-1) . 80488 . 16954 4.7475[. 000] 
LRUKYDS(-1) -. 035825 . 35655 -. 10048[. 921] 
TPEBIRA(-1) -. 0019011 . 0041827 -. 45450[. 653] 
LNIP(-1) . 10027 . 80507 . 12455[. 902] 
LNM1(-2) . 10112 . 22356 . 45234[. 654] 
LRUKYDS(-2) -. 56339 . 33305 -1.6916[. 1C'OJ 
TREBIRA(-2) . 3665E-3 . 0039493 . 092806[. 927] 
LNIP(-2) -. 62832 . 76441 -. 82197[. 417] 
LNM1(-3) -. 096791 . 23172 -. 41771[. 679] 
LFUKYDS(-3) -. 16949 . 33620 -. 50415[. 618] 
TREBIRA(-3) -. 9524E-3 . 0038873 -. 24499[. 8083 
LNIP(-3) . 72150 . 78914 . 91428[. 367] 
LNM1(-4) . 32485 . 18865 1.7219[. 095] 
LRUKYDS(-4) -. 052257 . 32779 -. 15941[. 874] 
TREDIFA(-4) . 0033477 . 0031951 1.0478[. 303] 
LNIP(-4) -. 38369 . 47425 -. 80904[. 424] 
R-Squared . 99885 F-statistic F(22, 32) 1267.7[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99807 S. E. of Regression . 024629 
Residual Sum of Squares . 019411 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.5365 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 56005 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 140.5631 
DW-statistic 1.8263 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version ýk F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation SCHI-SO( 4)= 1.9701[. 741]*F( 4, 28)= . 26005[. 901]1 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SD( 1)= . 094030[. 759]*F( 1, 31)= . [)53090[. 819]1 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.6194[. 445] Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= 1.3574[. 44]*F( 1, 53)= 1.3411[. 25 ]8 
***#*ýk*********#****** **#*#************************#************************** 
A: Lagrange multiplie r test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET tes t using the square of the fitted val ues 
C: Eiased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 30 
Variable Deletion Test (OLS case) 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
List of the variables deleted from the regression: 
LNM1(-2) LNM1(-3) LNMI(-4) TREBIRA(-1) TREBIRA(-2) 
TREBIRA(-3) TREBIRA(-4) LNIF(-1) LNIP(-2) LNIP(-3) 
LNIP(-4) LRUKYDS(-1) LRUKYDS(-2) LRUKYDS(-3) LRUKYDS(-4) 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Frob] 
CONST -1.2430 1.0899 -1.1405[. 260] 
LNM1(-1) . 93225 . 057709 16.1543[. 000] 
"TREBIRA -. 
0041181 . 0016314 -2.5243[. 415] 
LNIP . 034486 . 040625 . 84888[. 4003 
LRUKYDS . 28016 . 22985 1.2189[. 229] 
S1 -. 019253 . 016447 -1.1706[. 248] 
S2 . 020343 . 015896 1.2798[. 247] 
88.3 -. 5155E-4 . 011712 -. 0044010[. 997] 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SQ(15)= 17.2703[. 303] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(15)= 20.7287[. 146] 
F Statistic F(15,32)= . 97651[. 500] 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
TABLE 31 
Dependent variable is LNMI 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -1.2430 1.0899 -1.1405[. 260] 
LNMi(-i) . 93225 . 057709 16.1543[. 000] 
TREBIRA -. 0041181 . 0016314 -2.5243[. 015] 
LNIP . 034486 . 040625 . 84888[. 400] 
LRUKYDS . 28016 . 22985 1.2189[. 229] 
S1 -. 019253 . 016447 -1.1706[. 248] 
S2 . 020343 . 015896 1. -2798[. 2071 
S3 -. 5155E-4 . 011712 -. 0044010[. 997] 
R-Squared . 998-73_ F-statistic F( 7,47) 401 . 3[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99808 S. E. of Regression . 024536 
Residual Sum of Squares . 026296 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.5365 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 56005 Maximum of Log-likelihood 130.1988 
DW-statistic 2.1156 Durbin's h-statistic -. 47440[. 635] 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version #F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SQ( 4)= 11.6429[. 00]*F( 4,43)= 2.8867[. 433]' 
* B: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( 1)= 1. i956[. 274]*F( 1,46)= 1.0222[. 317]) 
* C: Normality SCHI-SO( 2)= 2.5891C. 274]* Not applicable 
***a 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SO( 1)= . 16650[. 683]*F( 1,53)= . 16O93[. 69Q]y 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 32 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
55 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8804 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST 7.4106 5.5543 1.3342[. 189] 
LNM1(-1) 1.3625 . 27687 4.9212[. 000] 
TREBIRA -. 0014730 . 0023136 -. 63665[. 5228] 
LNIP -. 14916 . 12237 -1.2189[. 2293 
LRUKYDS -1.5631 1.1827 -1.3217[. 193] 
Si -. 015069 . 016400 -. 91885[. 363] 
62 . 019445 . 015655 1.2421[. 221] 
S3 . 9009E-4 . 011527 . 0078151[. 994] 
UHAUS 1.8340 1.1550 1.5879[. 119] 
R-Squared . 99842 F-statistic F( 8,46) 3624.80.000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99814 S. E. of Regression . 024149 
Residual Sum of Squares .. 
026825 Mean of Dependent Variable 10.5365 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 56005 Maximum of Log-likelihood 131.6663 
DW-statistic 2.0002 Durbin's h-statistic *NONE* 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* * * 
* A: Serial Correlation *CHI-SO( 4)= 8.1040[. 088]*F( 4,42)= 1.8145[. 144]' 
* * * 
* BsFunctional Form *CHI-SO( i)= 3.0411[. 0813*F( 1,45)= 2.6338[. 112]' 
* * * 
* C; Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 2.8935[. 235]* Not applicable 
* * * 
* D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= . 3O334[. 582)*F( 1,53)= . 29393[. 590]) 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
g: Samsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Sased on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
TABLE 33 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
58 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 20561 . 22167 . 92754[. 360] 
LIPGNP 1.3342 . 46900 2.8448[. 007] 
LRGGNP -. 046444 . 27678 -. 16780[. 868] 
GTRBR -. 011860 . 0063120 -1.8790[. 068] 
LNMI(-1) . 51404 . 15090 3.4065[. 002] 
LIPGNP(-1) -. 79230 . 45303 -1.7489[. 088] 
LRGGNP(-1) -. 15623 . 21839 -. 71539[. 4793 
GTRBR(-1) -. 0064080 . 0088798 -. 72164[. 475] 
LNM1(-2) . 22067 . 17324 1.2738[. 210] 
LIPGNP(-2) . 016559 . 43240 . 038295[. 970] 
LRGGNP(-2) -. 056192 . 22004 -. 25537[. 800] 
GTRBR(-2) . 0010452 . 0088811 . 11769[. 907] 
LNM1(-3) -. 036711 . 17786 -. 20640[. 838] 
LIPGNP(-3) -. 53168 . 44056 -1.2068[. 2353 
LRGGNP(-3) . 12903 . 19256 . 67008[. 507] 
GTRBR(-3) . 0068959 . 0095354 . 72319[. 474] 
LNMI(-4) . 30819 . 17739 1.7374[. 090] 
LIPGNP(-4) -. 11103 . 48841 -. 22732[. 821] 
LRGGNP(-4) . 27014 . 20524 1.3162[. 196] 
GTRBR(-4) -. 0013906 . 0066269 -. 220984[. 835] 
R-Squared . 99777 F-statistic F(19,38) 896.1401[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99666 S. E. of Regression . 015225 
Residual Sum of Squares . 0088080 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.5718 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 26343 Maximum of Log-likelihood 172.6851 
DW-statistic 2.0552 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics * LM Version *F Version 
* A: Serial Correlation SCHI-SO( 4)= 7.7235[. 102]*F( 4,34)= 1.3058[. 288]* 
* B: Functional Form SCHI-SO( 1)= . 78471[. 376]*F( 1,37)= . 50746[. 481]* 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.3591[. 507]* Not applicable 
* D: Heteroscedasticity SCHI-SO( 1)= 2.0681[. 150]*F( 1,56)= 2.0706[. 156]4 
* E: Predictive Failure *CHI-SO( 5)= 49.3080[. 000]*F( 5,38)= 9.8616C. 000]* 
A: Lagrange multiplie r test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET tes t using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: Based on the regre ssion of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
TABLE 34 
Variable Deletion Test (OLS case) 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
List of the variables deleted from the regression: 
GTRBR(-1) LIPGNP(-1) LRGGNP(-1) LNM1(-2) GTRBR(-2) 
LIF'GNP(-2) LRGGNP(-2) LNM1(-3) GTRDR(-3) LIPGNP(-3) 
LRGGNP(-3) LNM1(-4) GTRBR(-4) LIPGNP(-4) LRGGNP(-4) 
58 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST -. 38177 . 19042 -2.0049[. 050] 
GTRBR -. 011328 . 0023204. -4.8818[. 000] 
LIPGNP . 51855 . 10113 5. "1278[. 000] 
LRGGNF' 1.1338 . 12097 9.3726[. 000] 
LNM1(-1) . 35908 . 050294 7.1396[. 000] 
***************##***##**#*#*****************#***********#*******************#*> 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SO(15)= 45.2796[. 000] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(15)= 87.9996[. 000] 
F Stat. istic F(15,38)= 9.0177[. 000] 
TABLE 35 
Variable Deletion Test (OLS case) 
Dependent variable is LNMI 
List of the variables deleted from the regression: 
LRGGNP LRGGNF(-1) GTRBR(-1) LIPGNP(-2) LRGGNP(-2) 
GTREBR(-2) LNM1(-3) LRGGNF(-3) GTRBR(-3) LIPGNP(-4) 
GTRBR(-4) 
58 observations used for estimation from 7502 to 8903 
**********#*****#***'*#*#***********#******************************************ý 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
CONST . 10915 . 13324 . 81923[. 417] 
LIPGNF 1.1245 . 27209 4.1328[. 000] 
GTRBR -. 013043 . 0016601 =7.8567[. 000] 
LNM1(-i) . 40071 . 076563 5.2337[. 000] 
LIPGNF(-1) -. 70029 . 23469 -2.9839[. 004] 
LNMI(-2) . 32381 . 057716 5.6103[. 000] 
LIPGNP(-3) -. 36372 . 10305 -3.5294[. 001] 
LNMI(-4) . 098076 . 096766 1.0136[. 3.16] 
LRGGNP(-4) . 46180 . 13274 3.47900.0013 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SO(11)= 8.5549[. 663] 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(11)= 9.2556[. 598] 
F Statistic F(11,38)= . 59770[. 819] 
TABLE 36 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is LNM1 
58 observations us ed for estimation from 7502 to 8903 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Riatia[Prob] 
CONST . 10915 . 13324 . 81923[. 417] 
GTRBR -. 013043 . 0016601 -7.8567[. 000] 
LIPGNP 1.1245 . 27209 4.1328[. 000] 
LNM1(-1) . 40071 . 076563 5.23370.0001 
LIPGNP(-1) -. 70029 . 23469 -2.9839[. 004] 
LNM1(-2) . 32381 . 057716 5.6103[. 000] 
LIPGNP(-3) -. 36372 . 10305 -3.5294[. 001] 
LNM1(-4) . 098078 . 096766 1.0136[. 316] 
LRGGNP(-4) . 46180 . 13274 3.4790[. 001] 
R-Squared . 99739 ' F-statistic F( 8, 49) 2338.7[. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared . 99696 S. E. of Regression . 014521 
Residual Sum of Sq uares . 010332 Mean of Dependent Variable 5.5718 
S. D. of Dependent Variable . 26343 Maximum of Log-lik elihood 168.0573 
DW-statistic 1.8432 
Diagnostic Tests 
* Test Statistics # LM Version *F Version 
*** ýI 
* A: Serial Correlation SCHI-SO( 4)= 2.8819[. 5783*F( 4,45)= . 58822E. 67311 
* E3: Functional Form *CHI-SQ( i)= 1.2390[. 266]*F( 1,48)= 1.0478[. 311]1 
***I 
* C: Normality *CHI-SO( 2)= 1.5709[. 456]ß Not applicable I 
*** ýI 
D: Heteroscedasticity *CHI-SQ( 1)= . ('23815[. 877]*F( 1,56)= . o23004[. oac']I 
*** ýI 
* E: Fredictive Failure *CHI-SQ( 5)= 101.1438[. 0003*F( 5,49)= 20.2288[. 000]I 
#* * *********#**********************************IC****#**#**************** *ýI 
A: Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B: Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D: E+ased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
E: A test of adequacy of predictions (Chow's second test) 
1)A'1A: u, 
085. IP UKYDS M1 BACREIN BACROIN 
7401 27.1000 18494.0 12123.0 10655.0 16721.0 
7402 28.0000 20140.0 12520.0 11415.0 17000.0 
7403 30.2000 22155.0 12798.0 12638.0 17804.0 
7404 32.0000 23890.0 13714.0 13074.0 18180.0 
7501 34.0000 23845.0 13763.0 13617.0 18710.0 
7 502 36.6000 25820.0 15292.0 "10757.0 18465.0 
7503 38.6000 27502.0 16032.0 10825.0 19133.0 
7504 39.8000 29816.0 16680.0 10600.0 19543.0 
7601 41.3000 29748.0 16906.0 10454.0 19612.0 
7602 42.3000 30377.0 17468.0 10679.0 20371.0 
7603 43.5000 32532.0 18560.0 11495.0 21182.0 
7604 44.8000 35125.0 18897.0 12490.0 22423.0 
7701 46.7000 33804.0 18392.0 12799.0 22385.0 
7702 47.6000 35423.0 19825.0 12849.0 23108.0 
7703 48.9000 37549.0 20796.0 13790.0 23820.0 
7704 49.8000 40344.0 22695.0 13857.0 24247.0 
7801 52.8000 39448.0 22886.0 14365.0 24612.0 
7802 53.6000 41116.0 23594.0 14812.0 26051.0 
7803 54.7000 43306.0 24621.0 15408.0 26047.0 
7804 55.3000 45753.0 26137.0 15651.0 26931.0 
7901 57.7000 44027.0 25659.0 16488.0 27741.0 
7902 59.2000 47813.0 26590.0 17301.0 28619.0 
79Q3 62.3000 51815.0 27376.0 18220.0 29270.0 
7904 64.5000 54803.0 28318.0 18783.0 30758.0 
8001 60.1000 54096.0 27188.0 19872.0 31714.0 
8002 70.5000 55511.0 27595.0 20962.0 33036.0 
8003 73.8000 60264.0 28388.0 23297.0 35177.0 
8004 76.5000 62676.0 30161.0 22960.0 35901.0 
8101 78.3000 61209.0 29398.0 22908.0 37255.0 
8102 78.5000 62077.0 31077.0 22813.0 39314.0 
8103 80.1000 65165.0 31727.0 24710.0 43133.0 
8104 81.3000 67915.0 34859.0 24594.0 47211.0 
8201 82.7000 66963.0 34244.0 26418.0 53936.0 
8202 84.4000 67554.0 36777.0 26828.0 58192.0 
8203 85.9000 70778.0 37819.0 27984.0 61844.0 
8204 87.1000 74286.0 40035.0 29047.0 65805.0 
8301 88.7000 73668.0 41290.0 29562.0 71672.0 
8302 88.7000 72982.0 42435.0 28915.0 73419.0 
8,0 90.6000 77496.0 42766.0 30479.0 77060.0 
8304 91.6000 81276.0 44539.0 31433.0 82238.0 
8401 92.7000 78819.0 46372.0 32349.0 86100.0 
8402 94.4000 77957.0 48499.0 33392.0 90684.0 
8403 95.0000 81228.0 49855.0 34035.0 95006.0 
8404 96.9000 86627.0 51558.0 36360.0 102955.0 
8501 98.4000 85258.0 53462.0 38362.0 112767.0 
8502 99.5000 85685.0 55947.0 36406.0 114522.0 
850.3 100.4000 89767.0 58507.0 36482.0 114927.0 
8504 101.6000 95229.0 60957.0 36382.0 118697.0 
8601 101.6000 91570.0 64191.0 36861.0 122277.0 
8602 102.2000 92113.0 68370.0 37831.0 129989.0 
OBS. IP UKYDS M1 BACREIN BACROIN 
8603 102.8000 96772.0 73307.0 38429.0 137682.0 
8604 103.8000 102680.0 74695.0 39612.0 149833.0 
8701 105.3000 99244.0 79170.0 39893.0 157659.0 
8702 107.6000 100624.0 84982.0 42301.0 171342.0 
6703 108.6000 107250.0 88664.0 41571.0 180908.0 
6704 109.7000 113739.0 91866.0 41853.0 190749.0 
8801 111.3000 109690.0 95799.0 42767.0 196187.0 
8802 113.6000 111742.0 100883.0 45595.0 206869.0 
8803 116.0000 119512.0 103987.0 52258.0 221554.0 
8804 118.1000 126289.0 105048.0 55801.0 233364.0 
8901 121.1000 122509.0 *NONE* 58151.0 250551.0 
8902 123.4000 123321.0 *NONE* 62189.0 267262.0 
8903 124.5000 129580.0 *NONE* 69420.0 3092287.0 
8904 125.4000 136089.0 *NONE* 71480.0 324492.0 
9001 126.7000 132339.0 *NONE* 73250.0 332208.0 
9002 133.0000 133459.0 *NONE* 74957.0 342310.0 
9003 136.5000 138845.0 *NONE* 74814.0 346054.0 
9004 136.9000 144869.0 *NONE* 76972.0 356647.0 
9101 139.5000 136597.0 *NONE* 76913.0 364411.0 
9102 141.9000 140385.0 *NONE* 76976.0 373765.0 
9103 143.7000 146129.0 *NONE* 75280.0 375420.0 
9104 144.0000 152253.0 *NONE* 74870.0 384545.0 
9201 145.1000 *NONE* *NONE* 74471.0 359764.0 
9202 147.5000 *NONE* *NONE* 72256.0 360748.0 
9207, 148.1000 *NONE* *NONE* 71540.0 358591.0 
9204 *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* 
OBS. TREBIRA 80V RLCB LNM1 LBACROIN LBACREIN 
7401 *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* 9.4029 9.7244 9.2738 
7402 11.2400 13.0000 9.5000 9.4351 9.7410 9.3427 
7403 10.9800 13.0000 9.5000 9.4570 9.7872 9.4445 
7404 10.9900 13.0000 9.5000 9.5262 9.8081 9.4784 
7501 9.3700 11.5000 7.5000 9.5297 9.8368 9.5191 
7502 9.4800 10.5000 6.2500 9.6351 9.8236 9.2833 
75Q3 10.4800 11.0000 6.5000 9.6823 9.8592 9.2896 
7504 10.6400 12.0000 7.0000 9.7220 9.8804 9.2686 
7601 8.4200 10.5000 5.5000 9.7354 9.8839 9.2547 
7602 10.9900 11.5000 6.5000 9.7681 9.9219 9.2760 
7603 12.3500 13.0000 8.5000 9.8288 9.9609 9.3497 
7604 13.5100 15.0000 11.0000 9.8468 10.0178 9.4327 
77Q1 9.3500 10.5000 5.0000 9.8197 10.0161 9.4571 
7702 7.4600 9.5000 4.0000 9.8947 10.0479 9.4610 
77Q3 5.3000 8.0000 3.0000 9.9425 10.0783 9.5317 
7704 6.2900 8.1200 4.0000 10.0299 10.0960 9.5365 
7801 5.9900 7.5000 3.0000 10.0383 10.1110 9.5725 
7802 9.2700 11.0000 6.7500 10.0687 10.1678 9.6032 
7803 9.1700 11.0000 6.7500 10.1114 10.1677 9.6426 
7804 11.5600 13.5000 10.0000 10.1711 10.2010 9.6583 
7901 11.4400 14.0000 10.5000 10.1526 10.2307 9.7104 
7902 13.3300 15.0000 11.5000 10.1883 10.2618 9.7585 
79Q3 13.3600 15.0000 11.5000 10.2174 10.2843 9.8103 
7904 15.8400 18.0000 15.0000 10.2513 10.3339 9.8407 
8001 16.2800 18.0000 15.0000 10.2105 10.3645 9.8971 
8002 15.6800 18.0000 15.0000 10.2254 10.4054 9.9505 
8003 14.4000 17.0000 14.0000 10.2537 10.4681 10.0561 
8004 13.0700 15.0000 11.6800 10.3143 10.4885 10.0415 
8101 11.5300 13.6400 9.9100 10.2887 10.5255 10.0392 
81Q2 12.0900 13.0000 9.0000 10.3442 10.5793 10.0351 
8103 13.9600 14.0000 10.2500 10.3649 10.6720 10.1150 
8104 14.5100 15.6000 12.5500 10.4591 10.7624 10.1103 
8201 12.4900 14.2200 10.5400 10.4413 10.8956 10.1818 
8202 12.2300 13.6400 9.6900 10.5126 10.9715 10.1972 
82Q3 9.9100 11.5000 7.3100 10.5406 11.0324 10.2394 
82Q4 9.9000 11.0600 6.7500 10.5975 11.0945 10.2767 
8301 10.4100 11.7200 7.7200 10.6284 11.1799 10.2942 
83Q2 9.4700 10.7300 6.3400 10.6557 11.2039 10.2721 
6303 9.1600 10.5000 6.0000 10.6635 11.2523 10.3248 
8304 6.8700 10.0000 5.5000 10.7041 11.3174 10.3556 
8401 8.4300 9.7400 5.3100 10.7445 11.3633 10.3843 
8402 8.8600 10.1500 5.8100 10.7893 11.4151 10.4161 
8403 10.0200 11.5000 7.3100 10. B169 11.4617 10.4351 
8404 9.1000 10.5600 6.2500 10.8505 11.5420 10.5012 
8501 12.9300 14.8000 10.1300 10.8867 11.6331 10.5548 
6502 11.8900 13.5500 9.3500 10.9322 11.6485 10.5025 
8503 11.0600 12.5000 7.8600 10.9769 11.6521 10.5046 
6504 11.1500 12.5000 7.8600 11.0179 11.6843 10.5018 
8601 11.0600 13.1300 8.3500 11.0696 11.7140 10.5149 
8602 9.3200 11.0000 6.0800 11.1327 11.7752 10.5409 
OBS. TREBIRA ROV RLCB LNM1 LBACROIN LBACREIN 
8603 9.6100 11.0000 6.0800 11.2024 11.8327 10.5566 
8604 10.6600 12.0000 6.9200 11.2212 11.9173 10.5869 
8701 9.3500 11.4300 6.1600 11.2794 11.9682 10.5940 
8702 8.5400 10.0000 4.6900 11.3502 12.0514 10.6526 
8703 9.6900 11.0000 4.9000 11.3926 12.1057 10.6352 
8704 8.1900 8.5700 3.6700 11.4281 12.1587 10.6419 
8801 8.4400 8.7600 3.8200 11.4700 12.1868 10.6635 
8802 8.4900 8.5700 2.8700 11.5217 12.2398 10.7276 
88033 11.5600 13.0000 5.1200 11.5520 12.3084 10.8639 
8604 12.5500 14.0000 5.7000 11.5622 12.3604 10.9295 
8901 12.4100 14.0000 5.9700 *NONE* 12.4314 10.9708 
8902 13.5900 15.0000 5.9700 *NONE* 12.4960 11.0379 
8903 13.4400 15.0000 5.9700 *NONE* 12.6420 11.1479 
8904 14.5000 16.0000 6.5900 *NONE* 12.6900 11.1772 
9001 14.5900 16.0000 6.5900 *NONE* 12.7135 11.2016 
9002 14.3200 16.0000 6.5900 *NONE* 12.7435 11.2247 
9003 14.2300 16.0000 6.5900 *NONE* 12.7544 11.2228 
9004 12.1100 15.0000 5.1100 *NONE* 12.7845 11.2512 
9101 11.5600 14.0000 5.1100 *NONE* 12.8060 11.2504 
9102 10.7500 12.5000 5.1100 *NONE* 12.8314 11.2512 
9103 9.6600 11.5500 *NONE* *NONE* 
, 
'12.8358 11.2290 
9104 10.1000 11.5000 *NONE* *NONE* 12.8598 11.2235 
9201 10.1000 11.5000 *NONE* *NONE* 12.7932 11.2182 
9202 9.4200 11.0000 *NONE* *NONE* 12.7959 11.1880 
9203. 9.1600 9.7700 *NONE* *NONE* 12.7899 11.1780 
9204 *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* 
O6S. LBACRTO LRUKYDS 
7401 10.2174 6.5257 
7402 10.2547 6.5783 
7403 10.3236 6.5980 
7404 10.3499 6.6155 
7501 10.3837 6.5297 
7502 10.2827 6.5589 
7503 10.3076 6.5688 
7504 10.3137 6.6189 
7601 10.3112 6.5797 
7602 10.3434 6.5767 
7603 10.3944 6.6172 
7604 10.4606 6.6645 
7701 10.4683 6.5846 
7702 10.4901 6.6123 
7703 10.5350 6.6436 
7704 10.5481 6.6972 
7801 10.5707 6.6162 
7802 10.6180 6.6426 
7803 10.6324 6.6742 
7804 10.6592 6.7182 
7901 10.6971 6.6373 
7902 10.7347 6.6941 
7903 10.7683 6.7235 
7904 10.8106 6.7448 
6001 10.8510 6.6775 
8002 10.8967 6.6687 
8003 10.9763 6.7051 
8004 10.9829 6.7084 
8101 11.0048 6.6615 
8102 11.0369 6.6730 
8103 11.1250 6.7014 
8104 11.1817 6.7279 
8201 11.2942 6.6967 
8202 11.3506 6.6851 
82Q3 11.4057 6.7141 
8204 11.4601 6.7486 
8301 11.5252 6.7221 
8302 11.5360 6.7127 
8303 11.5856 6.7515 
8304 11.6411 6.7882 
8401 11.6822 6.7455 
8402 11.7286 6.7164 
840-7 11.7679 6.7511 
8404 11.8445 6.7957 
8501 11.9259 6.7644 
8502 11.9246 6.7583, 
850.3 11.9277 6.7958 
8504 11.9517 6.8430 
8601 11.9775 6.8038 
8602 12.0306 6.8038 
OBS. LBACRTO LRUKYDS 
8603 12.0789 6.8473 
8604 12.1519 6.8969 
6701 12.1938 6.8485 
8702 12.2721 6.8407 
8703 12.3126 6.8952 
8704 12.3571 6.9439 
8801 12.3840 6.8932 
8802 12.4390 6.8913 
6803 12.5202 6.9376 
8804 12.5748 6.9748 
8901 12.6401 6.9193 
8902 12.7052 6.9071 
8903 12.8445 6.9477 
8904 12.8891 6.9896 
9001 12.9128 6.9356 
9002 12.9415 6.9112 
9003 12.9501 6.9248 
9004 12.9799 6.9643 
9101 12.9975 6.8867 
9102 13.0186 6.8970 
9103 13.0186 6.9245 
9104 13.0377 6.9635 
9201 12.9813 *NONE* 
9202 12.9785 *NONE* 
9203 12.9718 *NONE* 
9204 *NONE* *NONE* 
VATA: 651204Njo 
CBS. M1 IPGNP GGNP BACREMA GTRBR RCRCA 
7401 132.9000 63.6000 229.1000 114.1000 7.1200 *NONE* 
7402 140.8000 64.8000 238.9000 117.7000 5.7100 *NONE* 
7403 141.5000 65.9000 250.8000 119.0000 5.7100 *NONE* 
7404 158.4000 69.2000 264.9000 120.6000 5.1900 *NONE* 
7501 149.3000 68.2000 237.8000 117.1000 3.3800 11.5000 
7502 160.6000 69.1000 249.2000 115.3000 3.3800 10.2800 
7503 164.4000 69.2000 259.7000 112.7000 3.1300 9.0900 
7504 179.9000 72.3000 281.0000 114.7000 3.1300 8.8500 
7601 166.8000 70.5000 260.7000 110.0000 3.1300 8.6800 
7602 180.2000 71.6000 274.7000 112.9000 3.1300 6.3400 
7603 176.9000 72.4000 283.0000 114.1000 3.1800 8.3400 
7604 186.9000 74.4000 305.4000 119.2000 3.1800 8.3200 
7701 179.7000 72.9000 280.2000 116.6000 3.1800 8.2600 
7702 190.5000 74.4000 291.1000 119.2000 3.1800 7.9600 
7703 193.1000 74.7000 296.9000 119.2000 3.1800 7.8300 
7704 208.1000 77.7000 327.4000 125.2000 2.6700 7.7400 
7801 204.2000 76.1000 300.0000 118.8000 2.6700 7.3400 
7802 215.4000 77.4000 314.7000 122.4000 2.6700 7.2700 
7803 217.5000 78.4000 324.2000 123.0000 2.6700 7.3000 
7804 237.9000 80.5000 350.5000 128.6000 2.6700 7.2900 
7901 225.5000 79.1000 322.4000 127.4000 3.6800 7.4200 
7902 233.1000 80.0000 340.4000 133.1000 3.6800 8.2700 
7903 230.2000 81.4000 351.2000 134.9000 4.7000 9.2400 
7904 247.9000 84.2000 379.8000 144.0000 5.7300 10.3900 
8001 228.7000 82.7000 352.4000 138.5000 6.7600 11.6600 
8002 237.1000 84.5000 361.8000 144.0000 7.2800 12.5400 
8003 237.8000 85.4000 369.0000 142.2000 7.2800 12.5300 
8004 257.3000 88.1000 394.2000 174.0000 7.2800 12.5700 
8101 232.4000 85.9000 362.6000 175.6000 7.2800 14.2100 
8102 242.5000 87.5000 373.8000 178.9000 7.2800 15.2900 
8103 234.3000 88.7000 386.1000 178.1000 7.2800 15.4400 
8104 255.3000 92.5000 417.1000 181.4000 7.2800 15.0100 
8201 237.6000 90.2000 377.9000 175.8000 7.2800 14.6100 
8202 250.7000 91.4000 389.0000 177.6000 7.2800 13.6100 
8203 248.5000 92.8000 397.0000 179.1000 6.7600 13.0600 
8204 273.1000 96.1000 426.4000 180.8000 4.7000 11.1300 
8301 263.4000 93.6000 395.0000 173.1000 3.6800 10.7200 
8302 277.9000 94.4000 407.5000 176.1000 3.6800 9.7700 
8303 274.0000 95.9000 417.4000 177.1000 3.6800 9.8000 
8304 295.8000 99.2000 455.8000 181.9000 3.6800 9.7700 
8401 272.5000 96.2000 421.8000 178.8000 3.6800 9.7800 
8402 282.8000 96.6000 422.9000 181.7000 4.1900 9.7800 
8403 281.5000 97.3000 439.6000 182.50010 4.1900 9.8900 
8404 314.2000 101.1000 479.0000 186.0000 4.1900 9.7800 
8501 285.2000 98.0000 428.8000 188.9000 4.1900 9.8000 
8502 294.4000 98.4000 444.0000 191.9000 4.1900 9.7500 
8503 297.8000 99.7000 463.3000 188.3000 3.6800 9.1400 
8504 334.1000 103.6000 498.4000 197.4000 3.6800 9.1300 
<3601 313.4000 100.9000 447.5000 199.4000 3.1800 8.8400 
8602 329.3000 101.9000 474.0000 "202.5000 3.1800 8.6900 
O8S. M1 IPGNP GGNP BACREMA GTRBR RCRCA 
8603 326.9000 103.1000 488.6000 201.5000 3.1800 8.6400 
8604 358.8000 106.9000 526.0000 206.2000 3.1800 8.6300 
8701 336.8000 103.6000 467.6000 203.7000 2.6700 8.4500 
8702 358.7000 104.3000 488.3000 204.4000 2.6700 8.2900 
8703 357.2000 104.4000 502.3000 208.0000 2.6700 8.2800 
8704 385.2000 108.5000 544.8000 208.9000 2.1600 8.1800 
8801 369.5000 104.7000 495.3000 208.0000 2.1600 8.0700 
8802 393.5000 105.9000 511.9000 212.9000 2.6700 8.0600 
8803 389.1000 106.3000 528.7000 213.9000 3.1800 8.7000 
8804 427.0000 110.4000 572.1000 221.1000 3.1800 8.6900 
8901 403.2000 107.4000 530.6000 225.1000 3.6900 9.2600 
8902 412.0000 108.4000 548.8000 231.6000 4.7000 9.7300 
8903 408.7000 109.1000 558.8000 237.1000 4.7000 10.1400 
8904 450.6000 113.7000 607.0000 243.5000 5.7300 11.1000 
9001 412.8000 110.8000 570.3000 248.8000 5.7300 11.5200 
90Q2 483.2000 112.0000 585.9000 254.4000 5.7300 11.6000 
9003 502.8000 113.4000 612.6000 257.4000 5.7300 11.6900 
9004 584.2000 117.2000 656.7000 263.0000 5.7300 11.9700 
9101 530.4000 *NONE* *NONE* 343.4000 6.2500 12.2200 
91Q2 541.0000 *NONE* *NONE* 354.5000 6.2600 12.2600 
9103 546.9000 *NONE* *NONE* 357.9000 7.2800 12.9200 
9104 604.3000 *NONE* *NONE* 359.9000 7.8000 12.9500 
9201 556.6000 *NONE* *NONE* 356.0000 *NONE* 13.3800 
9202 576.4000 *NONE* *NONE* 364.2000 *NONE* 13.4400 
9203 588.2000 *NONE* *NONE* 359.4000 *NONE* 14.0500 
9204 669.6000 *NONE* *NONE* 339.9000 *NONE* *NONE* 
OBS. LNMI LRGGNP LIPGNP LBACREMA 
7401 4.6896 1.2815 4.1526 4.7371 
7402 4.9473 1.3047 4.1713 4.7681 
7403 4.9523 1.3365 4.1881 4.7791 
7404 5.0651 1.3424 4.2370 4.7925 
7501 5.0060 1.2490 4.2224 4.7630 
7502 5.0789 1.2827 4.2356 4.7475 
7503 5.1023 1.3225 4.2370 4.7247 
7504 5.1924 1.3575 4.2808 4.7423 
7601 5.1168 1.3078 4.2556 4.7005 
7602 5.1941 1.3446 4.2711 4.7265 
7603 5.1756 1.3632 4.2822 4.7371 
7604 5.2306 1.4122 4.3095 4.7808 
7701 5.1913 1.3464 4.2891 4.7587 
7702 5.2497 1.3642 4.3095 4.7808 
7703 5.2632 1.3799 4.3135 4.7808 
7704 5.3380 1.4383 4.3529 4.8299 
78Q1 5.3191 1.3717 4.3320 4.7774 
7802 5.3725 1.4026 4.3490 4.8073 
7803 5.3822 1.4195 4.3618 4.8122 
7804 5.4719 1.4711 4.3883 4.8567 
7901 5.4183 1.4051 4.3707 4.8473 
7902 5.4515 1.4481 4.3820 4.8911 
7903 5.4389 1.4620 4.3994 4.9045 
7904 5.5130 1.5064 4.4332 4.9698 
8001 5.4324 1.4495 4.4152 4.9309 
8002 5.4685 1.4543 4.4368 4.9698 
8003 5.4714 1.4635 4.4473 4.9572 
8004 5.5502 1.4984 4.4785 5.1591 
8101 5.4485 1.4401 4.4532 5.1682 
8102 5.4910 1.4521 4.4716 5.1868 
8103 5.4566 1.4708 4.4853 5.1823 
8104 5.5424 1.5061 4.5272 5.2007 
8201 5.4706 1.4326 4.5020 5.1693 
8202 5.5243 1.4483 4.5152 5.1795 
8203 5.5154 1.4535 4.5304 5.1879 
8204 5.6098 1.4900 4.5654 5.1974 
8301 5.5737 1.4399 4.5390 5.1539 
8302 5.6273 1.4625 4.5475 5.1711 
8303 5.6131 1.4707 4.5633 5.1767 
8304 5.6897 1.5249 4.5971 5.2035 
8401 5.6076 1.4781 4.5664 5.1863 
8402 5.6447 1.4766 4.5706 5.2024 
8403 5.6401 1.5081 4.5778 5.2068 
8404 5.7500 1.5556 4.6161 5.2257 
8501 5.6532 1.4760 4.5850 5.2412 
8502 5.6849 1.5068 4.5890 5.2570 
8503 5.6964 1.5362 4.6022 5.2380 
8504 5.8114 1.5709 4.6405 5.2852 
8601 5.7475 1.4895 4.6141 5.2953 
8602 5.7970 1.5372 4.6240 5.3107 
OBS. LNM1 LRGGNP LIPGNP LBACREMA 
8603 5.7897 1.5558 4.6357 5.3058 
8604 5.8828 1.5934 4.6719 5.3288 
8701 5.8195 1.5071 4.6405 5.3166 
8702 5.8825 1.5437 4.6473 5.3201 
8703 5.8783 1.5710 4.6482 5.3375 
8704 5.9538 1.6137 4.6868 5.3419 
8801 5.9122 1.5541 4.6511 5.3375 
8802 5.9751 1.5756 4.6625 5.3608 
8803 5.9638 1.6042 4.6663 5.3655 
8804 6.0568 1.6452 4.7041 5.3986 
8901 5.9994 1.5974 4.6766 5.4165 
8902 6.0210 1.6219 4.6858 5.4450 
8903 6.0130 1.6335 4.6923 5.4685 
8904 6.1106 1.6750 4.7336 5.4951 
9001 6.0230 1.6384 4.7077 5.5166 
90Q2 6.1804 1.6547 4.7185 5.5389 
9003 6.2202 1.6868 4.7309 5.5506 
9004 6.3702 1.7233 4.7639 5.5722 
9101 6.2736 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8389 
91Q2 6.2934 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8707 
9103 6.3043 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8803 
9104 6.4041 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8858 
92Q1 6.3218 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8749 
9202 6.3568 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8977 
9203 6.3771 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8844 
9204 6.5067 *NONE* *NONE* 5.8287 
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CHAPTER 4 
IS IT MONEY, CREDIT OR BOTH, OR NEITHER? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
BASED ON THE FREE LIQUIDITY RATIO FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS. 
This chapter is based on my paper "Free Liquidity Ratio for 
Commercial Banks: an Estimate with Italian Data" published (in 
English) on the Italian review "Giornale degli Economists e Annali 
di Economia", vol. L, pp. 399-424, July-August 1991. I am very 
grateful to Giovanni'Amisano, Wiji Narendranathan, and the anonymous 
referees of the above-mentioned review for their helpful comments. I 
am also indebted to Norman Ireland and Keith Cowling for their 
valuable suggestions. None of them is responsible for any mistake 
that might be found here 
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IS IT MONEY, CREDIT OR BOTH, OR NEITHER? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
BASED ON THE FREE LIQUIDITY RATIO FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS. 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have analyzed the macroeconomic 
implications of oligopsony in the market for credit, and the 
implications of financial systems' securitization. Since some 
emphasis has been put on the behaviour of the banking system, it 
would be interesting, at this point, to have a closer look at the 
assumptions concerning the behaviour of the banks. In particular, in 
accordance'with Bernanke and Blinder's [1988] model - signalled in 
chapter 3 as an important theoretical foundation for the 
"institutional analysis" performed there - the banking system has 
been assumed to play an important role in the allocation of the 
financial funds, as argued by the "credit view", in contrast with 
the traditional orthodox approach that described the banking system 
as a mere passive "veil" on the economy. The main differences 
between the two approaches lie, of course, in the relevance of 
market imperfections and information asymmetries, but also, as a 
consequence, in the extent to which the 'autonomous financial 
investment decisions of the banks affect the aggregate level of 
physical investment. If the non-remunerated liquid assets in the 
banks' portfolios reflect a non-investment decision, a decision to 
postpone an investment decision, then a detailed empirical analysis 
of the banks' "liquidity preference" could turn out to be an 
interesting- although only partial - test on the reliability of a 
few assumptions of the "credit view". 
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The commercial banks' free liquid reserves have been the object 
of a few empirical studies in the 1970s and in the early 1980s, in 
connection with the debate on the stability of the demand for money 
(for instance Cagan [1969], Bryant [1983], Langhor [1981], Richter 
and Teigen [1982], Wessels [1982]). Surprisingly, such empirical 
studies do not seem any longer to be a very central topic, although 
the free liquid reserves play an important theoretical role for at 
least two reasons. First of all, the free liquidity ratio 
contributes to determine the money multiplier, and, therefore, its 
behaviour directly affects the behaviour of the money stock. 
Secondly, the free liquid reserves of commercial banks are commonly 
regarded as a "shock absorber", due to their high degree of 
liquidity. This implies that, if the bank's willingness to supply 
funds determines the aggregate level of credit and liquidity, then - 
given the balance sheet equality between banks' deposits and banks' 
assets - the level of free liquid reserves must be negatively 
correlated to the value of less liquid financial assets. 
The next section briefly surveys the empirical literature on 
commercial banks' free reserves and its theoretical foundations. 
Section 3 contains a brief non-formal description of the literature 
on (partially) irreversible investments under uncertainty, and a few 
considerations on how this kind of literature might be used as an 
interpretative tool to describe the behaviour of free liquid 
reserves. Section 4 presents a few empirical estimates based on a 
model that incorporates into the standard approach - based on the 
portfolio allocation theory -a few theoretical aspects of the 
literature analyzed in section 3. Section 5 draws a few conclusions. 
In particular, it will be argued that the empirical results shown in 
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this paper are consistent with the "credit view", such as 
illustrated in the famous contribution by Bernanke and Blinder 
[1988]. 
2. A few comments on some standard empirical works. 
The behaviour of the free liquidity ratio for commercial banks 
has often been related to the availability of liquidity and 
borrowing from the central bank (Langhor [1981], Wessels [1982], 
Richter and Teigen [1982]). The traditional background is provided 
by the portfolio allocation theory. The explanatory variables 
usually considered are the level of liquidity, such as determined by 
the public and by the foreign sector, some kind of opportunity cost, 
and the own yields on liquid assets, all of which summarized by some 
relevant interest rate. In most empirical contributions, as often 
happens for the estimates of financial variables, the explanatory 
power of the equations describing borrowing from the central bank, 
or commercial banks' free liquidity ratio is not very high. This 
fact is often justified by the high volatility of financial 
variables. 
The free reserves of commercial banks are in general assumed to 
depend positively on their own yield, and negatively on the yield on 
alternative assets, in accordance with the standard wealth 
allocation theory. In addition, the free liquid reserves can be 
regarded as a sort of "shock absorber" for commercial banks. In such 
a context, a new 
interpretation of the free liquidity ratio is 
possible, as we will see 
in the next section. 
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The rate of interest on riskless alternative liquid assets in 
Italy is traditionally the rate on short term treasury bills. The 
own yield on free reserves in Italy has been fixed at 0.5% for more 
than thirty years: obviously such a variable cannot describe 
properly the dynamics of the own yield on banks' free reserves. 
Arguing that free reserves are most required the more frequently the 
required reserves fluctuate, Richter and Teigen [1982] use the 
variance of constrained reserves as a proxy variable for the yield 
on free reserves. Since the required reserves ratio has been subject 
in Italy only to rare modifications, this solution does not seem to 
apply to the Italian case, and in any case, the variance of liquid 
constrained reserves over twelve months turned out to be non 
significant in preliminary analyses performed with our data. 
Some early studies (for example Cagan [1969]) consider the rate 
of interest on banks' borrowing from the central bank as a proxy for 
the yield on free reserves, because the higher the free reserves 
ratio, the less likely it is that the banks need to borrow from the 
central bank; and the higher the interest rate on banks' borrowing, 
the more convenient it is to keep reserves. This point could be 
criticized because the same reasoning could apply to the interbank 
rate, or to the "call money rate", whose behaviour is closely 
related to that of the treasury bill rate, which is regarded as an 
opportunity cost and not as a yield on reserves. 
To the extent that the free reserves of commercial banks play 
the role of "shock absorbers", an empirical specification describing 
their behaviour should include the information about shocks in the 
supply of liquidity determined by the public and foreign sectors. 
For this reason, Richter and Teigen [1982] included two more 
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variables for free liquid reserves of commercial banks in their 
equation: the first one is the ratio between the variation of the 
net central bank balances of the state, and the total deposits. The 
second is the ratio of the variation of the net foreign balances of 
the central bank and the total deposits. Richter and Teigen point 
out that the signs of the coefficients referred to these two 
regressors cannot be established a priori, and indeed in their 
estimates the sign of the coefficient of the latter variable changes 
throughout two different sample periods. In fact their size and 
dynamic path might reflect or determine expectations about future 
policy interventions: if, for example, the net foreign position of 
the central bank showed a persistent drastic variation, one could 
expect some intervention of the central bank, meant to affect the 
liquidity of the system, according to the monetary policy targets. 
Similarly, the size and dynamic path of the net central bank 
balances of the state could determine the expectations of some other 
policy decisions, such as open market operations. All these reasons 
suggest that the dynamic path of the liquidity created by the state 
and foreign sectors may be relevant not only for its direct effect, 
but also because they contribute to determine expectations about 
policy interventions. 
The rate of inflation, and, possibly, its rate of growth, could 
capture some of the opportunity costs of holding free liquid 
reserves, especially in a context like the Italian one, where the 
yield on free reserves has been kept constant at a very low level 
for Gthe* g time. 
setting of our model is only partly similar to that of f 
Richter and Teigen [1982], because the own yield on free liquid 
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reserves has been interpreted here according to the above-mentioned 
literature on investments with sunk costs under uncertainty. The 
next section contains a brief explanation of such theoretical 
approaches. 
3. A new possible interpretation of the free liquidity ratio for 
commercial banks. 
A new tool of interpretation for the free liquidity ratio of 
commercial banks may be provided by the recent literature on 
investment decisions under conditions of irreversibility and 
uncertainty (Bertola and Caballero [1991], Dixit [1992a], [1992b], 
Pindyck [1991]) - which provides a useful framework of 
interpretation for the decision of "non-investing" - and by a recent 
"new-keynesian" contribution which applies the conceptual framework 
of irreversible investment under uncertainty to the case where the 
decision of "non-investing" corresponds to a decision of investing 
in liquid assets (Chamley [1993]). The purpose of the discussion of 
the present section is to provide an alternative theoretical 
interpretation of the variable "yield" on the free reserves of 
commercial banks which has always been a weak point of the empirical 
works on this issue, given the fact that, as is well known, free 
reserves are usually non-remunerated and, therefore, the yield 
justifying their existence has to be defined on a more theoretical 
ground. Since many of the contributions mentioned early in this 
section provide exhaustive surveys on the literature on investments 
with sunk costs under uncertainty, only a brief summary of the main 
points of this approach will be presented in what follows. 
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The starting point of the literature on irreversible 
investments under uncertainty is provided by the observation that 
most models of investment decision are based on the implicit 
assumption that the investment expenditure is reversible. This is 
also one of the basic implicit hypotheses of the familiar "net 
present value" rule, stating that firms should take up a project of 
investment when the net present value of its cash flow is at least 
as large as its costs. 
In the real world, on the other hand, the investment decision 
usually takes place under the following conditions: 
a) sunk costs, due to the fact that the investment might be 
firm-specific or industry-specific; in the case of bank loans and 
financial investments the presence of sunk costs - from the point of 
view of the bank - is due to the presence of "lemon problems": in 
other words, the bank invests in financial assets carrying some 
intrinsic risk of capital losses, due not only to the possible 
bankruptcy of a borrower, but also to potential unexpected changes 
in the market interest rates, susceptible to determine a change in 
the market value of the bank loans and other financial assets; 
b) "on-going" uncertainty concerning the future profitability 
of the specific investment, the latter being only inferred on the 
basis of some probability calculus; 
c) relevance of decision timing: in other words, the investment 
can be delayed, allowing the firm (in our case the bank) to collect 
further information on all of the variables affecting the investment 




The three above-mentioned conditions imply that the investor 
(i. e., in this case the bank) has to take into account the presence 
of a potential positive "value of waiting". In this context, the 
investment decision has been described by using the parallel of the 
"call option" in financial economics: the financial investment is 
not undertaken 'when the financial investment is "only just in the 
money", while it is undertaken when the option is "well in the 
money". In other words, the traditional "net present value" rule 
could be transformed into a rule suggesting that an investment 
should be undertaken if the net present value of its cash flow 
exceeds the purchase and installation cost by an amount at least 
equal to the value of keeping the option to invest the same 
resources elsewhere. 
The problem could be simply described as follows. 
Let xt be a variable directly affecting the level of financial 
profits (for instance, the price of the financial asset under 
consideration), let n(xt) be an indicator of the profitability of 
the financial investment, and let F(xt+llxt) be the probability 
distribution of xt+ltxt, i. e. The probability distribution of xt+l 
given the value of xt. Then, the value of having in hand a financial 
investment can be defined as follows: 
co 
V1(x*) = Eo C ptn(xt)Ix0=x* ) 
t=O 
where pt is the factor of discount from the (future) time "t" to the 
present time to and Ep stands for "expectation at time to. 
The value Vp of having the option is given by the value of 
being free between choosing to invest immediately (by paying a given 
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immediate cost, say "k") and postponing the investment decision by 
one period. Formally, this could be described as follows. 
VO = max ( Vl(xt) - k, R"E[VO(xt+l)Ixt]} 
In the presence of uncertainty, and for given expectations of 
xt+l, it may be rational for the investor to postpone the investment 
and wait for new information. It can be proved12 that the higher the 
level of "on-going" uncertainty, the higher the value of "keeping 
alive" the option to invest in the future relative to the value of 
"having in hand" the investment project. In other words, an increase 
in the level of "on-going" uncertainty increases the "value of 
information". Dixit (1989,1992a, 1992b) has employed this simple 
idea to formally explain some empirical phenomena, such as the 
persistence of relatively high profit margins in the absence of 
barriers to entry. It-has also been pointed out (namely in Pindyck 
[1991] and Dixit [1992b]) that this same theoretical framework can 
be applied to the cases of financial investments and bank credit, to 
the extent that the presence of a "lemon premium" may cause 
financial investments to be partially irreversible. In many cases, 
the stochastic behaviour of the relevant state variable describing 
the "on-going" uncertainty (in our case xt) has been described by a 
geometric Brownian motion (Bertola and Caballero [1991], Dixit 
[1992a], Pindyck [1988]). 
The implications of these results for our analysis are quite 
straightforward. To the -extent that the future value of the bank 
assets is uncertain, the investment decision is partially 
irreversible because it carries some kind of sunk costs. Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to assume that for some financial investments 
12 See, for example Bertola and Caballero [1991] 
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the "value of waiting" is greater than the value of "having in hand" 
an investment project (i. e. a financial asset in our case). In such 
a context, the bank needs a sort of "buffer stock" asset; the 
investment into a "buffer stock" asset could be assimilated to a 
"non-investment" decision, taken in order to "wait" for more 
information about those specific financial investments that contain 
sunk costs. 
Chamley [1993] provides a rigourous formalization of the 
investment decision in a model where the investment in liquid assets 
corresponds to "non-investment". In his model, postponing 
investments enables the agents to gather information and to avoid 
investments in bad states. Chamley proves (among other results) that 
°... if the time interval to reverse the no-investment position is 
sufficiently short, the immediate investment by all agents cannot be 
an equilibrium outcome, because in this outcome, each agent has an 
incentive to postpone his investment in order to learn first the 
impact of aggregate investment on his individual payoff" (Chamley 
[1993] ). 
Assuming that the commercial banks' free liquid reserves play 
the role of temporary liquid assets, their demand will be higher the 
higher the "value of waiting", i. e. the higher the degree of 
uncertainty about the future value of financial investments. 
Since a big portion of banks' assets is constituted by direct 
credit to enterprises, it can be argued that the aggregate level of 
banks' free liquidity ratio (which is an aggregate stock of 
temporary liquid assets held by the banking system) might be 
affected by all those variables affecting the general degree of risk 
of the economy. An approximate measure of the risk of the economy 
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might be given by the rate of variation of the price level, since it 
typically carries uncertain and asymmetric effects on the economy as 
a whole. In such a context, if the yield on the free liquid reserves 
is given by the "value of waiting" for additional information on the 
financial investments, then the rate of growth of the price level 
should act as a proxy for the yield on the free liquid reserves. As 
a consequence, the free liquidity ratio should be positively 
correlated with the rate of growth of the price level. 
Obviously, the size of a temporary asset (like the free liquid 
reserves) might be affected by the volume of transactions performed 
by the banks and by the volume of credit intermediated. -A variable 
that might capture the effect of such a "transactionary" motivation 
on the free liquidity ratio might be the gross margin of banks' 
intermediation, or a proxy for it. 
In the empirical specification that follows, it has been 
assumed that the free liquid reserves of commercial banks behave at 
the same time as a financial market "buffer stock" asset (i. e. 
affected by considerations on the profitability of the financial 
investments and by the "value of waiting" for further information on 
the degree of riskiness of financial investments) and as a 
"transactionary" liquid asset, whose size is affected by the volume 
of transactions, determined by the margin of intermediation. 
4. The model 
The free liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio between the 
free reserves held by the commercial banks at the central banks and 
the total deposits. The estimates are based on quarterly data and 
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have been implemented by following the "general-to-specific" 
methodology. The definitions of all the variables considered and all 
the tables with all the estimates and diagnostic tests are shown in 
the Appendix. 
One of the main difficulties in building our model lies in the 
relevant institutional modifications that affected the Italian 
context throughout the sample period considered. In particular, 
among the most relevant phenomena, we can quote the gradual increase 
of importance of the stock market, and the birth of new kinds of 
financial intermediaries. 
Like in Richter and Teigen, it will be assumed that the free 
liquidity ratio for commercial banks depends on the level of the 
required reserves ratio, on the variations of the liquidity stock 
determined by the State and by the foreign sector, on the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves, and on the yield of liquid 
reserves (or on the convenience of holding them). The opportunity 
cost is typically described by a representative money market 
interest rate. For what concerns the own yield of liquid reserves, 
while Richter and Teigen consider that the free liquid reserves are 
most required the higher the variance of the reserve requirement, in 
this work it will be assumed - on the basis of the above-mentioned 
literature on investment under uncertainty and with sunk costs - 
that the free liquidity ratio depends positively on the degree of 
uncertainty of the whole economy, summarized by the-rate of growth 
of the price level. On the other hand, as far as a transactionary 
motivation for the liquid assets is also present, the free liquidity 
ratio should be positively correlated with the margin of 
intermediation - acting as a proxy for the volume of banks' 
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financial intermediation - given that the higher the profitability 
of the bank -intermediation, the higher the incentives to increase 
the existing stock of financial funds intermediated by the banks. 
If the financial investment of the banks is regarded as 
partially irreversible and subject to uncertainty, and is assumed to 
be alternative to the choice of keeping the funds invested in liquid 
assets, then the free liquidity ratio should be positively 
correlated to the "value of waiting " for further information about 
the new, financial investments, as argued above. If the "value of 
waiting" is a concept associated to the degree of uncertainty in the 
economy (in the sense that the higher the degree of uncertainty, the 
higher the value of "waiting for further information"), then the 
free liquidity ratio should be positively correlated with the rate 
of growth of the price level, which will be used here as a proxy for 
the degree of uncertainty of the whole economy. The° variable 
employed for this purpose is the rate of variation of the implicit 
deflator of the gross domestic product, henceforth DINF. In fact, it 
is the rate of growth of the price level, rather than the price 
level itself, that best captures the concept of "on-going 
uncertainty", since a constant increase on the price level (i. e. a 
non-stationary trend in the prices time series) could be associated 
to a situation of constant inflation and static expectations, while, 
on the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that it is a trend in 
the Increase in the price levels (i. e. a trend in the rate of growth 
of the price index) that more directly and explicitly affects the 
degree of uncertainty for the agents of the economy', by making more 
difficult for them to make inferences on the continuously changeable 
causal links existing among the different variables. Since the rate 
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of growth of the price level is calculated with respect to two 
consequent periods of time, a qualitatively similar information 
could be captured by a suitable lag structure of the price level. 
Therefore, an alternative specification has also been implemented, 
which includes the price level (whose suitable lag structure will 
again be determined by following the general-to-specific approach) 
instead of its rate of growth DINF. 
In the present model, the dependent variable is defined, like 
in Richter and Teigen [1982], as the ratio between the free bank 
reserves - or unconstrained banks' reserves - and total bank 
deposits, i. e. the current account, saving deposits, plus the 
deposit certificates of central banks. In the estimates, such a 
variable is defined as W. Like Richter and Teigen, we assume that 
free reserves are affected by the behaviour of reserves 
requirements, but, unlike Richter and Teigen, the variance of 
reserves requirements is not regarded here as a proxy for the yield 
(or convenience) of holding free reserves, but, like in Richter and 
Teigen, it is still assumed that higher levels of reserve 
requirements would reduce the need for free reserves as a liquid 
asset, given that liquidity would in that case be less scarce (since 
the banks might be able, in case of need, to temporarily and costly 
diverge from the reserve requirements). For this reason, it is 
assumed here that the free liquidity ratio is negatively correlated 
with the coefficient of reserves requirements (defined as L1). Using 
the levels of L1 instead of its variance as a regressor constitutes, 
in our opinion, a more general approach: in fact, since we are 
following the general-to specific methodology, and our general 
unrestricted model contains four lags, if it is the variability 
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rather than the level of reserve requirements that matters, this 
should be evident from the final dynamic structure of the model, 
which could suggest, if necessary, a re-specification of the whole 
model, according to the results of the diagnostic tests. However, it 
is assumed here that the required reserves are relevant also because 
the higher their level, the more costly (in terms of opportunity 
cost) it is to keep free liquid reserves, because in this way the 
banks have to waive a larger amount of potentially profitable 
financial investments. For this purpose, the variable considered 
here is defined as L1, and is the ratio between the constrained 
reserves and the total deposits. As will be pointed out later, and 
also in the tables of the appendix, the lagged values of L1 are not 
significant in the general unrestricted model with four lags. This 
confirms the fact that the variable Li seems to be significant in 
its level rather than in its variance. 
Like in Richter and Teigen, it is assumed that the free 
liquidity ratio is affected by the variations in the aggregate 
liquidity determined by the public sector and the foreign sector. 
the two variables here considered for this purpose are quite similar 
to the ones employed by Richter and Teigen: the first is defined as 
G and is the ratio between the variation of the credits of the Bank 
of Italy with the Public Sector and the average level of bank 
deposits over the considered period; the second, defined as FX, is 
the ratio between the variation of the net foreign position of the 
bank of Italy and the average level of deposits over the considered 
period. 
As mentioned earlier, and on the basis of the literature on 
investments irreversibility, we assume that the free liquidity ratio 
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should be higher the higher the degree of uncertainty and risk 
characterizing the whole economy. Therefore, since in the present 
model the proxy for the "value of waiting" is (as discussed above) 
DINF, then the dependent variable L3 is expected to be positively 
correlated with DINF. However, an alternative specification of a 
general unrestricted model containing a lag polynomial in the 
variable P (the implicit GDP deflator) instead of DINF will be 
considered. The results of such an alternative specification are - 
as we will see later - analogous to those of the specification with 
DINF. 
Finally, the variable RDIFF3, defined as the difference between 
the rate of interest on the bonds issued by special credit 
institutions (RBCI) and the rate of discount (RD), has been 
considered. There are several reasons that justify a variable so 
defined. First of all, RBCI can be regarded as a representative 
medium-long term interest rate, while RD is - obviously -a typical 
money market interest rate. Therefore RDIFF3 contains information on 
the time structure of the interest rate, whose modifications may 
determine re-allocations of the banks' assets. To the extent that 
the free reserves are a temporary liquid asset, their relative size 
should be positively correlated to the volume of funds re- 
allocations performed by the banks. 
Secondly, RDIFF3 could be regarded as a proxy for banks' 
profitability because, being determined by the difference between a 
long run and a short run interest rate (and containing therefore 
information on the term structure of the interest rates), it 
provides information about one of the most typical roles of the 
banking system: transforming the maturity and degree of risk of 
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financial assets. In addition, in Italy, for a large part of the 
time series here considered, many small banks operating only locally 
had been investing most of their funds in assets issued by special 
credit institutions operating in the medium and long run. This 
situation gave rise to the phenomenon known in the Italian context 
as "double intermediation". 
To the extent that RDIFF3 contains information on banks' 
profitability, it should be regarded as an opportunity cost of 
holding free reserves, and should be expected to be negatively 
correlated with W. On the other hand, if the free liquid reserves 
are mainly a temporary liquid asset, determined by the process of 
funds re-allocation, we should expect the variations of RDIFF3 to be 
positively correlated with L3, because changes in the term structure 
of the interest rate should determine a re-allocations of the banks' 
financial funds. 
The signs of the various coefficients of the lag polynomial of 
RDIFF3 can tell us whether free liquid reserves have to be 
interpreted as a temporary asset held in the process of transactions 
and re-allocations, or according to the wealth allocation theory, 
which would suggest that RDIFF3 plays the role of an opportunity 
cost, and should therefore be negatively correlated with W. 
The time series considered for the estimates start in 1975, in 
order to exclude the year of the first oil shock, 1974. Since 
quarterly data have been employed for the estimates, a general 
unrestricted model with four lags has been defined, since, as argued 
by the econometric literature, such a number of lags is sufficient 
to "capture" the dynamic behaviour of a model defined over quarterly 
data. 
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In some preliminary analyses, a lag polynomial of the three 
months treasury bill, which is one of the most relevant money market 
interest rates in the Italian context (and which had been 
successfully employed in a previous version of the present model, 
estimated over a shorter sample period), turned out to be non 
significant in a general model including lag polynomials in L1, FX, 
G, RDIFF3, or in L1, FX, G, RDIFF3, or in Li, FX, G, DINF. 
Other variables (as the treasury bills rate, the call money 
rate, the interbank rate, the interest rate on long term government 
bonds, the stock market index and its variance over the last twelve 
months, or its variation weighted with the variance over the last 
twelve months) that have been regarded as' proxies for the 
opportunity costs in other empirical works on banks' liquid reserves 
turned out to be non significant or less significant. 
The package MICROFIT version 3.0 has been employed for the 
estimates. 
The appendix contains the definition of all the variables and 
the tables containing the results of the estimates and the tests in 
detail. 
Following the general-to-specific methodology, the following 
general unrestricted model with four lags has been estimated. 
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L3 = const +E ai L3t-i +E Ni FXt-i +E Ti Gt-i + i=1 i=0 1=0 
44 
+E ni RDIFF3t-i +E 6i DINFt-i + et; with e- N(o, a2) (1 
i=0 i=0 
The data employed for the estimates start from 1975, first 
quarter, but, since the model employed for the estimates contains 
four lags, the period covered by the estimates starts in 1976, first 
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quarter. The estimates have been run over the sample period 1976 QI- 
1991 QIV, and over the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV, both for 
the general unrestricted model and for the restricted one. The 
latter sample period has been considered in order to be able to 
perform the predictive failure test, although this implies a loss of 
degrees of freedom. 
Table 1 in the appendix contains the results of the estimates 
and diagnostic tests of the general unrestricted model over the 
sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV. In the Chi-square version of the 
functional form test, HO is rejected both at the level of confidence 
of 0.95 and 0.99; in the F-version of the same test, HO is 
marginally rejected at the level of confidence of 0.95, while it is 
not rejected at the level of confidence of 0.99. The failure of the 
functional form test, which usually indicates that the function is 
not properly specified, might be due, in this case, to the fact that 
the general unrestricted model has a low number of degrees of 
freedom over the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV, since the results 
in this regard are much better in the restricted model. and over the 
sample period 1976 QI - 1991 QIV, both for the general unrestricted 
and for the restricted model. 
The general unrestricted model estimated over the sample period 
1976 QI - 1989 QIV also marginally fails, at the level of confidence 
of 0.95, both the Chi-square and the F version of the 
heteroscedasticity test, while HO is rejected at the level of 
confidence of 0.99. This, again, might be caused by the low number 
of the degrees of freedom, since the general unrestricted model, 
when estimated over the complete sample period, largely passes the 
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Heteroscedasticity tests both in the Chi-square and in the F 
version, at the level of confidence of 0.95. 
However, Table 1 shows that the remaining diagnostic tests 
(serial correlation, normality, predictive failure) do not present 
any problem over the sample period 1976 QI -1989 QIV. 
Table 2 shows the variable deletion test on the restrictions on 
the general model that determines the final "parsimonious" 
specification, shown in detail in table 3 and briefly reported here. 
L3 = 0.019335 -0.085682 L1 +0.067034 FX +0.099713 G+ 
+0.0010731 RDIFF3 +0.10260 DINF-3 -0.0015241 RDIFF3-4 + 
+0.25831 L3-4 (2 
R2 = 0.65962 
Table 3 shows that the specification suggested in the 
restricted model largely passes all the diagnostic tests at the 
level of confidence of 0.95. 
A first look at the dynamic specification obtained suggests 
that the behaviour of the free liquidity ratio is inconsistent with 
the assumption (made also by Richter and Teigen [1982] a priori) of 
instantaneous adjustment of the free liquid reserves. Such an 
assumption was motivated by the hypothesis of rational expectation 
in financial markets. This does not mean that the rational 
expectation hypothesis must necessarily be rejected, but it suggests 
that some delays in the adjustment of the variables (consistent with 
some form of rationality of the agents) exist. 
. quation 2 can be reparametrized according to the following 
pattern: 
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L3 = const + ßp Li + ß1 FX + ß2 G+ ß3 RDIFF3 + 
+ß4 DINF-4 + ß5 (RDIFF3-RDIFF3-4) + ß6 L3-4 (3 
Equation 4 yields the following equation, estimated over the 
sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV: 
L3 = 0.019335 -0.085682 L1 +0.067034 FX +0.099713 G+ 
-0.0004511 RDIFF3 +0.10260 DINF_3 
+0.25831 L3-4 + 0.0015241 (RDIFF3-RDIFF3_4); (4 
According to the theoretical background presented in the 
previous (and partly in the present) section, the coefficient p3 of 
the variable RDIFF3 is expected to be negative, since it may be 
regarded as an opportunity cost for holding liquid assets. On the 
other hand, the coefficient ß5 of the term (RDIFF3-RDIFF3-4) is 
expected to be positive, since it could be associated to a variation 
in the potential bank profitability, or in the term structure of the 
interest rate. In fact, such phenomena would determine a re- 
allocation of the bank's financial assets, which could increase the 
amount of liquidity necessary for the bank's transactionary purpose. 
The lagged value of L3 appearing in all of the restricted 
specifications may be determined by adjustment costs. 
The sign of the coefficient referred to DINF is positive. This 
suggests that the increase in the price level may not be regarded as 
an opportunity cost, but can rather be interpreted in accordance to 
the literature on investments with sunk costs and under uncertainty. 
In fact, if the bank credit and some kinds of financial assets are 
regarded as (partially) irreversible investments, the higher the 
level of uncertainty and risk of the whole economy - signaled by the 
rate of growth of the price level DINF - and the higher the "value 
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of waiting", the higher. the incentives for the banks to keep some 
funds in perfectly liquid temporary (and costlessly reversible) 
assets, such as the free liquid reserves held at the central bank. 
Intuitively, one could think of a "transactionary" component of 
the demand for banks' liquid reserves, positively correlated with 
the term (RDIFF3-RDIFF3-4), and a "speculative" component positively 
correlated with DINF. On the other hand, the present level of the 
variable RDIFF3 could be regarded as an opportunity cost for holding 
reserves. 
Table 4 shows the general unrestricted model estimated over the 
complete sample period 1976 QI - 1991 QIV, which yields satisfactory 
results in almost all of the diagnostic tests, except the Chi-square 
version of the functional form test, at the level of confidence of 
0.95 (while for the same test H0 is rejected at the level of 
confidence of 0.99), and the f version of the same test, at the 
level of confidence of 0.95. 
Table 5 contains the variable deletion test which determines 
the final specification, and shows that the general unrestricted 
model estimated over the sample period 1976 QI - 1991 QIV supports 
the same restrictions as the one estimated over the sample period 
1976 QI - 1989 QIV. Table 6 shows the final specification of the 
model, the same as the one obtained for the sample period 1976 QI - 
1989 QIV, which yields satisfactory results in all of the diagnostic 
tests. 
The values of the parameters of the restricted model seem to be 
very close in the estimates performed in the two different sample 
periods. Even in the estimates using the whole sample (i. e. 1976 QI 
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- 1991 QIV), the restricted model can be reparametrized according to 
the pattern of equation 3, obtaining the following estimate. 
L3 = 0.023203 -0.114752 L1 +0.076871 FX +0.078367 G+ 
-0.0008477 RDIFF3 +0.10131 DINF_3 
+0.30852 L3_4 + 0.0016986 (RDIFF3-RDIFF3_4); (5 
R2 = 0.68225 
Since the variable DINF is defined as the rate of variation of the 
price level, a similar kind of information - as far as the dynamic 
behaviour of the price level is concerned - should be obtained by 
introducing in an ADL model a lag polynomial in the price level P, 
instead of a lag polynomial in the variable DINF. Table 7 shows a 
model of this kind estimated over the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 
QIV, and table 10 over the sample period 1976 QI - 1991 QIV. In both 
cases the general unrestricted model yields satisfactory results for 
almost all of the diagnostic tests, excepting the functional form 
test. Table 8 (for the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV) and table 
11 (for the sample period 1976 QI 1991 QIV) show the variable 
deletion tests performed in order to test a restricted model 
containing P-3 and P_4 instead of the three-period-lagged rate of 
variation of the prices (DINF_3). 
Table 9 (for the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV) and table 12 
(for the sample period 1976 QI - 1991 QIV) show the final 
specification containing the two lagged variables P-3 and P-4 
instead of DINF-3. As is shown in both tables, the restricted model 
passes almost all of the diagnostic tests, excepting (marginally) 
the functional form test, over the sample period 1976 QI - 1989 QIV. 
The better performances of the model containing the variable DINF 
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could suggest that this variable better captures the "on-going 
uncertainty", associated to the "value of waiting" that could be 
imagined as the original motivation for the liquidity preference of 
the bank. However, apart from the functional form diagnostic test, 
the results of table 9 are very similar to those of table 3, and 
those of table 12 are very similar to those of table 6, as expected. 
This suggests that the specification obtained from a model including 
a lag polynomial in the variable DINF is analogous and consistent 
with the specification obtained from a general unrestricted model 
with a lag polynomial in the price level. 
5. Conclusions. 
The empirical results presented here suggest that the behaviour 
of the banks' free liquidity ratio can be interpreted according to a 
theoretical framework based on the implications of the recent 
literature on investments under uncertainty and with sunk costs. 
Such a framework justifies - for the banks -a particular concept of 
"speculative" and "transactionary" demand for money, which shows 
many similarities with the Keynesian liquidity preference theory. In 
fact, in this context, the free liquid reserves could be interpreted 
as temporary and liquid assets that the banks hold in the process of 
collecting information about (partially). irreversible financial 
investments, or in the process of reallocating their funds. 
According to the theoretical framework followed in this paper, the 
amount of free liquid reserves depends on the "value of waiting" for 
new information about the possible investments in (less liquid) 
financial assets. Increases in the "value of waiting" may be due to 
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the increase in the degree of uncertainty and riskiness of the whole 
economy such as perceived by the banks. In this model it has been 
assumed that the rate of growth of the price level (the variable 
DINF) or, alternatively, some measure of variation of the price 
level - obtained form the general-to-specific methodology can be 
regarded as a proxy for the degree of uncertainty and risk of the 
aggregate economy. 
The "value of waiting" may also be correlated with the increase 
in the profitability of the banks (summarized in our specific case 
by the difference RDIFF3-RDIFF3-4, ), to the extent that this might 
generate a process of reallocation of the financial investments of 
the banks, requiring a temporary "transactionary" liquid asset. In 
our specific case, the difference RDIFF3-RDIFF3-4, such as 
determined by the general-to-specific methodology, may be regarded 
as the variation of the banks' potential profitability, since the 
variable RDIFF3 is a proxy for the banks' gross margin of 
intermediation. 
The theoretical approach to the banks' behaviour followed in 
this chapter and supported by the empirical analysis carries some 
relevant macroeconomic implications. In particular, the results are 
consistent with the "credit view" and with those macroeconomic 
models (like Bernanke and Blinder [1988], described in the chapter 1 
of this thesis) which emphasize the willingness of banks to invest 
and their perception of the degree of risk and uncertainty of the 
whole economy, and attribute to these factors a key role in the 
determination of the aggregate level of credit, liquidity and 
output. 
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APPENDIX 
List and description of the variables 
BLIQ = Commercial Banks free reserves held at the Bank of Italy 
(also defined as BLIQ = BRES - REQRES); 
BRES = BLIQ + REQRES; 
DBITE = FBITES-FBITES-1; 
DEP = Current account, saving deposits and certificates of deposit 
of commercial banks; 
DEPAV = (DEP + DEP_1)/2; 
DFX = FXBI - FXBI-1; 
DINF = (P - P-1)/P-1; 
DBITE = Credits of the Italian Central Bank with the Italian 
Treasury; 
G= DBITE/DEPAV; 
FXBI = net foreign position of the Italian Central Bank; 
L1 = REQRES/DEP; 
L3 = BLIQ/DEP; 
P= implicit deflator of the Italian GDP; 
RBCI = rate of interest on the bonds of special credit institutions; 
RD = official rate of discount; 
RDIFF3 = RBCI-RD; 
REQRES = required reserves of the commercial banks; 
The source of the data is "Supplemento al Bollettino Statistico 
della Banca d'Italia", with the exception of the variables P and 
RBCI, whose time series have been provided by DATASTREAM Services 
(at the Univewrsity of Warwick), on the basis of OECD and Bank of 
Italy data. 
Diagnostic Tests 
The diagnostic test performed in the tables that follows are 
those provided by the package MICROFIT 3.0, briefly described in the 
appendix to the third chapter. 
TABLE 1 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
56 Observations : 76Q1 - 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST -. 0037698 . 025605 -. 14723 L1 -. 31016 . 17114 -1.8123 FX . 064257 . 041937 1.5322 G . 18029 . 059156 3.0478 RDIFF3 . 0010357 . 6947E-3 1.4909 DINF -. 12189 . 083007 -1.4684 L3-: L -. 086127 . 19064 -. 45178 L1-i . 094389 . 10124 . 93320 FX-i . 023941 . 038019 . 62970 G-3. . 092621 . 060976 1.5190 RDIFF3-i . 1067E-3 . 7204E-3 . 14815 DINF-i -. 10944 . 082970 -1.3190 L3-2 . 083835 . 15496 . 54100 L1-2 . 015078 . 10908 . 13823 FX-2 . 062467 . 040045 1.5599 G-2 . 014034 . 062966 . 22289 RDIFF3-2 . 7158E-3 . 7266E-3 . 98512 DINF-2 . 13966 . 079568 1.7553 L3-3 . 22209 . 16504 1.3457 L1-3 -. 062563 . 10775 -. 58065 FX-3 -. 057762 . 038407 -1.5039 G-3 -. 069076 . 053503 -1.2911 RDIFF3-3 -. 9141E-3 . 7106E-3 -1.2864 DINF-3 . 26125 . 080241 3.2559 L3-4 . 39815 . 15193 2.6206 L1-4 . 28406 . 18816 1.5096 FX-4 -. 047411 . 038738 -1.2239 G-4 -. 066266 . 052619 -1.2594 RDIFF3-4 -. 0015988 . 7358E-3 -2.1729 DINF-4 -. 010158 . 072631 -. 13986 






Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 8.3230 F( 4,22) . 96014 Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 8.2662 F( 1,25) 4.3294 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 2.7169 not applicable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 4.3516 F( 1,54) 4.5498 
Predictive failure Chi-sq( 8) 8.3876 F( 8,26) 1.0484 
TABLE 2: Variable Deletion Test (OLS) 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
List of the variables to be deleted from the regression: 
DINF 
L3-i L1-i FX-1 G-i RDIFF3-i DINF-i 
L3-2 L1-2 FX-2 G-2 RDIFF3-2 DINF-2 
L3-3 L1-3 FX-3 G-s RDIFF3-3 
L1-4 FX-4 G-4 DINF-4'- 
56 Observations used for estimation from 76Q1 to 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 019335 . 011803 1.6381 L1 -. 085682 . 061803 -1.3864 FX . 067034 . 030737 2.1809 G . 099713 . 035553 2.8046 RDIFF3 . 0010731 . 3833E-3 2.7999 
"DINF-3 . 10260 . 051390 1.9966 RDIFF3-4 -. 0015241 . 3806E-3' -4.0045 L3-4 . 25831 . 094211 2.7418 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SQ(22): 24.0317 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(22): 31.3940 
F Statistic F(22,26) : . 88842 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
56 Observations : 76Q1 - 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 019335 . 011803 1.6381 Li -. 085682 . 061803 -1.3864 FX . 067034 . 030737 2.1809 G . 099713 . 035553 2.8046 RDIFF3 . 0010731 . 3833E-3 2.7999 DINF-3 . 10260 . 051390 1.9966 RDIFF3-4 -. 0015241 . 3806E-3 -4.0045 L3-4 . 25831 . 094211 2.7418 
R-squared . 65962 F - test( 7,48) 13.2887 Residual sum of sq. . 5084E-3 Regression S. E. . 0032543 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0052110 Mean of dep. var. . 013338 DW - stat. 2.0719 Max. log-likelihood 245.6106 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 5.9674 F( 4,44) 1.3120 
Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 2.7788 F( 1,47) 2.4540 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 2.4170 not appl icable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 3.1793 F( 1,54) 3.2502 




: L3 (ordinary least squares) 
: 76Q1 - 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 015878 . 019723 . 80504 
L1 -. 20250 . 13861 -1.4608 
FX . 089845 . 039545 2.2720 
G . 12392 . 053117 2.3330 
RDIFF3 . 4820E-3 . 6231E-3 . 77354 
DINF -. 085172 . 074139 -1.1488 
L3-1 -. 015069 . 16242 -. 092777 
L1-i . 026848 . 091035 . 29492 
FX-1 . 0063814 . 036042 . 17705 
G-1 . 034838 . 050171 . 69439 
RDIFF3-i -. 3810E-4 . 6737E-3 -. 056555 
DINF-i -. 046302 . 074278 -. 62337 
L3-2 . 10135 . 13861 . 73119 
L1-2 -. 022660 . 089866 -. 25209 
FX-2 . 037804 . 036066 1.0482 
G-2 -. 014769 . 051956 -. 28427 
RDIFF3-2 . 2243E-3 . 6777E-3 . 33101 DINF-2 . 11549 . 072098 1.6019 
L3-3 . 32542 . 14593 2.2299 
L1-3 -. 035279 . 086196 -. 40929 
FX-s -. 051524 . 034605 -1.4689 
G-3 -. 093654 . 046633 -2.0083 
RDIFF3-3 -. 9606E-3 . 6983E-3 -1.3756 
DINF-3 . 19516 . 069629 2.8028 
L3-4 . 37860 . 13897 2.7243 L1-4 . 12062 . 14188 . 85014 FX-4 -. 040350 . 036806 -1.0963 G-4 -. 090393 . 046476 -1.9449 RDIFF3-4 -. 0019906 . 6784E-3 -2.9342 DINF-4 -. 014627 . 064359 -. 22711 
R-sciuared . 79299 F- test(29,34) 4.4912 
Residual sum of sq. . 3838E-3 Regression S. E. . 0033599 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0054250 Mean of dep. var. . 012533 DW - stat. 1.8960 Max. log-likelihood 293.9631 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 5.4641 F( 4,30) . 70009 Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 5.8889 F( 1,33) 3.3442 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 5.1442 no t applicable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 2.2943 F( 1,62) 2.3053 
TABLE 5: Variable Deletion Test (OLS) 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
List of the variables to be deleted from the regression: 
DINF 
L3-i Li-z FX-i G-i RDIFF3-i DINF-i 
L3-2 L1-2 FX-2 G-2 RDIFF3-2 DINF-2 
L3-s L1-3 FX-3 G-3 RDIFF3-3 
L1-4 FX-4 G-4 DINF-4 
64 Observations used for estimation from 76Q1 to 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 023203 . 0098608 2.3530 
Li -. 11475 _050595 -2.2680 FX . 076871 . 029799 2.5797 
G . 078367 . 031487 2.4888 
RDIFF3 . 8509E-3 . 3498E-3 2.4326 
DINF-3 . 10131' . 048108.2.1060 RDIFF3-4 -. 0016986 . 3699E-3 -4.5919 L3-4 . 30852 . 086850 3.5523 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SQ(22): 22.3052 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(22): 27.4245 




Dependent Variable L3 (ordinary least squares) 
64 Observations : 76Q1 - 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 023203 . 0098608. 2.3530 L1 -. 11475 . 050595 -2.2680 FX . 076871 . 029799 2.5797 G . 078367 . 031487 2.4888 RDIFF3 . 8509E-3 . 3498E-3 2.4326 DINF-3 . 10131 . 048108 2.1060 RDIFF3-4 -. 0016986 . 3699E-3 -4.5919 L3-4 . 30852 . 086850 3.5523 
R-squared . 68225 F - test(29,34) 17.1771 
Residual sum of sq. . 5891E-3 Regression S. E. . 0032435 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0054250 Mean of dep. var. . 012533 DW - stat. 1.9467 'Max. log-likelihood 280.2508 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 6.5191 F( 4,52) 1.4744 
Functional form Chi-sq( 1) . 46637 F( 1,55) . 40373 Normality Chi-sq( 2) 5.1661 not appl icable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 2.9345 F( 1,62) 2.9794 
TABLE 7 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
56 Observations : 76Q1 - 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST -. 088081 . 054782 -1.6078 L1 -. 019680 . 21159 -. 093008 FX . 045630 . 046148 . 98879 G . 18519 . 060375 3.0673 RDIFF3 . 0010022 . 7014E-3 1.4288 p -. 5119E-3 . 0012622 -. 40556 L3-i . 071497 . 18747 . 38138 Li-i . 32218 . 15231 2.1153 FX-i . 029063 . 038270 . 75943 
G-i . 080636 . 061162 1.3184 
RDIFF3-i . 1226E-3 . 7592E-3 . 16149 
P-1 . 2297E-3 . 0016815 . 13662 
L3-2 . 15190 . 16786 . 90493 L1-2 . 13172 . 14056 . 93712 
FX-2 . 050455 . 039503 1.2772 
G-2 -. 013772 . 57196 -. 24079 RDIFF3-2 . 4703E-3 . 7348E-3 . 64007 P-2 . 0030587 . 0018026 1.6969 L3-3 . 19322 . 17076 1.1315 L1-3 . 085022 . 12049 . 70566 FX-3 -. 059549 . 037958 -1.5688 G-. s -. 082098 . 052031 -1.5779 RDIFF3-3 -. 0013316 . 7432E-3 -1.7917 P-3 . 0015483 . 0017813 . 86924 L3-4 . 32562 . 16212 2.0085 L1-4 . 17166 . 18877 . 90938 
. FX-a -. 
060466 
. 039796 -1.5194 G-4 -. 045978 . 050575 -. 90910 RDIFF3-4 -. 0012928 . 7808E-3 -1.6558 P-4 -. 0047610 . 0015283 -3.1153 
R-squared . 79099 F - test(29,26) 3.3929 Residual sum of sq. . 3122E-3 Regression S. E. . 0034650 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0052110 Mean of dep. var. . 013338 DW - stat. 1.8073 Max. log-likelihood 259.2647 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F versio n 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 4.4100 F( 4,22) . 47015 Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 15.7970 F( 1,25) 9.8233 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) . 80449 not appl icable Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 2.0559 F( 1,54) 2.0580 
Predictive failure Chi-sq( 8) 8.4959 F( 5,26) 1.0620 
TABLE 8: Variable Deletion Test (OLS) 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
List of the variables to be deleted from the regression: 
P 
L3-i L1-i FX-i G-s RDIFF3-i P-1 
L3-2 Ll-2 FX-2 G-2 RDIFF3-2 P-2 
L3-3 L1-3 FX-3 G-3 RDIFF3-3 
L1-4 FX-4 G-4 
56 Observations used for estimation from 76Q1 to 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 022851 . 011802 1.9362 
L1 -. 069551 . 078939 -. 88107 FX . 076169 . 031505 2.4177 G . 092573 . 035773 2.5878 RDIFF3 . 97577E-3 . 4035E-3 2.4179 P-3 . 0010826 . 7893E-3 1.3715 P-4 -. 0011457 . 8115E-3 -1.4119 RDIFF3-4 -. 0016866 . 4163E-3 -4.0513 L3-4 . 22610 . 093781 2.4109 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic C HI-SQ(21): 22.4504 
Likelihood Ratio St atistic C HI-SQ(21): 28.6902 
F Statistic F(21,26) : . 82849 
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Table 9 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
56 Observations : 76Q1 - 89Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 022851 . 011802- 1.9362 Li -. 069551 . 078939 -. 88107 FX . 076169 . 031505 2.4177 G . 092573 . 035773 2.5878 RDIFF3 . 97577E-3 . 4035E=3 2.4179 P-3 . 0010826 . 7893E-3 1.3715 P-4 -. 0011457 . 8115E-3 -1.4119 RDIFF3-4 -. 0016866 . 4163E-3 -4.0513 L3-4 . 22610 . 093781 2.4109 
R-squared . 65112 F - test( 7,48) 10.9646 
Residual sum of sq. . 5211E-3" Re gression S. E. . 0033296 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0052110 Me an of dep. var. . 013338 DW - stat. 2.0608 Ma x. log-likelihood 244.9196 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 5.2847 F( 4,43) 1.1202 
Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 5.9604 F( 1,46) 5.4793 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 1.4179 not appl icable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 2.3787 F( 1,54) 2.3955 
Predictive failure Chi-sq( 8) 4.0846 F( 8,47) . 51058 
TABLE 10 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
64 Observations : 76Q1 - 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST -. 027609 . 035760 -. 77208 
LI -. 13364 . 14692 -. 909618 
FX . 062601 . 044485 -. 90961 
G . 11718 . 052976 2.2120 
RDIFF3 . 7645E-3 . 6298E-3 1.2139 
p -. 8587E-3 . 9488E-3 -. 90501 
L3-i . 0013699 . 16293 . 0084079 
Li-i . 11704 . 11454 1.0218 
FX-i . 0084395 . 036263 . 
23273 
G-1 . 039619 . 053049 . 
74685 
RDIFF3-i . 9685E-3 . 7091E-3 . 13658 
p-1 . 0011425 . 0013807 . 82745 
L3-2 . 071539 . 13782 . 51908 
L1-2 . 048689 . 10574 . 
46045 
FX-2 . 027483 . 036561 . 
75171 
G-2 -. 0038531 . 050140 -. 076846 
RDIFF3-2 . 1221E-3 . 6928E-3 . 17625 
P-2 . 0014074 . 0014722 . 
95597 
L3-3 . 22319 . 14767 
1.5114 
L1-3 . 088914 . 10468 . 84938 
FX-3 -. 044169 . 035229 -1.2538 
G-3 -. 075577 . 045169 -1.6732 
RDIFF3-3 -. 0012158 . 7317E-3 -1.6615 
P-3 . 9361E-3 . 0014937 . 
62666 
L3-4 . 31198 . 14413 2.1645 
L1-4 . 16089 . 15120 1.0641 
FX-4 -. 052233 . 038418 -1.3596 
G-4 -. 054721 . 045103 -1.2132 
RDIFF3-4 -. 0014132 . 7362E-3 -1.9197 
P-4 -. 0028906 . 0011715 -2.4673 
R-squared . 77662 F - test(29,34) 4.0762 
Residual sum of sq. . 4142E-3 Regression S. E. . 0034902 
S. D. of dep. var.. . 0054250 Mean of dep. var. . 012533 
DW - stat. 1.8245 Max. log-likelihood 291.5277 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F versi on 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 5.6936 F( 4, 
'30) 
. 73237 
Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 11.4200 F( 1,33 ) 7.1674 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 1.6863 not applicable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 1.7314 F( 1,62) 1.7239 
TABLE 11: Variable Deletion Test (OLS) 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
List of the variables to be deleted from the regression: 
P 
L3-i L1-i FX-i G-i RDIFF3-i P-i 
L3-2 L1-2 FX-2 G-2 RDIFF3-2 P-2 
L3-3 L1-3 TX-3 G-3 RDIFF3-3 
L1-4 FX-4 G-4 
64 Observations used for estimation from 76Q1 to 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 020968 . 0095354 2.1989 
Li -. 050117 . 064032 -. 78269 
FX . 081942 . 029312 2.7955 
G . 083338 . 031282 2.6641 
RDIFF3 . 83547E-3 . 6880E-3 1.3681 
P-3 . 94138E-3 . 6880E-3 1.3681 
P-4 -. 0010241 . 
7027E-3 -1.4574 
RDIFF3-4 -. 0018415 . 3734E-3 -4.9314 
L3-4 . 25501 . 
084727 3.0097 
Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
deleted variables: 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic CHI-SQ(21): 17.1962 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic CHI-SQ(22): 20.0268 
F Statistic F(22,26) : . 59485 
Table 12 
Dependent Variable : L3 (ordinary least squares) 
64 Observations : 76Q1 - 91Q4 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio 
CONST . 020968 . 0095354 2.1989 L1 -. 050117 _ . 064032" -. 78269 FX . 081942 . 029312 2.7955 G . 083338 . 031282 2.6641 RDIFF3 . 83547E-3 . 6880E-3 1.3681 P-3 . 94138E-3 . 6880E-3 1.3681 p-4 -. 0010241 . 7027E-3 -1.4574 RDIFF3-4 -. 0018415 . 3734E-3 -4.9314 L3-4 . 25501 . 084727 3.0097 
R-squared . 69455 F - test( 8,55) 15.6330 
Residual sum of sq. . 5663E-3 Re gression S. E. . 0032089 S. D. of dep. var.. . 0054250- Me an of dep. var. . 012533 DW - stat. 2.0484 Max. log-likelihood 281.5144 
Diagnostic tests 
Test statistics LM version F version 
Serial correlation Chi-sq( 4) 5.2806 F( 4,51) 1.1466 
Functional form Chi-sq( 1) 2.84264 F( 1,54) 2.5099 
Normality Chi-sq( 2) 3.1569 not appl icable 
Heteroscedasticity Chi-sq( 1) 3.0690 F( 1,62) 3.1229 
OBS. BLIQ DEP FBITES FXBI P RBCI 
75Q1 2459.0 82485.0 21642.9 391.2000 22.5000 10.4800 
75Q2 2636.0 85676.0 23063.6 441.4000 22.9000 10.7800 
75Q3 3861.0 90621.0 24995.9 -633.3000 23.4000 10.8000 
75Q4 3414.0 99854.0 29533.0 -1366.6 24.0000 10.6600 
76Q1 1993.0 103828.0 32561.7 -3161.4 25.0000 12.6000 
76Q2 1865.0 105436.0 36003.6 -3318.8 26.7000 13.8700 
76Q3 1398.0 109025.0 37168.2 -2726.4 28.0000 13.7100 
76Q4 2383.0 121569.0 39511.0 5205.9 29.6000 14.1800 
77Q1 2444.0 125453.0 38733.0 5683.6 --31.2000 14.8800 
77Q2 1683.0 129355.0 35035.4 7870.5 31.9000 14.6000 
77Q3 2346.0 133667.0 34436.0 9986.1 33.1000 14.4400 
77Q4 3236.0 149886.0 35217.0 11899.6 34.2000 13.9800 
78Q1 4238.0 154717.0 38354.1 13242.5 35.4000 13.6000 
78Q2 2389.0 159981.0 35599.8 15707.6 36.3000 13.2300 
78Q3 1972.0 165802.0 34251.1 18952.5 37.8000 12.9300 
78Q4 5059.0 185027.0 40026.0 19659.9 38.9000 13.3900 
79Q1 2339.0 185895.0 35316.7 24811.8 40.2000 13.4400 
79Q2 1793.0 191252.0 33883.2 28465.5 42.0000 13.4200 
79Q3 1699.0 197757.0 34245.6 28465.5 43.7000 13.4100 
79Q4 3875.0 221879.0 40692.0 30538.0 46.0000 14.2700 
80Q1 2582.0 216952.0 41554.6 36932.0 47.8000 14.7600 
80Q2 2823.0 219232.0 44460.9 45771.5 50.3000 15.2000 
80Q3 2971.0 221608.0 46678.9 52004.6 52.4000 15.9600 
80Q4 4958.0 251264.0 50262.0 55068.1 54.6000 16.3000 
81Q1 3681.0 245411.0 56604.3 54548.1 57.0000 17.6700 
81Q2 4057.0 242977.0 58947.3 56968.4 59.3000 20.9500 
81Q3 5061.0 242296.0 61510.7 55597.4 62.3000 21.3300 
81Q4 6150.0 274127.0 64179.0 58058.4 65.4000 21.0000 
82Q1 3358.0 266007.0 66406.0 50926.9 67.8000 20.4300 
82Q2 5410.0 270194.0 67349.0 48003.7 69.9000 20.7500 
82Q3 4785.0 279505.0 67024.0 50371.0 73.0000 19.8000 
82Q4 4455.0 325080.0 75751.0 51166.0 75.8000 19.8600 
83Q1 4834.0 313167.0 82012.0 58064.0 78.6000 18.2800 
83Q2 5679.0 318257.0 75787.0 67666.0 80.8000 17.9000 
83Q3 2490.0 329890.0 75280.0 71889.0 83.4000 17.4700 
83Q4 3931.0 368389.0 80181.0 76089.0 86.4000 17.3302 
84Q1 2851.0 354292.0 85252.0 71999.0 89.1000 15.250e 
84Q2 3637.0 354612.0 81368.0 74815.0 91.0000 14.7302 
84Q3 2293.0 365653.0 82467.0 79801.0 92.7000 14.450e 
84Q4 5008.0 411862.0 90101.0 81813.0 94.6000 13.840E 
85Q1 2302.0 404952.0 100235.0 76337.0 97.4000 12.780¬ 
85Q2 3594.0 407547.0 99824.0 82401.0 99.2000 13.420E 
85Q3 2790.0 418497.0 103329.0 60960.0 101.0000 13.080¬ 
85Q4 7968.0 454170.0 117563.0 61435.0 102.3000 13.270¬ 
86Q1 4040.0 436713.0 128705.0 66826.0 104.7000 12.550E 
86Q2 4433.0 437883.0 117894.0 66260.0 107.4000 9.800E 
86Q3 3662.0 447918.0 121062.0 60960.0 109.1000 9.540E 
86Q4 4699.0 496101.0 128503.0 61435.0 110.2000 9.0504 
87Q1 4782.0 482944.0 130153.0 66826.0 111.2000 9.130¬ 
87Q2 3727.0 490784.0 132631.0 65871.0 114.0000 9.920E 
87Q3 4527.0 494098.0 141973.0 65318.0 115.0000 11.020E 
87Q4 5647.0 531819.0 137223.0 74305.0 117.0000 11.190¬ 
88Q1 5582.0 509205.0 137680.0 74829.0 118.7000 10.8404 
88Q2 4932.0 519164.0 137192.0 74128.0 120.7000 10.850( 
OBS. BLIQ DEP FBITES FXBI P RBCI 
88Q3 6151.0 531417.0 140600.0 78782.0 123.4000 11.0800 
88Q4 4899.0 571564.0 139446.0 82823.0 124.9000 11.0500 
89Q1 7829.0 555000.0 139103.0 88890.0 126.5000 11.5700 
89Q2 4239.0 565720.0 131363.0 91306.0 128.4000 11.7700 
89Q3 4458.0 570320.0 131321.0 98938.0 130.2000 11.6700 
89Q4 5453.0 625348.0 145469.0 92875.0 132.7000 12.0800 
90Q1 8159.0 598021.0 145104.0 98003.0 135.8000 12.1500 
90Q2 4072.0 607436.0 124856.0 110079.0 137.8000 12.0700 
90Q3 4105.0 619686.0 130429.0 109929.0 139.8000 12.0500 
90Q4 4471.0 686279.0 146388.0 103335.0 143.3000 11.2900 
91Q1 5227.0 649292.0 148311.0 111080.0 145.2000 12.1600 
91Q2 1854.0 662288.0 137574.0 109322.0 148.0000 11.2400 
91Q3 2926.0 670060.0 144041.0 108950.0 151.2000 11.5100 
91Q4 4849.0 746907.0 163898.0 95342.0 152.9000 11.4300 
92Q1 *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* *NONE* 11.1400 
. _ý 
OBS. RD REQRES 
75Q1 8.0000 11159.0 
75Q2 7.0000 11508.0 
75Q3 6.0000 12032.0 
75Q4 6.0000 12040.0 
76Q1 12.0000 14382.0 
76Q2 12.0000 14755.0 
76Q3 12.0000 15167.0 
76Q4 15.0000 16622.0 
77Q1 15.0000' 18383.0 
77Q2 13.0000 19081.0 
77Q3 11.5000 19571.0 
77Q4 11.5000 20262.0 
78Q1 11.5000 22774.0 
78Q2 11.5000 23678.0 
78Q3 10.5000 24389.0 
78Q4 10.5000 25281.0 
79Q1 10.5000 27816.0 
79Q2 10.5000 28653.0 
79Q3 10.5000 29513.0 
79Q4 15.0000 30671.0 
80Q1 15.0000 32527.0 
80Q2 15.0000 32434.0 
80Q3 16.5000 33009.0 
80Q4 16.5000 33749.0 
81Q1 19.0000 36924.0 
81Q2 19.0000 36113.0 
81Q3 19. "0000 
35844.0 
81Q4 19.0000 36654.0 
82Q1 19.0000 40982.0 
82Q2 19.0000 40379.0 
82Q3 18.0000 42226.0 
82Q4 18.0000 45184.0 
83Q1 18.0000 50979.0 
83Q2 17.0000 49955.0 
83Q3 17.0000 52905.0 
83Q4 17.0000 54108.0 
84Q1 16.0000 60042.0 
84Q2 15.5000 58555.0 
84Q3 16.5000 60306.0 
84Q4 16.5000 62838.0 
85Q1 15.5000 71656.0 
85Q2 15.5000 70726.0 
85Q3 15.5000 73125.0 
85Q4 15.0000 74890.0 
86QI 14.0000 79583.0 
86Q2 12.0000 78582.0 
86Q3 12.0000 79200.0 
86Q4 12.0000 83858.0 
87Q1 11.5000 89626.0 
87Q2 11.5000 90740.0 
87Q3 12.0000 91107.0 
87Q4 12.0000 92438.0 
88Q1 12.0000 96198.0 
88Q2 ý 12.0000 96201.0 
0135. RD REQRES 
88Q3 12.5000 99516.0 
88Q4 12.5000 101822.0 
89Q1 13.5000 106250.0 
89Q2 13.5000 107413.0 
89Q3 13.5000 110452.0 
89Q4 13.5000 111370.0 
90Q1 13.5000 117756.0 
90Q2 12.5000 116793.0 
90Q3 12.5000 119399.0 
90Q4 12.5000 124322.0 
91Q1 12.5000 128756.0 
91Q2 11.5000 122010.0 
91Q3 11.5000 121804.0 
91Q4 12.0000 127762.0 
92Q1 12.0000 *NONE* 
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CHAPTER 5 
OPTIMAL PHYSICAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM: TWO 
FACES OF THE SAME DECISION? 
*I am very grateful to Keith Cowling and Norman Ireland for their 
helpful suggestions. I am also indebted to Giovanni Amisano, Flavio 
Rovida and Jeremy Smith for their comments and suggestions regarding 
the econometric part of this work, and to Pier Luigi Sacco, Jeffrey 
Bernstein and Colin Mayer for helpful comments and/or discussions at 
various stages of my work. Obviously, none of the above-mentioned 
people are responsible for any mistakes that might be found or for 
the views expressed here. Many thanks also to Dr. Giovanni Bucchieri 
and to the "Ufficio Studi" of Mediobanca for providing me with the 
volumes of the data employed for the empirical analysis of this 
chapter. 
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OPTIMAL PHYSICAL CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM: TWO 
FACES OF THE SAME DECISION? 
1. Introduction. 
The present chapter and the next one are closely related, since 
they constitute two different parts of the same investigation. The 
analysis has been divided into two parts in order to simplify the 
exposition and in the attempt of making it less tedious. The 
introductory comments contained in this section refer therefore both 
to this chapter and chapter 6. 
The purpose of the analysis is to provide a simplified dynamic 
framework in which the decisions concerning the firm's investment 
and financial structure take place simultaneously, in the presence 
of bankruptcy and adjustment costs and with imperfect competition in 
the goods market. The assumption of imperfect competition has been 
introduced in order to capture a few strategic effects of the 
investment decision, although with a few simplifying assumptions. 
However there are a few relevant differences between the 
approach followed in this chapter and in chapter 6. ' 
The theoretical part of this chapter uses - as a tool of 
interpretation -a model by Bernstein and Nadiri [1986], with a few 
modifications, mainly consisting in the introduction of imperfect 
competition in the goods market, while some more substantial 
modifications have been introduced in the empirical implementation 
of the model. 
In the model by Bernstein and Nadiri [1986] the cost of 
financial capital is a function of the leverage ratio and- the 
decisions concerning the firm's financial structure and investments 
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take place at the same time, but the variables affecting the 
leverage ratio are assumed to be exogenous. In this way the profits 
do not interact with the leverage ratio and with the cost of 
financial capital. 
In the model of chapter 6, the firm chooses simultaneously the 
level of investments as well as the optimal financial structure, and 
the cost of financial capital still depends on the financial 
structure of the firm, but, in this case, the cost of capital, the 
optimal financial structure and the profits are assumed to interact, 
because of a few possible causal links suggested by various 
theoretical contributions (from finance and industrial economics) 
briefly analyzed in chapter 6. If, under a given set of assumptions 
(that will be discussed in this chapter and in the next one), a link 
between the profits and the leverage ratio of the firm exists, then 
- to the extent that the profits are affected by the degree of 
concentration and other strategic variables - the simultaneous 
decision problem of investment and optimal financial structure is 
also affected by those market strategic interactions that 
characterize a context of imperfect competition. While this last 
point is one of the main concerns of chapter 6, the present chapter 
will follow the theoretical part of the contribution by Bernstein 
and Nadiri [1986], as a simplified starting point for the empirical 
analysis based on firms data. 
The empirical analysis includes a few estimates of an 
investment function based on three industrial samples of data of 
Italian firms operating respectively in the chemical, electronic, 
and clothing sectors. The source of the data is the survey provided 
13S$ 
by Mediobanca (an Italian credit institution), a reliable and 
commonly employed source of firm's data. 
The relevance of the firm's financial structure for the 
investment decision, with asymmetric information on financial 
markets, has been the subject of many contributions both in finance 
and in industrial economics, although most of them do not raise the 
problem of simultaneity between investment and financial structure. 
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In izlustrial economics, the relevance of firms' financial 
structure has been pointed out - within the context of predatory 
pricing models - by the literature concerned with the "deep pocket 
argument" (Telser [1966], Benoit [1984], Poitervin [1989a]) and by 
the models based on the assumption of "limited liability effect" 
(Brander and Lewis [1986], Poitervin [1989b] ). In the former, it is 
assumed that "strong" firms can afford a long-during price war 
because they can rely on large financial resources. In the latter, a 
high level of debt is regarded as a pre-commitment for an aggressive 
policy. The signalling game of entry deterrence yields - as a result 
- the optimal financial structure for the incumbent and the entrant. 
Following the famous contribution by Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen [1988] that shows the significance of cash flow for the 
firm investment decision, the relevance of the firm financial 
structure has been analyzed in many neoclassical studies 
by 
introducing some form of market imperfection and/or transaction 
costs within a Tobin's Q framework. The focus was often on R&D 
investments (Bernstein and Nadiri [1986] and [1993]), or, in another 
class of investment models, on a hierarchy of finance funds, 
resulting from transaction costs in placing new shares and taxes 
(see for example Bond and Meghir [1992]). 
A causal and recursive link between financial structure and 
investments decision had already been pointed out in the past by the 
"radical economics" literature, and, more recently, by some "new- 
Keynesian" contributions in a macroeconomic framework (like for 
instance Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988], [1989], [1990a], [1990b], 
Bernanke and Gertler [1989]). 
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Regarding the internally generated flow of profits as the main 
source of finance, as a result of the imperfect substitutability 
between internal and external funds for the firm, the radical 
economists often envisage a causal link between the flow of profits 
for the firm and the investment decision. 
Finally, a link between financial structure and investment 
decision may simply be based on an incentive argument which can be 
summarized by considering that with asymmetric information "... the 
greater the debt-equity ratio, the more the incentives of managers 
who act in the interest of equity holders diverge from the interests 
of creditors" (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, [1988], p. 151). This 
last argument has led to many other contributions, even based on 
different theoretical approaches, to formalize the cost of financial 
capital (and, as a consequence the rate of discount of future 
incomes for the representative firm) as an increasing function of 
the leverage ratio or the gearing ratio (for example Bernstein and 
Nadiri [1986], Ganoulis [1991], Bond and Meghir [1992]), or to 
include managerial costs depending on the amount of borrowing in the 
profit function (Bernstein and Nadiri [1993]). 
The recent new-Keynesian contributions aim at formalizing the 
role of asymmetric information and risk in affecting the willingness 
of financial intermediaries to supply credit and its cost. 
Most of the empirical analyses on firm investment decision that 
are based on some version of Tobin' sQ theory rely on stock market 
data and assume perfect competition on the goods market. A model 
that might be potentially adapted to describe an imperfectly 
competitive framework is the one by Abel and Eberly [1993], which 
introduces a stochastic variable in the firm's profits, and is meant 
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to provide a framework that incorporates fixed cost investments in a 
stochastic context with investment irreversibility. 
Another purpose of this paper is to attempt to overcome a 
limitation of the empirical works based on Tobin's Q theory, which 
rely on small samples mainly composed by firms issuing shares on the 
stock market: such firms usually enjoy a well established 
reputation, and may not always be regarded as representative for the 
entire population. In Italy (like in all of the non-securitized 
financial systems) the firms operating in the stock market only 
constitute a very small minority. In order to use the data from the 
Mediobanca sample (mainly accounting data) some restrictions will 
have to be made. However, for what concerns the general issue of the 
use of accounting data, this paper follows Martin [1993], who, 
objecting to Benston's [1982] criticism on the reliability of 
accounting data, argues as follows: 
"... If this argument were correct, the consequences would be 
severe indeed. It would mean that industrial economists could 
not carry out empirical research. It would mean that a wide 
spectrum of government publications describing economic 
activity ought to be discontinued, since they are based on what 
is, originally, accounting data. " 
(Martin, 1993, p. 517). 
The next section (and its subsections) contains the first model, 
mainly based on Bernstein and Nadiri [1986]. Section 3 contains the 
comments on the empirical analysis, section 4 contains the 
conclusions. A few drawbacks and limitations of Bernstein and 
Nadiri's framework are illustrated in the next chapter, which 
contains a brief digression on a few issues concerning the financial 
decisions of the firm. 
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2. A model of financing and investment with asymmetric information 
and bankruptcy costs 
This model resembles, in its theoretical part, the one by 
Bernstein and Nadiri [1986], with a few modifications mainly 
consisting in two aspects: the first aspect is the above-mentioned 
introduction of imperfect competition in the goods market. The 
second is the introduction of a distinction between "purely 
technological" adjustment costs of investment, and "strategic" costs 
of investments. Such a distinction is not very relevant for the 
theoretical part of the analysis (since a few simplifying 
assumptions are made on the conjectures of the different firms), but 
is going to carry some significant consequences for the empirical 
analysis that will be implemented in this paper. 
The model provides a framework to formalize the interaction 
between financial structure and investment decisions. Following 
Bernstein and Nadiri [1986], it is assumed that financial and real 
decisions are connected in the sense that in each moment in time the 
firm chooses the financial structure that minimizes the cost of 
capital. It is the minimized cost of capital that affects in its 
turn the investment decision of the firm. As in Bernstein and Nadiri 
[1986], the decision of each firm is assumed to take place in 
continuous time, but, unlike in Bernstein and Nadirs, it is revealed 
to other firms and outsiders only at discrete intervals. This last 
assumption will carry some relevant implications for the empirical 
analysis, as we will see later. Again as opposed to Bernstein and 
Nadirs [1986], the firms act in a context of imperfect competition. 
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Let us define the variable profits as: 
var. profits of firm i= u°(k, wlpi) (1 
where k= physical capital; 
w= variable inputs cost; 
pi = profit margin, determined by the demand elasticity, product 
differentiation, conjectures, and other aspects affecting the 
market power of the firms. 
It is assumed that in each moment the firm is optimizing the 
quantity' of variable inputs employed, whose price is w. The mark up 
pi is assumed to depend on the conjectures of 'the firms and on the 
demand elasticity. As a first approximation, it is assumed that the 
conjectures of different firms are symmetrical. It is assumed that 
increasing levels of k always increase the variable profits, i. e. 
the variable profits depend positively on the capital stock. This 
means that the marginal profitability of capital is positive even 
when the average profitability of capital is negative. 
Let us also assume that the following budget constraint holds: 
k(t) = S(t) + B(t) (2 
where K is the physical capital, S the value of shares, B the debt. 
Broadly speaking, this is equivalent to saying that the short run 
assets equal the short run liabilities, or that the payments are 
implemented instantaneously. The firm accumulates capital according 
to the following rule: 
k=I- gk, k(0)>0 and lim k(t)? -O (3 t->oD 
where g is the rate of depreciation of capital stock, I is the 
investment level. The rate of depreciation is assumed to be fixed, 
and it is also assumed that 
05g51. A dot over a variable stands for 
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differentiation with respect to time. The flow of funds, which must 
hold at any moment in time, is defined as follows: 
u°(k, wtpi) - A[I(t)] - [rf(t) + 0(0(t))]. B(t) + B(t) + 
+ S(t) - D(t) =0 (4 
where u°(k, wipi) is the, same as defined earlier, A[I(t)] is the 
function of (purely technological) adjustment costs of investments, 
D(t) the dividends, rf(t) the interest rate on risk free borrowing, 
ß(t)=B(t)/S(t) the leverage ratio, $(R(t)) a risk premium on 
borrowing, which is a monotonically increasing function of the 
leverage ratio, B(t) is the level of borrowing, S(t) the value of 
the new shares issues. A[I(t)] is twice continuously differentiable, 
with A(0)=0, A'>O, A">O, according to the standard assumptions. 
A[I(t)] is also assumed to be increasing, monotonic and invertible. 
As in Bernstein and Nadirs, the function $(n(t)) represents the 
premium paid to bondholders, which depends on the leverage ratio, 
such that O(0) is twice continuously differentiable and 0(0)=0, 
0'>0. The function of the risk premium O(Q) recognises the'fact that 
the cost, of debt increases as the firm increases its leverage. 
Bernstein and Nadiri's assumption that the firm operates in the 
interests of its shareholders is kept (in contrast with the model of 
the next chapter). Therefore, like in Bernstein and Nadiri, in each 
period, the shareholders equate their rate of return to the flow of 
funds accruing to them. Formalizing: 
rs = D(t)/S(t) + S(t)/S(t) (5 
where rs is the rate of return on shares and S is the value of the 
shares. This means that the rate of return on shares includes the 
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dividends per share plus the capital gain. Bernstein and Nadiri 
define then V=B+S as the value of the financial capital of the firm. 
Departing from Bernstein and Nadiri, in this paper the value of 
shares S is not defined on the basis of stock market data, since in 
the sample employed for the empirical analysis we are dealing mainly 
with firms not issuing shares on the stock markets, and operating in 
a country (Italy) where the stock market is of very little 
relevance, since the magnitude of the transactions concerning 
securities is very small compared to the magnitude of intermediated 
financial funds. However this distinction is only relevant for what 
concerns the empirical analysis, and will be explained later in more 
detail. 
Using equations 4,5, and the definition V=B+S, following 
Bernstein and Nadiri [1986], we get: 
V= [(rs + rf"C + O(n)-n) / (1 + ()]V- r (6 
where r= u°(k, wlpi) - A(I) (7 
Equation 6 shows that the financial capital value of the firm 
may increase due to the cost of capital and the variable profits net 
of "purely technological" adjustment costs of investments. 
Bernstein and Nadiri, by integrating equation 6 obtain the 
following general solution: 
ttt 




where "c" is the constant of integration and 
=['(rs+rfO+O(O 
M)/(l+n)] is the cost of financial capital. In order 
to have 
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lim V(t)>O with D>O 
t->4)0 
Bernstein and Nadiri impose that 
00 t 
c 
Jr(t)exP [_Jsds]dt (9 
00 






The firm, in order to maximize. the value of the initial 
financial capital, minimizes 4 by selecting the optimal financial 
structure, and maximizes V(O) by choosing the optimal level of 
investments, given the optimal variable profits. The right-hand side 
of equation 10 is the objective functional. In this framework, the 
procedure is recursive: first, the unit cost of financial capital is 
minimized, second, by using the minimized unit cost of financial 
capital, the initial present value of the variable profits, net of 
the "purely technological" adjustment costs of investments, is 
maximized. The "financial' decision is described as follows: 




= [-rs + rf + O'A(1+A) + 0] / (1+A)2 =0 (12 
do 
In this framework the value of the shares and its instantaneous 
variation are exogenous, as well as the interest rate on the risk 
free debt rf, while the risk premium 0 depends on the leverage ratio 
n. the optimal financial structure corresponds to a situation where 
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the marginal rate of return to shareholders equates the marginal 
cost of debt, which is determined by the interest rate on risk free 
assets and the marginal premium required by lenders. By substituting 
equation 12 into equation 11, we get: 
-, i, ° = rf + q'n + $M (13 
The minimized cost of financial capital (D° such as defined in 
equation 13, is the rate of discount of variable profits, net of 
"purely technological" adjustment costs. Therefore, the problem of 
determining the optimal level of investments may be redefined as 
follows: 
co z 





subject to conditions 3. 
The optimal conditions can be obtained from the following 
Hamiltonian: 
H= u°(t) - A(I(t)) + q(I-gk) (15 
Assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied, the first 
order conditions are the following: 
8H/8I = -A' +q=0 (16 
q= (''° + 9)q- 8u°/Sk (17 
where q is the shadow price of the constraint, defined by using the 
current marginal valuations. Conditions 16 and 17, must hold 
together with conditions 3. The transversality conditions will be 
the following: 
lim z(t) ? 0, [k*(t)-k(t)]z(t) =0 (18 
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where z(t) - e-4°tq(t). Assuming that the transversality conditions 
are satisfied, equations 16 and 17 can be solved by obtaining the 
following: 
A"I = (4°+g)A' - 6u°/dk (19 
Condition 19 corresponds exactly to the standard results of the 
neoclassical models on firm's investment decision, with the only 
difference that here the rate of discount 4° depends on the leverage 
ratio, which, in its turn, depends on a few exogenous variables 
summarizing the information concerning the financial markets. 




In the graphic, SS is the stable saddlepath. It is important to 
note that 6u°/Sk in this case is not the marginal productivity of 
FIGURE 1 
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capital of the standard neoclassical perfectly competitive models of 
investment decision, but it is the marginal profitability of 
capital, which is conditional on the (exogenous) conjectures. 
Therefore,, in this- framework, disturbances in the optimal level of 
investments may be caused not only by exogenous technological 
shocks, but also by changes in the conjectures, market shares, 
demand elasticity, as well as in the (exogenous) "financial" 
variables, like the value of shares and the interest rates on risk 
free assets. 
2.1 The empirical implementation 
Figure 1 shows that in the long run equilibrium E both 
conditions 3 and 19 are satisfied. From equation 19, we get: 
Aý _ (6u°/8k)/(, D°+9) 
hence: 
I* = G[(6u°/8k)/(4°+g)] (20 
where I* is the optimal level of investments, and G= A'-l. The 
function G is monotonic and increasing, since the same has been 
assumed about A(I(t)). I* is conditional on the exogenous mark up 
(which, in its turn, might depend on the demand elasticity, and 
market power) as well as the interest rate on risk free assets and 
the (exogenous) rate of return and value of shares. We assume that 
for each firm the decisions are taken in continuous time, but made 
known to outsiders at discrete intervals. In other words, each firm 
reveals to the others its investment (and financial structure) 
decision only when the balance sheet and profits and losses account 
are published. Nevertheless, the investment decision is taken in 
147 
continuous time, although the information on the rivals' behaviour 
is founded on the latest available accounting data, which constitute 
the information source for conjectures. Following Cowling's [1982] 
approach, one can interpret the values of the firms' conjectures as 
an interval whose lower bound is given by the total absence of 
collusion, and the higher bound by the situation of collusion. We 
assume therefore that the conjectures of the firm appearing in 
equations 3 and 4 are consistent with a game admitting a sequential 
equilibrium, corresponding to a situation of collusion. If a firm 
deviates from its observable levels of investments of the previous 
periods (which is assumed to be a source of information for the 
conjectures of the other firms), it might cause the other firms to 
revise their strategy and, as a consequence, their conjectures. A 
deviation from the path, of investments might induce the rival to 
change their behaviour, and possibly follow a less collusive and 
more aggressive policy. Therefore, it might be possible to think of 
a particular category of investments' adjustment costs - defined 
here as "strategic" adjustment costs of investments' for convenience 
- as those costs 
deriving from the fact that when a firm modifies 
its level of investments, it might have to bear the costs determined 
by changes in the rivals' strategy. In analogy with other empirical 
specifications (mainly the ones with partial adjustment, containing 
the lagged dependent variable among the regressors) we can think of 
the "costs of being, out of the optimal level of investment" as 
opposed to the "strategic costs of adjustment", that, in this 
framework, would be proportional to the deviation of the investments 
at time "t" from the previous level, at time "t-1". 
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At this point we need a few approximations and simplifying 
assumptions in order to perform the empirical analysis. First of 
all, we will indicate analytical forms for the function A(I) 
(describing the "purely technological" adjustment costs of 
investments) and formalize the functional link between the marginal 
profitability of capital and the average profitability of capital. 
Both formalizations need to be consistent with all of the 
assumptions of the model. What we need is simply a monotonically 
increasing one-to-one function between the marginal profitability of 
capital and the average profitability of capital. For what concerns 
the "purely technological" adjustment cost of investments we need a 
function with the following characteristics: A(0)=0, A'>O, A">0. A 
fairly general approximation for the function A(I), could be the 
following, which also has the advantage of being easy to handle on 
the algebraic point of view: 
A= 00"Ia with a>l; 00>0 (21. 
For what concerns the functional link between 6u/6k and u/k, it has 
to be consistent with the assumption, previously expressed, that the 
marginal profitability of capital is always positive, even when the 
average profitability of capital is negative. This is because the 
marginal profitability of capital is not empirically observable, 
unlike the average profitability of capital. Therefore, a condition 
for the latter to be employed as an approximation for the former is 
the existence of a one-to-one invertible functional link between 
them. The following analytical form shows the properties of having a 
positive marginal profitability of capital - even when the average 
profitability of capital is negative - and, at the same time, of 
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showing an invertible one-to-one functional link between the average 
profitability of capital and the marginal profitability of capital: 
8u/8k = exp(al"u/k) (22. 
Substituting definitions 21 and 22 in equation 20, taking logs and 
rearranging yields the following equation: 
1 al u1 
In I* = ln(1/e0"a) +- in(-, D°+g) (23 
a- 1 a- 1k a- 1 
The variable P° is not observable and equation 13 expresses V as a 
function of the exogenous rate of return on shares and the leverage 
ratio A. Given that g is assumed to be constant and fixed, the 
leverage ratio n could be used as a proxy for the two variables in 
the bracket on the right-hand side of equation 23. In particular, we 
will use 61"0 as a proxy for the variable (4'°+g). Substituting then 
gl. QP for (4)°+g) in equation 23, we obtain the following: 
1 al uR 
In I* _ [ln(1/eoa)+lne1] +- "ln(n) (24 
a-1 a-1 k a-1 
Where ß depends on the relation between 61"nß and (, °+g). The size 
of the parameter ß is not stated a priori, and will be determined by 
the data. In this way, the data themselves will specify whether the 
variable defined as (4°+g) is concave or convex in ei. i. Such a 
formulation allows us not to rule out a priori neither a risk averse 
nor a risk lover attitude of the lenders. 
We need now to take into account the "non-technological" 
adjustment costs of investments. It is assumed that, as in the model 
of partial adjustment, the firm minimizes a quadratic cost function 
including the cost of being out of equilibrium as well as the 
strategic cost of deviating from the level of investment signalled 
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at the previous time. The problem for the firm may be formalized as 
follows: 
min C= a(It - I*)2 + b(It - It-1)2 (25 
C is the total "non-technological" cost. The variables written in 
italic (the investments) are expressed in logs, "a" represents the 
"cost of being out of equilibrium", "b" represents the "non 
technological cost of deviating from the previous level of 
investments". Assuming that the second order conditions for the 
optimization problem described by equation 25 are satisfied, we 
obtain the following first order conditions: 
öC/oIt = 2a(It - I*) + 2b(It - It-1) =0 (26 
It = [a/(a+b)]"I* + [b/(a+b)]"It-1 =u I* + (1 - p)It-1 (27 
where p=a/(a+b). Substituting equation 27 into equation 24, we get: 
u 




Po= Lln(1/60a)+ln911; Pi= 
U al 
:" ß2=(ß"u)/(a-1); ß3=1-µ 
a-1a-1 
Equation 28 represents the specification employed for the 
econometric estimations. The value of the coefficients of equation 
29 might be interpreted in economic terms. Looking at equations 27 
and 28, it could be said that, at time "t", the higher the "non- 
technological" cost of deviating from the "t-1" level of 
investments, the lower the value of the parameter p of equation 27, 
which must be, in any case, greater than 0 and smaller than 1. To 
give an example, in an industry characterized by a high degree of 
collusion among the firms, and an extremely high expected cost of 
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breaking the collusion, the parameter p should be positive and close 
to 0. In the extreme case, it should be equal to 0. This would imply 
that the coefficient ß3 of the lagged investments in equation 28 




aln It = ß0 + ßl - R2"ln(n) + (28' 
k 
but the regressors should be (in this extreme case) non significant. 
A negative value, or a value greater than one for the coefficient 
ß3, would in any case contradict the theoretical framework of this 
paper. No particular restrictions can be made on the value of the 
coefficient of (u/k) and ln(n), apart from the fact that the former 
has to be positive, the latter negative, and their absolute value 
should be smaller, the larger ß3 (i. e. the closest to 1 is ß3). 
2.2 The dataset and the use of the data 
The dataset has been constructed by using all of the available 
firms' data from the Mediobanca sample, for three industries: the 
chemical, the electronics and the clothing. The appendix contains a 
report on the methodology followed in processing the data and the 
list of all of the firms included in the sample. 
A few comments concerning the definition of B(t) and k(t) are 
necessary at this point. Most empirical work on investments and 
firms' financial structure employ data obtained from the stock 
market and tend not to use accounting data. Often, in those cases, 
the samples include only a small number of firms, usually the ones 
issuing securities in the stock and bond markets. It must be said, 
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however, that these firms represent a small minority, both in terms 
of their number and their volume of trade, in a country with a non- 
securitized financial system. Since one of the purposes of this 
paper was to perform estimates on a very large and representative 
sample of firms operating in a few given industries, a different 
approach had to be followed. The sample provided by Mediobanca is 
one of the most complete sources of information. It was therefore a 
natural choice for the present purpose. 
For the sake of the empirical analysis we have to consider that 
our data refer to an institutional context (Italy) where the 
overwhelmingly larger amount of credit is provided by the banking 
system, usually at a variable interest rate. Therefore, to the 
extent that the interest rate is flexible and adjusts, the balance 
sheet value could be a reasonable approximation for the "market 
value" of debt, although some distortion might derive from the 
absence of a measure for the risk of insolvency. In addition, if 
banks are regarded as institutions obtaining economies of scale in 
collecting information and monitoring the performances of the 
borrowers, then the information they have about the quality of their 
customers is not only private, but it is also part of the 
entrepreneurial skills of the banks' managers. To the extent that 
banks are agents seeking to maximize their profits by allocating 
their portfolio, the information they can get about the reliability 
of their customers is the main point of bank competition. 
Since one of the purposes of this analysis is to investigate 
the relevance of the financial structure and flow of profits for the 
firm's investment decision, and test it for a very large sample of 
firms, proper valuations of the market value of debt for firms not 
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operating on the stock and bond markets is not available, and, 
again, we argue that the book value should be an acceptable 
approximation. 
Even for what concerns physical capital it might be difficult 
to define a "market value" for capital coming from firm specific 
investments. In other words, the physical capital k might not have a 
market value at all if considered apart from its original production 
unit, while it could be extremely productive when employed within 
the firm's specific technology. The concept of market value of 
physical capital becomes even more ambiguous if we take into account 
strategic interaction among firms. Aoki and Leijohnufvud [1988] 
point out that the value of the endowment of physical capital of a 
firm is not independent from the endowment of physical capital of 
the competitors. Therefore, the market value of physical capital may 
become a very ambiguous concept in a context of imperfect 
competition, when the various competitors are able to adjust it 
according to strategic needs. These considerations could suggest 
that, to the extent that we are interested in explaining 
investments, the variation of the net book value of physical capital 
might be a reasonable approximation, since such variation reflects 
the cost of capital goods in the period under consideration. This 
argument becomes stronger if we think that for a very large sample 
of firms, like the one we are using here, there might not be a 
better approximation and measure for the investment expenditure. 
However, a price index of capital goods will be employed when the 
capital stock has to be expressed at different prices from those 
determining the book value. Moreover, distortions might be a problem 
even for alternative definitions of the empirical data. In 
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particular, empirical works where the so-called "market value" of 
physical capital is properly defined (in a non-securitized country), 
only refer to small samples of relatively big firms, for which data 
determined from the stock market, or detailed surveys (usually 
provided by the firms themselves, very rarely by independent 
institutions) are available. In the paper by Bernstein and Nadiri 
[1986], for example, the data set considered is a panel of forty- 
nine firms for the period 1959-64. In this regard it is very 
important to observe that the Bernstein and Nadiri model puts the 
emphasis on the market value of the financial assets of the firm and 
on the market value of R&D capital (as well as R&D expenditures), 
such as reported in surveys based on data provided by the firms 
themselves, and for what concerns the value of financial capital, by 
stock market data. Moreover, there is empirical evidence showing 
that the firms performing high levels of expenditure in R&D are 
raising a significant part of financial funds on the share market. 
As is well known, the share market is subject to several distortions 
such as speculative bubbles, and, according to the findings of the 
literature on share prices excess volatility (for example Shiller 
[1984], [1989]), they might not correctly reflect the net present 
value of dividends, and not, as a consequence, the proper value of 
the assets of the firms. Therefore, even the use of data obtained 
from share markets impose some form of prior restrictive assumption, 
often violated by the empirical evidence, and for this reason it is 
argued that the kind of approximation taken here might not contain 
more elements of distortion than the empirical works based on the 
usual mainstream approach. Finally, it might be worth mentioning 
that firms whose data appears in the Mediobanca survey, are usually 
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subject to some form of monitoring (such as official auditing), 
where criteria for data collecting might be no less rigorous and 
strict that the ones of the official statistical institutions. 
All the above considerations might lead us to conclude that, on 
one hand, the models emphasizing the "market values" of financial 
assets and physical capital might rely on suitable data only when 
they refer to very small and specific categories of firms, and that 
on the other hand, the book values of the variable considered in the 
gearing ratio might be, in our specific case, an acceptable 
approximation for the market values, given that any of these choices 
contains a degree of approximation. 
Since the data used here mainly concern firms not issuing 
securities, if we define "k" and "B" at their book values, then the 
leverage ratio, with regard to the balance sheet constraint 9, will 
be defined as 
B(t) 
Q(t) = (29 
E(t) + R(t) 
Since the balance sheet constraint 9 holds at any moment in 
time, if k(t) and B(t) are defined at book values, the value of the 
own capital will be defined as E(t)+R(t), again at book value. 
The variable profits have been calculated, on the basis of 
Mediobanca data, as the value added minus the labour costs. Other 
details, such as the use of appropriate deflators for the prices of 
capital goods are explained in the appendix. The empirical results 
will be considered in the next section. 
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3. The empirical results 
The tables enclosed in the appendix contain some estimations 
made by following the technique of unbalanced panel data. 
The data have been obtained from the "Mediobanca" sample and 
refer to `three sectors: the chemical sector (tables 1-8), the 
electronic sector (tables 9-20) and the clothing sector (21-32). 
We start with equation 28 for the empirical specification of 
the investment function. Since in all of the three sectors the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is close to one, the 
parameter restriction ß3=1 has been tested. Such restriction would 
yield equation 28' as an empirical specification : 
The usual F-test on parameter restrictions has not been 
employed in this case, for two main reasons. First of all, in the 
case of panel data, it is necessary to make use of some testing 
procedure robust to heteros Ce. dasticity, and the usual F-test based 
on the residual sum of squares is not robust to heterosCe: dasticity. 
Secondly, as it is well known, in the case of instrumental 
variables, the power of the test depends on the fact of having good 
instruments. In our case, looking at the unrestricted model 
(equation 28) the instruments for u/k and ln(ß) are their respective 
lagged variables, while for the lagged dependent value (i. e. lnIt-i) 
the instrument is a variable here defined as "LNKHLAG". This 
variable corresponds to the lagged value of the book value of the 
physical capital, gross of the accumulated depreciation (instrument 
for "LAGLOGIN", as defined below). -This value includes all of the 
costs of purchase and installation of all of the pieces of physical 
capital that have not become obsolete and are still in use in the 
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production process of the firm. Those which become obsolete earlier 
than expected are liquidated or eliminated from the balance sheet. 
The operation of liquidation originates an atypical or non-operative 
profit or loss. In this sense, the variable LNKHLAG can be thought 
of as the cumulated sum of the "purely technological" adjustment 
cost of investment implemented in the past and still in use in the 
firm. The kind of instrument employed for the lagged dependent 
variable is different from the one employed for the other 
regressors. Therefore, in contrasting the residual sum of squares of 
the restricted and unrestricted models, not only is there a problem 
of power of the test, but also a problem of homogeneity of the set 
of instruments employed. In fact, the "atypical" instrument LNKHLAG 
is only employed in the unrestricted model. 
Therefore, in order to test, for the parameter restriction 3=l, 
the following procedure has been implemented. First of all, the 
following regression has been implemented: 
U 
, 
In It = PO + ßl - P2'ln(i2) + (1-ß3)"1n It-1 (28" 
k 
Secondly, using the white (robust to heteroschedasticity) t- 
statistics the following null hypothesis has been tested: 
HO : (1-133) =0 
In case the null hypothesis is rejected, equation 28 is still 
regarded as the best one. In case the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, then equation 28' is adopted as an empirical 
specification. However, the implications of the theoretical model 
here adopted require that if the parameter restriction ß3=1 holds, 
then, in equation 28' the regressors have to be non significant, as 
explained in the previous section. 
IL 
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It might be interesting to note that the empirical 
specification 28 would be likely to yield satisfactory results even 
if the "Kaleckian" interpretation of investment behaviour (such as 
formulated, for example, in Henley [1990]) is true. In fact, 
although the Kaleckian theory of investments is formulated in 
aggregated terms, it argues that the investments depend positively 
on the rate of profits and on the non-utilized production capacity. 
If one accepted that the leverage ratio could capture the effects of 
an unexpected negative shock in the profits, then it could be argued 
that the leverage ratio is correlated with the "unexpectedly non- 
utilized" production capacity. Another way of seeing a connection 
with the "Kaleckian" investment theory lies in the implications of 
the "deep pocket argument", or, in other words, the signalling use 
of the financial structure, mentioned in the introductory section. 
According to this approach, the signalling use of the financial 
structure leads the incumbent firms to choose a financial structure 
too expensive for the potential entry, in order to deter entry., 
Furthermore, by observing that the higher the level of investments 
at time t-1, the higher is likely to be the "non-utilized" 
production capacity (especially in the presence of an "entry- 
deterrence" use of investment), it could be observed that, loosely 
speaking, the explanatory power of the "non-utilized" production 
capacity could be jointly captured by the variables lnIt-1 and 
ln(n), while the rate of profits on physical capital is an 
explanatory cause of investment already present in the Kaleckian 
formulation. 
The estimations have been run using the package DPD (a routine 
of Gauss developed by Arellano and Bond [1988]). 
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Since the years employed for the estimations, for what concerns 
Italy, are in general regarded as years of uniform economic growth 
without any particular shock, the estimations for all of the 
equations have been implemented both with and without dummies. 
Appendix 1 contains the definition of the variables employed in 
the estimates and the tables with the estimates. 
Appendix 2 contains the list of all of the data for all of the 
firms and a detailed description of the way the data have been 
processed. 
The joint significance of the variables is assessed on the 
basis of the Wald test of joint significance, while the individual 
significance of the variables is assessed on the basis of the t- 
statistics. 
Table 1 shows the estimation of equation 28 for the chemical 
sector without annual dummies. The variables are jointly significant 
(at the level of confidence of 95%), and seem to be also 
individually significant, although lnmu is less significant than the 
others (the null hypothesis is only rejected with a level of 
confidence of . 61 in the "one-step estimates with robust test 
statistics"). Table 2 only shows some descriptive statistics and the 
asymptotic variance matrices. Table 3 shows the estimate for 
equation 28 with the time dummies, which are only significant with a 
level of confidence of 0.75. Apart from the dummies, both the value 
of the coefficients and their significance are analogous to the ones 
shown in table 1, representing equation 28 without dummies. 
Table 4 again shows some descriptive statistics and the 
asymptotic variance matrices of the equation estimated in table 3. 
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Having noticed that in equations 1 and 3 the coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable (lnIt-1) is close to one, the 
parameter restriction ß3=1 for equation 28 has been tested. For this 
purpose, equation 28 has been reparametrized in the form of equation 
28", where the null hypothesis H0: (1-ß3)=0 has been tested. Tables 5 
and 7 show the estimates of equation 28" without time dummies and 
with time dummies respectively. For the reasons explained at the 
beginning of this section, the test implemented for this purpose is 
the robust t-statistics on the significance of the coefficient of 
lnIt-i. Both in the case of table 5 and table 7, the null hypothesis 
H0: (1-ß3)=0 is rejected at the level of confidence of 0.99. This 
means that the equations that better describe the behaviour of 
investments for the firms of the chemical sector are the ones of 
table 1 and 3, reported as follows (the numbers in brackets refer to 
the robust t-statistics, and the definitions of the variables are 
reported in appendix 1): 
Chemical sector: estimate without time dummies. 
login = . 777427 +. 
922032 laglogin +. 001551 prorat -. 174732 lnmu 
(2.98282) (29.579329) (8.337532) (-. 871038) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 1100.341505 
Rz= . 739 
Chemical sector: estimate with time dummies. 
login = . 850922 +. 922766 laglogin +. 001655 prorat -. 180182 lnmu + (3.238360) (29.868663) (8.978494) (-. 899436) 
- . 034625 
D89 - . 200129 D90 
(-. 383689) (-1.796919) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance - 1071.366471 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance of time dummies = 3.419619 
R2= . 743 
161 
Tables 9 and 11 show the estimate of equation 28 for the 
electronics sector without time dummies, and with time dummies 
respectively. Table 10 shows some descriptive statistics and the 
asymptotic variance matrices for the estimates of table 9, while 
table 12 provides the same information for the estimates of table 
11. The time dummies are only significant at the level of confidence 
of 0.75. The variables are jointly significant, but in this case 
some variables are individually less significant than in the 
estimates for the chemical sector. Both in the estimate of table 9 
and 11, the variable lnmu is not significant, while the variable 
"prorat" is only significant at the level of confidence of 0.55 in 
table 9 and 0.61 in table 11. 
In this case also the null hypothesis H0: (l-R3)=0 has been 
tested following the same procedure as in the chemical sector. Table 
13 shows the estimate for equation 28" without time dummies (while 
table 14 shows again the same descriptive statistics and asymptotic 
variances) and equation 15 shows the estimates for equation 28" with 
time dummies (and again table 16 shows the respective descriptive 
statistics and variance matrices). Both in table 13 and 15 HO is not 
rejected, although only at the level of confidence of 0.90. This 
leads to a reformulation of the model according to equation 28' 
(table 17 for the specification without time dummies and table 19 
for the specification with time dummies, while tables 18 and 20 show 
the respective descriptive statistics and variance matrices). As 
explained at the beginning of this section and at the end of section 
2.1, this result could be interpreted as a situation where, for the 
firms, the fact of deviating from the previously signalled behaviour 
determines a very high level of "non-technological" or "strategical" 
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adjustment costs of investments. In other words, the cost of being 
out of the (theoretically) optimal level of investments is 
neglectable compared to the cost of deviating from the (possibly 
collusive) level of investments previously signalled. This implies 
(in order that our theoretical framework should be consistent with 
the theory) that the regressors of equation 28' must be non- 
significant. This seems to be the case, since the Wald test of joint 
significance for tables 17 and 19 yield a very low value (excepting 
for the test of joint significance of the time dummies) suggesting 
that all of the regressors of equation 28' are in this case non- 
significant. In the case of the electronic sector, although the 
results do not contrast with the theory, they yield a set of 
equations that do not contain very much information on the behaviour 
of the firms' investments, apart from the fact that the "strategic" 
cost of deviating from the previously signalled level of investments 
seems to be very costly. This yields a situation where only the past 
level of investments is strongly significant for the explanation of 
the present level of investments, while a certain degree of 
ambiguity is still present for what concerns the other variables. 
However, a situation where the firms' behaviour is strongly affected 
by the rivalry and/or collusion among the different firms and by a 
large use of signals, seems to fit with the characteristics of the 
electronics sector. 
Electronics sector: estimate in levels without time dummies, 
loginv = . 123611 +. 997099 
laglogin +. 013059 prorat -. 012975 lnmu 
(0.32456) (23.729008) (0.756941) (-. 080122) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 656.280974 
R2- . 815 
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Electronics sector: estimate in levels with time dummies. 
loginv = . 246333 +. 997998 laglogin +. 014465 prorat -. 001043 lnmu + (0.669812) (24.053351) (0.872424) (-. 006415) 
-. 178303 D89 -. 219409 D90 
(-1.356358) (-1.840832) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 725.725731 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance of time dummies = 3.711439 
R2= . 818 
Electronics sector: estimate with the parameter restriction ß3=0 and 
without time dummies. 
dogin = . 066896 +. 013419 prorat -. 013873 lnmu (1.46291) (1.464071) (-. 125758) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 0.757294 
R2= . 012 
Electronics sector: estimate with the parameter restriction ß3=0 and 
with time dummies. 
dogin = . 228658 +. 014714 prorat -. 001651 lnmu -. 178467 D89 + (2.06872) (0.825006) (-. 012991) (-1.246084) 
-. 219552 D90 
(-2.025493) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 0.841852 
Wald test of joint significance of time dummies = 5.042572 
R2= . 032 
A result that seems to contrast with the theory has been 
obtained in the case of the clothing sector. 
Table 21 shows the estimate of equation 28 without- time 
dummies, table 22 shows its descriptive statistics and asymptotic 
variance matrices. Table 23 shows the estimates of equation 28 with 
time dummies, and table 24 shows its descriptive statistics and 
asymptotic variance matrices. The regressors are jointly 
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significant, and the time dummies are significant at the level of 
confidence of 0.95, therefore the equation of table 23 is the most 
reliable. In this equation, the coefficient for the variable lnmu 
has a wrong sign, but the variable itself is not significant. 
However, the results of the estimate of table 23 seem to contradict 
the theoretical framework of this paper, since the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable is greater than one. The null 
hypothesis H0: (l-ß3)=0 has been tested in tables 25 and 27 by 
running regression 28" and looking at the robust t-statistics for 
the lagged dependent variable. Table 25 shows the estimate for 
equation 28" without time dummies, table 26 shows its relative 
descriptive statistics and variance matrices, table 27 shows the 
estimate for equation 28" with time dummies and table 28 shows its 
descriptive statistics and variance matrices. In the estimate of 
table 25, HO is not rejected at the level of confidence of 0.90, 
while in table 27 the situation is more ambiguous, since HO is not 
rejected only at the level of confidence of 0.80. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and the estimate of equation 28' is 
implemented (table 29 for equation 28' without time dummies and 
table 31 for equation 28' with time dummies), the results do not 
seem to be consistent with the theoretical framework followed here, 
since the regressors in the estimates of equation 28' are jointly 
significant at the level of confidence of 0.95. In fact, as it has 
been pointed out at the beginning of this section and at the end of 
section 2.1, the theory followed in this paper implies that when the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, then in equation 28' the regressor 
must not be significant, as in the case of the electronics sector. 
Therefore, the results of the estimates for the clothing sector do 
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not seem to fit with the theory described in this paper, although a 
certain degree of ambiguity remains due to the fact that the null 
hypothesis in table 27 has not been rejected only at the level of 
confidence of 0.80. However, it might be interesting to note that 
theoretical framework of this paper, designed to describe the 
investment behaviour with imperfect competition, yields the worst 
results in the clothing sector, which is, among the three considered 
here, the closest to the perfectly competitive configuration. 
Since the time dummies turned out to be significant, while the 
null hypothesis H0: (l-ß3)=0 has not been rejected, with a slightly 
higher degree of ambiguity than in the case of the electronics 
sector, only the estimates of table 23 and 31 (i. e. equation 28 and 
28" both with time dummies) are reported in what follows: 
Clothing sector: estimate'in levels with time dummies. 
loginv = . 107130 +1.032241 laglogin +. 056679 prorat +. 107080 lnmu + (0.078584) (5.489028) (1.552927) (. 444283) 
-. 633829 D89 -. 275820 D90 
(-2.302265) (-. 978829) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 37.181121 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance of time dummies = 6.854276 
Rz= . 200 
clothing sector: estimate with the parameter restriction ß3=0 and 
with time dummies. 
dogin = . 340421 +. 
055356 prorat . 095473 lnmu -. 613535 D89 + 
(1.86353) (5.579749) (. 599836) (-2.586558) 
-. 254475 D90 
(-1.000071) 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance = 32.403434 
Wald (robust) test of joint significance of time dummies = 7.494676 
R2= . 129 
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We can conclude, therefore, that the empirical results seem to 
be consistent with the theoretical framework of this paper for what 
concerns the chemical and electronics sectors, while they show some 
inconsistency with the theoretical framework of this paper (apart 
from showing low explanatory power and very scarce significance of 
the regressors) for what concerns the clothing sector. In this last 
sector, the estimates of tables 29 and 31 show a certain degree of 
statistical correlation between the term dlogin (difference of the 
logs of the investments) and the term prorat (rate of profits on 
physical capital). It might be interesting to note that the worst 
results have been obtained in a sector (clothing) whose market 
structure is much closer to the perfectly competitive one (at least 
for what concerns the presence of technological know-how, barriers 
to entry and average size of the firms) than the other two sectors 
analyzed here. In this sense, the clothing sector is more distant 
from the theoretical framework employed, which justifies the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable on the basis of the effect 
of stability vs. modifications in the conjectures of the different 
firms operating in an imperfectly competitive context. 
4. Conclusions. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide and test empirically a 
simplified dynamic 
framework where the decision concerning 
investments and the financial structure of the firm take place 
simultaneously, in the presence of bankruptcy and adjustment costs 
and with imperfect competition on the goods market. An important 
feature of this model is the presence of non-technological 
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adjustment costs of investments, determined by a deviation from the 
level of investments such as signalled at discrete intervals. 
In section 3 an empirical analysis has been implemented on the 
basis of the theoretical model presented in section 2. The empirical 
analysis is based on three samples of firms' data from three 
different industries: the chemical, the electronics and the clothing 
industries. The results, obtained through panel data techniques, 
seem to be consistent with the predictions of our theoretical 
framework for what concerns the chemical and the electronics 
sectors, while they show a few inconsistencies for what concerns the 
clothing sector, i. e. the sector whose market configuration seems to 
be closest to the perfectly competitive one. 
A possible explanation for such inconsistencies might be found 
in the simplifying assumptions made on the very complex relations 
between the cost of capital, the profitability of the firm, and the 
strategic interactions among the different competitors. A big number 
of theoretical contributions in industrial economics and in finance 
point out many different relations of causality and possible 
functional links among these variables. These issues, as well as an 
alternative interpretation of the investment behaviour, constitute 
the purpose of the analysis of the next chapter. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In what follows the symbols of the Variables Included in the 
Estimations and in the equations are reported. The first section 
refers to the instruments, the second 
1. INSTRUMENTS: 
CONST = (constant) intercept term; 
LNKHLAG = lagged value of the book value of the physical capital, 
gross of the accumulated depreciation (instrument for "laglogin", as 
defined below). This value includes all of the costs of purchase and 
installation of all of the pieces of physical capital, that have not 
become obsolete and are still in use in the production process of 
the firm. Those which become obsolete earlier than expected are 
liquidated or eliminated from the balance sheet. The operation of 
liquidation originates an extraordinary profit or loss. In this 
sense, the variable lnkhlag can be thought of as the cumulated sum 
of the "purely technological" adjustment cost of investment 
implemented in the past and still in use in the firm. 
PRORATLA = lagged value of "prorat", as defined below; 
LNMULA=log of the lagged value of (l+n), (where the debt only 
include log term financial debt). (l+A) has been employed instead of 
p, since 0 is often null, and could not have been calculated in 
logs. 
2. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
LOGINN = lnI(t) as defined in equation 37. 
DLOGINV = lnI(t) - lnI(t-1) 
173 
D89 = dummy variable for year 1989. 
D90 = dummy variable for year 1990. 
3. REGRESSORS: 
LAGLOGIN = lnI(t-1) as defined in equation 37; 




however, u(t)/k, determines some problems of approximation. u(t) is 
a flow variable determined between t-1 and t, while k has to be 
defined either at time t or at time t-l. Its price, again, has to be 
defined either at time t or t-1. Any choice would contain some 
degree of approximation. The choice made here, analogous to the one 
made by Bernstein and Nadiri [1986], is the following: 




VAR. PROF. - variable profits, i. e., from Mediobanca data, the 
difference between the value added and the labour cost. The implicit 
simplifying assumption here is that it is the capital stock at time 
t-l that contributes to determine the variable profits at time t. 
However, the capital stock, although considered at time t-l for the 
sake of simplification, has to be valuated at a price level 
calculated at the same time when the variable profits are 
calculated, i. e. time t. 
174 
Pk = implicit price deflator of capital goods (source DATASTREAM 
services at the University of Warwick, on the basis of OECD data); 
in particular the data are the following: 







4. "RAW" DATA AND VARIABLES: 
ACC. D. (t) = Accumulated depreciations at time "t"; 
DEPR(t) = Depreciations at time "t"; 
I(t) = gross investment (INV. in the tables of the data), defined as 
follows: 
I(t) = K(t) - ACC. D. (t) - K(t-1) + ACC. D. (t-1) + DEPR(t) 
u(t) = variable profits (VAR. PROF. in the tables of the data) 
defined as the difference between the value added (V. ADD. ) and the 
labor cost (LAB. C. ); 
EQ. = Equities (Book Value); 
RES. = balannce sheet reserves and accumulated profits; 
L. T. F. D. = long term financial debt; 
mu = (EQ. +RES. )/L. T. F. D. ; this ratio has been earlier defined as 0; 
the variable lnmu is not actually the log of mu, but its proxy. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 1 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 124 Sample period is 1988 to, 1990 
Observations: 274 Degrees of freedom: 270 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla lnmula 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 136.145185 TSS = 521.925911 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.504241 
Wald t est of joint significance: 713.365013 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.777427 0.287009 2.708721 0.006754 
laglogin 0.922032 0.034794 26.499427 0.000000 
prorat 0.001551 0.000695 2.230373 0. "025723 
lnmu -0.174732 0.209604 -0.833627 0.404491 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.808 [ 89 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -2.434 [ 61 3 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 1100.341545 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat 
CONST 0.777427 0.260635 2.982820 
laglogin 0.922032 0.031171 29.579329 
prorat 0.001551 0.000186 8.337532 
lnmu -0.174732 0.200602 -0.871038 
Robust test for first-order -serial correlation: 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
0.013 1. CG00 







-1.084 C 89 ] 
-1.621 C 61 ] 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
86 
76 97 
61 74 91 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 2 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
loginv 8.29173 1.38268 
laglogin 8.18781 1.39863 
prorat 5.60625 64.72126 







loginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.86 1.00 





ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x1OOO00) 
CONST 1aglogin prorat lnmu 
8237.406 
-970.297 121.065 
-3.612 0.380 0.048 
-352.984 -92.076 0.927 4393.389 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
6793.052 
-794.295 97.166 
-3.445 0.374 0.003 
-391.501 -42.124 0.625 4024.107 
..................................................... TABLE 3 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
D. F. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 124 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 274 Degrees of freedom: 268 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla lnmula TIM DUMS 
------------------ 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 134.188713 TSS =5 21.925911 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.500704 
Wald test of joint significance: 718.765907 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 4.080675 df = 2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.850922 0.291546 2.918658 0.003515 
laglogin 0.922766 0.034681 26.607521 0.000000 
prorat 0.001655 0.000696 2.378346 0.017390 
lnmu -0.180182 0.208825 -0.862841 0.388225 
D69 -0.034625 0.104818 -0.330339 0.741144 
D90 -0.200129 0.106813 -1.873648 0.060979 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistic s not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation : -1.813 C 89 7 




ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
----------------- 
Wald test of joint significance: 1071.366471 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 3.419619 df = 2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.850922 0.262763 3.238360 0.001202 
laglogin 0.922766 0.03.0894. 29.868663 0.000000 
prorat 0.001655 0.000184 8.978494 0.000000 
inmu -0.180182 0.200328 -0.899436 0.368421 
D89 -0.034625 0.090243 -0.383689 0.701209 
D90 -0.200129 0.111374 -1.796919 0.072348 
Robust t est for first-order serial correlation: -1.112 C 89 3 
Robust t est for second-order serial correlation: -1.629 C 61 3 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
0.002 1.000 
-0.233 - 0.260 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
86 
76 97 
6i 74 91 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
------------ ----------------------- --------- -------------------------------- 
TABLE 4 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
loginv 8.29173 1.38268 3.80666 11.43889 
laglogin 8.18781 1.39863 2.94444 11.23452 
prorat 5.60625 64.72126 -0.54212 1070.34302 
lnmu 0.25076 0.25699 0.00000 1.52245 
Correlation Matrix 
loginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.86 1.00 
-0.07 -0.15 1.00 
0.11 0.12 -0.06 1.00 
---------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100040) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
8499.897 
-959.771 120.275 
-3.446 0.3+84 0.048 
-322.892 -91.582 0.931 4360.777 
-574.327 0.062 -0.013 -34.140 1098.675 
-467.075 -12.728 -0.607 -41.846 582.659 1140.894 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
6904.459 
-773.526 95.445 
-3.138 0.359 0.003 
-502.517 -48.320 0.404 4013.145 
-258.264 -24.767 -0.030 93.552 814.384 
-604.220 9.038 -0.592 389.434 434.822 1240.407 
ttt+t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 5 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 124 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 274 Degrees of freedom: 270 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla 
--------------------- 
lnmula 
-------------------- ------- - - - - ----- ------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
-- -- -- ----- - 
RSS = 136.145185 TSS = 147.403211 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) =-0.252121 
Wald test of joint significance: 20.239797 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.777427 0.204536 3.800901 0.000144 
laglogin -0.077968 0.024736 -3.152046 0.001621 
prorat 0.001551 0.000683 2.269625 0.023230 
lnmu -0.174732 0.159402 -1.096172 0.273004 
NOTE: Standard errors and te st statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.882 C 89 ] 
Test for second-order serial 
-------------------- 
correlation: -2.448 C 61 
---------------- 
] 
------- - - -------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBU 
--------------- 
ST TEST STATISTICS 
---- --- - 
Wald test of joint signif icance: 191.495887 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.777427 0.286724 2.711415 0.006700 
laglogin -0.077968 0.034015 -2.292135 0.021898 
prorat 0.001551 0.000195 7.937991 0.000000 
lnmu -0.174732 0.172805 -1.011148 0.311946 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.343 C 89 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.624 C 61 3 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
0.013 1.000) 
-0.247 -0.266 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
86 
76 97 
61 74 91 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TABLE 6 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
dloginv 0.10392 0.73481 
laglogin 8.18781 1.39863 
prorat 5.60625 64.72126 






dloginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
i. Ut) 
-0.28 1.00 
0.16 -0.15 1.00 
-0.02 O. 12 -0.06 1.00 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
4183.560 
-491.340 61.186 
-2.338 0.248 0.047 
-287.520 -41.739 0.582 2540.893 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
8221.048 
-960.425 115.705 
-3.987 0.442 0.004 
-356.808 -30.050 0.620 2986.166 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 7 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 124 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 274 Degrees of freedom: 268" 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instrumen ts used are: 





---------------- -------------- ------ --------- 
RSS = 134.188713 TSS =1 47.403211 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) _, 0.250352 
Wald test of joint si gnificance: 21.120679 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 18.490814 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.850922 0.217426 3.913627 0.000091 
laglogin -0.077234 0.024657 -3.132315 0.001734 
prorat 0.001655 0.000684 2.418750 0.015574 
lnmu -0.180182 0.158791 -1.134716 0.256494 
D89 -0.034625 0.124695 -0.277681 0.781257 
D90 -0.200129 0.106666 -1.876220 0.060625 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.888 C 89 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -2.279 C 61 ] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 212.232895 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 9.381470 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.850922 0.291524 2.918873 0.003513 
laglogin -0.077234 0.033557 -2.301539 0.021361 
prorat 0.001655 0.000186 8.880043 0.000000 
lnmu -0.180182 0.173496 -1.038541 0.299018 
D89 -0.034625 0.090164 -0.384027 0.700958 
D90 -0.200129 0.119150 -1.679641 0.093027 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.367 [ 89 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.646 [ 61 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
0.002 1.000 
-0.233 -0.260 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
86 
76 97 
61 74 91 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TADLE 8 CHEMICAL SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
dloginv 0.10392 0.73481 -3.58269 2.76505 
laglogin 8.18781 1.39863 2.94444 11.23452 
prorat 5.60625 64.72126 -0.54212 1070.34302 
lnmu 0.25076 0.25699 0.00000 1.52245 
Correlation Matrix 
dloginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
-0.28 1.00 
0.16 -0.15 1.00 
-0.42 C). 12 -4.06 1.00 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 




-2.265 0.249 0.047 
-259.151 -41.429 0.578 2521.450 
-882.083 9.873 0.213 -37.851 1554.877 
-598.587 3.018 -0.544 -27.834 597.461 1137.768 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat Inmu D89 D90 
8498.642 
-942.051 112.610 
-3.579 0.405 0.003 
-407.754 -41.518 0.455 3010.079 
-328.169 -15.461 0.037 75.519 812.951 
-1007.960 48.375 -0.384 353.130 414.646 1419.674 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 9 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 159 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla lnmula 
--- -------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS 72.782900 TSS , 392 . 534262 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) =0 . 457754 
Wald t est of joint significance: 6 99.198213 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.123611 0.378417 0.326654 0.743930 
laglogin 0.997099 0.042020 23.729008 0.000000 
prorat 0.013059 0.013967 0.935046 0.349765 
lnmu -0.012975 0.154067 -0.084216 0.932885 
NOTE: Sta ndard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.564 C 52 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: 1.789 E 38 ] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 656.280794 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.123611 0.380848 0.324569 0.745508 
laglogin 0.997099 0.043560 22.889978 0.000000 
prorat 0.013059 0.017253 0.756941 0.449085 
lnmu -0.012975 0.161940 -0.080122 0.936140 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -2.076 C 52 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 1.699 C 38 ] 
E stimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.230 1.000 
0.259 -0.485 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 
'8 48 61 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
------------- ----------------------- --------- -------------------------------- 
TABLE 10 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
loginv 8.81888 1.55662 5.84644 13.92139 
laglogin 8.69317 1.54594 5.48894 13.92139 
prorat 2.50357 4.82378 -1.41262 46.03984 
lnmu 0.41392 0.42540 0.00000 1.91044 
Correlation Matrix 
loginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.91 1.00 
-0.33 -0.38 1.00 
0.22 0.22 -0.19 1.00 
---------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
14319.978 
-1541.109 176.570 
-264.279 23.414 19.507 
47.383 -126.749 28.744 2373.667 
Robust AV M of one-s tep estimates (x300000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
14504.557 
-1613.254 189.752 
-323.165 27.247 29.766 
311.210 -154.356 61.602 2622.449 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 11 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 157 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla lnmula TIM DUMS 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 71.356743 TSS = 392.534262 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 0.454502 
Wald test of joint significance: 704.168013 df =3 
Wald test - it sig of time dams: 3.163735 df =2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.246333 0.383129 0.642951 0.520256 
laglogin 0.997998 0.041849 23.847676 0.000000 
prorat 0.014465 0.013781 1.049584 0.293909 
lnmu -0.001043 0.153039 -0.006814 0.994564 
D89 -0.176303 0.133653 -1.334077 0.182179 
D90 -0.219409 0.128708 -1.704703 0.088250 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.540 C 52 7 
Test for second-order serial correlation: 1.703 38 ] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 725.725731 df =3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 3.711439 df =2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.246333 0.367765 0.669812 0.502978 
laglogin 0.997998 0.041491 24.053351 0.000000 
prorat 0.014465 0.016580 0.872424 0.362977 
lnmu -0.001043 0.162555 -0.006415 0.994882 
D69 -0.178303 0.131457 -1.356358 0.174985 
D90 -0.219409 0.119190 -1.840832 0.065646 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -2.024 C 52 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 1.688 38 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.222 1.000 
0.257 -0.492 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 
38 48 61 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
------------ ----------------------- --------- -------------------------------- 
TABLE 12 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean ' Std Dev Min Max 
loginv 8.81888 1.55662 5.84644 13.92139 
laglogin 8.69317 1.54594 5.48894 13.92139 
prorat 2.50357 4.82378 -1.41262 46.03984 
lnmu 0.41392 0.42540 0.00000 1.91044 
Correlation Matrix 
loginv laglogin prorat Inmu 
1.00 
0.91 1.00 
-0.33 -0.38 1.00 
0.22 0.22 -0.19 1.00 
---------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100400) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
14678.793 
-1518.178 175.133 
-260.795 23.003 18.992 
43.610 -127.023 26.264 2342.093 
-811.273 -14.631 3.526 44.791 1786.304 
-824.376 -12.352 3.431 29.789 911.825 1656.582 
Robust AV M of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
13525.079 
-1451.431 172.150 
-279.743 24.206 27.489 
287.264 -165.761 51.855 2642.417 
-945.312 7.512 2.134 346.529 1728.099 
-593.291 -12.755 -30.465 132.884 725.937 1420.635 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 13 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. R. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 159 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla Inmula 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 72.782900 TSS = 73 . 795977 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) ="0 . 228877 
Wald t est of joint significance: 2.579555 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.123611 0.269935 0.457930 0.647003 
laglogin -0.002901 0.029827 -0.097272 0.922510 
prorat 0.013059 0.010154 1.286158 0.198388 
inmu -0.012975 0.112252 -0.115587 0.907980 
NOTE: Sta ndard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.464 [ 52 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: 1.789 [ 38 3 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 0.829524 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat 
CONST 0.123611 0.272793 0.453133 
laglogin -0.00901 0.029697 -0.097698 
prorat 0.013059 0.019252 0.678333 
lnmu -0.012975 0.125432 -0.103442 
df =3 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.940 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: 1.710 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.230 1.000 
0.259 -0.485 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 






C 52 ] 
[ 38 3 





















glogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
-0.38 1.00 
0.22 -0.19 1.00 
----------------------------------------- 







ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 






CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
7286.503 
-779.971 88.964 
-148.707 13.079 10.310 
86.732 -75.324 20.274 1260.060 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
7441.586 
-769.965 88.190 
-257.883 16.173 37.065 
-180.341 -68.071 93.711 1573.325 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 15 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 157 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST 1nkhlag proratla lnmula TIM DUMS 
------------------ 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES - 
RSS = 71.356743 TSS = 73.795977 
Estimated sigma-squared (leve ls) = 0.227251 
Wald test of joint significance: 3.009473 df = 3 
Wald t est - it sig of time dums: 3.191340 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.246333 0.281894 0.873849 0.382200 
laglogin -0.002002 0.029695 -0.067434 0.946236 
prorat 0.014465 0.009917 1.458512 0.144700 
lnmu -0.001043 0.111320 -0.009367 0.992526 
D89 -0.178303 0.158610 -1.124160 0.260945 
D90 -0.219409 0.128458 -1.708031 0.087631 
NOTE: Sta ndard errors and tes t statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.448 C 52 ] 




ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
----------------- 
Wald test of joint signifi cance: 0.900979 df = "Ir 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 4.974831 df = 3 
Var ' Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.246333 0.266984 0.922650 0.356190 
laglogin -0.002002 0.028929 -0.069219 0.944815 
prorat 0.014465 0.018432 0.784743 0.432604 
lnmu -0.001043 0.128440 -0.008119 0.993522 
089 -0.178303 0.143126 -1.245774 0.212848 
D90 -0.219409 0.108533 -2.021591 0.043219 
Robust test for first-order serial cor relation: -1.938 C 52 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial cor relation: 1.715 38 ] 




0.257 -0.492 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 
38 48 61 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
---------------------------- 














Mean Std Dev Min 
0.12571 0.67493 -2.26800 
8.69317 1.54594 5.48894 
2.50357 4.82378 -1.41262 
0.41392 0.42540 0.00000 
Matrix' 
glogin prorat Inmu 
1.00 
-0.38 1.00 






ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (xl00000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
7946.438 
-772.217 88.180 
-140.582 12.647 9.835 
147.064 -77.374 17.745 1239.207 
-1213.429 -6.157 - -1.988 -4.168 2515.715 
-1015.105 14.452 1.185 -46.751 929.083 1650.134 
Robust AV M of one-step esti mates (x1 00000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
7128.069 
-704.159 83.691 
-234.033 14.787 33.974 
-26.904 -83.186 83.935 1649.682 
-859.015 -9.891 18.656 18.120 2048.515 
-276.275 -30.589 -16.186 -48.255 415.799 1177.942 
TrTrrttttttttttttttt++++++++t+t+++++++++++t++++++ttt+tt++++++t+tt++tt++. t+ t+ 
TABLE 17 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 160 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST proratla Inmula 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 72.937946 TSS = 73.795977 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) _-0.227931 
Wald test of joint significance: 2.489874 df =2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.097862 0.066896 1.462909 0.143492 
prorat 0.013419 0.009165 1.464071 0.143175 
lnmu -0.013873 0.110314 -0.125758 0.899923 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.470 C 52 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: 1.795 C 38 ] 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significances 0.757294 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat 
CONST 0.097862 0.085144 1.149370 
prorat 0.013419 0.018641 0.719857 
lnmu -0.013873 0.124524 -0.111407 
df -2 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.915 
Robust test for second-order serial correlations 1.711 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.231 1.000 
0.260 -0.485 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 
Z. 8 48 61 




C 52 ] 
1 38 3 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
----------------------------- 




























ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST prorat lnmu 
447.501 
-33.678 8.400 
-576.415 30.114 1216.908 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST prorat lnmu 
724.952 
-116.944 34.748 
-786.171 104.774 1550.615 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++t+++++ 
TABLE 19 ELECTRONICS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 73 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 163 Degrees of freedom: 158 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST proratla lnmuls TIM DUMS 
--- ---------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 71. 462719 TSS = 73.795977 
Estimated sig ma-squared (levels) = 0.226148 
Wald test of joint si gnificance; 2.953471 df =2 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 5.042572 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.228658 0.108565 2.106194 0.035187 
prorat 0.014714 0.008952 1.643639 0.100251 
lnmu -0.001651 0.109294 -0.015105 0.987949 
D89 -0.178467 0.158212 -1.128027 0.259309 
D90 -0.219552 0.128243 -1.712004 0.086896 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -3.455 C 52 3 




ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
----------------- 
Wald test of joint significance: 0.841852 df = 2 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 5.761961 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.228658 0.110555 2.068272 0.030614 
prorat 0.014714 0.017835 0.825006 0.409368 
Inmu -0.001651 0.127076 -0.012991 0.989635 
D89 -0.178467 0.143222 -1.246084 0.212734 
D90 -0.219552 C). 108394 -2.025493 0.042817 
Robust t est for first-order serial correlation: -1.914 [ 52 3 
Robust t est for second-order serial correlation: 1.717 [ 38 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.222 1.000 
0.257 - 0.492 1.000 
Plumber of observations available to sample covariances 
50 
42 52 
38 48 61 













Mean Std Dev 














ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST prorat lnmu D89 D90 
1178.629 
-29.572 8.014 
-531.433 27.751 1194.520 
-1261.127 -1.080 -10.130 2503.090 
-682.801 -0.494 -45.741 925.826 1644.618 
Robust AVM of one- step esti mates (x1 00000) 
CONST prorat lnmu D89 D90 
1222.247 
-108.698 31.808 
-755.730 96.284 1614.837 
-945.623 20.590 11.484 2051.260 
-545.047 -11.815 -59.876 413.112 1174.934 
t+t+t+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 21 CLOTHING SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 123 Degrees of freedom: 119 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla 
--------------------- 
lnmula 
------------- ----- - - ------ - -------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
---------- - - -------- 
RSS = 115.218683 TSS = 142 . 480903 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) =0 . 968224 
Wald test of joint significance: 52.000751 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.184326 1.163379 0.158440 0.874110 
laglogin 0.985627 0.145428 6.777400 0.000000 
prorat 0.049803 0.026546 1.876129 0.060638 
lnmu 0.054561 0.305055 0.178856 0.858051 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -2.213 C 41 ] 




-1.770 [ 29 
------ -- - 
3 
----------------- ------- - ------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 43.785445 df 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.184326 1.297000 0.142117 0.886987 
laglogin 0.985627 0.167070 5.899492 0.000000 
prorat 0.049803 0.035182 1.415579 0.156899 
lnmu 0.054561 0.237616 0.229617 0.818389 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -2.026 C 41 3 
Robust test for second-order serial correlations -1.491 C 29 3 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.277 1.000 
-0.405 -0.382 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
, 39 
Z4 41 
29 36 43 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
-------------------------- 
TABLE 22 CLOTHING SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
loginv 7.65923 1.08068 
laglogin 7.42861 1.20292 
prorat 2.64756 5.10037 






loginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.61 1.00 
-0.02 -0.24 1.00 
-0.02 0.05 -0.27 1.00 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
j35345.176 
-16738.811 2114.944 
-1895.034 212.774 70.467 
-13362.277 1194.543 328.883 9305.879 
Robust AVM of one-step estim ates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
168220.923 
-21481.590 2791.231 
-3027.811 347.631 123.779 
-4821.920 216.211 390.165 5646.156 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 23 CLOTHING SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
LEVELS IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 123 Degrees of freedom: 117 
Dependent variable is: loginv 
Instruments used are: 




RSS = 113.975244 TSS = 142.480903 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) 0.974147 
Wald test of joint significance: 49.259641 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 7.130057 df = 2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.107130 1.194270 0.089703 0.928523 
laglogin 1.032241 0.156853 6.580951 0.000000 
prorat 0.056679 0.027194 2.084238 " 0.037139 
lnmu 0.107080 0.311662 0.343577 0.731164 
D89 -0.633829 0.242712 -2.611448 0.009016 
D90 -0.275820 0.242481 -1.137491 0.255333 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.815 C 41 3 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.854 C 29 3 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
---------------- 
Wald test of joint significance: 37.181121 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 6.854276 df = 2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.107130 1.363247 0.078584 0.937363 
laglogin 1.032241 0.188055 5.489028 0.000000 
prorat 0.056679 0.036498 1.552927 0.120441 
lnmu 0.107080 0.241017 0.444283 0.656838 
D89 -0.633829 0.275307 -2.302265 0.021320 
D90 -0.275820 0.281786 -0.978829 0.327664 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.458 C 41 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.512 C 29 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.170 1.000 
-0.412 -0.391 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
39 
34 41 
29 36 43 






Variable Mean Std Dev Min 
loginv 7.65923 1.08068 5.40268 
laglogin 7.42861 1.20292 2.56495 
prorat 2.64756 5.10037 -0.98204 
inmu 0.38876 0.37268 0.00000 
Correlation Matrix 
loginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.61 1.00 
-0.02 -0.24 1.00 
-0.02 0.05 -0.27 1.00 
------------------------ 








ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
142628.019 
-18446.934 2460.280 
-2063.751 246.829 73.953 
-15132.398 1543.899 364.137 9713.319 
9327.897 -1552.567 -156.218 -1517.842 5890.888 
9829.961 -1618.166 -157.702 -1633.009 3562.866 5879.716 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
185844.190 
-25289.736 3536.478 
-3446.292 430.535 133.214 
-8153.932 761.835 475.023 5808.941 
19079.191 -3003.345 -434.152 -2275.677 7579.367 
20136.788 -3261.441 -335.687 -968.921 5976.377 7940.323 
...... "..... "".... "rsrTTTTTTTTTT TT T TT TtTT 
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TASLE 25 CLOTHING SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observationss 123 Degrees of freedom: 119 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 





------------- -------------- -------------------- 
RSS = 115.218683 TSS = 125 . 947474 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) =-0 . 484112 
Wald test of joint significance: 12.739973 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error- T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.184326 0.928495 0.198522 0.842637 
laglogin -0.014373 0.114487 -0.125544 0.900093 
prorat 0.049803 0.019788 2.516802 0.011843 
lnmu 0.054561 0.220024 0.247977 0.804152 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -2.103 C 41 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.762 E 29 ] 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 41.830350 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat 
CONST 4.184326 0.814687 0.226254 
l ag l og in -0.014373 0.103902 -0.138334 
prorat 0.049803 . 
0.011571 4.304151 
lnmu 0.054561 0.153087 0.356405 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.778 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.407 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
i. 000 
-Q . 277 1.000 
-0.445 -0.382 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
Z9 
34 41 






C 41 ] 
C 29 3 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
----------- ------------------------ --------- -------------------------------- 
TABLE 26 CLOTHING SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
dloginv 0.23062 1.01605 -2.04157 4.07362 
laglogin 7.42861 1.20292 2.56495 10.71250 
prost 2.64756 5.10037 -0.98204 35.68221 
lnmu 0.38876 0.37268 0.00000 1.54872 
Correlation Matrix 
dloginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
-0.54 1.00 
0.27 -0.24 1.00 
-0.09 0.05 -0.27 1.00 
---------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu 
86210.325 
-10548.960 1310.729 
-1303.348 150.095 39.158 
-9249.823 916.771 200.839 4841.057 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (xiOC)000) 
CONST l aglogin prorat inmu 
66771.430 
-8412.892 1079.554 
-698.506 84.619 13.389 
-2265.295 165.849 55.635 2343.560 
t 'T 1' T' TTTTTTTT1TTTTt? TT 41 . +.... 
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TABLE 27 CLOTHINS SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 123 Degrees of freedom: 117 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used ere: 
CONST lnkhlag proratla lnmula TIM DOMS 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 113.975244 TSS = 125.947474 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels). = 0.487074 
Wald test of joint si gnificance: 13.491017 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 5.503526 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error- T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.107130 0.946258 0.113214 0.909861 
laglogin 0.032241 0.122079 0.264096 0.791706 
prorat 0.056679 0.020402 2.778069 0.005468 
inmu 0.107080 0.226397 0.472974 0.636232 
D89 -0.633829 0.277427 -2.284670 0.022332 
D90 -0.275820 0.232893 -1.184322 0.236286 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.761 C 41 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -i. e6o C 29 3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 57.487634 df = 3 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 7.239915 df =3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.107130 0.948545 0.112941 0.910077 
laglogin 0.032241 0.129759 0.248465 0.803775 
prorat 0.056679 0.013807 4.105135 0.000040 
inmu 0.107080 0.177697 0.602599 0.546775 
D89 -0.633829 0.274422 -2.309683 0.020906 
D90 -0.275820 0.287353 -0.959867 0.337122 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.334 C 41 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.453 C 29 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.170 1.000 
-0.412 -0.7,91 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
: 39 
34 41 
29 36 43 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
------------ ---------------------------------- ------------------------------- TABLE 28 CLOTHING SECTOR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Ma>; 
dloginv 0.23062 1.01605 -2.04157 4.07362 
laglogin 7.42861 1.20292 2.56495 10.71250 
prorat 2.64756 5.10037 -0.98204 35.68221 
lnmu 0.38876 0.37268 0.00000 1.54872 
Correlation Matrix 
dloginv laglogin prorat lnmu 
1.00 
-0.54 1.00 
0.27 -0.24 1.00 
-0.09 0.05 -0.27 1.00 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat lnmu D89 D90 
89540.345 
-11343.550 1490.326 
-1394.370 171.814 41.626 
-10198.819 1134.684 225.571 5125.580 
4555.634 -1041.267 -133.167 -1195.355 7696.559 
4898.542 -947.547 -112.507 -1261.218 3245.061 5423.909 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST laglogin prorat Inmu D89 D90 
89973.781 
-12069.998 1683.742 
-1115.750 150.670 19.063 
-5296.271 650.077 106.594 3157.621 
10038.545 -1862.169 -168.293 -1470.038 7530.764 
8642.627 -1731.074 -158.446 -1299.568 5528.482 8257.151 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 29 CLOTHING SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 123 Degrees of freedom: _120 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 
CONST proratla lnmula 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES 
RSS = 117.227401 TSS = 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) = 
Wald test of joint significance: 
125.947474 
0.488448 
9.149326 df =2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.074526 0.124237 0.599873 0.548591 
prorat 0.050326 0.017389 2.894093 0.003803. 
lnmu 0.058787 0.211064 0.278527 0.780608 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -2.121 C 41 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.745 C 29 3 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
Wald test of joint significance: 30.392975 df =2 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.074526 0.092239 0.807970 0.419108 
prorat 0.050326 0.009302 5.409971 0.000000 
lnmu 0.058787 0.157939 0.372214 0.709734 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.923 C 41 ] 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.387 C 29 3 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.279 1.000 
-0.402 -0.376 1.000 
Plumber of observations available to sample covariances 
39 
Z4 41 
29 Z, 6 43 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step estimates coincide 
---------------------- 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 
dloginv 0.23062 1.01605 -2.04157 
prorat 2.64756 5.10037 -0.98204 
lnmu 0.38876 0.37268 0.00000 
Correlation Matrix 
dloginv prorat lnmu 
1.00 
0.27 1.00 
-0.09 -0.27 1.00 
---------------------------------------------- 
ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
----------------------------- 





CONST prorat lnmu 
1543.473 
-138.463 30.239 
-2107.492 138.602 4454.795 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST prorat lnmu 
850.798 
-46.845 8.654 
-986.191 37.939 2494.469 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
TABLE 31 CLOTHING SECTOR 
D. P. D. RESULTS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES IV 
Number of firms: 53 Sample period is 1988 to 1990 
Observations: 123 Degrees of freedom: -118 
Dependent variable is: dloginv 
Instruments used are: 




RSS = 109.693020 TSS = 125.947474 
Estimated sigma-squared (levels) =-0.464801 
Wald test of joint significance: 11.396426 df = 2 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 5.784191 df = 3 
Var 'Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.340421 0.180379 1.887252 0.059126 
prorat 0.055356 0.016929 3.269843 0.001076 
lnmu 0.095473 0.207265 0.460631 0.645063 
D89 -0.613535 0.258015 -2.377903 0.017411 
D90 -0.254475 0.214522 -1.186241 0.235527 
NOTE: Standard errors and test statistics not robust to heteroskedasticity 
Test for first-order serial correlation: -1.823 C 41 ] 
Test for second-order serial correlation: -1.920 [ 29 ] 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ONE-STEP ESTIMATES WITH ROBUST TEST STATISTICS 
---------------- 
Wald test of joint significance: 32.403434 df = 2 
Wald test - it sig of time dums: 7.494676 df = 3 
Var Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-Value 
CONST 0.340421 0.182675 1.863532 0.062387 
prorat 0.055356 0.009921 5.579749 0.000000 
lnmu 0.095473 0.159165 0.599836 0.548616 
D89 -0.613535 0.237201 -2.586558 0.009694 
D90 -0.254475 0.254457 -1.000071 0.317276 
Robust test for first-order serial correlation: -1.435 C 41 3 
Robust test for second-order serial correlation: -1.471 C 29 ] 
Estimated serial correlation matrix 
1.000 
-0.170 1.000 
-0.423 -0.405 1.000 
Number of observations available to sample covariances 
39 
3,4 41 
29 36 43 
Model just identified - two-step estimates and one-step est imates coincide 
---------------------------------------- 




























ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE MATRICES 
Non-robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100040) 
CONST prorat lnmu D89 D90 
3253.665 
-122.305 28.660 
-1705.112 132.803 4295.874 
-3178.852 -19.834 -423.680 6657.182 
-2221.899 -0.345 -500.110 2462.323 4601.967 
Robust AVM of one-step estimates (x100000) 
CONST prorat lnmu D89 D90 
3337.020 
-29.619 9.842 
-590.283 47.395 2533.342 
-3254.020 -38.155 -666.936 5626.443 
-3665.682 -34.560 -610.556 3742.469 6474.824 
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APPENDIX 2 
The data set has been obtained from the volumes of years 1988, 
1989,1990,1991 of Mediobanca survey on the accounting data of the 
main Italian enterprises. This choice is due to the fact that since 
1988 the lower bond of the sample has been raised to 25 billion 
Italian lire. Since each volume contains the data of the two 
previous years, the observations refer to years 1986,1987,1988, 
1989,1990, i. e. 5 years. 
Since the variable I(t) has to be constructed with the stock 
values of K (capital) and "accumulated depreciations" for t and t-1, 
plus the flow variable "depreciations" at time "t", the number of 
available years for the estimates would reduce to 4, but since the 
empirical specification employed here contains the lagged dependent 
variable, then the number of years available is 3. Furthermore, given 
that the dependent variable has to be constructed by using the 
values of consecutive stock values, and given that this same 
variable appears (lagged) as a regressor, then for each firm to be 
included in the dataset, it is necessary to have at least three data 
referred to three consecutive years. Therefore the three industrial 
samples (chemical, electronics and clothing sectors) have been, 
constructed by considering all of the firms appearing in the 
Mediobanca survey, for which at least three years of consecutive 
observations (between 1986 and 1990) were available. For this 
purpose an unbalanced panel data sample has been created. Unlike the 
balanced sample, which only includes the "survivors" over the sample 
period, and, for this reason, might contain some bias and lose the 
information referred to the firms that exit' an to the new entrants 
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during the time under consideration, the unbalanced sample yields 
more complete information, although at the cost of using a more 
complex econometric methodology. 
In any case, some limitations have been necessary in order to 
overcome a few problems that have arisen. 
First of all, we have to keep in mind that the purpose of this 
paper is to analyze the investment in physical capital. Therefore 
any kind of financial investment has not been taken into account for 
the estimates of the investment function. For- the same reason, it 
has been necessary to exclude from the dataset those firms that, 
during the period under consideration, have modified their nature 
from industrial firms to financial holdings. In any case, the 
information relative to their behaviour has been kept, by including 
in the samples (when it was possible) all of the fitms belonging to 
the old and new born financial holdings and operating in the 
industries under consideration. Obviously, each individual firm has 
to keep its individual nature over the time under consideration, and 
for this reason, mergers have been regarded as events that modify 
the individual nature of each firm. The unbalanced. panel technique 
allows in fact to consider as separate individuals the firms before 
the mergers and the new-born firms that are determined by mergers. 
Such an approach has also some common sense validity, to the extent 
that the individual determined by the merger is actually different - 
in its behaviour and in its conjectures - from the different 
individuals that contribute to determine the merger. Furthermore, a 
merger introduces, in general, an unpredictable piece of information 
in the information set of the different agents. In each different 
year under consideration the conjectures might be modified, and this 
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is consistent with the argument that justifies the "partial 
adjustment" empirical specification employed in this paper for the 
investment function. A last point to mention is the fact that the 
process of liquidation that precedes mergers or failures might 
actually start before the merger and/or the failure of the firm 
under consideration takes place in legal terms. In other words, the 
data of the firms under consideration showed, in the years just 
before the liquidation or the merger, the typical aspects that 
characterize the processes of liquidation or merger. Such processes 
(which in any case refer to events reported in the original volumes 
of Mediobanca survey) typically involve drastic changes in the 
balance sheet structure of the firm, like a dramatic increase in the 
"financial assets" or in the "other, assets" associated to a very 
large reduction in the physical capital. Obviously for each unity, of 
observation, the years where such phenomena took place could not be 
taken into account, while the unity of observation itself could 
still be considered for the rest of the period, where no mergers or 
liquidations took place. However, in all of the three samples, the 
number of firms involved in phenomena of mergers and/or liquidation 
is very small and neglectable, compared to size of the samplel3. The 
mere changes of name or denomination that do not affect the 
13 In'any case, the raw data (unfortunately not available on 
diskette) of the original volumes of Mediobanca survey on the 
Italian firms with more than 25 billion of lira sales may be 
obtained by contacting the research office of Mediobanca at the 
following address: 
Ufficio Studi di Mediobanca 
via Filodrammatici 
20100 Milano Italy - tel. (+)39 (0)2 88291 
Alternatively, the same volumes may be obtained by the author of 
this thesis. 
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structure, the main business and the characteristics of the 
individual firms will obviously not be regarded as mergers. 
The industry classification in the Mediobanca sample does not 
always correspond to the standard NACE, although this should not 
constitute a problem for the chemical sector. 
In order to simplify the exposition of the dataset, the list of 
the firms included in the sample is reported separately; each firm 
is associated to a number, that will be used to identify the data in 
the tables of the dataset. Since the econometric analysis has been 
performed with panel data techniques, each firm (i. e. each firm 
number) refers to several years (corresponding to a line in the data 
tables), and each year contain its relative values for the different 
variables. In what follows the firms included in the industry 
samples are listed and associated to their reference number 
appearing in the tables of the data. 
Chemical Sector: 
1 Procter & Gamble Italia; 2 Exxon Chemical Mediterranea; 3 Henkel 
Sud; 4 Agfa Gevaert; 5 Alusuisse Italia; 6 Colgate-Palmolive; 7 
Industrie Vernici Italiane; 8 Chimet; 9 Hoechst Italia; 10 
Elettrocarbonium; 11 SIAPA - Italo Americana Prodotti 
Antiparassitari; 12 Henkel Chimica; 13 Italiana Coke; 14 SPAD - 
Piemontese Amidi e Derivati; 15 Caffaro; 16 ACNA Chimica Organica; 
17 Snia Tecnopolimeri; 18 Grace Italiana; 19 Johnson Wax; 20 Sorin 
Biomedica; 21 Maxmeyer- Duco; 22 Annunziata; 23 General Electric 
plastics-Italia; 24 Monsanto Italiana; 25 Istituto delle Vitamine; 
26 Abet Laminati; 27 Marchon Italiana; 28 Rivoira; 29 Dobfar; 30 
Comind Sud; 31 Liri Industriale; 32 Zanussi Componenti Plastica; 33 
Uniroyal Chimica; 34 Giovanni Crespi; 35 Tillmanns; 36 
Italesplosivi; 37 Vitrofil; 38 Oxon Italia; 39 Salchi; 40 Engelhard; 
41 Baslini Industrie Chimiche; 42 PCBI; 43 Carbochimica Italiana; 44 
SIPE Nobel - Italiana Prodotti Esplodenti; 45 Degussa Prodotti 
Ceramici; 46 Mapei; 47 Hoechst Sara; 48 Marchon Sud; 49 Novacrome; 
50 Mas Industriale; 51 Laminati Plastici e Rivestimenti; 52 Baldini; 
53 Ilford Photo; 54 FIAP - Fabbrica Italiana Articoli Plastici; 55 
vifan; 56 Simel; 57 Diversey; 58 Vernici Lalac; 59 Ecofuel; 60 sun 
Chemical Inchiostri (called Baglini Inchiostri until 1988); 61 ICI 
Italia; 62 Enichem Augusta (from 1990 called Enimonst Augusta); 63 
Kodak; 64 Enichem Tecnoresine; 65 Sandoz Prodotti Chimici; 66 SIAC - 
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Societä Italiana Additivi per Carburanti; 67 Terni Industrie 
Chimiche; 68 COMET S. A. R. A.; 69 Union Carbide Italia; 70 Sikkens 
Linvea; 71 Miles Italiana; 72 Veneziani; 73 Autoadesivitalia; 74 
Sarma; 75 Alta; 76 Atochem Italia; 77 BASF Vernici; 78 Paraffine 
Sarde; 79 Nuova Pansac; 80 Boston; 81 FAR - Fabbrica Adesivi Resine; 
82 SIAD - Italiana Acetilene e Derivati; 83 Brill; 84 Henkel 
Italiana; 85 Fotoindustria; 86 Gorlex; 87 Flexa Films; 88 Romana 
Chimici; 89 Vedril; 90 Dow Italia; 91 SIO - Industria Ossigeno Altri 
Gas; 92 Mazzucchelli Celluloide; 93 Bristol Europe; 94 Italiana 
Keller; 95 LATI - Industria Termoplastici; 96 Orsa; 97 NALCO 
Italiana; 98 Boero Colors; 99 Silo; 100 3M Italia; 101 Agrimont; 102 
Erba Biochimica; 103 Fanini Fain - Fabbrica Italiana Articoli 
Novitä; 104 Luigi Stoppani; 105 AKZO Chemicals; 106 Cartochimica 
Valpellice; 107 IMEXCO Specialties; 108 BASF Italia; 109 Enichem 
Synthesis; 110 CERESTAR Italia; 111 DSM Italia; 112 Manitoba Italia; 
113 Samatec; 114 Casco Nobel; 115 Industrie generali; 116 Seeber; 
117 Roussel Hoechst Agrovet; 118 Alfatherm Industriale; 119 Giuseppe 
Olmo Superflexite Italiana; 120 Ovatex; 121 ITB; 122 Crion; 123 
Zobele Industrie Chimiche; 124 Flexa. 
Electronics Sector: 
1 ITALTEL SIT; 2 BULL HN Information System Italia (called until 
1987 Honeywell Bull Italia); 3 ELSAG Elettronica San Giorgio; 4 
Digital Equipment; 5 Robert Bosch; 6 Siemens Telecomunicazioni; 7 
Texas Instruments Italia; 8 Italtel Telematica; 9 UNISYS Italia; 10 
SOGEI; 11 Nuova Magrini Galileo; 12 Siemens Data; 13 Contraves 
Italiana; 14 ITALSIEL - Italiana Sistemi Informativi Elettronici; 15 
Elettronica; 16 Canon Italia; 17 Selenia Spazio (from 1990 Alenia 
Spazio); 18 Telemecanique; 19 Arcotronics Italia; 20 Hantarex; 21 
DEA Digital Electronics Automation; 22 Honeywell; 23 Marposs; 24 
SIES Peterlongo; 25 Marelli Autronica; 26 Italtel Tecnoelettronica; 
27 CSELT Centro Studi e Laboratori Telecomunicazioni; 28 
Dataconsyst; 29 Onceas; 30 Teknecomp; 31 Italdata; 32 Apple 
Computer; 33 SAFNAT - Fabbrica Nazionale Apparecchi Telefonici; 34 
Data Management; 35 Elettronica Industriale; 36 ARE - Applicazioni 
Radio Elettroniche; 37 Hartmann & Braun Italia; 38 OSAI A-B; 39 IBM 
Italia; 40 Siemens; 41 Selenia - Industrie Elettroniche Associate; 
42 ASEM; 43 Industrie Magneti Marelli; 44 Marconi Italiana; 45 
Hitachi Sales Italiana; 46 Plessey; 47 SMA Segnalamento Marino ed 
Aereo; 48 Compugraphics Italia (from 1989 Agfa Compugraphic); 49 
Varian; 50 Procond Elettronica; 51 GTE Sylvania; 52 Fabbrica 
Accumulators York; 53 Industrie Face Standard; 54 Hewlett-Packard 
italiana; 55 Landis & Gyr; 56 OLTECO - Olivetti Telecomunicazioni; 
57 Bonfiglioli Riduttori; 58 Dial Telecomunicazioni; 59 Fracarraro 
Radioindustrie; 60 Nuova Industrie Elettriche di Legnano; 61 
Telettra; 62 SGS Thomson Microelectronics; 63 Sony Italia; 64 
Olivetti Canon Industria; 65 Elmer; 66 Bailey Esacontro; 67 Esaote 
Biomedica; 68 AROS; 69 Nashua Reprographics; 70 Necsy - Network 
Control Sytem; 71 SEPA - Societä di Elettronica per 1'Automazione; 
72 Philips Automation; 73 Olivetti Prodotti Industriali. 
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Clothing Sector: 
1 Benetton; 2 GFT; 3 Stefanel; 4 Levi Strauss Italia; 5 Prenatal; 6 
Maglificio Bellia; 7 Maglificio Calzificio Torinese; 8 Byblos; 9 
Sanremo Moda Uomo; 10 Golden Lady; 11 Fila Sport; 12 Fratelli 
Claudio e Carlalberto Corneliani; 13 Belfe; 14 Giole; 15 Forall 
Confezioni; 16 Calze Malerba; 17 SICEM; 18 Dalmas; 19 IME - 
Industria Maglieria Europea; 20 Cagi Maglierie; 21 Sandys; 22 Lubiam 
Moda per 1'Uomo; 23 Calzificio di Parabiago Mario Re Depaolini; 24 
Belvest; 25 Confezioni F. G.; 26 GM; 27 Sima; 28 Industria Adriatica 
Confezioni; 29 Facib di Cortesi & C.; 30 Max Mara; 31 Carrera; 32 
Marina Rinaldi; 33 Manifatture del Nord; 34 La Matta; 35 Genny Moda; 
36 CP Company; 37 Samar; 38 Maska; 39 Columbia; 40 Confar Confezioni 
Aretine; 41 La Granda Confezioni; 42 Incom - Industria Confezioni 
Montecatini; 43 Commerciale Abbigliamento; 44 Maglieria ragno; 45 
Ligron; 46 Ball; 47 GFT Donna; 48 Luisa Spagnoli; 49 Lovable 
Italiana; 50 Filodoro Calze; 51 Luck; 52 Hitman Industria 
Confezioni; 53 Calzificio Fratelli Carabelli. 
Chemical sector 
firm t-1 
no. year V ACC. D. DEPR. K(-1) ACC. D. INV. V. ADD. LAD. C. VAR. PR. 
i' 1987 163397 127710 32908 151106 99852 17341 140297 62090 78207 
1988 175998 14 314 24143 163397 127710 22140 121024 70803 50221 
1989 195694 155397 2 748 175998 142314 29361 171466 86963 84523 
1990 300011 196865 30015 195694 155397 9 864 201923 102673 99250 
'2 1987 43596 30188 4555 38458 28659 8164 29221 22190 7031 
1988 58393 31390 3585 43596 30188 17180 36047 26204 9843 
1989 69223 33009 4373 58393 31390 13584 39984 29369 10615 
1990 76549 34885 4965 69223 33009 10415 41204 31669 9535 
3 1987 68393 40684 6499 64059 36061 6210 50025 26159 23866 
1988 74576 45563 6420 68393 40684 7724 33730 27851 5879 
1989 81271 48292 3966 74576 45563 7932 25873 30010 -4137 
1990 86624 55614 6903 81271 48292 4934 45440 32516 12924 
4 1987 18381 10029 1651 17487 8996 1512 58103 29715 28388 
1988 19583 10342 1501 18381 10029 2390 61566 31435 30131 
1989 20980 10752 1234 19583 10342 2221 63874 35407 28467 
1990 24898 116.31 2359 20980 10752 5398 71180 38324 32856 
5 1987 176199 139468 19441 155631 118668 19209 75767 36265 39502 
1988 205470 161217 
22261 176199 139468 29783 94486 38316 56170 
1989 227824 180479 19793 205470 161217 22885 87736 43869 43867 
1990 250930 194082 14203 227824 180479 23706 71958 47489 24469 
6 1987 77376 36271 3025 68693 33685 9122 63334 45759 17575 
1988 86041 40534 4497 77376 36271 8899 61620 51052 10568 
1989 92792 46732 6946 86041 40534 7499 76563 55021 21542 
1990 99902 54083 7749 92792 46732 7508 85889 57999 27890 
7 1987 224976 130383 18402 210878 113526 15643 84161 56264 27897 
1988 226752 142774 19167 224976 130383 8552 98191 60285 37906 
1989 237936 157501 16893 226752 142774 13350 111122 64734 46388 
1990 263644 173389 17479 237936 157501 27299 123419 68730 54689 
8 1987 18724 10776 1889 14980 9495 4352 9387 3379 6008 
1988 21133 12810 2264 18724 10776 2639 11962 3803 8159 
1989 23009 14546 2236 21133 12810 2376 13145 4422 8723 
1990 24843 16648 2052 23009 14546 1784 11148 5011 6137 
9 1987 48459 33131 3452 51335 35152 2597 74133 59643 14490 
1988 49718 33104 2967 48459 33131 4253 75386 65380 10006 
1989 50141. 32200 3371 49718 33104 4698 78077 74172 3905 
1990 43346 25729 3735 50141 32200 3411 70791 79353 -8562 
io 1987 229072 174233 15099 218982 162650 13606 77288 56843 20445 
1988 239503 189978 16655 229072 174233 11341 82460 53488 28972 
1989 253467 201898 12551 239503 189978 14595 101403 60041 41362 
1990 270382 213614 12756 253467 201896 17955 84636 65079 19557 
il 1987 38998 3242B 2649 34473 20273 5019 53229 . 34681 18548 
1988 43230 34692 2550 38998 32428 4518 54162 38128 16034 
1989 44700 . 35929 2817 43230 34692 3050 61517 44997 16520 
1990 5026 36731 3422 44700 35929 8146 65149 48384 16765 
12 1987 66232 26101 5993 55527 20624 11221 35297 20179 15118 
1988 79111 3227B 6908 . 66232 2610i 13610 39887 26127 13760 
1989 94468 39209 7994 '79111 32278 16420 42250 29576 12674 
1990 107540 47301 9027 94468 39209 14007 47810 31463 16347 
i., 1987 143926 110383 9512 
132423 100614 11246 58243 49004: ' 9239 
1988 149177 118878 9334 143926 1107,83 5090 60291 48013 12 278 
1989 144737 120124 7639 148177 118878 2953 63876 48513 15363 
1990 129740 106916 6187 144737 120124 4398 55658 42729 12929 
14 1987 85844 67436 10647 77315 59954 11694 31738 21375 10363 
1988 99152 75684 10236 85844 67436 15296 48326 23155 25171 
1989 112333 83198 11285 99152 75684 16952 61655 25422 36233 
1990 126765 92024 11732 112333 83198 17338 60431 27509 32922 
15 1987 125042 99573 6971 119552 93596 6484 67983 33169 34814 
1988 130867 107407 9820 125042 99573 7811 69132 34708 34424 
1989 138528 116328 10608 130867 107407 9348 715.5 36042 35493 
1990 145610 126691 11490 138528 116328 8209 79069 40323 38746 
16 1987 177690 62325 21357 156861 42303 22164 66207 35875 30332 
1988 217191 75471 15473 177690 
62325 41828 45593 37698 7895 
1989 271008 91252 18751 217191 75471 56787 4025 37761 -33736 
1990 316992 109657 21024 271008 91252 48603 2966 42274 -39308 
17 1987 83380 36708 9810 71353 28331 13460 48104 19747 28357 
1988 90072 45599 9322 83380 36708 7123 56463 22368 34095 
1989 99668 55062 9837 90072 45599 9970 53826 25142 28684 
1990 104426 65337 10744 99668 55062 5227 54026 27729 26297 
18 1987 82100 27723 8783 75258 20074 7976 49515 35518 13997 
1988 90374 33610 7420 82100 27723 9807 47952 40060 7892 
1989 99009 40423 8060 90374 33610 9882 52812 45155 7657 
1990 108886 51069 11408 99009 40423 10639 63539 47533 16006 
19 1967 11688 5100 1584 10122 3914 1964 30169 13140 17029 
1986 12784 6458 1709 11688 5160 1447 33771 13748 20023 
1989 14281 7859 1448 12784 6458 1544 35799 15115 20684 
1990. 15461 9138 1418 14281 7859 1319 40145 16633 23512 
20 1987 53105 36903 9979 47400 29005 7786 65621 38284 27337 
1988 52322 38878 8743 53105 36903 5985 80638 41360 39258 
1969 64521 44972 7501 52322 38878 13606 77307 42734 34573 
1990 80424 53033 9905 64521 44972 17747 86653 51670 34983 
21 1987 51469 23357 5882 47891 18638 4741 43869 29390 14479 
1988 56690 31138 5512 51469 23357 2952 50311 30646 19665 
1989 64447 35426 5336 56690 31138 8805 53212 31428 21784 
1990 71528 40112 6190 64447 35426 8585 50904 34153 16751 
22 1987 54815 19792 2492 48037 17528 7006 26475. 14846 11629 
1988 62380 21556 1928 54815 19792 7729 29133 15670 13463 
1989 70153 23500 2490 62380 '21556 8319 36766 17869 18897 
1990 83392 25788 2649 70153 23500 13600 37304 18983 18321 
23 1987 7475 , 
4544 1347 7162 3238 354 10693 3903 6790 
1988 7662 4991 676 7475 4544 416 12473 4571 7902 
1989 8259 5357 604 7662 4991 835 15524 5531 9993 
1990 8662 5842 705 8259 5357 643 10689 6100 4589 
24 1987 884 468 168 731 395 248 4311 3597 714 
1988 1230 779 398 884 468 433 6009 4163 1846 
1989 1524 947 255 1230 779 381 9331 5459 3872 
1990 1700 1050 177 1524 947 250 9385 5791 3594 
25 1987 13457 9246 1356 12490 8045 1122 13224 7798 5426 
1988 14100 10218 1186 13457 9246 857 14318 8854 5464 
1989 15779 11044 1131 14100 10218 1984 15156 9653 5503 
1990 16356 11914 1158 15779 11044 865 15550 10908 , 
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26 1987 46105 31688 7826 30207 24168 16204 45786 21674 24112 
1988 54733 39509 9290 46105 31688 10097 52606. 24314 28292 
1989 66026 47022 8858 54733 39509 12638 57814 27849 29965 
1990 75127 53165 7659 66026 47022 10617 63190 31238 31952 
27 1987 59887 42768 5734 55392 34540 2001 13893 7473 4 6420 
1988 65340 50137 
1989 70011 54867 
1990 72883 59321 
28 1987 57082 35615 
1988 64132 40203 
1989 71061 46027 
1990 82720 50964 
29 1987 8992 6467 
1988 11130 7890 
1989 13437 9754 
1990 17993 11645 
30-1987 73748 40554 
1988'115105 63830 
1989 167730 63247 
1990 204235 112609 
31 1987 39280 18350 
1988 44192 22377 
1969 46104 26382 
1990 41578 24264 
32 1987 24012 9256 
1988 25457 11087 
1989 29597 14032 
1990 34697 15572 
33 1987 26016 18653 
1988 28 355 21752 
1989 30340 24419 
1990 62306 31966 
34 1987 43818 31561 
1.988 47657 35722 
1989 50810 39569 
1990 54205 42466 
35 1987 7950 5089 
1988 8172 5513 
1989 8462 5893 
1990 8596 6264 
36 1987 1732 791 
1988 1826 893 
1989 1853 1012 
1990 1859 1105 
37 1987 43239 19143 
1988 63942 21981 
1989 65061 21413 
1990 67941 32888 
38 1987 83 375 56175 
1988 88110 62811 
1989 98883 72022 
1990 110042 78958 
39 1987 25013 14223 
1988 27998 17293 
1989 30401 20454 
1990 34073 23503 
40 1987 17113 9783 
1988 18019 11717 
1989 19663 13830 
1990 20564 15381 

































































































































18 354 5130 
22377 2564 





















































































































































7926 --; 4064 
1988 18801 12816 2024 16692 10873 2190 12348 7937 
1989 21528 14415 1718 18801 12816 2846 13839 8622 
1990 22326 14991 1772 21528 14415 1994 13282 E3246 
42 1987 34515 30118 3538 32144 27469 3260 18627 5948 
1988 40937 32681 3675 34515 30118 7534 24350 6751 
'19B9 527,33 36495 5166 40937 " 
32681 12748 21517 8029 
1990 . 59874 
42422 6889 52333 36495 8503 26508 8653 
43 19(37 29755 18622 2063 28935 17139 1400 14352 7483 
1966 31006 20088 1908 29755 18622 1693 16562 8420 
1989 40345 22059 2366 31006 20088 9734 18636 8707 
1990 45517 25488 3701 40345 22059 5444 16074 9607 
44 1987 93995 59587 9185 89129 51703 6167 27135 14723 
1986 97918 68505 9939 93995 59587 4944 28453 15320 
1969 99365 74946 8911 97918 68505 3917 32567 16025 
1990 96278 79939 8378 99365 74946 298 27569 16010 
45 1987 29122 22396 1644 28300 20917 987 17895 11588 
1988 30691 23732 1455 29122 22396 1688 18734 12955 
1989 31029 24444 1477 30691 23732 1103 19506 14905 
1990 33587 25170 1611 31029 24444 3443 20009 15358 
46 1987 23285 14718 2713 18805 12128 4603 14192 6436 
1988 24755 17105 2475 23285 14718 1558 13875 7784 
1989 26080 19033 
2272 24755 17105 1669 16704 9992 
1990 28920 20629 2561 26080 19033 3805 23424 12370 
47 1987 15930 10690 1972 14225 8723 1710 14192 5489 
1988 17897 12611 1920 15930 10690 1966 13653 6162 
1989 20091 14063 1707 17897 12611 2449 16195 7376 
1990 26299 15776 1740 20091 14063 6235 18056 8426 
48 1987 40356 27876 5734 37642 22163 2735 13893 7434 
1988 42846 32731 4861 40356 27876 2496 13245 7473 
1989 46331 37188 4457 42846 32731 3485 11432 7330 
1990 52993 41109 3947 46331 37188 6688 13493 8075 
49 1987 9020 6562 1723 8081 5503 1583 12371 6192 
1988 10912 7705 1333 9020 6582 2102 12443 7034 
1989 12272 8877 1274 10912 7705 1462 13774 8002 
1990 14084 10134 1404 12272 8877 1959 13836 8847 
50 1987 28999 18731 2368 25270 16909 4275 14612 10710 
1988 37285 21541 3041 28999 18731 8517 14612 12010 
1989 49725 22552 1491 37285 21541 12920 13571 11513 
1990 50368 23591 1436 49725 22552 1040 6414 8339 
51 1987 _ 23544 9232 3124 21211 6129 2354 10808 5794 
1988 31743 12701 3509 23544 9232 8239 14595 6993 
1989 36900 16658 4019 31743 12701 5219 16382 8298 
1990 39905 20399 4498 36900 16658 3762 14246 8240 
52 1987 11588 5421 817 10440 4743 1287 6458 4189 
1988 12831 6635 1166 11588 5421 1195 7716 4674 
1989 13751 7380 1075 12831 6635 1250 . 
7732 5214" 
1990 14228 8574 1492 13751 7360 775 9108" 5641 
53 1987 348 311 27 307 290 47 5124 2801 
1988 451 327 26 348 '311 113 5071 3320 
1989 601 426 101 451 327 152 6616 3836 
1990 1071 607 191 601 -426 480 7318 4060 
54 1967 18460 13884 1545 17169 12567 1519 10205 7460 
1488 23239 15037 1016 18460 13884 4642 10087 8474 
1989 64129 . 
16012 1091. -23239 15037' 41006 12382 ', 9850 
1990 64940 18804 3121 64129 16012 1140 13043 10796 
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'. l :Ti !' 
1989 24396 19103 
72 1987 7572 4364 
1988 9086 4776 
1989 10508 4335 
73 1987 18012 7964 
1988 19500 9170 
1989 22165 10256 
74 1987 11605 8493 
1988 12217 9585 
1989 13822 10509 
75 1987 23757 14480 
1988 27245 16095 
1989 31443 16882 
76 1988 616 402 
1989 604 425 
1990 477 327 
77 1988 54082 28927 
1989 61431 33657 
1990 68963 38718 
78 1988 40982 4864 
1989 48412 9744 
1990 50501 15210 
79 1988 56254 15659 
1989 60648 18047 
1990 74855 27358 
80 1988 45350 25132 
1989 51785 27538 
1990 53576 29830 
81 1988 32724 20767 
1989 35098 23629 
1990 37902 25903 
82 1988 95599 84820 
1989 103551 90786 
1990 114241 98397 
83 1988 22941 13532 
1989 24110 15299 
1990 30110 17027 
84 1988 3618 1393 
1989 5372 2075 
1990 7475 3010 
05 1988 706 545 
1989 1011 646 
1990 1-313 634 
86 1988 9955 5299 
1989 12138 6975 
1990 14881 8662 
87 1988 14810 8213 
1989 13347 8750 
1990 14488 10914 
88 1988 4953 2133 
1989 5569 2829 
1990 5975 3307 
89 1987 72937 33634 
1988 84335 44664 
1989 92758 52589 

























































































































































































































































































1988 1i X1964 35930 
91 1987 323468 269619 
1988 346427 285859 
92 1987 69713 42293 
1988 81005 49164 
93 19B7 60432 25318 
1988 7 3336 29788 
94.1987 30668 20894 
1988 34936 24379 
95 1987 "26052 19806 
1988 28729 22408 
96 1987 41896 32512 
1988 45674 35175 
97 1987 50996 34927 
1988 52947 39804 
98 1987 28080 15523 
1988 30358 17328 
99 1987 18323 15099 
1988 23580 17943 
100 1988 549017 343225 
1989 591384 390789 
101 1988 457853 48887 
19,89 512564 79779 
102 1988 81284 10917 
1989 102840 20409 
103 1988 '97354 39774 
1989 97911 44901 
104 1988 39311 34309 
1989 45743 35915 
105 1988 17923 13106 
1989 19549 13953 
106 1988 11695 7349 
1989 14234 9007 
107 1968 72 25 
1989 174 56 
108 1989 56035 22349 
1990 71542 29027 
109 1989 181254 71944 
1990 216335 85013 
110 1989 92345 44215 
1994 103772 55116 
111 1989 91975 45406 
1990 122406 54596 
112 1989 4030 4011 
1990 4250 4243 
113 1989 187103 90467 
1990 204218 105345 
114 1989 38274 12628 
1990 47388 17359 
115 27031 20397 
1990 28265 20793 
116 1969 59919 34574 
1990 75016 40150 
117 1989 617 417 
1990 720 523 

























































32033~ 17333 69043 35839 33204 
259592 29928 92676 43965 48711 
269619 28074 104545 47676 56869 
39026 7483 35703 22223 13480 
42293 13477 37714 23099 14615 
21218 6240 56710 18881 37829 
25318 12042 66880 21618 45262 
17436 4781 37778 25939 11839 
20894 4595 44658 29768 14890 
16868 2696 21427 8210 13217 
19806 3181 26944 8832 18112 
28710 3695 20528 8806 11722 
32512 4692 21393 9496 11897 
30941 5999 22313 15486 6827 
34927 2 326 24601 1713B 7463 
13458 2235.22706 15745 6961 
15523 2464 24898 17557 7341 
12803 3179 12375 3034 9341 
15099 5356 12809 3305 9504 
293619 46620 355064 199027 156037 
343225 46402 373891 225169 148702 
6340 75699 146337 144634 1703 
48887 69572 97451 153658 -56207 
3358 21357 51635 42170 9465 
10917 24052 62547 46830 15717 
34766 9961 18724 7956 10768 
39774 1812 17939 9556 8383 
34017 2916 17001 12205 4796 
34309 6799 11241 11591 -350 
11928 1455 9272 6235 3037 
13106 1849 7899 7082 817 
5824 981 6141 2633 3508 
7349 2670 7904 3347 4557 
12 19 804 631 173 
25 105 883 795 Be 
16034 11666 90458 61767 28691 
22349 16242 94889 69793 25096 
56993 31516 65780 54995 10785 
71944 41476 68026 63521 4505 
19104 8042 64261 36562 27699 
44215 13839 61968 38243 23725 
39119 19340 46378 25966.20412 
45406 36072 57313 31175 26138 
2897 254 22878 3902 18976 
4011 1750 26291 4838 21453 
83410 19559 47921 33010.. 14911 
90467 19554 38195 34013 4182 
9296 4713 23836 
. 
17232 6604 
12628 6742 28104 '22399 5705 
17636 4128 18370 10023 8347 
20397 2585 12912 9252 3660 
28868 14616 26943 18551 8392 
34574 15471 28961 20851 8110 
. 1,3 
02 93 10038 4032 6006 
417 107 13115 6261 6854 
, 14509 6564 16789 10775 6014 
1990 28643 18023 2454 24933 15908 4049 15735 11686 4049 
119 1989 22215 13928 1246 17641 13050 4942 14127 3937 10190 
1990 27225 15530 1641 2 215 13928 5049 14650 4144 10506 
120 1989 25795 15316 3626 19958 12983 7130 13019 7320 5699 
1990 27856 17930 3773 25795 15316 3220 15779 8858 6921 
121 1989 42472 19642 9051 41607 14196 4470 18327 7200 11127 
1990 43152 24588 8654 42472 19642 4388 19310 8146 11164 
122 1989 36526 15068 6007 32842 9357 3980 10904 3 568 7336 
1990 . 37234 19551 
4643 36526 15068 868 12816 4034 8782 
123 1989 11381 8192 912 10231 7420 1290 7417 4769 2648 
1990 12394 8969 797 11381 8192 1033 7001 5357 1644 
124 1989 10728 5837 1748 10273 4256 622 8999 6950 2049 





EQ. RES. L. T. F. D. loginv prorat mu lnmu no. year 
200.000 47461 28656 9.76082? 1.43 7697 0.424779 0.3 54017 1 1987 
22330 125440 2629B 10.00514 1.339409 0.177966 0.16"_ 789 1988 
22330 109850 54582 10.28742 2.363711 0.412937 0.34567 1989 
22330 1196BB 104772 11.43989 2.334783 0.737737 0.552584 1990 
16000 11976 5800 9.00749 0.676059 0.207321 0.188403 2 1987 
16000 8565 5781 9.751501 0.698717 0.235335 0.211342 1988 
31500 1480 6203 9.516648 0.370298 0.188084 0.172342 1989 
315c: 0 1335 5406 9.251002 0.249593 0.164641 -0.152413 1990 
30800 20667 24524 8.733916 0.80316 0.4765 0.389674 3 1987 
30BOO 31586 8323 8.952088 0.201939 0.133411 0.125232 19BB 
30BOO 33094 34728 8.97866 -0.13432 0.543525 0.434069 1989 
30800 30720 10784 8.503905 0.371491 0.175293 0.161517 1990 
12000 23322 34000 7.321189 3.150109 0.962573 0.674256 4 1987 
15000 23888 104000 7.779049 3.433688 2.674347 1.301375 19BB 
15000 28685 119350 7.705713 2.90179 2.732059 1.31696 1989 
15000. 31780 140B34 8.593784 3.045178 3.01056 1.388931 1990 
30000 22401 25282 9.863134 1.006935 0.482472 
" 
0.393711 5 1987 
30000 23790 17789 10.30169 1.455491 0 . 330712 0.285714 1988 
30000 24680 334BB 10.03824 0.933767 0.612436 0.477746 1989 
30000 24516 38603 10.07348 0.489926 0.708104 0.535384 1990 
3200 14789 3189 9.118444 0.473018 0.177275 0.163202 6 1987 
3200 18969 9053 9.093694 0.244701 0.408363 0.342428 19BB 
3200 19896 8356 8.922525 0.445914 0.361794 0.308603 1989 
3200 24155 12482 8.923724 0.574002 0.456297 0.375897 1990 
27920 B5403 4059 9.657779 0.269999 0.035818 0.035191 7 1987 
27920 68657 4655 9.05392 0.381405 0.0482 0.047074 1988 
27920 52283 13320 9.499272 0.520335 0.166079 0.153646 1989 
27920 39652 12362 10.21461 0.644531 0.182946 0.168008 1990 
5000 5749 5557 8.378391 1.032055 0.516978 0.41672 8 1987 
5000 6152 5366 7.878155 0.97705 0.481169 0.392832,, 1988 
5000 6970 7888 7.773174. 0.987255 0.658981 0.506203 1989 
5000 7710 7068 7.486613 0.687417 0.556098 0.442181 1990 
30000 23910 5896 7.862112 0.843643 0.109367 0.10379 9 1987 
45000 17471 4874 8.35538 0.621316 0.07802 0.075126 1988 
45000 25476 23841 6.454892 0.221406 0.338285 0.291389 1989 
45000 33259 21330 8.134761 ' 
-0.45239 0.272557 0.241028 1990 
50000 21630 14665 516266 9. 0.341965 0.204733 0.186258 10 1987 
50000 20922 10864 9.33619 0.502836 0.153182 0.142525 1988 
50000 27752 14575 9.588434 0.78672 0.187455 0.171812 j, 999 
50000 41130 12929 9.795624 0.359503 0.141874 0.132671 1990 
5700 46880 714 8.520986 4.160997 0.013579 0.013488 11 1987 
5700 50783 555 8.415825 2.322813 0.009826 0.009778 1968 
5700 55491 386 8.022897 1.822624 0.006308 0.006288 1989 
5700 55851 1053 9.005282 1.811937 0.017108 0.016963 '1990 
28500 677 40228 9.325542 0.408114 1.369371 0.862624 12 1987 
60000 1077 12564 9.51856 0.326344 0.205708 0.187067 1988 
60000 2044 32091 9.706255 0.254921. . 0.51723 0.416886 1989 
60000 2508 6930 9.547312 0.28043 0.110866 0.10514 1990 
22500 2665 14593 9.327768 0-273668 0.579893 0.457357 `13 1967 
.. r ,'l .. .r ,_ ''ý. +ý^ ,. m, .... _ ,. _". 
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4500 -257 10424 8.535033 0.348388 2.456752 1.24033 1988 
451.00 659 6254 7.990577 0.493931 1.21225 0.79401 1989 
4500 3327 2084 8.388905 0.497954 0.266258 0.236066 1990 
10000 21844 5653 9.366831 0.56 419 0.177522 0,163412 14 1987 
10000 24160 5248 9.635347 1.301463 0.15363 0,142913 1988 
10000 25386 4798 9.738141 1.454358 0.13559 0.127153 1989 
IO Q0 45709 3176 9.760656 1.071174 0.057011 0.055445 1990 
57199 100182 17270 8.777093 1.263763 0.109734 0.10412 15 1987 
61645 101468 11538 8.963288 1.286433 0.070736 0.068346 1988 
61645 105606 9949 9.142918 1.425141 0.059485 0.057783 1989 
61645 110606 8367 9.012986 1.654484 0.046574 0.047432 1990 
30000 738 5113 10.00622 0.249474 0.166341 0.153872 16 1987 
30000 1448 10889 10.64132 0.065135 0.346254 0.297326 1988 
15000 15000 12944 10.94706 -0.22424 0.431467 0.3587 1989 
20000 0 1591 10.79144 -0.20729 0.07955. 0.076544 1990 
22551 20703 7370 9.507478 0.62104 0.170389 0.157336 17 1987 
22551 26682 9497 8.871084 0.6953 0.192899 0.176387 1988 
22551 33199 15445 9.207336 0.607556 0.27704 0.244545 1989 
22551 35897 9679 8.561593 0.558858 0.1656 0.153236 1990 
42134 3462 982 8.984192 0.238985 0.021537 0.021308 16 1987 
42134 5443 069 9.190852 0.138137 0.018265 0.0181 1988 
47000 6595 766 9.19947 0.127066 0.014292 0.014191 1989 
57000 9467 1668 9.272282 0.258987 0.025095 0.024785 1990 
4038 22382 0 7.582738 2.584562 0 0 19 1987 
4038 23329 0 7.277248 2.892766 0 0 1988 
2736 17833 0 7.342132 3.079984 0 0 1989 
2736 24856 0 7.184629 3.470627 to 0 1990 
36400 45871 8922 8.960083 1.400234 0.108446 0.102959 20 1987 
36400 46413 10683 8.697012 2.306202 0.129001 0.121334 1968 
36400 52510 10513 9.518266 2.422433 0.118243' 0.111759 1989 
36400 55137 21073 9.783972 1.696372 0.230213 0.207187 1990 
27500 22069 7468 8.464003 0.466356 0.150659 0.140335 21 1987 
27500 20650 6064 7.990238 0.665794 0.12594 0.118618 1988 
27500 17358 5121 9.083075 0.803075 0.11416 0.108101 1989 
27500 18235 3618 9.057772 0.547163 0.079108 0.076135 1990 
8275 11284 31864 8.854522 0.35914 1.629122 0.96665 22 1987 
11275 . 
13807 38116 8.952735 0.36587 1.519656 0.924122 1988 
14000 19528 32334 9.026297 0.436034 0.964388 0.675181 1989 
14000 21087 31598 9.517825 0.37227 0.900561 0.642149 1990 
10000 6533 0 5.869297 1.630386 0 0 23 1987 
10000 4297 0 6.030685 2.566014 0 0 1,908 
10000 . 8990 
0 6.727432 3.524238 0 0 1989 
10000 6685 0 6.466145 1.499027 0 0 1990 
220 5561 0 5.513429 2.002205 0 0 24 1987 
220 6243 5839 6.070738 4.223536 0.90345 0.643668 1988 
220 44 0 5.942799 8.087271 0 0 1989 
220 1666 34100 5.521461 5.904607 18.08059 2.948672 1990 
5000 6278 2699 7.022868 1.150158 0.239315 0.214559. 25 1987 
5000 6962 2362 6.753438 1.234989 0.197459 0.180201 1988 
5000 7934 1986 ' 7.592B7 1.335326 0.153 549 0.142943 1989 
5000 8916 1567 6.76273 0.929338 0.112604 0.106703 1990 
8000 21607 2810 9.693013 3.761991 0.09491 0.090672 26 1987 
8000 27664 
2307 9.219994 1.867784 0.064687 0.062681 1988 
8000 34994 1682 9.444463 1.854081 0.039122 0.038376 1989 
8000 43672 1058 9.270212 1.593829 0.020475 0.020269 1990 
28940 5859 2057 7.601402 0.290093 0.059111 0.05743 27 1987 
28940 5303 18460 
289410 6404 0 
28940 7183 0 
2000 14983 17164 
2000 14491 732 
2000 15763 1582 
2000 17612 3064 
1000 1902 1694 
1400 3155 2182 
5000 2084 2727 
5000 2509 2727 
7000 56359 25600 
7000 47830 23011 
7000 54742 20253 
7000 66049 25423 
15000 190 9917 
15000 1019 8703 
15000 1802 6898 
16500 2312 5773 
5000 -1331 19202 
5000 2378 8032 
8000 2725 8190 
8000 3792 7687, 
4000 7755 2533 
4000 8681 2474 
4000 13964 1877 
10000 2110 28374 
10000 50799 3857 
10000 53013 3267 
10000 59122 2360 
10000 69914 432 
2400 3870 0 
4800 2379 0 
4800 3661 0 
4800 5370 0 
650 326 0 
650 503 0 
650 263 0 
650 313 0 
9000 849 3014 
9000 1564 9481 
9000 4807 15613 
9000 9702 7301 
3000 13003 3411 
3150 15187 . 
2239 
3300 16683 10098 
3940 20747 13235 
5780 1765 10061 
5780 280') 7220 
5780 2183 11256 
7000 2249 11773 
22230 2442 5617 
22230 2253 5000 
22230 3465 5700 
22230 3833 6290 
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4000 4447, 5700 7.691657 0.721484 0.675115 0.515882 1988 
4000 4546 7200 7.95367 0.821107 0.842499 0.611123 1989 
4000 4939 6718 7.597898 0.671153 0.751538 0.560494 1990 
1100 13295 2404 8.089482 2.555365 0.167002 0.154438 42 1987 
1100 15987 2277 8.927181 3.809512 0.133259 0.125098 1988 
1100 19887 2138 9.45313 1.536938 0.101873 0.097011 1989 
11OQ 21212 3850 9.048174 1.068681 0.172553 0.159183 1990 
6600 189 0 7.244228 0.548666 0 0 43 1987 
6600 2642 4950 7.434257 0.696076 0.535598 0.42892 1988 
6600 5691 0 9.18338 0.856654 0 0 1989 
6600 8024 5000 8.602269 0.335253 0.341904 0.294089 1990 
15190 11877 12451 8.726968 0.312477 0.460007 0.378441 44 1987 
15190 11940 14571 8.50593 0.363281 0.537081 0.429885 -- 1988 
15190 12129 17594 8.273081 0.529776 0.644021 0.497145 1989 
15190 12465 15330 5.697093 0.448726 0.55433 0.441045 1990 
10400 1775 7000 6.89467 0.804896 0.574949 0.454223 45 1987 
10400 3103 7000 7.4313 0.817775 0.518403 0.417659 1988 
10400 3960 6500 7.005789 0.6228 0.452646 0.373387 1989 
10400 5189 5500 8.144098 0.669544 0.352813 0.302186 1990 
2600 4294 8192 8.434464 1.094475 1.18828 0.783116 46 1987 
2600 5640 10698 7.351156 0.676702 1.267536 0.818694 1988 
2600 7149 10347 7.41998 0.826483 1.06124 0.723356 1989 
2600 8747 9911 8.244071 1.486976 0.873447 0.62778 1990 
3200 2001 7,008 7.444249 1.490383 0.57835 0.45638 47 1987 
3200 3519 2463 7.583756 1.36065 0.366572 0.312306 1988 
3200 4999 3044 7.803435 1.571576 0.371265 0.315734 1989 
3200 7037 2469 8.737934 1.514404 0.241184 0.216066 1990 
1000 16481 13066 7.913887 0.393162 0.74744 0.558152 48 1987 
1000 16752 5868 7.822445 0.440199 0.330554 0.285596 1988 
1000 17841 6143 8.156223 0.382008 0.3 26044 C, . 28222 1989 
1000 22150 0438 8.80807 0.561745 0.364492 0.310783 1990 
250C) 1684 0 7.367077 2.258317 0 0 49 1967 
2500 2621 0 7.650645 2.111646 0 0 1988 
2500 3862 0 7.287561 1.695394 0 0 1989 
2500 4735 0 7.580189 1.393036 0 0 1990 
4285 5597 6370 8.360539 0.4; 9722 0.644606 0.497501 50 1987 
4285 5643 5866 9.049819 0.24119 0.590854 0.464271 1988 
4285 5645 8749 9.466532 0.123133 0.881067 0.631839 1989 
4285 3483 12028 6.946976 -0.06716 1.548404 0.935467 1990 
12000 38 5608 7.763871 0.313238 0.465858 0.382441 51 1987 
12000" 662 5155 9.016634 0.505551 0.407124 0.341548 1988 
12000 2170 4122 8.560061 0.399905 0.290896 0.255337 1989 
12500 3050 2969 8.232706 0.281268 0.190932 0.174737 1990 
2800 696 3788 7.160069 0.375265 1.083524 0.734061 52 1987 
2800 904 3O2 7.085901 0.469486 0.891469 0.637354 . 1988 2 800 963 5353 7.130899 0.382814 1.422535 0.864815 1989 
2800 1028 5925 6.652863 0.515864 1.547806 0.935232 1990 
2000 1244 0 3.850148 128.7508 0 0 53 1987 
2000 1.95 0 4.727388 45.04247 0 0 1988 
2000 -317 0 5.023881 21.11866 0 0 1989 
2000) 304 0 6.173786 17.64825 0 0 1990 
14C)C) 3787 3198 7.325808 0.557917 0.616541 0.4802 89 54 1987 
1400 3728 4183 8.442901 0.335495 0.815718 0.596481 1988 
2516 11553 21253 10.62147 0.290795 1.510626 0.920532 1989 
5816 11653 4912 7.038784 0.0442 68 0.281184 0.2A. 7785 1990 
8400 13759 10380 9.931297 1.527004 0.468433 0.384196 55 1987 
15240 9581 8.898912 0.339875 0.405288 0.340242 1988 
16106 11493 7.177782 0.358272 0.468987 0.384573 1989 
15893 9993 6.562444 0.168004 0.377194 0.320048 1990 
762 1622 8.033983 0.167451 0.049509 0.048322 56 1987 
52*2 1291 8. 36421 2 0.223597 0.039696 0.038929 1988 
987 3056 8.646114 0.176759 0.09 643 0.088599 1989 
1379 2727 8.3 69621 0.098333 0.081698 0.0785 32 1990 
2821 1409 6.2 4558 1.557124 0.363051 0.33097 5 57 1987 
3-540 1279 6.124683 1.769148 0.278043 0.24533 1988 
3 718 1250 6.251904 1.26009 0.261616 0.232393 1989 
4853 2250 6.695799 0.437423 0.380518 0.32 458 1990 
1501 0 5.361 92 2.636686 0 0 58 1987 
1196 0 6.721426 3.475027 0 0 1988 
1678 0 6.788972 2.481856 0 0 1989 
. 1835 0 5.66296 2.874933 0 .0 1990 
-3212 0 7.004882 0.015056 0 0 59 1987 
-3579 0 7.669962 -0.29483 0 0 1988 
-7087 0 7.550135 1.418442 0 0 1989 
-5695 0 8.63693 1.042691 0 0 1990 
3522 974 7.641564 0.840856 0.068389 0.066152 60 1987 
5383 1987 7.95 263 0.577641 0.123393 0.116354 1988 
6123 7714 8.187855 0.393908 0.457994 0.377062 1989 
6620 742; 1 8.055475 0.260712 0.42797 0.356254 1990 
4785 0 8.500454 0.784293 0 0 61 1987 
7022 0 9.276783 0.333721 0 0 1988 
9044 0 10.21618 0.349762 0 0 1989 
11106 0 9.158205 0.194095 0 0 1990 
24067 28918 10.07778 0.485636 0.200726 0.182926 62 1987 
38661 33318 10.18867 0.617421 0.209995 0.190616, 1968 
57716 32581 10.58777 0.482511 0.183332 0.168334 1989 
98861 3379 9.490998 1.573048 0.030757 0.030294 63 1987 
124077 20947 9.4796194 1-. 60715B- 0.155075 0.144165 19BB 
152722 23137 9.775597 1.314802 0.141319 0.132184 1989 
86560 51298 9.973946 0.056773 0.531255 0.426088 64 1987 
-5471 85597 10.23635 -0.01392 0.90551 0.64475 1988 
-29565 108092 9.887612 -0.10142 1.534635 0.93005 1989 
54288 10901 5.7 6848 0.824092 0.17501 0.161276 65 1987 
15067 9386 8.116417 1.225326 0.148121 0.138127 1988 
15041 7762 8.446771 1.21234 0.122543 0.115597 1989 
14445 0 7.069874 11.6310 0 0 66 1987 
16637 0 6.463029 12.55741 0 0 1988 
18510 0 6.874198 16.55937 0 0 1989 
2782 67551 10.81968 0.187711 14.1261 2.716422 67 1987 
1017 105586 10.4765 0.194979 34.99702 3.583436 1988 
1218 71948 10.13805 0.208213 22.35799 3.150939 1989 
3257 11679 8.135054 0.451135 1.26164 0.81609 68 1987 
4410 14341 8.644002 0.272527 1.377618 0.866099 1988 
2349 16624 8.20166 0.22501 1.991137 1.095653 1989 
33906 45741 8.557183 0.060724 0.935284 0.660254 '69 1987 
92691 29949 10.34856 0.479534 0.278101 0.245376 1988 
88198 13454 8.900004 0.252221 0.130371 0.122546 1989" 
12708 193 7.003974 2.735142 0.014032 0.013935 76 1987 
15105 153 7.03966 2.636359 0.009473 0.009429 1988 
16515 748 7.658228 2.532174 0.042594 0.041712 1989 
7389 1093 7.823646 0.992517: 0.086822 0.083258 71 1987 
8162 1367 7.762596 0.865962' 0.102305 0.097403,. - 1989 
520ä 03.9 1367 7.734559 1.148258 0.100968 0.096189 1989 
2700 3409 2716 7.07327 1.337882 0.44459 0.367826 72 1987 
2700 3522 3820 7.42 9521 0.529296 0.61395 0.478685 1988 
2700 3693 3529 7.665572 0.628353 0.55201 0.439551 1989 
3000 1226 2479 7.746029 0.310547 0.586607 0.461590 73 1967 
3000 1233 1577 7.639642 0.259543 0.372549 0.31667 1988 
3000 -132 2754 7.993958 0.256241 0.960251 0.673073 1989 
2000 4196 0 7.431892 0.817873 0 0 74 1987 
2000 5657 0 6.806B29 1.251203 CU 0 1988 
2000 5B23 0 7.640123 1.777313 0 0 1989 
400 0 8895 1040 7.926964 -0.. 35891 0.02127 0.021047 75 1987 
40000 100215 1526 8.19257 -0.54212 0.030389 0.029937 1988 
40000 6503 1375 8.480944 -0.36606 0.02 9568 0.02 9139 1989 
1015 256 0 3.871201 28.72759 0 0 76 1988 
1015 1387 0 3.806662 19.54835 0 "0 1989 
1015 2937 0 3.951244 22.14195 0 0 1990 
4000 27389 1584 8.606302 0.598708 0.050464 0.049232 77 1988 
4000 30065 -757 8.955964 0.555903 0.022222 0.021979 1989 
4000 33951 1085 8.989195 0.528486 0.028569 0.028168 1990 
17715 3944 9589 7.721792 0.801016 0.442726 0.366534 78 1988 
17715 18542 8457 9.025576 0.64435 0.233252 ((. 209654 1989 
17715. 26787 7132 7.997327 0.367288 0.160262 0.148646 1990 
10000 1445 13875 8.122668 0.246071 1.21232 0.194042 79 1988 
15000 9615 5296 8.594895 0.297411 0.215153 0.19487 1989 
25000 1888 10762 9.167015 0.342903 0'. 400253 0.336653 1990 
10200 10732 5893 8.997147 0.534643 9.281531 0.248055 80 1988 
20200 1346 3482 8.940236 0.34021 0.161608 0.149805 1989 
20200 3284 2420 8.049108 0.069512 0.103049 0.098078 1990 
8000 12676 4228 7.824846 0.368738 0.204486 0.186055 81 1988 
8000 12770 2734 7.745003 0.436446 0.131632 0.123661 1989 
8000 12811 5817 7.98105 0.546425 0.279516 0.246482 1990 
2300 16637 5486 8.747193 1'. 408229 0.289697 0.22+4408 82 1988 
2300 42304 7870 9.075208 1.786264 0.176442 0.162494 1989 
2300 51369 6401 9.325988 1.748133 0.119268 0.112675 1990 
210 4010 0 7.735433 0.262411 0 0 83 1988 
4000 20191 0 7.302496 0.108325 0 0 1989 
4000 20965 0 8.751791 -0.33395 0 0 1990 
7500 25842 0 7.444833 3.73468 0 0 84 1968 
7500 28830 0 7.493874 0.500415 0 0 1989 
7500 28690 0 7.706613 0.405117 0 0 1990 
1000 2834 13000 4.543295 15.82839 3.390715 1.479492 85 1988 
1000 3f) 99 13000 5.918894 26.98402 3.171505 1.428277 1989 
1000 3145 20000 6.12905 13.44021 4.82509 1.762175 1990 
3500 974 1935 7.656337 1.689597 0.432499 0.35942 86 1988 
350') 1060 2229 7.733246 0.489402 0.488816 0.397981 1989 
3500 1431 1705 7.976252 0.591211 0.345772 0.296968 1990 
3300 415 2011 8.359603 0.796909 0.541319 0.432639 87 1988 
3300 762 2934 6.753438 0.497622 0.722304 0.543663 1989 
3300 1743 6141 7.338238 0.781132 1.217728 0.796483 1990 
75tß 1384 2469 6.993933 0.737864 1.156992 0.76871 88 1988 
1206 790 3580 6.496775 0.841104 1.793597' 1.0273 ' 
26 1989 
1350 913 4326 6.025866 0.871498 1.911622 1.06871 1990 
7000 4923 25013 8.608313 0.309307 2.097878 1.130717 89 1987 
7000 5305 17857 9.330964 0.485227 1.451199 0.896577 1988 
7000 6117 14530 9.336532 0.398178 1.107723 0.745608 1989 
. 10,00 
17612 5181 9.888678 0.460356 0.185619 0.170265 '90 1987 
ýý S 
10::. i c) 21251 10063 9.760367 0.561961 00 
318944 
0.276831 1988 
24396 103608 34769 10.30655 1.007821 0.271624 0.240295 91 1987 
2457.3 115758 29387 10.2426 1.005161 0.209412 0.190134 1988 
12000 14422 28514 8.920389 0.459151 1.079176 0.77,1972 92 1987 
1 000 11220 28256 9.50874 0.5073,05 1.216882 0.796102 1988 
1286 25294 667 8.738735 1.078001 0.025094 0.024784 93 1987 
1286 25397 242 9.396156 1.226849 0.009069 0.009029 1988 
3024 8530 8833 8.472405 1.274842 0.764497 0.567866 94 1987 
. =7024 12945 
9746 8.432724 1.449974 0.610307 0.476425 1988 
8000 . 5289 
1272 7.899524 1.780306 0.095718 0.09141 95 1987 
7400 83-12 269 8.064951 2.759956 0.017121 0.016976 1988 
1800 22883 335 8.214736 1.108565 0-013572 0.013481 96 1987 
"1800 23235 0 8.453614 1.206667 0 0 1988 
7500 7679 7736 8.699348 0.424755 0.509651 0.411879 97 1987 
7500 9642 6859 7.751905 0.442041 0.400128 0.336564 1988 
23000 3724 4003 7.711997 0.5247 0.14979 0.13958 98 1987 
23000 3821 4124 7.809541 0.556426 0.15376 0.143026 1968 
4000 6487 2612 8.064322 3.748391 0.24907 0.222399 99 1987 
4000 6094 6216 8.585973 2.805751 0.615811 0.479837 1988 
242825 64995 67845 10.74978 0.679906 0.220405 0.199183 100 1988 
242825 67889 63210 10.7451. 0.680662 0.203435 0.18518 1989 
95000' 234 225358 11.23452 0.004222 2.366361 1.21 3832 101 1988 
. 32562 
76993+ 223217 11.15012 -0.12946 2.037488 11.111031 1989 
75015 0 4172 9.969135 0.153652 0.055616 0.054124 102 1988 
9020 55225 0 10.08797 0.210399 .0 0 1989 
7000 14487 25553 9.206433 0.194051 1.189231 0.78355 103 1988 
7000 16794 24743 7.502186 0.137142 1.039884 0.712893 1989 
2000 23361 106 7.977968 0.984823 0.00418 0.004171 104 1988 
2000 24494 3300 8.824531 -0.06591 0.124557 0.117389 1989 
1500 4762 656 7.282761 0.619894 0.104759 0.099627 105 1988 
1500 5116 516 7.5224 0.15976.8 0.077993 0.075101 1989 
1750 1812 4598 6.888572 0.676978 1.290848 0.828922 106 1988 
1750 2784 3852 7.889834 0.987717 0.849581 0.614959 1989 
200 2 0 2.944439 3.659076 0 0 107 1988 
200 6 0 4.65396 1.763713 0 0 1989 
32000 23752 342 9.364434 0.981566 0.006134 0.006116 . 
108 1989 
32000 31164 212 9.695356 0.706226 0.003Z56 0.003351 1990 
. 80000 -10845 18582 10.35825 0.104553 0.268701 0.237993 109 1989 
80000 -18158 19997 10.63287 0.039068 0.323356 0.280171 1990 
58516 -4899 10659 8.992433 0.420995 0.197693 0.180397 110 1989 
58816 -5956 376 9.535246 0.467282 0.007113 0.007088 1990 
40000 3303 33507 9.869931 0.496495 0.77378 0.573113 111 1989 
55000 3719 43087 10.49327 0.532064 0.733783 0.550306 1990 
8500 12347 0 5.537334 446.8769 0 0 112 1989 
8500 89? 5 0 7.467371 1070.343 0 0 1990 
5,235 802 49326 9.881191 0.153086 0.912819 0.646578 113 1989 
53235 -1665 59185 9.880935 0.041024 1.147663 0.76438 1990 
27000 3116 3812 8.45808 0.250892 0.126577 0.119184 114 1989 
27000 3132 4168 9.075894 0.210875 0.138325 0.129558 , 1990 
3000 11827 3292 8.325548 1.297053 0.222027 0.200511 115 1989 
40017 12766 2897 7.857481 0.522941 0.17279 0.159386 1990 
. 13500 
3620 5467 9.589872 0.459868 0 . 319334' 0.277127 116 1989 
13500 6364 4980 9.646723 0.303331 0.25070 5 0.223707 1990 
2000 1669 0 4.532599 25.37019 . U 0 117 1989 
2000 2311 0 4.672829 32.48649 0 0 1990 
4820 5583 1687 E3.789355 J. 322: 387- - 0-162165 0.150284. 118 1989 
4820 4659 4387 8.306225 0.425294 0.462013 0.380361 1990 
750() 8960 2745 8.505525 2.090788 0.166768 0.154237' 119 1989 
7500 10754 2214 8.5 6945 1.20179 0.121288 0.114478 1990 
50000 9810 9587 8.872067 0.769658 0.647333 0.499158 120 1989 
5000 10445 8756 8.077137 0.6 6091 0.566915 0.449109 1990 
990C) X176 73095 8.405144 0.382381 5.590012 1.885555 121 1989 
9900 5896 63784 8.386629 0.463556 4.037984 1.617006 1990 
6175 13367 3318 8.289037 0.294247 0.169788 0.156823 122 1989 
6175 13556 6000 6.766192 0.307965 0.30409 0.265505 1990 
10010 5726 2402 7.162397 0.887361 0.357122 0.3053 66 123 1989 
1000 6646 2948 6.940 22 0.468693 0.365561 0.326105 1990 
1325 613 2111 6.43294 0.320778 1.089267 0.736813 124 1989 






no. year 1< ACC. D. 
1 1987 4494 . 2.5 223714 
1988 510760 277393 
1989 599909 344675 
1990 673979 423489 
2 1987 369245 323241 
1988 445071 357991 
1989 615911 391448 
£990 629921 419625 
3 1987 135359 92 271 
1988 146411 99: 328 
1989 157340 104973 
1990 166218 112659 
4 1987 59379 36541 
1988 92400 42679 
1989 139482 57436 
1990 167816 74368 
5 1987 21137 8619 
1988 25849 10+15 
1989 26708 11661 
1990 31445 14657 
6 1987 193897 154949 
1988 223405 184809 
1989 252123 208302 
1990 279549 230976 
7 1987 90753 65720 
1988 101097 71911 
1989 167042 80432 
1990 449940 85143 
8 1987 95190 43966 
1988 108788 54073 
1989 125377 76111 
1990 146958 88948 
9 1987 161614 146200 
1988 147259 127343 
1989 135976 115514 
1990 122763 90880 
10 1987- 4090 2949 
1988 4660 : 3702 
1989 5265 4358 
1990 5673 4539 
11 1987 51018 31623 
1988 59381 37957 
1989 64980 44187 
1990 69134 48287 
12 1987 143830 77160 
1988 178364 98136 
1989 227126 122025 
1990 257923 146238 
13 1987 122365 64914 
1988 125627 71248 
1989 141978 77953 
1990 146097 83268 
14 1987 43515 25370 
1988 66849 32713 
1989 76510 42866 
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15 1987 74046 46016 17850 73158 43082 15804 100375 66702 
1988 80855 50449 1809, 74046 46016 20468 106800 75714 
1989 90292 55219 14536 80855 50449 19203 111923 84889 
1990 100459 63842 12193 90292 55219 13737 113001 93069 
16 1987 8118 3082 2879 7056 2505 3364 14566 10145 
1988 9390 4186 1236 8118 3082 1404 26408 1 184 
1989 11706 5322 1256 9390 4186 2436 29643 16950 
1990 14606 5964 1686 11706 5322 3944 46474 24427, 
17 1987 92654 33767 19082 59937 25508 43540 69131 50404 
1988 9630 42823 17471 92654 33767 12083 76140 53228 
1989 103141 52803 16847 96322 4 823 13686' - 88303 61191 
1990 111154 62202 16 334 103141 52803 14948 95386 71564 
18 1987 8351 4839 1458 6883 3567 1654 26836 10208 
1988 11945 6090 1571 8351 4839 3914 30565 11679 
1989 13679 7661 1952 11945 6090 " 2115 41800 14354 1990 17088 9072 2256 13679 7661 4254 45165 16301 
19 1987 63726 45430 8140 53893 37633 10176 57242 44064 
1988 72241 M833 8477 63726 45430 9589 62985 47172 
1989 114592 58890 5883 72241 52833 42177 42331 3 782 
1990 122834 68573 12719 114592 58890 11278 71910 56703 
20 1987 15197 7626 2955 10268 4937 5195 15690 5303 
1988 23979 10979 4045 15197 7626 9474 20237 7304 
1989 26721 15106 4874 23979 10979 3489 20277 10944 
1990 35481 19060 5097 26721 15106 9903 27924 11046 
21 1987 31162 16285 2743 28395 '14401 3626 37698 35078 
1988 33719 18449 2966 31162 16285 3359 42219 37189 
1989 38443 20786 4252 33719 18449 6639 42869 42004 
1990 42924 23907 5972 38443 20786 7332 46754 
. 45871 22 1987 2960 2168 479 2749 1720 242 30064 16210 
1968 3328 2495 453 2960 2168 494 34021 18311 
1989 3757 2823 450 3328 2495 551 34801 22353 
1990 4037 2901 430 3757 2823 632 32703 22740 
23 1987 45178 21932 5982 40425 17339 6142 40957 32086 
1988 48205 29509 7865 45178 21932 3315 48139 36572 
1989 52468 33589 4866 48205 29509 5049 50920 42449 
1990 54259 37579 4487 52468 33589 2288 55927 47256 
24 1987 18441 9895 1457 16602 8593 1994 28300 15161 
1988 20616 10807 1566 18441 9895 2829 32367 17035 
1989 22316 12005 1870 20616 10807 2372 37783 19726 
1990 24254 13544 2216 22316 12005 2615 35619 22332 
25 1987 54007 26273 8049 34341 18904 20346 30102 19417 
1988 "-75114 33834 9163 54007 26273 22709 40617 26893 
1989 78906 4 101 13949 75114 33834 9474 57721 39677 
1990 102716 58741 20635 76906 42101 28005 76909 50517 
26 1987 16065 4267 2415 9808 1280 5685 14501 10968 
1988 23294 9828 5634 16065 4267 7302 28862 24402 
1989 29862 16505 6794 23294 9828 6685 37298 28311 
1990 39601 24015 7583 29862 16505 9812 42541 ; 1232 
27 1987 73312 48057 9335 64048 42791 13333 2712 0 
1968 89938 56077 9964 73312 48057 18570 6795 0 
1989 102861 64403 10924 89938 56077 15521 8478 0 
1990 111695 71101 11519 102861 64403 13655 9100 0 
28 1987 8191 6650 1955 692.1 5062 1637 26034 11174 
1988 9417 7939 1857 8191, 6650 1794 32213 13244 
1989 14722 9041 
' 
1538 , 9417 7939 5741 23174 15353 
1990 16767 28761 1880 14722 9041 4205 17542 16647 
29 1987 4162 1469 236 4017 1387 299 6245 2602 
1988 4433 1744 350 4162 1469 346 9787 3108 
1989 4974 2059 436 4433 1744 662 10826 3621 
1990 5096 2158 338 4974 2059 361 8085 4676 
30 1987 36944 20577 3362 29228 18122 8623 21994 20178 
1988 39388 
22994 3216 36944 20577 3243 28070 20983 
1989 46291 27680 5055 39388 22994 7272 40130 24151 
Ago 48906 31852 5552 46291 27680 3995 34671 25997 
31 1987 23994 15067 2632 20432 12542 3669 13224 9844 
1988 26712 17839 2778 23994 15067 2724 12746 9767 
1989 29749 20228 2959 26712 17839 3607 15009 11971 
1990 32859 23141 3382 29749 20228 3579 16476 13549 
32 1987 6234 2651 1634 5770 1935 1382 11778 7790 
1988 7136 3563 1816 6234 2651 1806 17847 10404 
1989 8480 4546 1379 7136 3563 * 1740 17996 11179 
1990 10333 5584 2000 8480 4546 2815 21556 13410 
33 1987 5 219 4010 691 4533 3353 720 13014 6738 
1988 6197 4647 684 5219 4010 1025 13710 8048 
1989 6444 5037 832 6197 4647 689 14663 10059 
1990 6434 5443 793 6444 5037 377 16627 10131 
34 1987 30057 19911 6744 29847 17424 4467 30662 28350 
1988 30872 19549 7994 30057 19911 9171 29995 28054 
1989 31230 20879 11472 30872 19549 10500 28894 30240 
1990 26168 16329 7979 31230 20879 7467 26857 25198 
35 1907 11161 8648 1793 9669 7133 1770 18882 11898 
1988 13330 10207 1941 11161 8648 2551 24753 15668 
1989 17757 12465 2443 13330 10207 4612 30839 19086 
1990 28444 16200 3815 17757 12465 10767 48570 31700 
36 1987 8928 5383 1546 6613 4190 2668 22941 10482 
1988 12283 7010 1949 8928 5383 3677 23959 13302 
1969 16097 9232 1987 12263 7010 3579 19258 14095 
1990 18522 10773 1626 16097 9232 2510 21138 14809 
37 1987 4413 2402 710 3930 1727 518 14681 8872 
1988 5151 3091 733 4413 2402 782 16682 10001 
1989 5309 3263 626 5151 3091 612 19359 11929 
1990 6094 4009 791 5309 3263 830 22777 13725* 
38 1987 8520 7237 1876 7662 5789 1286 16836 12130 
1988 9307 8286 1329 8520 7237 1067 16634 13204 
1989 9228 8309 1090 9307 8286 98B 19221 15124 
1990 9516 8758 1039 9228 8309 878 19847 16009 
39 1987 2458244 2262451 538116 2135121 1661451 266239 22587.40 932657 
1988 2648774 1807606 466316 2458244 2262451 1111691 2623903 1024749 
1989 2860550 1982834 445856 2648774 1807606 482404 2760068 1156572 
40 1987 70538 44017 6633 58834 39195 13515 188514 116007 
1988 83073 50023 8060 70538 44017 14589 212346 129100 
1989 92877 59820 11215 83073 50023 11222 270354 145123 
41 1987 341171 191912 27361 323391 167833 21062 652073 272544 
1988 378806 216324 28924 341171 191912 42147 392330 301713 
1989 424105 246002 33214 378806 216324 48835 476602 339577 
42 1987 1561 765 424 1010 412 642 6550 1436 
1988 
3351 1202 413 
' 
1581 765 1746 11700 3241 
1989 5861 1763 588 3351 1202 2537 11375 4576 
43 1988 227229 50064 34761 172378 21381 60929 227515 178130 
1969 249837 78622 42064 227229 50064 36114 216967 185164 
1990 273248 120138 50898 249837' 78622 32793 194863 171301 
'44 1988 165701 122193 23647 
'127979 102047 41223 273917 86766 
1989 203978 148067 31175 165701 122193 43578 304472 104693 
1990 240757 178884 35623 203978 148067 41585 324652 115991 
45 1988 1554 793 445 1135 588 659 22475 3264 
1989 1744 1173 546 1554 793 356 26102 4004 
1990 1841 1285 487 1744 1173 472 32670 4936 
46 1988 21932 13522 3588 25474 14772 1296 27649 21002 
1989 25207 16730 5187 21932 13522 5254 29957 21673 
; 1990 29885 20710 5008 25207 16730 5706 30193 23611 
47 1988 34271 27338 2524 31523 25250 3184 41729 26698 
1989 48433 27285 2172 34271 27338 16387 46472 32227 
1990 54019 29459 2809 48433 27285 6221- 47892 36175 
48 1988 7433 5146 1458 6771 4352 1326 10930 5736 
1989 8825 5558 1366 7433 5146 2346 9458 5786 
1990 9329 5701 1273 8825 5558 1634 8916 6400 
49 1988 10940 4176 1242 8934 3434 2506 15161 13145 
1989 12310 5191 1456 10940 4176 1811 17598 14712 
1990 14028 6335 1569 12310 5191 2143 20024 16142 
50 1988 13996 2088 1121 7026 981 6984 9804 10787 
1989 17347 4658 2045 13996 . 2088 2826 16471 15119 
1990 19331 6556 -2686 17347 4658 2772 17508 15765 
51 19BB 2853 1678 1526 2796 1090 995 6595 3526 
1989 2966 1862 1127 2853 1678 1056 6031 3746 
1990 3015 2035 1116 2966 1862 992 5580 4113 
52 1988 3426 2777 153 3168 2669 283 6042 3872 
1989 3840 2952 296 3426 2777 535 6581 4452 
1990 4631 3447 504 3840 2952 800 7540, 4839 
53 1987 175806 104242 15014 160672 94570 20476 182136 180631 
1988 198885 115513 16602 175806 104242 28410 246812 191438 
54 1987 54511 35401 9023 47220 28569 9482 83208 59880 
1988 65622 40933 8778 54511 35401 14357 99315 70610 
55 1987 45197 32749 5007 43343 29988 4100 53674 39631 
1988 46532 35692 4755 45197 32749 3147 61048 45455 
56 1987 32510 21603 4501 34633 21854 2629 29170 22413 
1988 30963 21398 3519 32510 21603 2177 13587 18057 
57 1987 26627 16618 4823 22167 14914 5579 21085 8157 
1988 37238 23424 5541 26627 18618 11346 28969 10098 
58 1987 4586 3133 986 3821 2520 1138 24513 7370 
1988 8693 4191 10101 4586 3133 13150 29455 9532 
59 1987 13161 9984 1305 12081 8763 1164 16762 10810 
1988 15190 11318 1514 13161 9984 2209 19797 12340 
60 1987 14354 8319 1593 12648 6758 1738 14389 12236 
1988 16377 9843 1720 14354 8319 "2219 17609 13867 
61 1989 326894 229720 47908 275513 199795 69364 486674 252432 
1990 413404 267947 55071 326894 229720 103354 457342 281556 
62 1989 404961 109033 62791 354045 53188 57862 195060 207266 
1990 509202 179724 82666 404961 109033 116216 267218 221965 
63 1989 29395 11787 5553 8736 2486 16911 60720 13295 
1990 47215 20116 10598 29395 11787 20089 123572 '25810 
64 1969 34232 17923 10419 27906 7724 6546 51653 '16343 
1990 37121 24506 6854 34232 17923 3160 39832 31470 
65 1989 46646 18839 9306 41398 11521 7236 79219 51056 
1990 50008 23197 5726 46646 18839 4730 58328 35298 
66 1989 10831 6402 5930 12462 4276 2173 53756 42687 
1990 12462 8498 8966' 10831 6402 8501 50774 39341" 
67 1989 14935 7965 3444, 10353 5197 5258 33929 21651 
1990 19284 11359 4102 14935 7965 5057 -46142 25346 
68 1989 14799 6458 2552 11160 5293 5026 23763 14129 
1990 15837 7945 3237 14799 6458 2788 23061 16065 
69 1989 10583 5008 3287 7123 2432 4171 18097 6518 
1990 15471 6001 1565 10583 5008 5460 13706 5565 
70 1989 35178 2 363 5552 29240 14252 3379 43605 17303 
1990 43532 28343 7768 35178 22363 10142 53208 22285 
71 1989 24959 16064 4480 15877 13026 10524 36864 27079 
1090 30311 21314 7527 24959 16064 7629 40547 29139 
72 1989 . 1811 620 754 1337 292 900 15820 10567 
1990 2008 970 777 1811 620 624. 15686 12468 
73 1989 3859 1342 2386 3602 1137 2438 5560 13362 
" 1990 2045 769 2193 3859 1342 952 25414 12628 
.. ýý 
ýý' 
ý_ _.. , .. 
f irm 
VAR. PROF ECG. RES. L. T. F. D. loginv prorat MU lnmu no. year 
167614 96000 105954 255784 11.0324 071392 0.50958 0.41183 1 1987 
222862 396000 189168 280925 11.2499 0.93977 0.48008 0.39209 1988 
... 35454 396000 
28 285 313595 11.491 1.7-5406 0.46234 0.38003 1989 
314028 396000 37431 331571 11.367 1.16632 0.43048 0.35801 1990 
120591 11880 228490 59574 10.4562 1.86245 0.24784 0.. 22142 2 1987 
129665 11880 260762 161110 11.4927 2.68266 0.59092 0.46431 1988 
121224 200000 67698 172322 12.3707 1.31133 0'. 64372 0.49696 1989 
57182 200000 70820 268908 11.4891 0.24149 0.99294 0.68961 1990 
.. "7658 
60000 36368 58543 9.63338 0.86142 0.60749 0.47468 3 1987 
3b443 60000 41827 32131 9.56878 0.78291 0.1554 0.27425 1988 
48253 60000 53458 88388 9.67055 0.96539 0.77904 0.57607 1989 
60322 90000 156805 81990 9.45853 1.09196 0.33221 0.28684 1990 
39348 22000 12753 0 10.5055 1.9754 0 0 4 1987 
58595 22000 26921 0 10.5412 2.44197 0 0 1988 
54492 22000 37850 30000 10.8491 1.03237 0.50125 0.4063 1989 
64 374 22000 49575 60000 10.4751 0.74378 0.83828 0.60883 1990 
26102 20000 42311 0 7.40489 1.95763 0 0 5 1987 
33540 20000 49195 0 8.53228 2.55015 0 0 1988 
37754 26000 49815 0 7.55904 2.28941 0 0 1989 
31608 33000 54994 0 8.62209 1.9913 0 0 1990 
38734 15500 108081 91261 10.1519 1.01495 0.73847 0.55301 6 1987 
67585 30000 82081 106730 10.3104 1.65159 0.95226 0.66899 1988 
121793 30000 88288 77395 10.4394 2.97251 0.65429 0.50337 1989 
179255 50000 80783 . 
88079 10.4589 3.87773 0.67347 0.5149 1990 
-7065 14000 14376 11936 8.52437 -0.2146 0.42064 0.35111 7 1987 
45317 14000 1825 35163 9.52069 1.723 2.22199 1.17 1988 
10905 50000 28227 30022 11.1122 0.35196 0.38378 0.32482 1989 
-39838 100000 62487 305960 12.6023 -0.436 1.88298 1.05882 . 1990 
12540 70000 35879 78570 9.895 0.23958 0.74207 0.55508 8 1987 
5626 70000 33305 76625 10.1004 0.10454 0.74174 0.55488 1988 
9915 100000 3608 69377 10.1728 0.1707 0.66961 0.51259 1989 
-72 100000 4019 73022 10.074 -0.0014 0.70201 0.53181 1990 
58947 7500 71753 30453 9.39074 2.84372 0.38425 0.32516 9 1987 
25806 7500 19797 51922 9.61787 1.59347 1'. 90211 1.06544 1988 
2566 7500 18126 38771 7.34987 0.12137 1.51296 0.92146 1989 
-30492 7500 20247 
22117 9.76296 -1.4126 0.7971 0.58617 1990 
5719 4000 4202 0 6.91075 4.30737 0 0 10 1987 
9050 6000 3577 0 6.81124 7.5492 0 0 1988 
8510 8000 43-08 0 7.0934 8.36772 0 0 1989 
7711 12000 3143 0 7.40974 8.0592 0 0 1990 
14310 30533 1960 28548 8.96738 0.73993 0.87859 0.63052 11 1987 
20710 30533 2777 21241 9.09178 1.01631 0.63768 0.49328 1988 
27688 30533 5408 19231 8.76358 1.2174 0.53507 0.42858 1989 
37455 30533 13392 4007 8.77725 1.70758 0.09122 0.0873. 1990 '" 
53548 12000 14788 13000 10.4826 0.92734 0.48529 0.39561, 12 1987 
60063 12000 20771 7000 10.8836 0.85746 0.2136 0.19359 1988 
83824 12000 25816 23000 11.1075 0.98421 0.60821 0.47512 1989 
83568 120100 31006 23000 10.8338 0.75374 0.53481 0.42841 1990 
-59426 40000 
37482 0 11.0441 -0.9192 0 0 13 1987 
27697 . 
40000 14559 0 9.97315 0.45885 0 0 1988 
1989 40000 7564 ''0 10.1711 0.34458 0 `'0 1989 
20628 40000 11839 0 9.55265 0.30542 0 0 1990 
24456 10800 17724 2071 9.3811 1.91943 0.07261 0.07009 14 1987 
33398 17280 18428. 2360 10.1507 1.75187 0.06609 0.064 1988 
38249 20736 27172 2650 9.47608 1.05548 0.05531 0.05384 1989 
47156 20736 33803 2675 9.21841 1.32867 0.04905 0.04788 1990 
33673 5000 22191 45702 9.66802 1.0549 0.96845 0.67725 15 1987 
. 1086 60000 10852 37907 9.92662 1.05555 0.53502 0.42854 1988 
270: 34 60000 1 779 38139 9.86282 0.83752 0.52404 0.42136 1989 
19932 60000 13187 56361 9.52785 0.53872 0.7701 0.57103 1990 
4421 8000 -2483 21232 8.12089 0.9153 3.84847 1.57866 16 1987 
14224 8000 92 13000 7.24708 2.68828 1.60652 0.95802 1988 
'12693 16000 4969 3000 7.79811 2.29758 0.14307 0.13372 1989 
22051 16000 2964 3000 8.27995 3.27434 0.15819 0.14686 1990 
18727 30000 8591 48804 10.6814 0.5125 1.26465 0.81742 17 1987 
22912 30000 6736 47671 9.39955 0.37032 1.29766 0.83189 1988 
27112 30000 5240 49248 9.52413 0.47737 1.3975 0.87443 1989 
23822 30000 6183 17084 9.61233 0.44861 0.47216 0.38673 1990 
16628 5000 14234 616 7.41095 4.72471 0.03203 0.03152 18 1987 
18886 10000 14985 579 8.27232 5.11827 0.02317 0.02291 1988 
27446 10000 2 554 496 7.65681 4.41566 0.01524 0.01512 1989 
28864 10000 29377 345 8.35561 4.54667 0.00876 0.00872 1990 
13178 5600 12639 16664 9.22779 0.76362 0.91365 0.64901 19 1987 
15813 5600 14750 4279 9.16837 0.82261 0.21027 0.19084 1988 
9549 9065 1730 9824 10.6496 0.46347 0.91005 0.64713 1989 
15207 9065 -38 21336 9.33061 0.2588 2.36358 1.213 1990 
10387 1800 3130 10675 8.55545 1.83582 2.16531 1.15225 20 1987 
12933 4900 1531 15853 9.15631 1.62586 2.46509 1.24274 1988 
9333 4900 3036 15063 8.15737 0.67627 1.89806 1.06404 1989 
16878 4900 3560 17512 9.20059 1.3775 2.06998 1.12167 . 1990 
2620 16000 -1423 42319 8.19589 0: 1764 2.90314 1.36178 21 1987 
5030 16000 -1712 41320 8.1194 0.3218 2.69214 1.35896 1988 
865 16000 -1366 39675 8.80072 0.05336 2.7ili5 1.31134 1989 
883 200 14860 38104 8.9 0.04741 2.53015 1.26134 1990 
13854 1500 15922 0 5.48894 12.6856 0 0 22 1987 
15710 1500 17130 0 6.20254 18.8794 0 0 1988 
12448 1500 18905 0 6.31173 14.0766 0 0 1989 
9963 1500 18972 0 6.44889 10.1119 0 0 1990 
8871 10030 13110 1074E 8.72291 0.36205 0.46448 0.3815 23 1987 
11567 10030 16460 11165 8.10621 0.4736 0.42223 0.35223 1988 
8471 10030 17950 11185 8.52695 0.4268 0.39975 0.33629 1989 
8671 10030 18931 11216 7.73543 0.43539 0.38728 0.32734 1990 
13139 4500 16142 7627 7.5979 1.54573 0.36949 0.31444 24 1987 
15332 4500 20648 9862 7.94768 1.70755 0.39216 0.33086 1988 
18057. 4500 26038 6547 7.77149 1.73406 0.21439 0.19424 1989 
J L3287 4500 30260 5265 7.86902 1.22156" 0.15147 0.14104 1990 
10685 5000 8005 3264 9.92064 0.65217 0.25098 0.22393 25 1987 
13724 5000 7910 10060 10.0305 0.47098 0.77924 0.57619 1988 
18044 5000 8097 9767 9.15631 0.41175 0.74574 0.55718 '1989 
26392 7500 35956 6710 10.2401 0.67976 0.15441 0.14359 1990 
3533 10000 -765 9270 8.64559 0.39034 1.00597 0.69613 26 1987 
4460 10000 -981 9655. 8.8959 0.3598 1.07052 0.7278 1988 
8987 10000 -877 10965 8.80762 0.62867 1.20191 0.78932 1989 
11309 10000 -13 10028 9.19136 0.80261 1.00411 0.6952 1990 
2712 1200 4243 16302 9.498 0.12021 2.99504 1.38505 27 1987 
6795 -1200 
4191 31031 .. 9.8293 0.25608 5.75607 1.91044 1988 
8476 1200 4191 29686 9.64995 0.23585 5.50659 1.87281 1989 
1200 4191 26262 9.52186 0.22431 4.87145 1.7701 1990 
8350 10591 1444 7.40062 7.53163 0.07624 0.07347 28 1987 
8350 12753 -2172 7.4922 11.716 0.10292 0.09796 1988 
8350 14986 5215 8.65539 4.98461 0.22347 0.20169 1989 
8768 16888 6555 8.34403 0.14934 0.2555 0.22753 1990 
5000 6116 793 5.70044 1.30513 0.07134 0.06891 29 1987 
5000 7097 656 5.84644 2.36055 0.05423 0.05281 1988 
750C) 5502 533 6.49527 2.52398 0.04099 0.04018 1989 
7500 6612 409 5.88888 1.10861 0.02898 0.02857 1990 
70000 71948 23200 9.06219 0.15407 0.16344 0.15138 30 1987 
70000 75724 18754 8.08425 0.41213 0.1287 0.12106 1988 
70000 77394 11496 8.89179 0.91814 0.078 0.0751 1989 
70000 79822 13846 8.2928 0.44181 0.09242 0.0839 1990 
4500 2993 8759 8.20767 0.40364 1.16896 0.77425 31 1987 
4500 5277 8732 7.90986 0.31762 0.89312 0.63022 1988 
6000 4502 8393 8.19063 0.32252 0.79916 0.58733 1989 
6000 5194 7488 8.18284 0.29143 0.66893 0.51218 1990 
7010 3 0 7.23129 0.9798 0 0 32 1987 
7010 2786 0 7.49887 1.97715 0 0 1988 
7010 5792 0 7.46164 1.79723 0 0 1989 
7010 10134 0 7.94272 1.9629 0 0 1990 
3780 18538 0 6.57925 5.0113 0 0 33 1987 
3780 20435 0 6.93245 4.4574 0 0 1988 
3780 22289 0 6.53524 2.81015 0 0 1989 
3780 
22401 0 5.93225 4.37664 C) 0 1990 
i3 0010 -264 2600 8.40447 0.17535 0.20415 0.18577 34 1987 
13000 -254 2450 9.1238 0.18208 0.19222 0.17581 1988 
15000 -1372 638 9.25913 -0.112 0.04682 0.04575 1989 
15000 964 398 8.91825 0.15193 0.02493 0.02463 1990 
4000 2904 56 7.47873 2.5948 0.00811 0.00808 35 1987 
4000 4354 0 7.84424 3.44089 0 0 1988 
4000 5881 C) 8.43642 3.54503 0 0 1989 
4000 7696 547 9.28424 3.02193 0.04677 0.04571 1990 
2000 2879 1574 7.88908 4.84484 0.32261 0.2796 36 1987 
2000 7282 2502 8.20985 2.86125 0.26955 0.23867 1988 
4000 10247 2080 8.18284 C). 92233 0.146 0.13627 1989 
4000 11037 1688 7.82804 0.87394 0.11226 0.10639 1990 
1500 3543 0 6.24998 2.48449 0 0 37 1987 
1500 5445 0 6.66185 3.16204 0 0 1988 
1500 7500 0 6.41673 3.39754 0 0 1989 
1500 10661 0 6.72143 4.19399 0 0 1990 
2614 12077 7666 7.15929 2.36736 0.521B2 0.4199 38 1987 
2614 16357 9441 6.97261 2.54452 0.49765 0.4039 1988 
2614 17738 9453 6.89568 3.77993 0.46448 0.3815 1989 
2614 20140 8131 6.77765 3.95893 0.35734 0.30553 1990 
540000 579522 11876 12.4694 2.63782 0.01061 0.01055 39 1987 
350000 257488 8712 13.9214 7.77376 0.0096 0.00955 1988 
550000 275957 28139 13.0865 1.79568 0.03039 0.02994. 1989 
30000 64960 38813 9.51156 3.47865 0.40873 0.34269 40 1987 
50000 62462 34571 9.58802 2.98752 0.3074 0.26804 1988 
65000 67313 49750 9.32563 3.5693 0.376 0.31918 1989 
130000 194085 112659 9.95523 2.29881 0.34762 0.29834 41 1987 
L30000 207352 113811 10.6489 0.57784 0.33737 0.2907 1988 
L30000. 212389 216405 10.7962 0.7944 0.63204 0.48983 1989 
1200 108 435 6.46459 
. 
8.05766 0.33257 0.28711 -42 1987 
1200 1587 38B 7.46508 9.86658 6.13922 0.13034 1988' 
6799 8000 4 28 7262 
49385 90000 2850 39273 
31803 90000 4146 31207 
23562 90000 -6569 34464 
187149 60000 143862 167924 
199779 60000 196883 377989 
208661 60000 243 544 479372 
i. 9211 1800 8932 11076 
22098 - 1800 12297 7077. 
27732 1800 16170 5044 
6647 5100 1773 4826 
8284 5100 3168 6057 
6582 5100 2421 6211 
15031 12000 14200 12338 
14245 12000 14302 21744 
11717 12000 15303 22B73 
5194 750 6365 5000 
3672 750 7430 595 
2516 750 7679 998 
2016 1000 2961 5291 
2886 10000 2204 5291 
3882 10000 1772 93+99 
-983 4900 0 5925 
1352 75000 270 35,921 
1743 7500 -344 3989 
3069 9900 52 O 
2285 9900 74 0 
1467 6600 93 0 
2170 1000 1540 10548 
2129 1000 1701 9253 
2701 iOOc7 18722 11646 
1505 +8690 50583 4393 
55374 38690 60921 45015 
23328 60000 3777 19390 
28705 6000 6993 55390 
14043 3000 16306 2063 
15593 10000 13794 6247 
6757 8000 7155 12828 
-4470 8000 14584 17062 




17143 5000 3552 5500 
19923 45000 220 19000 
5952 3000 13938 3000 
7457 3000 16093 3000 
2153 2000 3576 2282 
3742 4520 5751 1847 
234242 55560 164688 149347 
175786 55560 188945 139141 
250000 5929 286254 
45253 250000 16024 251588 
47425 12000 74605 0 
97762 12000 103271 0 
35310 9800 -7745 0 
8362 9800 -1900 10972 
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0.42297 0.35275 43 
0.33147 0.28629 
0.41308 0.34577 
0.82371 0.60068 44 
1.47144 0.9048 
1.57925 0.9475 
1.03205 0.70905 45 
0.50174 0.40662 
0.28069 0.2474 
0.70217 0.5319 46 
0.73258 0.54961 
0.82582 0.60203 
0.47092 0.385B9 47 
0.82671 0.60251 
0.83775 0.60854 
0.70274 0.53224 48 
0.07274 0.07021 
0.1184 0.1119 
1.33577 0.84834 49 
0.43355 0.36015 
0.79842 0.58691 






4.15276 1.63953 52 
3.42577 1.48744 
4.05501 1.62038 
0.04921 0.04804 53 
0.45191 0.37288 
1.98323 1.09301 54 
4.26306 1.66071 
0.10686 0.10153 55 
0.26255 0.23313 
0.84645 0.61327 56 
0.75549 0.56275 
0.94334 0.66441 57 
" 1.04,3 0.71442 
0.64312 0.4966 58 
0.42017 0.35078 
0.17712 4.16307 59 
0.15713 0.14594 
0.40925 0.34306 60 
0.17983 0.16537 
0.67809 0.51765 61 
0.56891 0.45038 


























3 4000 22452 22692 8.46168 0.78511 0.40197 0.33788 1990 
30600 164 71920 7.68386 1.27374. 2.3378 1.20531 66 1989 
38250 1869 69779 9.04794 2.44705 1.7393 1.0077 1990 
7800 5493 13428 8.56751 2.24315 1.01016 0.69821 67 1989 
7800 6263 5994 8.52853 . 82837 0.42622 0.35503 1990 
904 2500 965 8.52238 1.5468 0.8382 0.24984 68 1989 
900 4163 701 7.93308 0.7951 0.13846 0.12967 1990 
2343 7600 0 0.33591 2.32514 0 0 69 1989 
343 7646 0 8.6052 1.39788 0 0 1990 
16000 4597 3591 8.12534 1.65306 0.17435 0.16071 70 1989 
16000 12984 3445 9.22444 2.28745 0.11886 0111231 1990 
4000 6419 29942 9.26141 3.23301 2.87379 1.35423 71 1989 
40010 7023 22799 8.93971 1.21577 2.06831 1.12113 1990 
8000 382 0 6.80239 4.73516 0 0 72 1989 
6000 1883 0 6.43615 2.56131 0 0 1990 
12000 15169 14556 7.79893 -2.9815 0.53576 0.42902 73 1989 
1 000 15144 13730 6.85857 4.81549 0.50582 0.40934 1990 
xýýý -fi 
_ _' ý 
, ý, -ýyr "-ý3 
rý ,t*Iýi 
tý2y_ý r25. 4'ý 
Ir 
ii-.. n ... ., c . _. .. ý .ý .ý,... ý.. 
fý . ..,.. . 
Clothing sector 
firm 
no. year K ACC. D. DEFT;. 
1 1987'137643 89862 12023 
1988 181628 105425 16492 
1989 192682 123471 19342 
1990 194767 129555 18746 
2 1987 103100 81979 93Ö0 
1988 103554 84957 e120 
1989 118593 92694 10112 
1990 124236 96463 7992 
3 1987 33967 10731 : 3,614 
1988 35202 12703 4451 
1989 40003 15356 3 724 
. 1990 47130 18220 5310 
4 1987 4325 2510 670 
1988 4530 3100 677 
1989 5351 3874 686 
1990 6683 4729 27961 
5 1987 17724 8869 4679 
1988 21571 10349 4037 
1989 22697 11451 4403 
1990 25976 12758 4472 
6 1987 22794 13690 2793 
1988 25801 16012 3106 
1989 28375 18013 3257 
1990 30043 20491 3371 
7 1987 9994 3797 1104 
1988 10929 5049 1081 
1989 1 182 5887 1384 
1990 11914 6673 1436 
8 1987 11568 7009 1986 
1988 12630 7645 1243 
1989 13137 8531 1136 
1990 14535 8527 1599 
9 1987 20348 9896 1028 
1988 20692 10842 1303 
1989 20621 10670 1347 
1990 22957 11712 1557 
10 1987 36076 19802 5890 
1988 49156 26124 6677 
1989 56449 31716 6631 
1990 63029 37503 7961 
11 1987 12599 6464 2656 
1988 12546 7165 2613 
1989 12795 7970 2740 
1990 13000 8132 2920 
12 1987 13720 8675 1512 
1988 17768 9828 1471 
1989 18805 11170 1706 
1990 19671 12625 1008 
13 1987 8841 6095 978 
1988 11789 7943 1043 
1989 12231 7727 1030 
1990 13546 8557 1400 
14 1987 14447 6489 886 
1988 14529' 7088 694 
1989 14646 7514 572 
1990 15145 7836 430 




























































t-1 INV. V. ADD. 
89185 1095 270538 
89B62 44914 221352 
105425 12-350 168198 
123471 14747 219299 
69012 7698 176256 
81979 5604 187199 
84957.17414 167232 
92694 9866 157003 
8866 7497 67966 
10731 3714 69369 
12703 5872 70938 
15356 9573 88295 
1874 477 50931 
2510 2292 41169 
3100 73 48700 
3874 28438 61334 
7570 5408 34 333 
8869 6404 42650 
10349 4427 45425 
11451 6444 53243 
11357 3068 37607 
13690 3791 43224 
16012 3830 43120 
18013 2521 45526 
3466 13 19546 
3797 764 17919 
5049 1799 19020 
5887 382 21259 
5142 878 18135 
7009 1669 21264 
7645 757 29062 
8531 3001 25388 
8920 1812 33921 
9896 701 36924 
10842 1448 42583 
10670 2851 47946 
14526 9244 25265 
19802 13435 37176 
26124 8332 48754 
31716 8754 44418 
5841 2022 16533 
6464 1859 18523 
7165 2184 18841 
7970 2963 29764 
7678 2983 32122 
8675 4366 34759 
9828 1401 30694 
11170 419 41549 
5163 498 21221 
6095 2143 22018 
7943 '1688 22976 
7727 -1885 26135 
6009 198.11669 
6489 377 10171 
7088 263 11460 
7514 607 8847 
2965 1172 25505 



















































146631`° ' 8313 
16190 "° 9945 
1941" 9728 





1988 9709 4845 1164 8874 3933 1087 30037 21948 8089 
1989 12224 5619 905 9709 4845 2646 34472 25399 9073 
1990 0877 6465 1222 
12224 
5619 9029 37722 26329 11393 
16 1987 26455 13453' 2908 23292 10896 3514 20366 14428 5938 
1988 31838 16255 3234 26455 13453 5815 22157 15465 6692 
1989 34289 18666 2989 31838 16255 3029 26665 17856 8809 
1990 35695 19725 1992 34289 18666 2339 26046 19051 6995 
17 1967 9030 4540 407, 9376 4212 529 15236 4314 10922 
1988 14396 5670 1000 9830 4540 4436 16335 5093 11242 
1989 20014 6710 1106 14396 5670 5684 9964 5733 4231 
1990 21834 7727 1148 20014 6710 1951 13937 5925 8012 
18 1987 14984 10869 1071 14284 10179 1081 28210 12173 16037 
1988 21815 11885 1214 14984 10869 7029 33816 14107 19629 
1989 26686 13049 1337 21815 11885 5044 41486 16889 24597 
1990 29847 14566 1757 26686 13049 3401 45573 18985 26588 
19 1987 14677 10094 2558 12449 7569 2261 10074 4533 5541 
1988 16064 11916 2145 14677 10094 1710 9729 4341 5388 
1989 15968 12576 978 16064 11916 222 5470 4187 1283 
1990 17451 13642 1226 15968 12576 1643 7077 3618 3459 
20 1987 14319 7472 2309 12990 6668 2829 21843. 16999 4844 
1988 15192 8364 2569 14319 7472 2550 21487 16323 5164 
1989 15036 6949 3273 15192 8364 2532 20844 15402 5442 
1990 14528 8680 2121 15036 8949 1882 17928 13767 4161 
21 1987 12650 8772 1464 12389 7415 36B 13497 6736 6761 
1988 5546 1062 1205 12650 8772 1811 15247 7655 7592 
1989 6659 2031 1145 5546 1062 1289 22029 9067 12962 
1990 10826 3533 1785 6659 2031 4450 24060 10988 13072 
22 1987 21489 11789 1186 21509 11267 644 19714 16515 3199 
1988 21564 13020 1423 21489 11789 267 24394 18661 5733 
1989 25857 14145 1214 21564 13020 4382 23189 20611 2578 
1990 26514 15149 1148 25857 14145 801 23843 21220 2623 
23 1987 9667 7849 1002 9445 6954 329 15425 13176 2249 
1988 11739 8377 697 9667 7849 2241 15417 14442 975 
1989 14371 8981 942 11739 8377 2970 16824 15448 1376 
1990 15793 9836 1131 14371 8981 1698 18459 16762 1697 
24 1987 7173 4859 593 6943 4344 308 17537 15101 2436 
1988 82.64 5448 643 7173 4859 1145 18280 15579 2701 
1989 8352 5994 719 8264 5448 261 22423 16754 3669 
1990 8555 6453 621 8352 5994 365 24183 20516 3667 
25 1987 1975 1173 306 1652 993 449 6398 2472 3926 
1988 2637 1617 487 1975 1173 705 7818 3059 4759 
1989 ----3279 1995 856 2637 1617 1120 10362 3981 6381 
1990 4333 2229 1227 3279 1995 2047 11790 4585 7205 
26 1987 15290 6048 1296 15317 5102 323 13552 9865 3687 
1988 16166 7006 1253 15290 6048 1171 149.25 10888 4037 
1989 16932 8040 1294 16166 7006 1026 16940. 13204 3736 
1990 17179 8956 1260 16932 8040 591 16460 13039 3421 
27 1987 8754 4668 1862 7847 3357 1458 25254 9685 15569 
1988 10509 5277 891 8754 4668 2037 19108 -13778. 5330 
1989 13762 6303 1427 10509 5277 3654 18593 14660 3733 
1990 16771 6705 936 13762 6303 3543 18283 14896 3387 
28 1987 17144 11934 1535 15895 10479 1329 28247 20201 8046 
1988 18394 13206 1388 17144 11934 1366 25358 20451 4907 
1989 19338 13419 1126 '18394 13206 1857 25376 21150 4226 
1990 20085 14084 1126 19338 13419 1208 26133 21150 4983 






















1988 5697 1746 361 5405 1466 373 8228 3563 4665 
1989 5871 2056 379 5697 1746 243 8719 4012 4707 
1990 7785 2374 440 5871 2056 2036 8714 4387 4327 
1987 23470 17178 1842 21385 15623 2372 60047 19003 41044 
1988 24930 17590 2203 23470 17178 3251 68463 14994 53469 
1989 24323 18119 2958 24930 17590 1822 46955 15375 31580 
1987 27891 14421 2801 24233 12169 4207 29817 8345 21472 
1988 32075 15574 2446 27891 14421 5477 20890 10143 10747 
1989 32214 15565 2769 32075 15574 2917 25741. 11404 14337 
1987 8694 5348 3944 7738 3846 3398 22991 5294 17705 
1988 9692 6839 3775 8694 5348 3282 30616 6458 24158 
1989 11700 7746 3589 9692 6839 4690 37039 7858 29181 
1987 7084 4986 1102 6367 4233 1066 17460 3861 13599 
1988 7567 5637 1078 7084 4986 910 20846 6762 14084 
1989 7907 6129 1025 7567 5637 878 22543 6087 16456 
1987 4632 1817 677 4306 1304 490 6250 4273 1977 
1988 5246 2070 327 4632 1817 688 5599 4235 1364 
1989 5281 2155 335 5246 2070 285 6519 4695 1824 
1988 21174 2224 1323 7910' 1172 13535 25434 14912 10522 
1989 30044 5284 3331 21174 2224 9141 29664 16210 13454 
1990 35462 8653 5238 30044 5284 7287 2877 18063 -15186 
1988 10308 4500 1759 6798 3014 3783 15304 6054 9250 
1989 11387 5913 1794 10308 4500 1460 15925 7219 8706 
1990 12200 6972 1681 11387 5910 1435 18584 7941 10643 
1988 6702 2119 680 6751 1739 251 7760 1716 6044 
1989 7045 2430 521 6702 2119 553 7063 1377 5686 
1990 10176 2723 613 7045 2430 3453 7962 1408 6574 
1988 8382 2891 3635 3909 2338 7555 16147 7955 8192 
1989 9975 3735 3948 8382 2891 4697 21831 11272 10559 
1990 12924 4736 4405 9975 3735 6353 24061 13277 10784' 
1988 2048 1287 496 1776 1044 525 12632 3521 9111 
1989 2129 1447 435 2048 1287 356 11718 2344 9374 
1990 3235 1610 400 2129 1447 1343 16624 2048 14576 
1988 7814 3590 518 5578 3190 2354 18250 15113 3137 
1989 9532 4259 855 7814 3590 1904 20942 17310 3632 
1990 10420 5302 1225 9532 4259 1070 21701 17643 4058 
1988 25041 19003 1210 23943 18345 1650 26430 23932 2498 
1989 25746 19392 1278 25041 19003 1594 25324 24605 719 
. 1990 26567 20313 1555 25746 19392 1455 25239 24586 653 
1987 13706 7341 2417 12020 5336 2098 19119 9252 9867 
1988 15206 8899 1782 13706 7341 1724 17502 10572 6930 
1987 8465 5093 627 7013 4716 1702 17158 5418 11740 
1988 10109 5690 820 8465 5093 1867 20068 6010 14058 
1987 317 126 243 265 80 249 4034 6389 -2355 
1988 371 162 393 317 126 411 8658 4751 3907 
1987 3271 1384 838 2222 959 1462 4207 2872 1335 
1988 3582 2166 1045 3271 1384 574 3988 3763 225 
1987 3870 1859 441 2990 1614 1076 5697 7000 -1303 
1988 5273 1990 1200 3870 1859 2472 11196 6775 4421 
1989 10731 3594 4075 8507 2835 5540 83356 56454 26902 
1990 15745 5883 6111 10731 3594 8836 83196 63063 20133 
1989 27186 16440 2269 24543 14207 2679 50477 39364 11113 
1990 31054 19205 2915 27186 16440 4018 46818 31890 14928 
1989 31341 16812 2595 31278 15126 972 26345 19672 '16673 
1990 33277 17831 3791+ 31341 16812 4708 24814 17270 ,: ; 7544 
1989 20033 601 2462 12226 3885 8141 12462 `7577 `4885 
1990 243 24 8972 33 27 20033 6013 4659 15275 6352 6923 
51 1989 20956 13209 2322 19075 11213 2207 21409 11472 9937 
1990 2: 3627 15583 2566 20956 13209 2863 24043 12653 11390 
52 1989 11849 5960 973 10814 5435 1463 20722 15451 5271 
1990 12586 6762 1390 11849 5980 1345 9951 16031 -6080 
53 1989 54154 21507 2968 42422 18543 11736 29915 21501 8414 
1990 66954 24649 3154 54154 21507 1281 29064 23898 5166 
q 
\_ýr. .ýý _r 




EQ. RES. L. 'r. F. D. loginv prorat mu lnmu no. year 
745Ü0 73702 10043 6.99851 3.661457 0.067766 0.065568 1 1987 
74500 59188 7986 10.7125 3.402622 0.059736 0.05802 1988 
7450() 61394 5852 9.421411 1.341087 0.043063 0.042162 1989 
74500 66216 4480 9.598795 2.161971 0.031837 0.031341 1990 
28000 67283 7315 8.948716 0.827314 0.076771 0.073967 2 1987 
28000 82112 8552 8.631236 0.653734 0.077666 0.07479.8 1988 
28000 91652 9539 9.765c: 3 0.98595 0.079723 0.076704 1989 
28000 109118 21937 9.19685 -0.15011 0.159986 0.148408 1990' 
65000 43176 6163 8.922258 2.557654 0.056972 0.055408 3 1987 
651000 59965 5094 8.219865 2.016783 0.040763 0.039954 1988 
71500 69114 11761 8.677951 1.99948 0.06364 *0.0803 26 1989 
71500 69805 17702 9.166702 2.37322 0.125275 0.118028 1990 
200 21220 0 6.167516 21.90319 0 0 4 1987 
200 5477 0 5.676754 19.11641 0 0 1988 
200 8323 0 6.597146 28.29573 0 0 1989 
36035 144828 0 10.25548 35.68221 0 0 1990 
6250 14952 6000 8.595635 1.343983 0.282 992 0.249195 5 1987 
6250 15586 6000 8.764678 1.855734 0.274776 0.24277 1988 
6250 16181 6000 8.395477 1.340618 0.267487 0.237036 1989 
6250 17064 6000 8.770905 1.938819 0.. 2 57356 0.229011 1990 
6920 15890 10771 8.028781 1.296625 0.472205 0.386761 6 1987 
13840 11209 10128 8.240385 1.618888 0.404328 0.339559 1988 
13940 1248 7064 8.25062 1.285327 0.268369 0.237732 1989 
13840 13999 7006 7.832411 1.335209 0.251661 0.224472 1990 
10265 1924 10749 2.564949 0.949583 0.881861 0.632261 7 1987 
10265 1984 7146 6.638568 1.008764 0.583395 0.459571 1988 
10265 2137 11029 7.494986 1.060052 0.889292 0.636202 1989 
10265 
2293 9767 5.945421 1.186791 0'. 777751 0.575349 1990 
1000 10147 11524 6.777647 -1.860819 1.033821 0,. 709916 8 1987 
1000 13028 9927 7.41998 2.502527 0.707656 . 
0.535122 1988 
50000 11786 10299 6.62 9363 3.2 33355 0.613547 0.478435 1989 
5000 15714 7711 8.006701 2.051506 0.37226 0.316459 1990 
15000 496 2718 7.502186 -0.09619 0.1754 0.161609 9 1987 
15000 -2133 2441 6.552508 0.016118 0.18971 0.17371 1988 
15000 0 1704 7.277939 0.51613 0.1136 0.107598 1989 
15000 -769 895 7.955425 0.998732 0.062891 0.060992 1990 
3600 2014 20204 9.13173 0.960154 3.59886 1.525808 10 1987 
3600 4317 29336 9.505619 1.286199 3.705444 1.54872 1988 
E600 10706 25375 9.027859 1.260749 1.314358 0.839132 1989 
8600 21867 27359 9.077266 0.970264 0.897986 0.640794 1990 
7016 9365 6690 7.611842 0.758337 0.4084 0.342454 11 1987 
7016 -527 9500 7.527794 1.463434 1.464016 0.901793 1988 
7016 468 9500 7.688913 1.666545 1.269375 0.819504 1989 
7016 2 404 19500 7.993958 3.723261 2.070464 1.121698 1990 
5000 4746 5260 8.000685 1.214544 0.539709 0.431593 12 1987 
5000 5483 5117 8.381603 0.973478 4.488124 , 
4.397516 1968 
5000 6340 5827 7.244942 0.805075 0.513845 0.414653 1989 
5000 7743 5027 6.037871 0.9843 36 0.394491 0.33253 1990 
50C)0 5195 6333 6.2106 2.626575 0.621187 '0.483159 13 1987 
4990 7125 5825 7.669962 3.004389; 0.480809 . 0.392589 1988 
4990 9584 7183 7.4313 2.036065 0.492864 0.400696 1989 

























































4286 31968 5.88267 1.060127 
6601 26103 5.93 245 0.947955 
8640 220717 5; 572154 1.013129 
8792 16536 6.408529 0.681062 
3338 600 7.066467 1.207061 
4199 200 6.991177 1.558181 
2180 0 7.880804 1.757116 
2939 5000 9.108197 1.635136 
7565 677 8.16451 0.451345 
8600 3384 8.668196 0.489873 
10342 4484 8.015988 0.532499 
11579 3912 7.757479 0.424436 
1788 11000 6.270988 1.992808 
622 1 000 8.397508 2.022673 
4742 14000 8.64541 0.456742 
7841 14000 7.576097 0.570883 
32468 3400 6.985642 3.680947 
41450 2664 8.8578 4.540108 
51381 1866 8.525955 2.33333, 
64351 541 8.13185 1.848228 
4396 1800 7.723562 1.069838 
5452 6250 7.444249 1.118962 
7211 6750 5.402677 0.291361 
7981 5965 7.404279 0.966682 
3723 4665 7.947679 0.721366 
4224 3771 7.843849 0.717833 
4489 3297 7.836765 0.750772 
5899 2667 7.54009 0.648012 
9794 1388 5.908083 1.280722 
0 1198 7.501634 1.863315 
2051 975 7.161622 2.723012 
6781 710 8.400659 2.677549 
6517 401 6.467699 0.294292 
6956 286 5.587249 0.562533 
7202 1462 8.385261 0.284227 
6123 2374 6.685661 0.212303 
2204 2194 5.796058 0.850678 
1054 3000 7.714677 0.510445 
1402 4500 7.996317,0.385535 
1522 5100 7.437206 0.298457 
1190 1220 5.7301 0.883122 
1352 802 7.04316 1.110962 
677 2000 5.56452 1.227321 
1257 1775 5.899897 1.474198 
683 0 6.107023 5.613251 
376 0 6.558198 5.647798 
1185 0 7.021084 5.892936 
10 315 720 7.624131 5.3193 39 
-802 0 5.777652 0.340083 
-658 0 7.065613 0.415748 
585 340 6.933423 0.3 841,98 
1789 3739 6.381816 0.364706 
4671 8191 7.284821 3.266311 
10742 7778 7.619233 1.236567 
10134 38090-8.203576,0.685393 






















































































































































































982 1215 6526 7.192182 1.427068 0.296879 0.259961 28 1987 
9875 13181 5325 7.219642 0.891154 0.230959 0.207794 1988 
9872 14270 7790 7.526718 0.767501 0.322674 0.279656 1989 
9875 14547 6145 7.096721 0.801273 0.251617 0.224437 1990 
3000 450 6116 5.370638 0.799596 1.772754 1.019841 29 1987 
3000 610 7360 5.921578 1.127206 2.038781 1.111457 1988 
5,000 885 7729 5.493061 1.122226 1.313339 0.838692 1989 
, (i00 1062 4866 7.618742 1.07518 0.802705 0.589289 1990 
16300 32617 205 7.771489 6.711599 0.004191 0.004182 30 1987 
16300 60336 182 8.086718 8.088186 0.002375 0.002372 1968 
16300 74210 59072 7.50769 4.052838 0.652657 0.502384 1989 
; 5)o0 27,628 10009 8.344505 1.676991 0.337822 0.291043 31 1987 
6005 30540 9930 8.6083,13.0.759377 0.271757 0.240399 1988 
6000 30727 10135 7.978311 0.818448 0.275955 0.243695 1989 
5000 13258 3000 8.130942 4.286202 0.164312 '0.15213 32 1987 
5000 19798 0 8.096208 6.871837 00 1988 
5000 27663 30000 8.453188 9.634775 0.91847 0.651528 1989 
2000 13821 134 6.971669 6.004296 0.00847 0.008434 33 1987 
2000 19678 0 6.813445 6.389374 00 1988 
2000 24775 20000 6.771936 8.031749 6.746965 0.55788 1989 
2000 337 441 6.194405 0.620505 0.188703 0.172863 34 1987 
2000- 590 952 6.533789 0.461184 0.367568 0.313034 1988 
4000 595 1233 5.652489 0.540988 0.268335 0.237705 1989 
10000 1050 21089 9.513034 1.486295 1.908507 1.06764 35 1988 
10000 2193 22661 9.120525 0.668783 1.858525 1.050306 1989 
10000' 3078 23869 8.893847 -0.58141 1.825126 1.038553 1990 
2400 5342 5780 8.238273+ 2.326636 0.746577 0.557658 36 1988 
24.00 7493 5890 7.286192 1.412002 0.59537 0.467106 1989 
2400 8096 8646 7.26892 1.843096 0.823742 0.600891 1990 
7800 '4890 7800 5.525453 1.14776 0.614657 0.479123 37 1988 
7800 6538 7800 6.315358 1.168692 0.544009 6.434382 1989 
7800 8050 7800 8.146999 1.350351 0.492114 0.400194 1990 
4980 797 5650 8.929965 4.963083 0.978016 0.682094 38 1988 
4980 1694 13028 8.454679 1.811401 1.952053 1.082501 1989 
4980 3379 13113 8.756682 1.638264 1.568728 0.943411' 1990 
5000 658 0 6.263398 11.84657 00 39 1988 
9000 855 0 5.874931 11.60335 00 1989 
5000 3573 0 7.202661 20.26015 00 1990 
1800 1101 2785 7.763871 1.250311 0.960014 0.672952 40 1988 
18000 1331 3646 7.551712 0.809963 1.164484 0.772182 1989 
1600 1677 4266 6.975414 0.72953 1.22692 0.800619 1990 
3200 5452 6250 7.408531 0.424715 0.722376 0.543705 41 1988 
3200 5621 1303 7.374002 0.112171 0.147716 0.137774 1989 
: 3200 5663 963 7.282761 0: 097421 0.108654 0'. 103147 1990 
5000 4852 2649 7.64874 1.390907 0.268879 0.2238134 42 1987 
5000 7601 2432 7.452402 1.036269 0.193001 0.176472 1988 
10500 13080 2000 7.439559 4.815669 0.084618 0.081412 43 1987 
10504 18782 0 7.532088 3.968019 00 1988 
3000 1815 1500 5.517453 -11.9941-0.311526 0.271192 44 1987 
3000 1857 0 6.018593 19.46919 " '` ,. 
0.. 0 1988 
6500 426 13850 7.28'7561 0.995927 1.999711 . 1.096516 45 1987 
6500 501 14059 6.352629 0.113488 2.008142 1.101323 1988 
8000 123 - 675 6.981006. -0.89223,0: 083097.0.079825 46 1987 
8000 2196 3400 7.812783 2.092407%0.333464 0.228778 1988 
28000 41456 2896 8.61975 4.46777710,041695 0.04085 47 1989 
28000 46601 2670 9.08659 2.674124=. '0.03579 0.035165 1990 
4950 42112 0 7.893199 1.012796 0 0 48 1989 
4950 6010 0 8.29854 1.316872 0 0 1990 
7688 2428 14984 6.879356 0.389169 1.481218 0.90875 49 1989 
9610 1396 20395 8.457018 0.492215 1.85308 1.048399 1990 
2500 4147 3155 9.004668 0.551683 0.47465 0.388421 50 1989 
500 4760 13658 8.446556 0.468096 1.881267 1.05823 199f? 
4500 3006 4500 7.699339 1.190599 0.59952 0.469704 51 1989 
4500 6081 4500 7.959625 1.393731 0.425291 0.354376 1990 
45000 968 2408 7.288244 0.92307 0.44038 0.364907 52 1989 
4500 1246 2129 7.204149 -0.98204 0.370519 0.315189_ 1990 
46010 6960 20465 9.370416 0.331917 1.740221 1.008039 53 1969 
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CONTROLLING GROUPS, MARKET POWER, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL IN A NON- 
SECURITIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FIRMS' INVESTMENT DECISION 
1. Introduction 
The contents of this chapter might be regarded as a digression 
starting from the theoretical analysis of the investment decision of 
the firm of the previous chapter. The present analysis is, moreover, 
largely based on the same type of literature and very much concerned 
with the same problems analyzed in the previous chapter. For this 
reason, the present introductory section does not contain the usual 
brief survey on the relevant literature. The purpose of this chapter 
is to assess and analyze the implications - for the investment 
decision of the firm - of a few results of the industrial economics 
and finance literature. In addition, some emphasis will be placed on 
a few financial "anomalies" and institutional features that might 
characterize the "non-securitized" financial systems. For several 
reasons, many parts of the analysis will be deliberately conducted 
in a qualitative way. First of all, it might useful to attempt to 
-describe, in more than usual detail, the multiplicity of causal 
links that characterize the interaction between finance and firm's 
investment decision. This attempt might not be easily done by the 
usual description of "stylized facts" through simplifying functional 
links, because such an approach might cause some loss of 
information, even if it has the big merit and advantage of yielding 
, blgebraically 
tractable , models focusing on a few important 
mechanisms. These few important mechanisms might indeed not exhaust 
all of the possible causal links existing between some structural 
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features (such as market power), the cost of capital, and a few 
financial decisions. Obviously, it will not be possible here to 
perform a complete and exhaustive analysis, but a few important 
theoretical contributions of industrial economics and finance - 
suggesting the simultaneity of the financial and investment decision 
- need, nevertheless, to be explicitly taken into account, and 
(since they often result in causal links of opposite sign) not all 
of them at the same time, and by means of a qualitative analysis. 
Finally, as in the previous chapter, another goal of the present 
analysis is to provide a framework where the simultaneity of 
financial and investment decisions is explicitly taken into account. 
Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of the present 
analysis. Section 3 discusses a few possible causal links between 
the real decisions of the firm and the cost of capital. Section 4 
formalizes the more general decision problem of the firm, which 
includes a set of "financial decisions" - discussed in section 5- 
and a set of "real decisions", discussed in section 6. Section 7 
contains a few conclusive comments. 
2. The main assumptions of the analysis. 
In the standard models of finance it is assumed that the market 
for shares is associated with a market for firms' control, acting as 
a mechanism of incentives and control on managers' behaviour: a 
management acting inefficiently would cause (in an efficient market) 
the firm's share price to fall, increasing the probability of a 
hostile take-over, and putting at risk the job of the management 
itself. This theoretical assumption requires a situation of highly 
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dispersed shares ownership, such as the one of the British and 
American "securitized" financial systems. The fact that the 
"managerial revolution" approach took place iný the Anglo-Saxon 
institutional contexts, where the theoretical implications of the 
separation between ownership and control is an important issue, 
could be pertinent here. While in the U. K. and in the U. S. hostile 
takeovers constitute a very frequent phenomenon, they are relatively 
rare in Germany (not more than four or five per year, as De Felice 
et al. [1988] and Mayer [1992] points out) and almost completely 
absent in Italy and in most of the "non-securitized" financial 
sectors14. In non-securitized financial systems, a very little 
dispersion-of firms' ownership is associated with the persistence of 
the old traditional family clan, who typically leads its financial 
holdings and some of the most important firms of the group 
effectively and efficiently (at least from their point of view! ). 
Another feature of these-institutional contexts is the fact that 
stock markets are rarely a source of financial funds, compared to 
intermediated credit. In particular, the transactions in the stock 
market mainly concern, the larger financial groupsl5. 
In this section (and the following subsections), it is assumed 
that the management act in the interest of the controlling group of 
shareholders, while the individual shareholder herself is regarded 
as an external supplier of funds. Further, it will be assumed that 
the market for shares is not associated with a market for control, 
while "informal" financial markets exist for the firms whose shares 
14 For a discussion on the main characteristics of "securitized" and 
"non-securitized" financial systems see, for example, Gardener 
[1991] and Gardener and Molyneux [1990]. 
15 In 1987, the 29 larger financial holdings had issued 94% of 
shares traded in the Italian stock market, according to the data 
provided by Brioschi, Buzzacchi and Colombo [1990]. 
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are not traded in the stock market. All these assumptions are meant 
to describe a "non-securitized" financial sector, where,, in 
addition, the management is directed by the group in control. In 
Italy, for example, such a situation applies not only to small or 
average sized firms, but also to most of the giant firms, issuing 
shares in the stock market. 
The main assumptions of the present analysis are the following: 
i) The goods market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, 
although perfect competition can be a limit case of the framework of 
analysis employed in this paper; 
ii) The management is composed of members of the controlling 
group of the firm and acts in the interest of the controlling group 
of the firm; 
iii) The stock market is not associated with a market for 
firm's control; in other words, takeovers, mergers and any 
transaction having as an object the firm's control are performed by 
means of private negotiations among the managements of the different 
firms; 
iv) On the basis of assumptions ii) and iii), the controlling 
group of shareholders finance the physical capital with their own 
wealth (i. e. by subscribing shares), or by retaining profits, or by 
raising external funds, which can be debts or shares allocated to 
non-controlling shareholders. In other words, the following balance 
sheet constraint must always 
hold: 
k=E+R+B (1 
where k= value of the physical capital (net of the accumulated 
depreciation); E= Psub N, i. e. equities defined at their 
"subscription" price; R= reserves; B= financial debt. The 
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expression "E +R+ B" is then the financial capital of the firm. 
Following the finance literature, its cost is the discount factor 
for the future streams of income. 
v) The decisions of the firm are assumed to be taken in 
continuous time, but are made known to outsiders only at discrete 
intervals (i. e. when the accounting data are available to 
outsiders). 
For what concerns point i), we define the profit function in 
the same way as in the previous chapter: 
u°(k, w I Pi) (2 
where k is the physical capital, w, the cost of variable 
inputs, pi is the profit margin, determined by the demand 
elasticity, the degree of product differentiation, and all the other 
aspects affecting the market power of the firm. 
For assumption ii) it might be worth mentioning a recent 
empirical study by Blanchard et al. 
[1993], on the behaviour of 
managers with cash windfalls, that shows evidence that contrasts 
with the assumption of perfect capital markets models, while it "... 
needs to be stretched considerably to fit the asymmetric information 
model in which managers act 
in the interest of shareholders, (... ) 
and supports the agency model of managerial behaviour". However, In 
those institutional contexts without the structural and 
institutional phenomenon of dispersion of firms' ownership, the 
persistence of controlling groups and the lack of a market for 
firms' control might take the appearance of a self-sustaining 
mechanism, if one assumes 
that the insiders are better informed on 
the quality of the firm's investments than the outsider potential 
buyers of the shares. In fact, the assumption of highly dispersed 
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share ownership, may raise the 
"radical economics" objection as to 
why should the original controlling groups have decided to give up 
their control and switch to a configuration of highly dispersed 
ownership16. The relatively higher share ownership dispersion (and 
higher frequency of hostile take-overs) which characterizes the 
"securitized" financial systems (i. e. mainly the U. S. and the U. K. ) 
can certainly find a reasonable economic justification. However, the 
above-mentioned "radical" objection could be accepted at least in 
"weak terms", assuming, in other words, that the economic conditions 
that would induce the original controlling groups to gradually 
disperse their controlling shares might not have occurred for all 
institutional contexts. 
Buying a non-majority share is equivalent to performing a 
financial portfolio investment, since the shareholders who do not 
belong to the controlling group cannot interfere neither on the 
strategic choices of the 
firm, nor on the decision concerning the 
distribution of dividends, and their motivation lies entirely in the 
remuneration (dividends plus capital gains) of their shares. The 
stock market in this framework only provides a constraint on the 
behaviour of the managers (operating through a mechanism of 
incentives), compelling them to distribute dividends in order to 
remunerate the shareholders at the market rate of returnl7. 
16 For a discussion, see Cowling [1982], ch. 4 
17 The individual's decision on whether to invest in financial 
assets or physical assets is intrinsically characterized. by a 
situation of information asymmetry. If we interpret the investment 
decisions of agents in terms of traditional portfolio allocation 
theory, the distinction between insiders and outsiders introduces a 
sort of discontinuity 
in the portfolio analysis. The traditional 
assumption that managers act on behalf of the generical shareholder 
removes this discontinuity 
in the portfolio decision because it 
allows us to. regard the single share as a portion of ownership of 
the firm. But this may imply a loss of relevant information, to the 
extent that the level of wealth needed to buy the control of a firm 
188 
Assumption ii) and iii) do not imply that the financial control 
of a firm cannot be the object of a transaction: they only say that 
the existence of a stock market does not necessarily imply the 
existence of a market for financial control, since "outsiders" may 
regard their investments in shares as a financial portfolio. The 
transactions involving financial control could be modelled as single 
episodes of bargaining, or described as modifications of coalitions 
among a (small) number of "insiders", but they will be considered 
exogenous for the purposes of this analysis. 
On the basis of assumptions ii) and iii), the asset denominated 
"control of, the firm" can be defined as: 
00 L 
V(0) = exp [-J (D(s)ds] {u°(k, w Iµi) - A[I(t)]} dz (3 
00 
where, like in the model of chapter 5, f(s) is the 
(instantaneous) cost of firm's financial funds, A[I(t)] is the 
"purely technological" adjustment cost function of -investment. This 
function is twice continuously differentiable, with A(0)=0; A'>O; 
A">O. Equation 3 simply expresses the fact that, by definition, the 
controlling group has the right to choose how to allocate the flow 
of variable profits. 
The value of the asset denominated "control' of the firm X" 
might not be the same for the controlling group of firm X and the 
controlling group of another firm, say Y. In fact, since the 
variable profits u°(k, wlpx) of firm X are conditional on the 
is high compared to the wealth that an individual might be willing 
to invest in a diversified portfolio of financial assets. In other 
words, in the absence of a market for control associated to the 
stock market, the 
decision of investing in physical capital is 
equivalent to a decision of entry. 
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conjectures cx and the market share shx of firm X, it might well be 
that, because of the strategic market interactions, if the 
management of firm'Y bought the control of firm x, the increase in 
the present value of the variable profits of firm Y could be bigger 
than V(O) such as defined in equation 3. 
In other words, due to market strategic interactions, the value 
attributed to the asset denominated "control of firm X" by the 
management of firm X might not necessarily coincide with the value 
attributed to the same asset by the management of firm Y. In this 
sense, a non-hostile takeover might take place when the management 
of - firm Y offers to the controlling group of firm Xa price for the 
control of firm X larger that the present value of the future 
variable profits. In this sense, an element of indeterminacy is 
introduced for what concerns the value of the firm's financial 
capital. If this is true, it might not be appropriate to equate the 
value of the physical capital of the firm to the value of its 
financial assets, even if one assumes (following the efficient 
financial markets hypothesis) that the price of the shares of a firm 
is determined by the present value of the firm's future profitslB. 
This last point takes into account the fact that serious objections 
on the equality between stock prices and present value of future 
dividends have been raised by the empirical studies on excess 
18 At this point, an obvious objection is that a situation of 
different value attributed to the firm's control by the managements 
of two different firms would be unstable and temporary, since it 
would cause mergers and takeovers and disappear. However, the 
managers of a firm might have incentives not to reveal the impact of 
a merger on its conjectures. Furthermore, some of the advantages of 
a merger could be obtained by a collusive strategy, which would 
raise a prisoner's dilemma. 
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volatility, started by Shiller [1981], [1984] and Summers 
[1986]19. 
However, the result of the model illustrated later could hold even 
if it is assumed that share prices are equal to the net present 
value of future dividends. 
Assuming that there is no market for control, the problem for 
the managers is just to raise, in the cheapest way, the financial 
funds necessary to cover the optimal physical capital, according to 
the constraint 1. The price in the shares of their company is only 
relevant to the managers to the extent that it allows the 
possibility of raising financial funds in the future 
by issuing new 







If the managers are only concerned with remunerating the 
shareholders at the expected ex ante rate of return on shares r*s, 
the higher the rate of growth of the share price, the lower the 
dividends that the managers need to pay in order to keep the 
remuneration of the shares of their company at the market level. If 
we identify the managers with the controlling group, we can regard 
the decision of profits retention as a redistribution of income 
internal to the firm, that makes unavailable for the shareholders 
not belonging to the controlling group a portion of the income 
produced by the firm. Such a portion of income could increase the 
value of the firm 
(and as a consequence the value of the firm 
control) or could be reallocated in the future, on the basis of a 
decision taken by the controlling group. In this sense the dividend 
19 For an exhaustive analysis of some of the main contributions on 
this regard see Shiller [1989]. 
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distribution can be thought of as the cost that the management has 
to support in order to raise external finance on the stock market. 
For given values of r*s, ps(t), ps(t), N(t), equation 4 yields 
the dividend policy that the managers must follow in order to 
remunerate shareholders at the financial market yield. If we assume 
a stable "efficient market" relationship (on the basis of the 
information available for investors) between r*s and the risk-free 
interest rate rf, r*s also represents an opportunity cost for the 
controlling group's wealth invested in the asset defined as "control 
of the firm". 
Therefore, the dividends will be: 
D(t)= r*s(t)Ps(t)N(t)-Ps(t)N(t) (5 
The managers are constrained to choose their dividend policy in 
order to remunerate the shareholders at the market yield on 
shares20. Once such a 
"market" constraint is satisfied, the managers 
retain the remaining profits on behalf of the controlling group. In 
this case, if the cash flow is not sufficient to pay the required 
level of dividends, the firm could pay the shareholders by reducing 
the accumulated profits (reserves), or the shares. However, on the 
basis of the balance sheet constraint of equation 1, such a 
reduction of the reserves has to be financed by issuing new debt, or 
new shares, or by reducing the level of physical capital. The 
20 We can imagine that, if the elements affecting the time path of 
ps(t) act, for a sufficient 
length of time, in such a way that the 
capital gain element prevails to the extent that 
D(t)= r*s(t)ps(t)N(t)-ps(t)N(t) <0 
then, this situation of "negative dividends" would correspond to a 
situation where the firm finds it convenient to issue new shares on 
the stock market. 
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reduction in the level of physical capital may bring about the 
liquidation of the firm. The liquidation of the firm may happen not 
only in cases of bankruptcy, but also when the controlling group 
finds the opportunity cost of keeping its wealth endowment invested 
in physical capital higher than the net present value of the right 
to dispose of the future flows of variable income of the firm. 
We define now the cost of the firm's own capital as the 
negative cash flow that the firm has to pay in order to provide 
itself with this source of capital. Therefore: 
c(t) = r*s(t)ps(t)N(t)-ps(t)N(t) (6 
where c(t) stands for cost of own capital. 
in unit terms we will have: 
c(t) 
i(t)' = (7 
E(t) + R(t) 
where E(t) and R(t), are respectively the subscription value of the 
shares and the reserves originating either from the past accumulated 
profits retentions, or, again, by mean of shareholders' 
subscription. Therefore, the cost of the firm's own capital could be 







where n(t) are the variable profits, net of "purely technological" 
adjustment costs-of investments, at time t, D(t) the dividends such 
as defined in equation 5, rf the interest rate on risk free assets, 
O (n) a risk premium on borrowing which is assumed to be (as in the 
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previous chapter) an increasing function of the leverage ratio t2 
such that 0(0)=0 and $'>0. The denominator of equation 8 shows that 
the own capital is increased by the past accumulated profits, which, 
in their turn are determined by the profits, net of the "purely 
technological" adjustment costs of investments and of the 
remuneration of borrowed capital, as well as own capital. If the 
payment of the remuneration of debt and own capital entirely exhaust 
n, then the firm does not accumulates profits. If the remuneration 
of debt and own capital leads to financial flows greater than n, 
then the denominator of 8 increases and the cost of own capital also 
increases. This mechanism, however, needs further explanation which 
will be given in section 5, dealing with the financial decisions of 
the firm. 
Assumption "v" is analogous to the one of the model of the 
previous chapter. 
3. A digression on the cost of capital and the "financial side of 
the firm" 
The considerations contained in this section will not be 
formalized into a model, but will be helpful in a qualitative 
discussion that will follow in the next section. Let us consider 
equation 8 and let us assume that ps-reflects the net present value 
of the future dividends (assuming efficient financial markets) but 
the information about it only gradually spreads and affects ps. For a 
given exogenous value r*s, a persistent increase in the profits 
associated with a less than complete adjustment of ps(t) to the new 
level of profits, would enable the firm to retain more profits, 
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reducing more and more the denominator of equation 8. If the average 
cost of financial funds is an increasing function of the leverage 
ratio, then the firm's cost of financial capital would be 
increasingly reduced. 
if we imagine a persistent reduction (increase) of n°(k, wipi), 
and we assume that news about this spread first gradually and then 
increasingly faster (i. e. according to an "epidemic" diffusion model 
like the one earlier mentioned and described in Shiller [1989], 
chapter 2), in such a way as to determine increasingly negative 
(positive) values of ps(t)N(t), this might indeed reproduce (on 
the basis of equation 8) a few empirical phenomena, such as 
persistence in the levels of dividends and cheaper cost of own 
capital for firms that enjoy a persistent positive trend in their 
level of profits. 
The assumption of persistence of the value 
; 
s(t)N(t) for a non 
infinitesimal length of time would also be consistent with the 
empirical phenomenon of excess volatility in share prices (Shiller 
[1981], [1984], [1989]) for the same argument that accounts for the 
empirical phenomenon of "sticky dividends". In fact, looking at 
equation 8, if a firm is able to increase its level of profits, and 
this determines an increase in the share price ps, which takes 
place gradually, so that a positive value of the term 
; 
s(t)N(t) 
persists for a non infinitesimal length of time, then for the same 
length of time the firm, in order to remunerate the shareholders at 
the exogenous rate r*s(t), would need to increase the dividends less 
than proportionately than the increase in ps. This would allow the 
firm to retain profits and accumulate reserves, so that, if the cost 
of borrowed capital 
is a function of the leverage ratio, even after 
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the complete adjustment of the dividends to the new equilibrium 
level of the share prices p, the firm would be enabled to enjoy a 
lower cost of capital. 
it is clear that the assumption concerning the relation between 
n(. ) and 'ps relies heavily on the assumptions concerning the 
diffusion of the information concerning the profits and the 
profitability of the firm. In addition, the profits and the 
profitability of the firms could also affect the. risk premium on 
external financial funds, which might apply not only to debt, but 
also to shares, to the extent that the presence of a controlling 
group and the lack of a market for firms' control lead the managers 
and the other agents to regard the shares as external funds. 
Therefore, looking at equation 8, one could say that the effect of 
an increase in n(. ) on the cost of financial capital might be 
ambiguous and depend on the assumptions on how ps reflects the 
information on profits, and whether and how the ex ante yield on 
shares contains some risk premium (being an external fund like the 
debt). In fact, looking at equation 8, if an increase in profits 
determines an immediate and instantaneous increase in the share. 
prices (and if all of the profits n(. ) net of the adjustment costs 
for investments are entirely absorbed as remuneration for the 
debtholders and the shareholders), then the numerator of equation 8, 
and the denominator of 8 would not change. On the other hand, if 
r*s(t) contains some kind of risk premium negatively correlated to 
n(. ), or to k, then the numerator of 8 would become smaller, and the 
denominator larger. All of these possible cases could be summarized 
by assuming some kind of functional link between n(. ), ps and 
r*s(t), whose quantitative effects have to be determined 
iT 
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simultaneously to the firm's financial decision and the flow of 
funds equation. 
However, some form of transaction costs might be captured by a 
"transaction premium" on external funds, not to be confused with the 
traditional risk premium on borrowing, usually assumed to be an 
increasing function of the leverage ratio. Such "transaction 
premium" on external financial funds might be thought of as being 
negatively correlated with the flow of profits, and formalized as 
follows: 
Assumption A. 
In addition to the risk premium on borrowing $=0(fl), the cost 
of external financial funds contains a "transaction" premium defined 
as follows. 
02=02(Tt); with 0210; (9 
where it are the variable profits. Since the variable profits, 
as we will see later, are assumed to be a monotonically increasing 
function of the stock of capital k, Assumption A is equivalent to 
the following: 
Assumption B. 
In addition to the risk premium on borrowing $=0(0), there is a 
"transaction" premium on firm's external finance defined as follows: 
Ok=$k(k)' with OkzO; (9' 
Assumption "A" may be justified on the basis of the following 
arguments "a", "c" and "d". Assumption B can be justified on the 
basis of argument "b". 
a) "Signalling and profit retention" argument: as Leland and 
Pyle [1977] point out, with information asymmetry and signalling on 
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stock market, the proportion of investment "owned" by the insiders 
is a signal of good quality of the investment. If the firm has to 
choose between financing new investments by issuing new shares or 
retaining profits, then the decision to retain profit to finance new 
investments and give up dividends may be equivalent to the insiders' 
decision to keep a high proportion of investment. Therefore, 'the 
decision concerning profits retention and dividends distribution 
enable the firm to send a signal. However, firms operating in a 
context close to perfect competition may not send such a signal, 
since profits, by definition, only allow the firm to remunerate the 
financial capital with a return close to the interest rate acting as 
opportunity cost. Therefore, the firms enjoying a certain degree of 
monopoly power (and, as a consequence a high margin of profits) are 
enabled to send a signal that perfectly competitive firms (or firms 
with low market power) cannot send. The immediate consequence of 
this argument would be a sort of binary discrimination between the 
firms able to reduce the lemon premium on their external finance by 
issuing a costly signal and those unable to do so. However, if we 
assume that lenders also detect the intensity of the above-mentioned 
signal (i. e. how 
big are the dividends that the insiders are giving 
up, and what is their magnitude compared to the capital invested in 
the enterprise), it could be assumed that the higher the profit 
rate, the more successful the firm is in reducing the risk premium 
the interest rate on borrowing. This situation could be captured by 
assuming a negative 
functional link between the risk premium on-debt 
(and external finance) and the profits. 
b) "Transactions and information spreading argument": let-us 
assume that the transaction concerning the liabilities of the firm 
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(i. e. equities and debt) are a major vehicle of information for 
spreading the quality of the investments of the firms. This is 
equivalent to the rather orthodox assumption that prices are the 
main vehicle of information spreading. Therefore, the higher the 
outstanding stock of financial capital of the firm and the higher 
the volume of its transactions, the more diffusion of information on 
the quality of the firm's investments. If the balance sheet 
constraint 1 holds, the higher the physical capital and the higher 
the transactions concerning the financial capital, the more diffused 
is the information on the quality of the firm's investments. This 
assumption can be formalized following the "general epidemic model" 
(Bailey [1957], quoted in Shiller [1984] and [1989]). 
"It is assumed, first, that new carriers of news (as of a 
disease) are created at a rate equal to an 'infection rate' p times 
the number of carriers times the number of susceptibles and, second, 
that carriers cease being carriers at a 'removal rate' c'. 
(Shiller [1989], p. 15) 
This model is quoted by Shiller as a possible tool for 
interpreting phenomena of information-spreading in stock market. It 
could be extended to the interpretation of the diffusion of 
information concerning the profitability of the physical capital of 
the firm "K" (referring to the balance sheet constraint 1) to the 
extent that "E", "R" and "B" are the objects of transactions, either 
internal or external to the firm (since one could think of the 
decision concerning dividends retention as a transaction internal to 
the firm, involving the controlling group and the outsiders). In 
particular, let us assume that the "infection rate" ß is constant, 
the removal rate z depends on the maturity of the financial assets 
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(and, for simplicity, could be assumed to be constant, as a first 
approximation), the "number of carriers" of information correspond 
to the individuals who have been involved in the negotiations having 
for object "S" and "B", the "number of susceptibles" correspond to 
all of the potential buyers of the firm's assets (i. e., at least 
potentially, the entire population). Then, on the basis of the 
balance sheet constraint 1, all these assumptions imply that the 
"lemon premium" on the firm's external finance depends negatively on 
"K" . 
c) "High vs low transaction costs" argument: if, due to 
information asymmetries, the internally generated financial flow, 
(which is the object of a transaction internal to the firm) is 
subject to lower transaction costs than external funds, then a firm 
enjoying a high market power (and, as a consequence high profits) 
can potentially rely on a larger source of "low-transaction-cost" 
financial capital. 
d) "Empirical" argument: this can obviously be accepted only if 
one follows methodological approaches where empirical evidence can 
be regarded as a possible source of information, specially in those 
cases where the implications of rigourously microfounded theories 
are clearly "falsified" by empirics or are unable to account for 
empirical evidence. The main point of this argument can be 
introduced on the basis of empirical results, such as the famous one 
provided by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, which can be summarized 
as follows: 
"... Indeed, outside the Fortune 500 companies, the overwhelming 
majority of bond finance has been obtained historically through 
private placements, usually with life insurances or pension funds. 
Two features of private placements are significant. First, they are 
more restrictive than typical bond arrangements, requiring minimum 
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levels of working capital and stockholders' equity and often 
limiting dividends payments and capital spending. Second, during 
periods of tight credit, small and medium-sized borrowers are often 
denied loans in favour of better-quality borrowers, who could also 
obtain funds from centralized securities markets. Similarly, bank 
loans and lines of credit, the typical source of finance for smaller 
industrial firms, restrict operating flexibility and require 
particular levels for certain financial operating ratios". 
(Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, [1988], p. 153) 
It must be said, first of all, that in "non-securitized" 
financial systems like the Italian one, the volume of financial 
funds traded on stock markets is hardly relevant at all, compared to 
the intermediated credit. Therefore the considerations of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen should apply, in general, to all firms. Since 
working capital can be regarded as a function of the sales, one can 
assume, for simplicity, that it is a function of the profits. 
e) "Strategic use of financial structure" argument: Loosely 
speaking, the implications of the literature on entry deterrence 
with the strategic use of financial structure (for example Benoit 
[1984], Poitervin [1989a] and [1990]) might suggest that higher 
profit margins could be associated with a higher leverage ratio 
(and, more generally, to a more costly financial structure). In 
fact, as suggested by Poitervin [1990], a costly financial structure 
is a signal that the incumbent with low costs (high profit margins) 
addresses to the potential entrant. 
On the basis of this argument, one could think of a causal link 
among the risk premium 0, the leverage ratio n, and the profits n 
like the following: 
++ 
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This functional link could be thought of as an effect of the 
persistence of an equilibrium in a strategic financial signalling 
game analogous to the one described in Poitervin [1990]. 
Alternatively, if there is common knowledge of this particular use 
of financial structure for entry deterrence purpose, the banks could 
be aware that the use of a more costly financial structure is needed 
to preserve a high market power, and, therefore, high profit 
margins. For this reason they could allow more profitable firms to 
have a higher leverage ratio, without charging them with a higher 
risk premium on borrowing. In other words, one could imagine a 
tradeoff between leverage ratio and profits like the following 
+- 
ý(n, n) = 
Argument "e" ("strategic use of financial structure") will not be 
considered in the following part of the paper because it would 
require a detailed analysis on the characteristics of the 
equilibrium in a financial signalling game, which is beyond the 
purpose of this paper. 
However, the considerations contained in this section suggest 
that some form of "transaction costs premium" (different from the 
traditional risk premium depending on the leverage ratio) might be 
included in the expected ex ante yield on shares, as well as in the 
interest rate on borrowing. This possibility will be considered in 
the qualitative analysis that follows. 
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4. The decision problem of the firm 
Again, the decision problem is assumed to be recursive, i. e., 
the firm, which in each moment is assumed to maximize the level of 
variable profits u°(k, w 1pi), chooses the financial structure that 
minimizes the cost of financial capital. The managers have to 
remunerate the shareholders at the ex ante expected yield, and have 
to pay the lenders at the interest rate on borrowing. 
The controlling group i's maximizing the value of the asset 




V (t)] {u°(k, w JNi) - A[I(t)]) dt (10 
0 
subject to the following constraints (together with the balance 
sheet constraint 1): 
k=I- gk, k(0)>O and lim k(t)ý: 0 (11 
t->co 
u°(k, w/P JE, shi, cj) - A[I(t)] - [rf(t) + 0(0(t))]. B(t) + B(t) + 
- R(t) - D(t) =0 (12 
where rf is the interest rate on risk free assets, O(R) a risk 
premium on borrowing earlier defined, A[(I)] is the function of 
(purely technological) adjustment costs of investments (such as 
A(O)=O, A'>O, A">O), D(t) the dividends, B(t) the level of 
borrowing, R(t) the reserves, S(t) the shares, and a dot over the 
variables indicates differentiation with respect to time. All of the 
above conditions have to be considered jointly with the optimal 
financial structure condition, i. e. an opportune determination of V 
such that the firm is equating the marginal cost of borrowing to the 
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marginal cost of the own capital "i". In this regard we introduce 
here a few slight modifications - with respect to the model of the 
previous chapter - which simplify the calculations and the 










which can be written as 
1+ 
N1-= h(Q) (14 
c+1 
where h(n) is a monotonically increasing function of n. Hence, if we 
define a risk premium on the gearing ratio, instead of the leverage 
ratio, let us define an equivalent risk premium ratio defined on the 
leverage as follows: let e(p) be the risk premium defined on p. Then 
0(p) = 6(h(p)) _ $(n). We will have in particular 0(0)-0,9'>0, and, 
as in the model of the previous chapter, $(0)=0, $'>0. 
We can then define the optimization of the firm's financial 
structure as follows: 
. °= min {(1-p)i(t) + [rf(t) + 0(p)] p) (15 
)i 
Equation 15 is the weighted average of the cost of financial 
funds, including borrowing and own capital. 
The problem is resolved recursively: in each moment the firm is 
optimizing the financial structure by choosing the optimal leverage 
ratio (which, as we will see later, is determined simultaneously 
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with the cost of own capital, given the flow of funds condition 12). 
The optimized financial structure determines the rate of discount 
appearing in the intertemporal problem. However, the optimal rate of 
discount is conditional on the flows of profits, net of the "purely 
technological" adjustment costs of investments. Therefore, the rate 
of discount will be a function of both the state variable and the 
control variable, as we will see in the following section. 
5. The financial decisions of the firm. 
Considering equation 15, and assuming that the second order 
conditions are satisfied, the first order conditions will be: 
d-t°/dµ = rf + e(u) + pO'(p) -i=0 (16 
Equation 16 says that the firm is equating the marginal cost of 
borrowing to the marginal cost of the own capital "i". Let us assume 
that 6(u) is homogeneous of degree 1, such that 
pO'(p) ° cO(u) (17 
where "c" is a constant, then equation 16 becomes: 
i- rf - 6(p)(1+c) (16' 
then: 
p= O-1((i-rf)/(l+c)) (18 
assuming that A(. ) is monotonically increasing and invertible, then 
equation 18 shows that u is a monotonically increasing function of 
(i-rf), i. e. the difference between the cost of the own capital and 
the interest rate on a risk-free asset. Since we have n=h(µ), with 
h(. ) monotonically increasing in p, then n is a monotonically 
increasing function of the difference (i-rf). We can then define : 
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t2 = h(p) = h(0-1((i-rf)/(l+c))) = b(i-rf) (19 
The leverage ratio is an increasing function of the difference 
between the cost of own capital and the interest rate on risk-free 
assets because, for a given rf, the higher the cost of the own 
capital, the higher the incentive for the firm to borrow and 
increase the leverage ratio. 
However, equation 19, which derives from the equality, at the 
margin, between the cost of own capital and the cost of debt, has to 
be considered together with the fact that the determination of 
dividends (which depends on a few exogenous variables containing 
information on the financial markets) contributes to determine the 
cost of own capital, on the basis of the assumptions made in section 
1. Therefore, we have to consider jointly equations 19,8 and 12. 
The flow of funds condition 12 may be significantly simplified with 
the following assumptions: 




- -f(n) (21 
Equation 20 is simply a definition, while equation 21 comes from the 
definition of the leverage ratio n, by observing that an increase in 
the debts and a reduction in the reserves (accumulated profits) 
reduces the leverage ratio. Then we can define: 
n(k(t), I(t)IE, shi, cj) - [rf(t)+O(n(t))]"B(t) - D(t) - -f(Q) (12' 
Now, considering equation 8, and substituting the flow of funds 
condition 12', we get 
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r*s(t)Ps(t)N(t)-Ps(t)N(t) 





then i(t) and n(t) are simultaneously determined by the following 
system: 
r*s(t)Ps(t)N(t)-Ps(t)N(t) 






The system composed by equations 8' and 19 will only be 
discussed qualitatively, since it is a non linear system of 
differential equations. In particular, the system is going to give a 
simultaneous solution for n(t) and i(t) conditional on n(t). It is 
extremely important to point out that the link among n(t), a(t), and 
i(t) crucially depends on the functional link (if any), on one hand 
between n(t) and ps(t), and, on the other hand, between n(t) and 
r*s(t). All these functional links need to be briefly discussed, by 
recalling some of the considerations contained in section 3. Before 
doing that, we nave to maze a ortet aigression oy noting that 
equation 16 may be solved in order to determine 4°(t) as a function 
of p(t). In fact, solving equation 16 for i(t) and substituting into 
equation 25, we get (omitting for simplicity the symbol (t) for 
notational convenience) 
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v= rf + 6(u) + Ne'(N) - u2e'(), ) _ t°(u) (22. 
If we further assume that 0"(p) is null or neglectable, and 
reminding that by definition we have 0<p<1, then 4° is monotonically 
increasing in p (or in n): 
+++ 
V°(h(n)) (23. 
Let us consider the system composed by equations 8' and 19, and 
let us make the last (very strong) simplifying assumption that the 
system has a unique solution for i(t) and n(t)21. On the basis of 
the relations existing among n(t), r*s(t) and ps(t) three main cases 
can be depicted. 
Case A: There is no relation between ps(t) and n(t): in other 
words ps(t) is exogenous. 
Such a case violates the standard assumption of efficient 
markets, stating that the share price is the net present value of 
the future stream of dividends. In fact, according to the efficient 
markets assumption, if the dividends are correlated with the flow of 
profits, then the share price ps(t) should adjust to variations of 
n(t); and, in particular, if the managers acted in the interest of 
the shareholders, they should pay out as dividends all of the 
available flow of profits (net of the "purely technological" 
adjustment cost of investments and of the interest payments on 
borrowing), determining a correspondent adjustment of the 'expected 
future dividends. However, since in this part of the analysis it has 
been assumed first of all that the managers do not necessarily act 
21 The assumption of solution unicity is indeed very strong 
although very usual and commonly accepted in neoclassical and 
rational expectation literature. 
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in the interest of the shareholders as such, secondly that they 
regard shares as an external source of finance and merely remunerate 
them at the expected ex ante yield on shares and thirdly, given that 
the empirical evidence raises a few doubts about the assumption of 
market efficiency, then there is no particular obligation to assume 
a priori that markets are efficients, that share prices reflect the 
net present value of dividends, and, above all, that dividend 
payments adjust completely to changes in the flow of profits. In 
particular, the strong empirical evidence provided by Blanchard et 
al. [1993] shows that firms tend to accumulate cash windfall without 
distributing them to shareholders. In this situation, the unexpected 
cash flows contributes to increase the reserves and reduces the cost 
of own capital such as defined in equation 8'. Therefore the case 
where ps(t) and n(t) are independent and uncorrelated is 
theoretically possible. In this case, we can see from equation 12' 
that when the profits n (k (t) ,I (t) }ii) increase, the leverage ratio 
would decrease. The numerator of equation 8' would not change, the 
denominator would increase, and, therefore, the cost of own capital 
would be reduced. This would determine a reduction in the leverage 
ratio, as we can see from equation 19. In this case, the system of 
equations 8' and 19 would determine a negative functional link 
between n(t) and C2(t), on the basis of the assumption of 
independence between n(t) and ps(t). The negative Functional link 
between n(t) and t2(t) would result in a negative functional link 
between °(t) and n(t), on the basis of equation 23. A similar 
situation would result if, on the basis of assumption A of section 
3, one assumed that both the remuneration of the own capital and the 
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cost of debt included a "transaction premium" like the one justified 
on the basis of arguments "a", "c" and "d" of section 3. 
In this case, a functional link like r*s=r*s(n) would hold. 
Therefore, an increase in n(t), being ps(t) exogenous, by 
reducing r*s(t), would reduce the numerator of 8', as well as 
reducing its denominator because of the accumulation of profits, as 
already mentioned. 
Case B: there is no "transaction cost premium" in r*s(t); ps(t) is 
positively correlated with n(t), perfectly and instantaneously 
adjusts to n(t), and profits (net of "purely technological 
adjustment costs of investments") are entirely exhausted in interest 
and dividends payments. 
In this case an increase in n(t) would not determine any 
accumulation of reserves, the denominator of 8' would not change, 
while the numerator would increase because of the increase in ps(t) 
determined by the increase in n(t). This would determine an increase 
in the cost of the own capital, which would determine, in its turn, 
an increase in the leverage ratio. Therefore in this case we would 
have a positive correlation between the leverage ratio and the 
profits. A similar but stronger effect would take place in the case 
of "excess volatility" of share prices (Shiller [1984], [1989]). In 
this case, because of the excess volatility assumption, the share 
prices would overshoot with respect to the expected level in 
dividends determined by the original increase in n(t). Ceteris 
paribus, the increase in the numerator of equation 8' would-be 
larger than in the case of complete exhaustion of profits into 
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dividends, and complete and 
changes in n (t) . 
The correlation between 
have an ambiguous sign in the 
Case C: One or more of 
C. i) The correlation bei 
proportional adjustment of ps(t) to 
n(t) and S2(t) would be uncertain and 
following case. 
the following situations apply. 
: ween n(t) and ps(t) is weak, so that 
there is no complete exhaustion of profits into dividends payment 
and the accumulation of profits is feasible (so that the controlling 
group is partially enabled to implement a redistribution of profits 
in their favour, at the expense of the generical shareholder). 
C. ii) r*s(t) contains a "transaction cost premium" negatively 
correlated with ir(t), like the one described in Assumption A of 
section 3, and an increase in n(t) determines at the same time an 
Increase in ps(t) and a reduction in the "transaction cost premium". 
C. iii) n(t) is positively correlated with ps(t), but ps(t) only 
gradually adjusts to changes in rr(t), so that the term ps(t)N(t) 
at the numerator of 8' persists for a non-infinitesimal length of 
time. 
Situation C. i is ambiguous for what concerns the effect on i(t) 
of an increase in the profits n(t): the numerator of 8' would 
increase because an increase in n(t) determines an increase in 
ps(t), but, since the correlation between n(t) and ps(t) is weak, 
and there is accumulation of profits, the denominator of 8' would 
also increase, and the resulting effect is ambiguous in the sense 
that it is not possible to state wether an increase in n(t) would 
increase or reduce R(t) without any specific assumption on the link 
between ps and it. Situation C. ii describes a case where an increase 
in n(t) would at the same time determine an increase in ps(t) and a 
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reduction in r*s(t), so that it is not clear whether the resulting 
effect would be an increase or a reduction in the numerator of 8'. 
Therefore, the resulting effect on i(t) would be ambiguous, even if 
a well-defined functional link between n(t) and ps(t) allowed us to 
determine the accumulation (if any) of profits and the variation (if 
any) in Q(t). For what concerns point C. iii, if an initial 
variation in n(t) determines a variation in ps(t), which 
takes place only gradually, and the term ps(t)N(t) persists for a 
relevant length of time, then the final effect of an increase in 
n(t) will be indeterminate for several reasons: first of all it will 
depend on the length of time necessary for ps(t) to reach its long 
run equilibrium. Secondly, the final effect on i(t) will result (as 
we can see from equation 8') in an increase both of the numerator 
(because of the increase in ps(t) determined by the increase in 
n(t)) and in the denominator (due to the fact that the firm will 
have accumulated reserves as long as the term ps(t)N(t) persists). 
By summarizing this discussion, we can say'that Case A would 
result in a relation between n(t), A(t), and, as a consequence °(t) 
that could be captured and described (at the price of some 
simplifications) by a functional link of this kind: 
A(t) = al(n) (24 
+-- 
and 4° = -D°(n) = 1>°(a1(n)) - °(n). (25 
Case B, on the other hand would determine a situation that could be 
described (again with some simplifications) by the following 
functional link: 
tl(t) = a2(n) (26 
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+++ 
and -D° = 4, °(A) = V(a2(n)) = +°(n). (27 
where in case A we have fl=a1(n), and in case B we have n=a2(n). 
In case C, on the contrary, the effect of n(t) on Q(t) would have an 
uncertain sign, because a variation in n(t) would determine effects 
of the opposite sign in i(t). However, apart from the very extreme 
and unlikely case where the opposite effects exactly compensate each 
other, n(t) should have, in general an effect on n(t), and therefore 
n(t), in general, will not be exogenous, differently from what has 
been assumed in the model of the previous chapter. 
In the following part of the present analysis we will assume 
that a functional link between n(t) and n(t) exists, and the two 
cases of R=al(n) and ß=a2(n) will be taken into account in two 
pieces of qualitative analysis. 
6. The "real" decisions of the firm 
Having found that definition 8' and constraints 12' and 15, 
referring to the financial decision of the firm, result in a 
functional link (either n=al(n) or n=a2(n) according to some 
specific assumptions on the behaviour of the financial markets), we 
can now turn to the "real" decisions of the firm, which can be 
described by the maximand 10 subject to the constraints 11. Again 
the problem can be solved by following the Hamiltonian approach. 
Co 
Max V(0)= exp L- 4, °(n(t))] {u°(k, w/pIE, shi, cj)-A[I(t)]) dt (10 I 
0 
S. t. 




n(t) = u°(k(t)Iui) - A[I(t)] 
We define then 
d4, °/dn = (dV/dai)'(dai/dn); (28 
with i=1,2 according to whether the functional link 25 or 27 
applies. The Hamiltonian of the problem is the following: 
H= exp L- °(n(t))tl (u°(") - A(I(t))] + z. [I(t) - g(k(t))] (29 
Since the discount factor is a function of it, which, in its 
turn, is a function of both the state and the control variable, it 
is a slightly atypical problem of optimal control, which will be 
solved without working with the current marginal variations. 
Assuming that the second order conditions are satisfied as 
well, the first order conditions will be the following: 
diý 0 




t "nl e-4°(n)t (31 
du 
The transversality conditions are analogous to the ones of the model 
of the previous chapter, i. e.: 
lim z(t)zO, [k*(t)-k(t)]z(t) -0. (32 t->°° 
It is assumed, in what follows, that the transversality conditions 
are satisfied. Substituting equations 30 and 31 into the derivative 
with respect to the state variable yields the following: 
dz 8u d'° Su 
- e-ý°(n) +r 
1 
e-ý°(n) 'n+ z'g 
dt ök L do ök J 
hence 
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dz r au dý° 
= e-'D°(n)t I1 I1 -t ni + z"g (33 
dt L Sk L do 




-tn '] - m(n, t)' (34 L do 
Then conditions 31 and 32, together with the constraint 11, yield 
the following system: 
z= A"m(n, t) (35 
öu 




kaI- g'k (37 
substituting equation 35 into 36 we get: 






I* = G[(8u°/8k)/(V+g)] (38' 
The system composed by equations 37 and 38 can be represented by the 





In the graphic, SS is the stable saddlepath. The model is 
similar to the neoclassical model of investment, apart from the fact 
that 6u/6k is in this case the "marginal profitability" of capital 
(and not the marginal productivity of capital), containing 
information on the conjectures. However, a few significant 
qualitative differences appear if we look at the effects of a 
perturbation in u(t), given the interactions existing between this 
variable, the rate of discount, and the leverage ratio. 
Let us assume that A'>O; A">0; if we also assume that the 
profit function u(t) is analogous to the one of the model of the 
previous chapter, and is homogeneous in k- so that an increasing 
monotone function f(") exists such that 8u/6k a f(u/k) - then a 
disturbance in u(t) would also imply a disturbance in öu/ök, and the 
model may be represented according to one of the two following 





An initial unexpected disturbance in 6u/6k would shift away the 
locus dz/dt=O from the initial equilibrium E to E'. However, to the 
216 
extent that °(n) is affected by u(t) (since °(n) is a function of 
n=[u(t)-A(I(t))]), the initial disturbance may also affect the 
financial variables of the problem (altering the "slope" of dz/dt) 
and determining the new equlibrium E". 
As opposed to the standard neoclassical models of investment, 
an initial disturbance in u°(k, wJpi) (possibly determined by some 
exogenous change in the conjectures) affects the equilibrium through 
two channels: the real channel (i. e. öu/ök) and the financial 
channel (i. e. °). The latter, in this case, amplifies (because of 
the sign of the functional link 25) the effects of the disturbances 
in the "real side" of the firm's decisions adding to the former 
channel an effect of the same sign. On the other hand, if the 
functional link 27 applies, the effect on -t° of the disturbance in 
u(t) would have the opposite sign of the "direct" and "real" effect, 
as we can see in figure 3. In particular, in this case, the effect 
of an initial disturbance in u(t) through the "financial" channel 
(i. e. the effect bringing the possible equilibrium from E' to E") 
could partially or totally offset the "direct" and "real" effect 
(i. e. the one shifting the equilibrium from E to E'). Figure 3 shows 
a situation where the "financial" effect only partially offsets the 
"real" one. 









The purpose of this chapter was to present a qualitative 
framework of analysis for the investment decision of the firm in a 
"non-securitized" financial system characterized not only by 
asymmetric information, but also by the absence of a market for 
firms' financial control. As in the model of the previous chapter, 
the financial structure and the flow of profits are relevant 
variables. This qualitative analysis is meant to describe a feed- 
back mechanism among profits flow, financial structure, cost of 
capital and investment decision of the firm. In this context, 
imperfect competition and market power are not ruled out a priori. 
The case represented in figure 2, based on the functional link 
25, is meant, ideally, to find a connection with the analysis by 
Cowling and Waterson [1976] on the relation between market power and 
profit margins: in addition to the causal link going from the market 
power to the flow of profits (empirically shown by Cowling and 
Waterson [1976]), one could think of another link, going in the 
opposite sense, via the financial structure and the mechanism of 
financing investments, which might be potentially barrier-creating. 
To the extent that a connection exists between profit margins, cost 
of finance and investments, the empirical links between market power 
and profits on the one hand, and the link between financial 
structure and investments on the other, could be thought of as two 
faces of the same mechanism. 
The interpretation of the firm's investment decision as 
described in figure 2, is consistent with the results of those 
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Keynesian macromodels (eg. Greenwald and Stiglitz [1988], [1989], 
[1990a], [1990b], Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss [1984], Bernanke and 
Blinder [19881), where the financial side of the economy amplifies 
the possible disturbances affecting the real side of the economy. 
The case represented in figure 3 shows a situation where the 
"financial" side of the firm determines a mechanism which tends to 
smooth out the effects of the perturbations in the "real" investment 
decision. 
Both the case of figure 2 and figure 3 would suggest that the 
flow of profits only is a relevant explanatory variable for the 
firm's investments, since Q(t) would be a function of the flow of 
profits, differently from what happens in the model of the previous 
chapter. This last consideration might also provide a further 
interpretation for the fact that the empirical analysis performed in 
the previous chapter does not provide, for the clothing sector, 
results consistent with the (standard) theoretical framework 
employed. The reason for this could be quite simple and trivial: the 
complexity created by some of the potential causal and functional 
links discussed in this chapter are ignored in the simplified 
framework of the more standard theory, which might often tend - for 
the sake of simplicity and algebraic tractability of the models - to 
focus on a'few relevant causal links. 
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This study is concerned with the macroeconomic effects of 
market concentration and of institutional factors. Some chapters, 
namely the second and the third, were meant to show (by means of 
theoretical and empirical analyses) the effective macroeconomic 
relevance of the institutional and structural aspects under 
consideration; other chapters (namely the fourth) were meant to 
provide evidence in favour of a few starting assumptions of this 
analysis (in particular, a behavioural assumption of banks' 
liquidity preference consistent with the "credit view"), or to 
describe and critically discuss (by means of theoretical and 
empirical analyses) the interactions between banks and credit 
suppliers, and their implications for the firms' investment 
decisions, given the "realistic" hypothesis of simultaneity between 
investment and financial decisions, and given some "institutional" 
assumptions typical of the "non-securitized" financial systems 
concerning the relevance of the securities' transactions compared to 
the intermediated credit, and whether or not the market for shares 
is associated to a market for firms' control. 
In accordance with the methodological premises briefly 
illustrated in the first chapter, some of the starting points of the 
analysis are taken from acquired results of the relevant literature. 
In this sense Stiglitz' [1991] point that economics is a "cumulative 
discipline", and that "not every piece of research has to begin at 
the beginning" is taken. 
The two models presented in the second chapter describe an 
economy characterized by industrial firms oligopsonistic in the 
market for credit. In the first (simplified) model, the behaviour of 
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the supply function of bank credit to the industrial firms is 
captured by a "Cobb-Douglas", which can be thought of as a reduced 
form for the monetary sector. In this simplified case, an exogenous 
decrease in the market power of the industrial firms on the credit 
market increases the effectiveness of monetary policy. This happens 
because a reduction in the degree of concentration, by reducing the 
spread between the marginal productivity of capital and the cost of 
capital, creates an expansionary effect. The second model attempts 
to generalize the results by introducing a banking sector where 
banks behave in accordance with the portfolio allocation theory. In 
this case the results are weakened. In fact, while it is still true 
that, apart from extreme cases, reductions in the market power of 
industrial firms in the credit markets increase the macroeconomic 
level of investment and affect the monetary policy multiplier, on 
the other hand the sign of the latter effect becomes ambiguous and 
depends on the analytical forms of the behavioural functions and on 
the sensitiveness of the agents to the different interest rates of 
the various assets. Both models however show that modifications of 
the market structure in the banking sector have, in general, 
macroeconomic effects. In this sense the second chapter provides a 
"strong" result. 
The third chapter suggests an interpretation of the phenomenon 
of "securitization" on the basis of Williamson's [1985] contractual 
framework. It is pointed out that in securitized financial systems 
substitutability between securities and intermediated credit is an 
empirically relevant phenomenon that makes the demand for bank 
credit to the industry more unstable than the supply. For this 
reason, in a securitized financial system, and in a monoequational 
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framework it is possible to identify and estimate a supply function 
of bank credit to industry, rather than a demand function, while a 
demand function is identified in a non-securitized system. A 
comparative econometric analysis has been performed with British and 
German data, because the two countries had (apart from the 
phenomenon of securitization) many similarities in their regulatory 
systems, as well as in the degree of concentration of their banking 
sectors and in the magnitude of the respective economies, at least 
until German Unification. In accordance with the predictions of the 
theoretical analysis, a supply function for bank credit to industry 
is estimated in the U. K., while a demand function is estimated in 
Germany, as expected. The diagnostic tests and the statistical 
properties of the estimated functions are largely satisfactory. 
The analytical form of the bank credit supply function is based 
on the theoretical part of the paper by Bernanke and Blinder [1988], 
which put a strong emphasis on the macroeconomic effects of the 
attitude of banks and their willingness to lend money to firms, 
affected by the degree of risk of the whole economy, such as 
perceived by the banking system. This specific aspect of the 
behaviour of banks is analyzed in Chapter 4, which contains an 
empirical analysis (performed with Italian data) of the free 
liquidity ratio for commercial banks. The free liquid reserves of 
commercial banks are regarded as a liquid asset associated to the 
non-investing decision of the bank. Such a non-investing decision 
might be determined by an increase in the degree of risk of the 
whole economy perceived by the banks (which is the core of Bernanke 
and Blinder's [1988] model), and is interpreted on the basis of the 
recent literature on investment decisions under conditions of 
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investments' irreversibility and uncertainty (for instance, Dixit 
[1992a], [1992b], Pindyck [1991]). Even in Chapter 4 the empirical 
results are consistent with the suggested interpretative framework, 
and the diagnostic tests, as well as the statistical properties of 
the estimated functions, are largely satisfactory. 
Chapters 5 and 6 look at the interactions between industrial 
firms and financial intermediaries in a "microeconomic" perspective. 
The focus is on the investment decision, and one of the main 
concerns is to perform a theoretical and empirical analysis on the 
connections between risk, cost of capital and investment decisions. 
Chapter 5 presents a theoretical model - partly based on a 
contribution by Bernstein and Nadirs [1986] - where the decisions 
concerning the financial structure and the investment of the firm 
are simultaneous. Chapter 5 also contains an empirical analysis of 
the firms' investment decision based on the proposed theoretical 
framework. The estimates are performed by means of panel data 
techniques using Italian firms' data referred from three industrial 
sectors: chemicals, electronics and clothing. Only the results of 
the first two industries seem to be consistent with the theoretical 
framework employed, while the inconsistencies of the empirical 
results referred to the clothing sector seem to be determined by the 
complexity of the (possibly alternative) causal links among market 
structure, investment and financing decisions suggested by various 
contributions in finance as well as in industrial economics. 
The study of such causal links is precisely the concern of 
Chapter 6, which contains an analysis of the implications of a few 
alternative hypotheses (based on precise results of the industrial 
ýw 
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economics literature) on the link existing between the cost of 
capital, the market structure and profit margins. 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 seem to provide some "strong" results (at 
least as far as the empirical results in the case of chapters 3 and 
4 can be regarded as strong, in the light of Stiglitz' [1991] 
caveats - discussed in the introduction - on the valuation of a 
theory on the mere basis of "goodness of fit" and other econometric 
tests). Chapters 5 and 6, on the other hand, raise a few issues that 
increase the complexity of the models. For this reason the analysis 
of those two chapters, intended as a" deliberately qualitative 
critical discussion, might be regarded as a starting point for some 
further study based on the assumption of simultaneous financing and 
investment decisions in a non-securitized financial sector. 
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